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## Pettit AC

### FW

#### Every agent must recognize freedom as a necessary good.

**Gewirth 84**

Alan Gewirth (UChi Prof) “THE ONTOLOGICAL BASIS OF NATURAL LAW: A CRITIQUE AND AN ALTERNATIVE.” 29 American Journal of Jurisprudence. 95. 1984. HeinOnline.

Let me briefly sketch the main line of argument that leads to this conclusion. As I have said, the argument is based on the generic features of human action. To begin with, every agent acts for purposes he [they] regards as good. Hence, he [they] must regard as necessary goods the freedom and well being that are the generic features and necessary conditions of his action and successful action in general. From this, **it follows that every agent logically must hold** or accept **that** he has **[they have] rights to these conditions.** For if he were to deny that he has these rights, then he would have to admit that it is permissible for other persons to remove from him the very conditions of freedom and well-being that, as an agent, he must have. But it is contradictory for him to hold both that he must have these conditions and also that he may not have them. Hence, on pain of self-contradiction, every agent must accept that he has rights to freedom and well-being. Moreover, every agent must further admit that all other agents also have those rights, since all other actual or prospective agents have the same general characteristics of agency on which he must ground his own right-claims.¶ What I am saying, then, is that every agent, simply by virtue of being an agent, must regard his freedom and well being as necessary goods and must hold that he and all other actual or prospective agents have rights to these necessary goods. **Hence, every agent, on pain of self-contradiction, must accept the** following **principle:** Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself. The generic rights are rights to the generic features of action, freedom, and well-being. I call this the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), because it combines the formal consideration of consistency with the material consideration of the generic features and rights of action

#### However, the non-interference model of freedom allows institutional humiliation—non-domination solves

**Pettit 97**

Philip Pettit (Laurence Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University). “Freedom with Honor: A Republican Ideal.” Spring 1997. http://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/papers/FreedomwithHonor\_SocialResearch\_1997.pdf

And so to my claim about the constitutional consistency of freedom as noninterference with institutional humiliation. For the lesson of our reflections is that if the task is to promote negative liberty overall then the best constitutional arrangement for doing that may involve leaving some people with a certain power of interfering in the lives of others. But if some people have such a power of interfering with others then, cases of covert manipulation apart, it will generally be salient to relevant parties that they have that power: everyone is going to be interested, after all, in whether some people dominate others in this way and it will usually be evident from the allocation of resources that they do or do not exercise such domination (Pettit, 1997, ch. 2). And where it is salient to all that a dominates b, then it will equally be salient that if b does anything in the domain of a’s power, then b does that by the implicit leave—by the grace and favor—of a. There may not be much actual interference practiced in the relationship but it will still be the case, and it will still be saliently the case, that b acts and lives at the mercy of a. **With such** manifest **domination**, of course, **humiliation** routinely **follows**. The subordinate party has to look out for the moods and feelings of the dominating person. They have to make sure that they stay on their best side. They will naturally seek to ingratiate themselves with their superior, if that is possible, and they may even find themselves inclined to bow and scrape. The subordinate party will live in a position where their grounds for self-respect are severely compromised; they will be forced to accept a considerable measure of humiliation. I earlier associated the absence of humiliation with enjoying a voice and being given an ear. The connection between domination and humiliation comes out nicely in the loss of voice that domination entails. The dominated person is obliged to watch what they say, having an eye to what will please their dominators; they have to impress their dominators, wherever that is possible, and try to win a higher ranking in their opinion. But such a person will naturally be presumed to lack an independent voice, at least in the area where domination is relevant. They will fail to make the most basic claim on the attention of the more powerful, for they will easily be seen as attention-seekers: they will easily be seen in the way that adults often see precocious children. They may happen to receive attention but they will not command attention; **they may happen to receive respect but they will not command respect.**

#### Social institutions shouldn’t humiliate people; honor is a basic human good. This takes out libertarian NCs.

**Pettit 97**

Philip Pettit (Laurence Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University). “Freedom with Honor: A Republican Ideal.” Spring 1997. http://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/papers/FreedomwithHonor\_SocialResearch\_1997.pdf

The decent society, as Avishai Margalit (1996) defines it for us, is one in which the **institutions do not humiliate people**. They do not deprive a person of honor. Specifically, they do not undermine or jeopardize a person’s reasons for self-respect. More specifically still, they do not signal the rejection of the person from the human commonwealth: they do not cast the person as less than fully adult of human. Decency is a crucial value in a society, because honor in the sense in question here is of the first importance to human beings. **To be deprived of honor is** to be cut out of conversation with your fellows. It is **to be denied a voice** or to be refused an ear: it is not to be allowed to talk or not to be treated as ever worth hearing (Pettit and Smith 1996). People differ, topic by topic, in how far they are thought worth listening to; they enjoy lower and higher grades of esteem. But to be deprived of honor is to be denied the possibility of ever figuring in the esteem stakes; it is to be refused the chance to play in the esteem-seeking game. According to a certain stoic attitude, the prospect of not having a conversational entrée to others is not so very bad. After all, it may be said, you can always provide your own company, you can always find consolation in the community of your soul with itself. But this attitude is shallow. Being a person is intimately tied up with enjoying a certain status in communion with others, and perhaps the best marker of the required status is that your voice is authorized by those others. Your reports and remarks, your complaints and your quips, your gossip and your jokes are recognized as a contribution to a shared conversation. You are not ignored, you are not ridiculed, and you are not dismissed. You are a somebody, not a nobody. Let us grant, then, that **honor is a basic human good** and that decency is a social value of the first importance; let us endorse the basic message of Avishai Margalit’s book. Starting from that assumption, what I wish to show is that the orthodox, liberal, and libertarian conceptualizaztion of freedom is consistent with a serious lack of decency and that this argues for returning to what I think of as an older, republican way of understanding freedom. If we are to make something important of the value of decency in our political thinking, as I believe we should, then we need to reappropriate the republican approach to politics that was sidelined by classical liberalism in the early nineteenth century.

#### Non-domination is the only notion of freedom that can apply to state actors. Prefer civic republicanism—state interference promotes freedom if it ensures non-domination

**Waltman 2**

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Civic republicanism's origins lie in the ancient world, in the political theory undergirding several notable Greek city-states and the Roman republic. (2) Thereafter, it lay dormant until resurrected in the Italian city-states of the Renaissance, and then by the "Commonwealth men" of seventeenth century England. From the latter, it was transported to the American colonies and flowered during the Revolutionary era and immediately afterward. While republican thinkers from these various periods parted company on several matters, their unifying focus was that the polity is a self-governing community of citizens. The aim of the civic republican polity is maintaining the liberty of its citizens. Since liberty cannot be achieved outside a community-a wild animal can be "free" but it cannot be said to have "liberty"-the individual citizen must be intimately connected to the community. He must believe that his **[their] interests are inseparable from** those of **the community**, and that the role of citizen is a natural part of life. The state can rely on its citizens, who after all are the state, to exercise civic virtue and to consider the needs of the community along with their own. The citizenry governs itself by the process of deliberation, a deliberation devoted to finding and pursuing the public interest. To this end, political institutions in a republic should evidence a certain balance and be rather slow acting, at least under ordinary circumstances. Representative democracy, which allows republics to be larger than city-states, is a method for the further protection of liberty. It is not, pointedly, an end in itself. Unlike liberal individualism, which posits no overriding end for the polity, civic republicanism stands emphatically on liberty as its central value. Liberty is taken to mean being free from domination. More formally, according to Richard Petit, a leading contemporary republican theorist, "One agent dominates another if and only if they have a certain power over that other, in particular a power of interference on an arbitrary basis." (3) Domination can therefore take either of two forms. In the first, one private individual holds power over another (dominium); in the second, it is the state which exercises the domination (imperium). Both are equally odious to republicanism. If I am dominated, I am not free, no matter what the source of the domination. To be a citizen is to be at all times and all places free of domination, since citizenship is synonymous with the enjoyment of liberty. Prohibiting dominium presupposes that no citizen can be the servant of another, for servanthood brings domination with it by its very nature. If you are my servant and I order you around, you are quite clearly being dominated. Nevertheless, it is important to note that **you are dominated even if I chose not to order you around** (for whatever reason). You still cannot look me in the eye as an equal, for we both know that "The Remains of the Day" is more realistic than Wooster and Jeeves. Not only may I alter my reserved role at any time without consulting you, but you will also be ever mindful of my ability to do so, and that cannot help but affect how you think, feel, and act. You and I are both aware that there may come a time when you will have to tread gingerly. Citizens of a republic simply cannot have such a relationship. As Petit said of civic republicans: The heights that they identified held out the prospect of a way of life within which none of them had to bow and scrape to others; they would each be capable of standing on their own two feet; they would each be able to look others squarely in the eye. (4) Or, as Walt Whitman succinctly described a citizen, "Neither a servant nor a master am I." (5) Governmental power can of course be a source of domination also, for the enormous power of the state is ever pregnant with the potential for domination. **There is, however, a critical difference** here. Whereas interference, real or potential, by one individual over another's choices is by its nature domination, governmental interference in one's affairs may or may not be. This is because liberty can only be made meaningful in a community, and the needs of the community will necessarily at times come into conflict with one or more individuals' autonomy, or at least with individuals' autonomy as they would define it. It is the community that makes liberty possible, and a citizen's freedom is inseparable from the interests and health of the community. As Blackstone noted, "**laws, when prudently framed, are** by no means subversive but rather **introductive of liberty**." (6)

#### Thus, the standard is non-domination, defined as minimizing the capacity for arbitrary interference. 3 more reasons.

#### First, nondomination is the primary moral good and turns other frameworks; it’s a pre-req to other values.

**Pettit 99**

Pettit, Philip (Professor at Princeton). Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford University Press, USA (September 30, 1999).

The first of the further benefits becomes visible when we reflect on a salient way in which **arbitrary interference is worse than nonarbitrary**. To suffer the reality or expectation of arbitrary interference is to suffer an extra malaise over and beyond that of having your choices intentionally curtailed. It is to have to endure a high level of uncertainty, since the arbitrary basis on which the interference occurs means that there is no predicting when it will strike. Such uncertainty makes planning much more difficult than it would be under a corresponding prospect of non-arbitrary interference. And, of course, it is also likely to produce a high level of anxiety. Freedom as non-domination requires us to reduce the capacities for arbitrary interference to which a person is exposed, while freedom as non-interference requires us to minimize the person's expectation of interference as such. But this means that, while the non-domination ideal would tend to require conditions where certainty is high, the non-interference ideal is consistent with a great loss on this front. It is quite possible that the maximal non-interference possible for someone will be available under an arrangement where that person has to suffer much uncertainty. But it is hardly conceivable that the same is true for the maximal non-domination that they might achieve. Imagine that we have a choice between leaving employers with a lot of power over employees, or men with a lot of power over women, and using state interference to reduce such power. Maximizing overall non-interference is perfectly compatible with taking the first option. While we do not guard against interference by the stronger under that option, we may not think that it is very likely to occur; and because we do not guard against interference by the stronger, we will count the absence of state interference as a great boon. Thus maximizing overall non-interference is perfectly compatible with forcing the individual employee or the individual woman to have to live with much uncertainty. What is true at the overall or aggregate level may also hold at the individual level. For related considerations may mean that maximizing the individual's own non-interference would require exposing them to a high level of uncertainty. Perhaps the recourse to the law would be so interventionist in their own lives and so ineffective in stopping interference by others that it would mean more interference, not less. Perhaps the way to maximize the person's expected non-interference is to leave them in subjection to others, then, in a position where they suffer much uncertainty. Their expectation of non-interference would be at a maximum, but at the maximal point envisaged the interference to which they are exposed would be the arbitrary sort that induces uncertainty: the sort that occasions anxiety and makes planning difficult. The project of increasing a person's freedom as non-domination could not tolerate this uncertainty, because it would baulk at accepting any degree of subjection to another. Devotees of freedom as nondomination emphasize the advantage of their ideal in this respect when they say that the unfree person is exposed to the inconstant, uncertain will of another and consequently suffers anxiety and wretchedness. 'Having always some unknown evil to fear, though it should never come, he has no perfect enjoyment of himself, or of any of the blessings of life' (Priestley 1993: 35). Their assumption is that if we try to further someone's freedom as non-domination then we will remove the spectre of such uncertainty. Maybe the person has to live by the standing rule of a constitution and **a law**, a rule **that makes for a degree of coercion** in their lives. But they do not have to live under constant fear of unpredictable interference, and so they can organize their affairs on a systematic basis and with a large measure of tranquillity. The second benefit associated with freedom as non-domination, and not with freedom as non-interference, becomes visible when we reflect on another way in which arbitrary interference is worse than non-arbitrary. To suffer the reality or expectation of arbitrary interference is not only to have to endure a high level of uncertainty. It is also to have to keep a weather eye on the powerful, anticipating what they will expect of you and trying to please them, or anticipating where they will be and trying to stay out of their way; it is to have strategic deference and anticipation forced upon you at every point. You can never sail on, unconcerned, in the pursuit of your own affairs; you have to navigate an area that is mined on all sides with dangers. Advancing someone's freedom as non-domination means reducing other people's capacities for arbitrary interference in their lives, and will reduce their need for strategic deference or anticipation, as it will reduce the level of uncertainty with which they have to live. But advancing someone's freedom as non-interference is not guaranteed to have this effect. For it may very well be that the best way to maximize someone's expectation of non-interference is to rely in good part on their native wit and cunning: to get them to look after their own freedom by forcing them to develop and exercise strategies of placating and anticipating the powerful. A world in which strategic flattery and avoidance is rampant—a world in which women become adept at placating their men folk, for example, or at not crossing their paths—may represent the best prospect for keeping interference as such at a minimum. Having to practise strategic deference and anticipation, however, like having to live with uncertainty, is a serious cost. For the strategic disposition imposed requires the agent to curtail their own choices: to tug the forelock at appropriate moments and, when that promises not to be enough, to keep out of sight. Such enforced self-denial, of course, does not represent a form of interference, even of arbitrary interference, for interference has to be intentionally perpetrated by another; that, indeed, is why the cause of freedom as non-interference can be promoted by an arrangement involving a lot of strategic deference and anticipation. But nonetheless it is clearly bad that people should have to resort to denying themselves various choices in order to achieve non-interference. And it is a clear advantage of the ideal of freedom as non-domination that in targeting arbitrary interference as the enemy, and in seeking to reduce the capacities of others to interfere arbitrarily in anyone's affairs, it presents a picture of the free life in which the need for strategy is minimized. The Third benefit associated with freedom as non-domination but not with freedom as non-interference is one that I have already highlighted in arguing that the fact that someone enjoys non-domination is likely to become a matter of common knowledge and to generate associated subjective and inter-subjective benefits. While someone's freedom as non-interference may be at a maximum in a situation where they have to recognize that they are vulnerable to the whim of another, and have an inferior social status to that other, the enjoyment of freedom as non-domination goes with the possibility of their seeing themselves as non-vulnerable in that way and as possessed of a comparable social standing with the other. They can look the other in the eye; they do not have to bow and scrape. That two people enjoy the same freedom as non-interference, that they even enjoy the same expectation of such freedom, is consistent with one of them, and only one of them, having the power to interfere in the life of the other. Consistently with possessing the power to interfere, the more powerful may have no interest in interfering; this may be because of indifference or preoccupation or devotion: it may even be because the less powerful people are good at keeping them happy or at keeping out of their way. Thus the powerful person may be as unlikely to interfere with others as the less powerful. But even if both parties enjoy equal non-interference, and an equal expectation of non-interference, they are likely to develop a shared awareness of the asymmetry of power, and indeed an awareness shared with others in the community: this was a major theme of the last chapter. And once it is a matter of common awareness that one of them is powerful enough to be able to interfere more or less arbitrarily in the life of the other, then that is going to affect their relative status. It is going to be a matter of common knowledge that the one is weaker than the other, vulnerable to the other, and to that extent subordinate to the other. Why should I be forced to think of myself in this way, it may be asked, if the other person is really no more likely to interfere with me than I with them? The answer takes us back to a consideration already mentioned in the last chapter. Seeing an option as an improbable choice for an agent, even as a vanishingly improbable choice, is different from seeing it as a choice that is not accessible to the agent: seeing it as a choice that is not within the agent's power. Thus the fact that another person is unlikely to interfere with me, just because they happen to have no interest in interfering, is consistent with their retaining access to the option of interfering with me. Now it is the attribution of accessible choices, not the attribution of probable choices, that determines how I and others view a person and, in particular, whether we view them as someone on whom I depend for enjoying non-interference (Pettit and Smith 1996). And so it is quite possible for me to be forced to think of myself as subordinate to someone who is no more likely to interfere with me than I am to interfere with them. More generally, it is possible for this way of thinking to be established as a matter of common recognition, so that my status, my standing in public perception, becomes that of a subordinate. Advancing someone's freedom as non-domination is bound to mean reducing this sort of subordination, as it is bound to mean reducing the uncertainty with which they have to live, and the strategy to which they have to have recourse. For while it is possible to enjoy the highest degree of non-interference available in a situation where you are subordinate to another, every increase in your non-domination is going to mean decreasing the subordination to which you are exposed. After all, increasing your non-domination means reducing the capacity of others for interfering with you on an arbitrary basis, and that means reducing their access to such interference. To sum up these reflections, then, freedom as non-domination may seem to do less well than freedom as non-interference in servicing unrestricted choice; after all, it is opposed only to arbitrary interference—specifically, to others having the capacity for such interference—not to interference as such. But freedom as non-domination does much better in three other respects, all of them of intuitively great importance. It promises to do better in delivering a person from uncertainty, and from the associated anxiety and inability to plan; from the need to exercise strategy with the powerful, having to defer to them and anticipate their various moves; and from the subordination that goes with a common awareness that the person is exposed to the possibility of arbitrary interference by another: that there is another who can deploy such interference, even if they are not likely to do so. As against my line of argument so far, it may be said that those who espouse freedom as non-interference are not generally known for welcoming or even acknowledging the uncertainty, the strategy, and the subordination I have been documenting. How to explain this? The answer may be that those who espouse the ideal often take it for granted that it is best furthered by traditional, non-dominating institutions—say, by the institutions of the common law—that are most readily justified, as they were traditionally justified, by the desire to avoid arbitrariness. Thus what the people in question effectively embrace is not what they officially embrace: it is not freedom as noninterference, neat, but rather freedom as non-interference under the rule of such a common law.2 This constrained version of the non-interference ideal is close enough to the ideal of freedom as non-domination to make it seem that uncertainty, strategy, and subordination are ruled out. They are ruled out, it is true, in the forum where people's relations are effectively directed by the relevant legal injunctions. But the constrained ideal still falls short of freedom as non-domination, since it is consistent with allowing domination—and the attendant uncertainty, strategy, and subordination—within those spaces where the relevant legal injunction leaves people to other devices. Thus it is consistent, in a way that freedom as non-domination would not be, with domination occurring in the workplace or in the home or in any of a multitude of so-called private spaces. I do not think that anyone can be indifferent to the benefits that freedom as non-domination promises. To be able to live your life without uncertainty about the interference you will have to endure; to be able to live without having to stay on your toes in dealing with the powerful; and to be able to live without subordination to others: these are great and palpable goods and they make a powerful case for the instrumental attractions of freedom as non-domination. A primary good They make a case, indeed, not just for the instrumental attractions of the ideal but for its status, in John Rawls's (1971) phrase, as a primary good. A primary good is something that a person has instrumental reasons to want, no matter what else they want: something that promises results that are likely to appeal to them, no matter what they value and pursue. The considerations rehearsed so far show that advancing someone's freedom as non-domination is likely to help them escape from uncertainty, strategy, and subordination; certainly, it is more likely to do this than advancing their freedom as non-interference. But something stronger also holds true. Suppose we take steps to reduce a person's uncertainty about interference, to reduce their need for exercising a strategy of deference and anticipation with others, and to reduce the subordination associated with vulnerability. It is hard to see how we could take such steps without at the same time advancing their freedom as non-domination. Freedom as non-domination appears to be, not just a more or less sufficient instrument for promoting those effects, but a more or less necessarily associated factor. There is no promoting non-domination without promoting those effects; and there is no promoting those effects without promoting non-domination. This may not hold in every possible world, but it certainly seems to hold under plausible assumptions about how the actual world works. Given that freedom as non-domination is bound up in this way with the effects discussed, how could anyone fail to want it for themselves, or fail to recognize it as a value? Short of embracing some religiously or ideologically motivated doctrine of self-abasement, **people will** surely **find their ends easier of attainment to the extent that they enjoy non-domination.** Certainly they will find those ends easier of attainment if they are ends conceived and pursued under the pluralistic conditions that obtain in most developed democracies and, of course, in the international world at large. Freedom as non-domination is not just an instrumental good, then; it also enjoys the status, at least in relevant circumstances, of a primary good. This point is easily supported. For almost all the things that a person is likely to want, the pursuit of those things is going to be facilitated by their having an ability to make plans (Bratman 1987). But short of enjoying non-domination, the person's ability to make plans will be undermined by the sort of uncertainty we discussed. Hence, to the extent that it involves a reduction in uncertainty, non-domination has the firm attraction of a primary good.

#### Second, nondomination comes first under util for state actors. It’s key to resolve the infeasibility of direct util calc.

**Pettit 99**

Pettit, Philip (Professor at Princeton). Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford University Press, USA (September 30, 1999).

Republicanism is a consequentialist doctrine which assigns to government, in particular to governmental authorities, the task of promoting freedom as non-domination. But suppose that the authorities endorse this goal in a zealous, committed manner. Does that not raise the problem that they may seek in the name of the republican goal to breach the very forms that we, as system designers, think that the goal requires (Lyons 1982)? Does it not mean that they may often be motivated to take the law into their own hands—to dirty their hands (Coady 1993)—and to advance republican ends by non-republican means? It is often said that a utilitarian sheriff who is committed to promoting overall happiness might be required to frame an innocent person in order to avoid the worse consequences associated with a riot (McCloskey 1963). Is there not a parallel reason for thinking that republican officials who are committed to promoting overall nondomination will be subject to similar rule-breaking requirements? It would be a very serious problem if republicanism was morally infeasible in this way, for it would undermine the capacity of constitutional and institutional designers—ultimately it would undermine the capacity of a people—to plan for the effects they want to achieve. Whatever is to be said of the utilitarian goal of overall happiness, however, the republican goal of freedom as **non-domination does not raise a** serious **problem of moral infeasibility** (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990: 71-8). People enjoy freedom as non-domination to the extent that no other is in a position to interfere on an arbitrary basis in their lives. The zealous agents who break faith with an assigned brief in order to promote non-domination assume and achieve resources of arbitrary power, for they behave in a way that gives their own unchallenged judgement sway over others. And this assumption of resources affects, not just the non-domination of those affected in this or that case, but the non-domination of most of the society; zealous agents set themselves up over all, not just over some. If certain agents think that they can maximize non-domination by transgressing the obligations of their brief, then, they are almost certain to be mistaken. Whatever non-domination they hope to bring about by departing from their brief, it is unlikely to be greater than the massive domination they thereby perpetrate over the population in general. Against this, it may be objected that the sort of domination that official agents exercise over me and my like in virtue of covertly interfering with someone else is not itself harmful, so long as we remain unaware of the fact of being dominated. The agents may have reason to think, therefore, that it will be worth their while interfering if the chances of the interference becoming recognized are sufficiently small. I reply that no agent will ever be certain of not being caught out, and that the cost of being caught out is so enormous that, still, there is very unlikely to be a case for transgression sufficient to move a zealous agent. The cost of being caught out is that someone else will come to see that their lives are subject to the more or less arbitrary interference, not just of the agent in question, but of any other official agent: and, if someone else, then everyone else, since anyone who detects transgression is more than likely to make it public. What if the chance of being caught out is really very small indeed? Why shouldn't a zealous agent conclude that however great the cost of being apprehended, the improbability is such that he or she should bend the law in this case: bend the law, for example, as in covering up the offences of an important public personage, and seeking thereby to advance the interests of the country? There may be the very exceptional circumstances where zealotry is pardonable—pardonable and perhaps even commendable—but a very serious consideration argues against there being many. This is that the more unlikely it is that an agent will be apprehended, the clearer it will be to people at large that this case is an acid test of whether they are living under a proper rule of law or under the arbitrary sway of officials who put themselves, out of whatever high motives, above that law. Let apprehension be likely and people may well reckon that the errant official just nodded. Let apprehension be unlikely and they will all the more certainly think that the errant official typifies a general, dominating frame of mind. Short of catastrophic circumstances, then, there is unlikely to be any serious reason why a zealous agent should be tempted in the name of non-domination to break with the very rules of behaviour—the republican forms of government—that are designed to promote it. The considerations I have raised show that, given the power of official agents, and given their potential for domination, there is every reason why zealous agents should want to go out of their way to show people at large that there is no possibility of their taking the goal of nondomination into their own hands. There is every reason why they should **look for institutional means of making it** salient and credible that they are pre-committed to sticking with their brief, and to sticking with their brief even in cases where there is a prima facie case for zealous opportunism. There is every reason why they should want to make it **salient and credible that their hands are tied**: that they are agents with little or no independent discretion.

#### Reject the burden of rejoinder; low risk is no risk and dropped arguments aren’t true

Cohn, 2013:

Nate Cohn (Georgetown). Improving the Norms and Practices of Policy Debate. «November 24, 2013, 02:10:58 PM» http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php/topic,5416.msg12020.html#msg12020

The fact that policy debate is wildly out of touch—the fact that we are “a bunch of white folks talking about nuclear war”—is a damning indictment of nearly every coach in this activity. It’s a serious indictment of the successful policy debate coaches, who have been content to continue a pedagogically unsound game, so long as they keep winning. It’s a serious indictment of policy debate’s discontents who chose to disengage. That’s not to say there hasn’t been any effort to challenge modern policy debate on its own terms—just that they’ve mainly come from the middle of the bracket and weren’t very successful, focusing on morality arguments and various “predictions bad” claims to outweigh. Judges were receptive to the sentiment that disads were unrealistic, but negative claims to specificity always triumphed over generic epistemological questions or arguments about why “predictions fail.” The affirmative rarely introduced substantive responses to the disadvantage, rarely read impact defense. All considered, the negative generally won a significant risk that the plan resulted in nuclear war. Once that was true, it was basically impossible to win that some moral obligation outweighed the (dare I say?) obligation to avoid a meaningful risk of extinction. There were other problems. Many of the small affirmatives were unstrategic—teams rarely had solvency deficits to generic counterplans. It was already basically impossible to win that some morality argument outweighed extinction; it was totally untenable to win that a moral obligation outweighed a meaningful risk of extinction; it made even less sense if the counterplan solved most of the morality argument. The combined effect was devastating: As these debates are currently argued and judged, I suspect that the negative would win my ballot more than 95 percent of the time in a debate between two teams of equal ability. But even if a “soft left” team did better—especially by making solvency deficits and responding to the specifics of the disadvantage—I still think they would struggle. They could compete at the highest levels, but, in most debates, judges would still assess a small, but meaningful risk of a large scale conflict, including nuclear war and extinction. The risk would be small, but the “magnitude” of the impact would often be enough to outweigh a higher probability, smaller impact. Or put differently: **policy debate** still **wouldn’t be replicating** a **real world policy** assessment, teams reading small affirmatives would still be at a real disadvantage with respect to reality. Why? Oddly, this is the unreasonable result of a reasonable part of debate: the burden of refutation or rejoinder, the responsibility of debaters to “beat” arguments. If I introduce an argument, it starts out at 100 percent—you then have to disprove it. That sounds like a pretty good idea in principle, right? Well, I think so too. But it’s really tough to refute something down to “zero” percent—a team would need to completely and totally refute an argument. That’s obviously tough to do, especially since the other team is usually going to have some decent arguments and pretty good cards defending each component of their disadvantage—even the ridiculous parts. So one of the most fundamental assumptions about debate all but ensures a meaningful risk of nearly any argument—even extremely low-probability, high magnitude impacts, sufficient to outweigh systemic impacts. There’s another even more subtle element of debate practice at play. Traditionally, the 2AC might introduce 8 or 9 cards against a disadvantage, like “non-unique, no-link, no-impact,” and then go for one and two. Yet in reality, **disadvantages are underpinned by** dozens or perhaps **hundreds of** discrete **assumptions,** each of which could be contested. By the end of the 2AR, only a handful are under scrutiny; the majority of the disadvantage is conceded, and it’s tough to bring the one or two scrutinized components down to “zero.” And then there’s a bad understanding of probability. If the affirmative questions four or five elements of the disadvantage, but the negative was still “clearly ahead” on all five elements, most judges would assess that the negative was “clearly ahead” on the disadvantage. In reality, the risk of the disadvantage has been reduced considerably. If there was, say, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform would pass, an 80 percent chance that political capital was key, an 80 percent chance that the plan drained a sufficient amount of capital, an 80 percent chance that immigration reform was necessary to prevent another recession, and an 80 percent chance that another recession would cause a nuclear war (lol), then there’s a 32 percent chance that the disadvantage caused nuclear war. I think these issues can be overcome. First, I think teams can deal with the “burden of refutation” by focusing on the “burden of proof,” which allows a team to mitigate an argument before directly contradicting its content. Here’s how I’d look at it: modern policy debate has assumed that arguments start out at “100 percent” until directly refuted. But few, if any, arguments are supported by evidence consistent with “100 percent.” Most cards don’t make definitive claims. Even when they do, they’re not supported by definitive evidence—and any reasonable person should assume there’s at least some uncertainty on matters other than few true facts, like 2+2=4. Take Georgetown’s immigration uniqueness evidence from Harvard. It says there “may be a window” for immigration. So, based on the negative’s evidence, what are the odds that immigration reform will pass? **Far less than 50 percent**, if you ask me. That’s not always true for every card in the 1NC, but sometimes it’s even worse—like the impact card, which is usually a long string of “coulds.” If you apply this very basic level of analysis to each element of a disadvantage, and correctly explain math (.4\*.4\*.4\*.4\*.4=.01024), the risk of the disadvantage starts at a very low level, even **before the affirmative offers a direct response.** Debaters should also argue that the negative hasn’t introduced any evidence at all to defend a long list of unmentioned elements in the “internal link chain.” The absence of evidence to defend the argument that, say, “recession causes depression,” may not eliminate the disadvantage, but it does raise uncertainty—and it doesn’t take too many additional sources of uncertainty to reduce the probability of the disadvantage to effectively **zero**—sort of the static, background noise of prediction.

#### And third, Kantianism requires nondomination.

**Ripstein 9**

Arthur Ripstein. Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Harvard University Press. 2009.

The right to freedom as independence provides a model of interaction that reconciles the ability of separate persons to use their powers to pur- sue their own purposes. In so doing, it also provides a distinctive concepttion of the wrongs that interfere with this independence. **Wrongdoing takes the form of domination.** Both your right to independence and the violations of it can only be explicated by reference to the actions of others. Wrongs against your person are not outcomes that are bad for you which other people happen to cause. Unlike the familiar “harm principle” put forward by Mill, which focuses exclusively on out comes that can be characterized without reference to the acts that bring them about, the right to freedom focuses exclusively on the acts of others. It is not that somebody does something that causes something bad to happen to you; it is that somebody does something to you. The idea of freedom as nondomination has a distinguished history in political philosophy. Recent scholars have pointed out that Berlin’s dichotomy between negative and positive liberty leaves out a prominent idea of liberty, sometimes referred to as the “republican” or neo-Roman conception of liberty, according to which liberty consists in independence from others. These scholars argue that this conception was central to the political thought of the civic republicans of the Renaissance, who were centrally concerned with the dangers of despotism. On this reading, the early modern republicans did not object to despotism because it interfered with their negative or positive liberty (to use anachronistic terms they would not have recognized). A despot who was benevolent, or even prudent, might allow people, especially potentially powerful ones, opportunity to do what they wanted or be true to themselves. The objection was to the fact that it was up to the despot to decide, to his having the power, quite apart from the possibility that he would use it badly. Unless someone has a power, there is no danger of it being used badly, but the core concern of the civic republicans was the despot’s entitlement to use it, and the subjugation of his subjects that followed regardless of how it was used.18 [Footnote 18. See generally Philip **Pettit**, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). In “A Third Concept of Liberty,” Proceedings of the British Academy 117 (2002): 239, Skinner points out that Berlin’s idea of positive liberty is not an idea of self-mastery but of mastering yourself.] Berlin is aware of this difference when he writes, “It is perfectly conceivable that a liberal-minded despot would allow his subjects a large mea sure of personal freedom.”19 Freedom as independence carries this same idea of independence further, to relations among citizens. It insists that everything that is wrong with being subject to the choice of a powerful ruler is also wrong with being subject to the choice of another private person. As a result, **it can explain the nature of wrongdoing even when no harm ensues.** One person is subject to another person’s choice; I use your means to advance purposes you have not set for yourself. Most familiar crimes are examples of one person interfering with the freedom of another by interfering with either her exercise of her powers or her ability to exercise them. They are small- scale versions of despotism or abuse of office.

#### I defend the resolution as a general principle.

#### Aff gets RVIs on counter-interps because

#### (a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

#### (b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

### C1

#### Contention 1 is Poverty

#### Living wage reduces poverty. Recent studies and economist consensus goes aff

**Konczal 14**

Mike Konczal (fellow at the Roosevelt Institute. His work has appeared in The Nation, Slate, and The American Prospect). “7 Bipartisan Reasons to Raise the Minimum Wage.” Boston Review. March 3, 2014.

Some minimum wage advocates don’t care much about income inequality per se. Instead, they are focused on alleviating poverty. Poverty has significant consequences for human flourishing, with especially pronounced effects on children. A major mistake of the War on Poverty was its assumption that the economy would be capable of employing all people at generous wages as long as they had the right skills and as long as discriminatory obstacles were surmounted. Thus job training was a priority. However, during the ’70s, ’80s, and 2000s, wages at the bottom part of the income distribution fell, especially for men, even as the low-wage workforce became more educated. Education and technological advances alone could not solve poverty. **Recent research strongly indicates that raising the minimum wage reduces poverty.** Dube finds that a 10 percent hike in the minimum wage would reduce the number of people living in poverty by a modest but significant 2.4 percent. It also shrinks the poverty gap—how far people are below the poverty line—by 3.2 percent. And it reduces the poverty-squared gap, a measure of extreme poverty, by 9.6 percent. So it provides meaningful benefits for the poorest individuals. **Larger increases would offer even more impressive gains**. Raising the minimum wage to $10.10 would lift 4.6 million people out of poverty. It would also boost the incomes of those at the 10th percentile of the income distribution by $1,700 annually. That is a significant benefit for workers who have seen declining wages during the past forty years. In a review of the literature since the 1990s, Dube finds fifty-four estimates of the relationship between poverty and the minimum wage. Forty-eight of them show that a minimum wage reduces poverty. This reflects a **remarkable consensus** among economists. The effect of an increased minimum wage on poverty is real, and it would be positive.

#### Dube et al.’s study is the most robust and generalizable

**Schmitt 13**

John Schmitt (Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C.) “Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect on Employment?” Center for Economic and Policy Research. February 2013. http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage-2013-02.pdf

Probably the most important and influential paper written on the minimum wage in the last decade was Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010)'s study,21 which offered a comprehensive reappraisal of both the new minimum wage research and its critics. The study was built around a key methodological innovation, which essentially generalized Card and Krueger's New Jersey study to make it nationally representative, and **identified a significant weakness in** much of the **earlier** minimum-wage **research** based on the analysis of state employment patterns, which had failed to control for regional differences in employment growth that were unrelated to the minimum wage. The most convincing critique of Card and Krueger's (1994, 2000) study of the increase in the New Jersey minimum wage (relative to Pennsylvania, where the minimum wage did not go up) was that it is difficult to generalize from a single case study. Even a perfect experiment will have random error that could affect the results in a single experiment. Imagine that the minimum wage had a small, but real, negative employment effect. Random errors will lead the results of separate tests to be distributed around this hypothetical negative employment effect, sometimes producing a larger disemployment effect than the "true" level, sometimes producing a smaller disemployment effect than what is "true" – even zero or positive measured disemployment effects. By this thinking, Card and Krueger's experiment could have been perfectly executed, but still represent only one result from a distribution of possible outcomes. Absent other information, the best estimate of the true effect of the minimum wage would be Card and Krueger's actual results, but we cannot convincingly rule out, based on that single case, that the effects were in truth larger or smaller than what was observed in the case of New Jersey in 1992. In recognition of this problem, Dube, Lester and Reich (2010) essentially replicated Card and Krueger's New Jersey-Pennsylvania experiment **thousands of times**, by comparing employment differences across contiguous U.S. counties with different levels of the minimum wage. The three economists carefully constructed a data set of restaurant employment in every quarter between 1990 and 2006 in the 1,381 counties in the United States for which data were available continuously over the full period.22 They also matched these employment data with the level of the federal or state minimum wage (whichever was higher) in the county in each quarter of each year in the sample. They then compared restaurant employment outcomes across a subset of 318 pairs of bordering counties where the prevailing minimum wage could differ, depending on the level of the federal and state minimum wage. Their methodology effectively generalizes the Card and Krueger New Jersey-Pennsylvania study, but with several advantages. First, the much larger number of cases allowed Dube, Lester, and Reich to look at a much larger distribution of employment outcomes than was possible in the single case of the 1992 increase in the New Jersey minimum wage. Second, since they followed counties over a 16-year period, the researchers were also able to test for the possibility of longer-term effects. Finally, because the relative minimum wage varied across counties over time, the minimum wage in a particular county could, at different points in time, be lower, identical to, and higher than the minimum wage in its pair, providing **substantially more** experimental **variation** than in the New Jersey-Pennsylvania (and many similar) studies. Using this large sample of border counties, and these statistical advantages over earlier research, Dube, Lester, and Reich "...find strong earnings effects and no employment effects of minimum wage increases."23

#### Living wage creates a ripple effect that boosts wages of all low-wage workers

**Harris and Kearney 14**

Benjamin H. Harris (Policy Director of The Hamilton Project, Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, and Deputy Director of the Retirement Security Project at Brookings) and Melissa S. Kearney (Kearney is the Director of the Hamilton Project; a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; and a Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Maryland, where she has been on the faculty since 2006. She is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a Faculty Affiliate of the Lab for Economic Opportunities. Kearney's research focuses on issues of social policy, poverty, and inequality). “The “Ripple Effect” of a Minimum Wage Increase on American Workers.” Brookings Institution. 10 January 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/01/10-ripple-effect-of-increasing-the-minimum-wage-kearney-harris

In this month’s Hamilton Project economic analysis, we consider the likely magnitude of the effects of a minimum wage increase on the number and share of workers affected. Considering that near-minimum wage workers would also be affected, we find that an increase could raise the wages of up to 35 million workers—that’s 29.4 percent of the workforce. For the purpose of this analysis, we set aside the important issue of potential employment effects, which is another crucial element in the debate about an optimal minimum wage policy. We also continue to explore the nation’s “jobs gap,” or the number of jobs needed to return to pre-recession employment levels. The Ripple Effects of Minimum Wage Policy Although relatively few workers report wages exactly equal to (or below) the minimum wage, a much larger share of workers in the United States earns wages near the minimum wage. This holds true in the states that comply with the federal minimum wage, in addition to those states that have instituted their own higher minimum wage levels. An **increase in** the **minimum wage tends to have a “ripple effect”** on other workers earning wages near that threshold. This ripple effect occurs when a raise in the minimum wage increases the wage received by workers earning slightly above the minimum wage. This effect of the statutory minimum wage on wages paid at the low end of the wage distribution more generally is **well recognized in the academic literature**. Based on this recognition, we quantify the number of workers potentially affected by minimum wage policy using the assumption that workers earning up to 150 percent of the minimum wage would see a wage increase from a higher minimum wage. We hasten to note that a complete analysis of the net effects of a minimum wage increase would also have to account for potential negative employment effects. Our main goal of this empirical exercise is to dispel the notion that the minimum wage is not a relevant policy lever, which is based on the faulty premise that only a small number of workers would be affected. Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, combined with information on the binding minimum wage in each state, we are able to calculate these shares. Just 2.6 percent of workers are paid exactly the minimum wage, but 29.4 percent of workers are paid wages that are below or equal to 150 percent of the minimum wage in their state. Furthermore, the hours worked by this group represent nearly one-quarter—24.7 percent—of hours worked, which indicates that a large share of the impacted group is working close to full time hours.

#### Wage rates are more important for the poor than employment rates

**Bernstein 14**

Jared Bernstein (senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in Washington and a former chief economist to Vice President Joseph R. Biden). “The Impact of a Minimum-Wage Increase.” New York Times. 18 February 2014. http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/the-impact-of-a-minimum-wage-increase/?\_r=0

While those against the increase will highlight this employment loss finding as a rationale for their opposition, it is in fact entirely consistent with the view of most supporters of the increase: while the increase is expected to cause some job losses, **the number of workers who would get a raise far outweigh those displaced**: 97 percent to 98.5 percent of potentially affected workers would benefit from the proposal. The budget office estimates that because of the increase, 900,000 who are currently poor would move above the poverty threshold. That’s about 2 percent of the number it expects to be poor when the increase is phased in (45 million). Of the affected workers, 88 percent are adult (20 and older), 56 percent are female, and most work full time (i.e., 53 percent work 35 or more hours a week). **The incomes of most** families with **low-wage workers will increase** under the proposal. About 70 percent of low-wage workers live in families whose average incomes are projected to rise, from 2.8 percent for the poorest families to 0.4 percent for middle-income families.

#### Non-domination requires reducing poverty. This is a prerequisite to the viability of civic republicanism

**Waltman 2**

Jerry Waltman (taught political science at the University of Southern Mississippi for 25 years; in 15 of those he participated in the British Studies Program.  He currently holds an endowed professorship in political science at Baylor University, where he teaches British politics and comparative public law.  He received his Ph.D. from Indiana University, and is the author of eight books and numerous articles in academic journals on both British and American politics.  In addition to his years spent on the British Studies Program, he has traveled and taught in the UK on many occasions). “Civic Republicanism, The Basic Income Guarantee, and the Living Wage.” USBIG Discussion Paper. No. 25, March 2002.

In sum, to be a citizen one must have a certain basic level of economic well-being, and that level must be judged by the standards of each society. Without it, no person can be free, and when people are not free the republican polity disintegrates. Adrian Oldfield has summed it up this way: For activity of any kind, including that involved in the practice of citizenship, people need certain resources. Some of these have to do with . . . civil, political, and legal rights. Others have to do with economic and social resources. Without health, education, and **a reasonable living income**, for instance, individuals do not have the capacity to be effective agents in the world, and the possibilities of a practice of citizenship are thus foreclosed in advance. Such rights and resources have to be secured for citizens, for citizenship is an egalitarian practice." (25) Richard Petit put the same point more briefly. "If a republican state is committed to advancing the cause of freedom as non-domination among its citizens, then it must embrace a policy of promoting socioeconomic independence." (26) A good case can be made, of course, that poverty is an evil in itself and requires a moral response. Every major American religious tradition, in fact, includes that position, to one degree or another. Catholicism, mainstream Protestantism, evangelical Protestantism, and Judaism all concur that poverty is a blot on God's world and that there is a duty to respond, disagree though they may about the causes of poverty and the appropriateness of public versus private means of addressing it. (27) The point here is different. Poverty is an evil because of its political consequences. By stunting the mind and warping the spirit, it makes people unfit for republican citizenship. Since the freedom of all citizens is dependent on the health of the political system, which in turn is dependent on the continuing practice of citizenship, **the viability of a republican polity is** threatened, and ultimately **destroyed**, **by** the threat of **poverty**.

### C2

#### Contention 2 is Bargaining Power

#### Living wage solves bargaining power. That’s key to non-domination.

**Konczal 14**

Mike Konczal (fellow at the Roosevelt Institute). “7 Bipartisan Reasons to Raise the Minimum Wage.” Boston Review. March 3rd, 2014. http://www.bostonreview.net/us/mike-konczal-seven-reasons-raise-minimum-wage

When low-wage workers protest at fast food restaurants, low wages are not necessarily their sole concern. The working conditions may be equally important. Between a lack of sick days, random shift scheduling, and working without pay, there is a host of problems and humiliations from which workers seek redress. **Civic republicanism presses against these practices**. Philip Pettit, the philosopher most associated with this strain of thinking, defines its goal in terms of “freedom as **non-domination**,**”** freedom “as a condition under which a person is more or less immune to interference on an arbitrary basis.” In what sense can people be considered free if their means of survival places them at the mercy of an erratic schedule, thereby preventing the formation of civic and communal ties? Surveys of New York City’s low-wage workers find that 84 percent of them are not paid for their entire workday. When bosses can flout labor contracts and arbitrarily impose working conditions in this way, workers lack the kind of freedom that civic republicans celebrate. **By making the labor market tighter through lower turnover and vacancies,** a higher minimum wage creates bargaining power for workers and will help to eliminate these kinds of domination.

#### Counterplans can’t solve. Living wage is key.

**NYT 14**

New York Times Editorial Board. “The Case for a Higher Minimum Wage.” February 8th, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/opinion/sunday/the-case-for-a-higher-minimum-wage.html

WHAT’S THE POINT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE? Most people think of the minimum wage as the lowest legal hourly pay. That’s true, but it is really much more than that. As defined in the name of the law that established it — the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 — the minimum wage is a fundamental labor standard designed to protect workers, just as child labor laws and overtime pay rules do. Labor standards, like environmental standards and investor protections, are essential to a functional economy. Properly set and enforced, these standards check exploitation, pollution and speculation. In the process, they promote broad and rising prosperity, as well as public confidence. The minimum wage is specifically intended to take aim at the inherent imbalance in power between employers and low-wage workers that can push wages down to poverty levels. An appropriate wage floor set by Congress effectively substitutes for the bargaining power that low-wage workers lack. When low-end wages rise, poverty and inequality are reduced. But that doesn’t mean the minimum wage is a government program to provide welfare, as critics sometimes imply in an attempt to link it to unpopular policies. An hourly minimum of $10.10, for example, as Democrats have proposed, would reduce the number of people living in poverty by 4.6 million, according to widely accepted research, without requiring the government to tax, borrow or spend. IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE? No. Other programs, including food stamps, Medicaid and the **e**arned-**i**ncome **t**ax **c**redit, also increase the meager resources of low-wage workers, but **they do not provide bargaining power to claim a better wage.** In fact, they can drive wages down, because employers who pay poorly factor the government assistance into their wage scales. This is especially true of the earned-income tax credit, a taxpayer-provided wage subsidy that helps lift the income of working families above the poverty line. Conservatives often call for increases to the E.I.T.C. instead of a higher minimum wage, saying that a higher minimum acts as an unfair and unwise tax on low-wage employers. That’s a stretch, especially in light of rising corporate profits even as pay has dwindled. It also ignores how the tax credit increases the supply of low-wage labor by encouraging more people to work, holding down the cost of labor for employers. By one estimate, increasing the tax credit by 10 percent reduces the wages of high-school educated workers by 2 percent. There are good reasons to expand the tax credit for childless workers, as President Obama recently proposed. It is a successful antipoverty program and a capstone in the conservative agenda to emphasize work over welfare. But an expanded E.I.T.C. is no reason to stint on raising the minimum wage — just the opposite. A higher minimum wage could help offset the wage-depressing effect of a bolstered E.I.T.C., and would ensure that both taxpayers and employers do their part to make work pay.

#### Bargaining power is key to solve income inequality

**Gupta 15**

Sarita Gupta (executive director of Jobs with Justice). “Protect and Expand Workers’ Ability to Bargain.” Moyers and Company. January 20th, 2015. http://billmoyers.com/2015/01/20/protect-expand-workers-ability-bargain/

Greedy corporations have been on a decades-long bender to take advantage of working people — depressing wages, benefits and job standards, which has led to record inequality and poverty. At Jobs With Justice, we believe that **fighting poverty requires expanding** and protecting **the ability of workers to bargain with their employers** to demand higher wages, better working conditions and better living standards. As the nature of work changes, we look at collective bargaining through the union workplace campaign lens, but also through nontraditional forms, including legislative, policy, rulemaking and industry-wide interventions that put more money in workers’ pockets and improve standards and conditions for workers. Only through bargaining do workers have the power to directly confront the corporate actors behind poverty and inequality. Video From Jobs With Justice San Francisco: Fight for $15 and Just Hours Protest One example of this effort is our Retail Workers Bill of Rights campaign – led by Jobs With Justice San Francisco. Retail jobs are well understood to be some of the fastest growing and most poorly paid jobs in our economy, and an increasing number of people employed in this industry aren’t able to get the hours they need to earn enough to support their families. Working with the city’s Board of Supervisors, we pushed legislation to offer workers access to fairer, more predictable schedules. And in response to growing outrage over the turbulence families are experiencing due to a rise in inflexible and erratic schedules, community and labor advocates in a half dozen cities are planning to move similar reforms in 2015. Beyond winning better scheduling practices from employers, these campaigns – and others like them – have the potential to set workers up for more transformational fights, making bolder demands that increase onramps to collective bargaining and ultimately confront corporate power and fight poverty and inequality. Sign up now to join the fight for fair schedules and expanded bargaining for workers.

#### Income inequality undermines civic republicanism

**Waltman 2**

Jerry Waltman (taught political science at the University of Southern Mississippi for 25 years; in 15 of those he participated in the British Studies Program.  He currently holds an endowed professorship in political science at Baylor University, where he teaches British politics and comparative public law.  He received his Ph.D. from Indiana University, and is the author of eight books and numerous articles in academic journals on both British and American politics.  In addition to his years spent on the British Studies Program, he has traveled and taught in the UK on many occasions). “Civic Republicanism, The Basic Income Guarantee, and the Living Wage.” USBIG Discussion Paper. No. 25, March 2002.

Nevertheless, too much inequality in material possessions is an equally serious problem. Again, both the moral case and the economic efficiency case against too much inequality, powerful though they may be, must yield to the political case. Severe inequalities in material conditions, to put it straightforwardly, can destroy the very bases on which legal and political equality are built. This is true for three reasons. **First**, when citizens enjoy vastly different incomes, they begin to **lose the sense of seeing each other as equals**. When housing, clothes, vacations, food, and so forth differ enormously, people invariably become detached from those who are on the other side of the chasm. Their experiences cannot help but disconnect them, and they begin to see fellow citizens as somehow the "other," different from themselves, unapproachable and perhaps vexing. Everyone need not be able to afford an identical house, but the square footage and the acreage on which it sits should not be too far apart. If it is a matter of choice, of course-citizen A spends his discretionary income on a large house while citizen B enjoys expensive wines in a smaller house-that is altogether different. That very act of choice makes them similar. **Second**, too much economic inequality can lead to **skew**ed **political participation**. Any form of clientelism is obviously incompatible with republicanism. However, even far short of that, marked economic inequalities open up the possibility that some can, if not the guarantee that they will, buy ever larger megaphones to amplify their voices. In a healthy republic, every citizen's views need to be heard and considered, much as in a Quaker meeting. If one group of citizens can drown out others' voices, then a republic cannot be maintained. It is inevitable that economic power is going to lead to political power. And with the disparities that accompany a market economy, it is also inevitable that in a republic some are going to have more wherewithal to invest in the political debate than others. But that gap should be narrow rather than large. If we cannot eliminate megaphones, we can at least restrict their size. **Third**, vast economic **inequalities impair** the **public institutions** that are a vital component of republican life. Republics require more domains than the courtroom and the polling station where citizens meet as equals, unaffected by wealth and income. Public parks, for example, are much more than attractive and pleasant locales. They are places where citizens can see each other and interact as equals. When those with superior wealth erect their private enclaves to enjoy tennis, picnics, and the outdoors, a link in the citizenship chain is broken. The same is true for public transport and public schools. When people do not see their personal fate linked to public institutions, they lose interest in them. Why should, I, the wealthy begin to think, pay for these facilities which I do not use? When that happens a vital thread of a common citizenship is cut. Of even more central concern is the military. Citizen service in the military is the hallmark of a republic. When the army becomes largely a semi-mercenary force of those for whom it presents an attractive economic alternative, one of the central vestiges of citizenship is removed.

**Counterplans are cost-prohibitive and can’t solve relative income inequality; that’s key**

**Economist 13**

Citing Harvard professor TM Scanlon

The Economist. “The cheque is in the mail.” 19 November 2013. <http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/11/government-guaranteed-basic-income>

Whatever else they say about a basic income, everyone seems to assume that it would decrease income inequality. But those who support the proposal as an egalitarian salve should think twice. Raising the floor for all by adopting an annual UBI would make **no dent in the wealth gap**. Everybody from a homeless person to a middle-class teacher to a hedge-fund billionaire would receive the same cheque from the government. While the extra thousands would make the most difference to those on the bottom of the pile, the cash would be in lieu of all existing welfare benefits. And the income would not be sufficient to launch most of the poor into the lower middle class. Even if the income could bring a family of four above the $23,550 poverty line—a figure that **would cost trillions**—it would still leave many Americans in effective destitution, particularly those living in expensive urban centres like New York City where the average monthly rent is now $3,000. Compounding the problem would be upward pressure on housing prices that a UBI may spur. Beyond these economic uncertainties, a basic income would do little to ease the indignity of the wealth gap. T.M. Scanlon, a Harvard philosopher, catalogues several reasons inequality is objectionable. The stigmatisation of the lower orders would remain a problem in highly inegalitarian societies like America: One consequence of **extreme inequality in income** and wealth can be that it forces the poor to live in a way that is reasonably seen as humiliating. Here again, **the evil is comparative** — it is not merely an objection to having ragged clothes, or poor housing, but of having to live and to present oneself in a way that is so far below the standard generally accepted in society that it marks one as inferior, and as someone that others would not want to associate with. This provides a reason not only to improve the lot of the poor, but also, even if their lot is, in absolute terms, not so bad, to object to the creation of a much higher standard of living for others. This may not, in some cases be a sufficient reason to deny others these benefits, but it is a recognizable cost that these benefits bring, and one that cannot be put down to envy. Mr Scanlon isn’t exactly arguing for levelling here—notice his hedge in the last sentence—but he does identify the harms of inequality that a UBI might leave untouched. To cancel every anti-poverty measure and reallocate government funds for a UBI would entrench inequality unless financed with a heavily progressive tax. There are other risks, too. Some poor families receiving a lump sum from the government will make wise financial decisions. Others won't, making fungibility a liability. Libertarians like Charles Murray are untroubled by this possibility. "The [guaranteed income] says just one thing to people who have never had reason to believe it before," Mr Murray writes. "'Your future is in your hands'. And it is the truth."

### Theory

#### 1. Don’t vote on presumption or permissibility because human fallibility means there’s always a non-zero risk of offense. If you do presume, then presume aff to offset 7-4-6-3 time skew and the 8% neg bias this year[[1]](#footnote-1) and at the TOC specifically[[2]](#footnote-2) which impact turn his shells. TOC stats come first; they account for time skew, topic lit, and all other factors to determine net effect, and analytics get overstated by debaters to win rounds.

#### 2. Neg burden is to win offense to a post-fiat advocacy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education.

**Nelson 8**

Adam F. Nelson, J.D.1. Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Lincoln-Douglas Debate. 2008.

And the truth-statement model of the resolution imposes an absolute burden of proof on the affirmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution. If the negative need only prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to deny our ability to make truth-statements or to prove normative morality does not exist or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, such strategies seem fundamentally unfair, as they provide the negative with **functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole. Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of competing world-views rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the negative retains equal flexibility while being denied access to those skeptical arguments indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way. Such a model of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer their worldview, thereby further enforcing **a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate the truth of ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world. They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

#### 3. The neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

#### 4. Err aff against theory. Intervention’s inevitable in blippy theory debates. Gut checking minimizes it long term by reducing the number of debates resolved on blippy, dropped spikes. I’m reading a stock aff at the core of the lit, and it’s on the wiki.

#### 5. Independently, voting on theory encourages more frivolous theory in future rounds which crowds out topic education. Any aff abuse must be weighed against this innate DA to theory, which sets a non-arbitrary brightline for reasonability.

## Harvard Pettit AC

Every agent must recognize freedom as a necessary good.

**Gewirth 84** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

[Brackets for gendered language] Let me briefly sketch the main line of argument that leads to this conclusion. As I have said, the argument is based on the generic features of human action. To begin with, **every agent acts for purposes he regards as good. Hence,** he **[they] must regard as necessary goods the freedom and well being that are the** generic features and **necessary conditions of** his **action** and successful action in general. From this, **it follows that every agent logically must hold** or accept **that** he has **[they have] rights to these conditions.** For if he were to deny that he has these rights, then he would have to admit that it is permissible for other persons to remove from him the very conditions of freedom and well-being that, as an agent, he must have. But it is contradictory for him to hold both that he must have these conditions and also that he may not have them. Hence, on pain of self-contradiction, every agent must accept that he has rights to freedom and well-being. **Moreover, every agent must** further **admit that all other agents also have those rights, since all other** actual or prospective **agents have the same** general **characteristics of agency** on which he must ground his own right-claims.¶ What I am saying, then, is that every agent, simply by virtue of being an agent, must regard his freedom and well being as necessary goods and must hold that he and all other actual or prospective agents have rights to these necessary goods. **Hence, every agent, on pain of self-contradiction, must accept the** following **principle: Act in accord with the generic rights of** your recipients as well as of yourself. The generic rights are rights to the generic features of action, **freedom, and well-being.** I call this the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), because it combines the formal consideration of consistency with the material consideration of the generic features and rights of action

Freedom requires civic republicanism, which says that the state must ensure non-domination.

**Waltman 2** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

Civic republicanism's origins lie in the ancient world, in the political theory undergirding several notable Greek city-states and the Roman republic. (2) Thereafter, it lay dormant until resurrected in the Italian city-states of the Renaissance, and then by the "Commonwealth men" of seventeenth century England. From the latter, it was transported to the American colonies and flowered during the Revolutionary era and immediately afterward. While republican thinkers from these various periods parted company on several matters, their unifying focus was that **the polity is a self-governing community of citizens**. The aim of the civic republican polity is maintaining the liberty of its citizens. Since **liberty cannot be achieved outside a community**-a wild animal can be "free" but it cannot be said to have "liberty"-**the individual** citizen must be intimately connected to the community. He **must believe that** his **[their] interests are inseparable from** those of **the community**, and that the role of citizen is a natural part of life. The state can rely on its citizens, who after all are the state, to exercise civic virtue and to consider the needs of the community along with their own. The citizenry governs itself by the process of deliberation, a deliberation devoted to finding and pursuing the public interest. To this end, political institutions in a republic should evidence a certain balance and be rather slow acting, at least under ordinary circumstances. Representative democracy, which allows republics to be larger than city-states, is a method for the further protection of liberty. It is not, pointedly, an end in itself. **Unlike liberal individualism, which posits no overriding end for the polity, civic republicanism stands** emphatically **on liberty** as its central value. Liberty is taken to mean being free from domination. More formally, according to Richard Petit, a leading contemporary republican theorist, "One agent dominates another if and only if they have a certain power over that other, in particular a power of interference on an arbitrary basis." (3) Domination can therefore take either of two forms. In the first, one private individual holds power over another (dominium); in the second, it is the state which exercises the domination (imperium). Both are equally odious to republicanism. If I am dominated, I am not free, no matter what the source of the domination. **To be a citizen is to be** at all times and all places **free of domination**, since citizenship is synonymous with the enjoyment of liberty. Prohibiting dominium presupposes that no citizen can be the servant of another, for servanthood brings domination with it by its very nature. If you are my servant and I order you around, you are quite clearly being dominated. Nevertheless, it is important to note that **you are dominated even if I chose not to order you around** (for whatever reason). **You still cannot look me in the eye as an equal**, for we both know that "The Remains of the Day" is more realistic than Wooster and Jeeves. Not only may I alter my reserved role at any time without consulting you, but you will also be ever mindful of my ability to do so, and that cannot help but affect how you think, feel, and act. You and I are both aware that there may come a time when you will have to tread gingerly. Citizens of a republic simply cannot have such a relationship. As Petit said of civic republicans: The heights that they identified held out the prospect of a way of life within which none of them had to bow and scrape to others; they would each be capable of standing on their own two feet; they would each be able to look others squarely in the eye. (4) Or, as Walt Whitman succinctly described a citizen, "Neither a servant nor a master am I." (5) **Governmental power can** of course **be a source of domination also**, for the enormous power of the state is ever pregnant with the potential for domination. **There is, however, a critical difference** here. Whereas interference, real or potential, by one individual over another's choices is by its nature domination, governmental interference in one's affairs may or may not be. This is **because liberty can only be** made **meaningful in a community, and** the **needs of the community will** necessarily at times come into **conflict** with one or more individuals' autonomy, or at least with individuals' autonomy as they would define it. It is the community that makes liberty possible, and a citizen's freedom is inseparable from the interests and health of the community. As Blackstone noted, "**laws**, when prudently framed, **are** by no means subversive but rather **introductive of liberty**." (6)

Libertarian non-interference alone can’t protect freedom

**Pettit 99** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

Whether it is furthered by courtesy of constitutional provision, or in virtue of an equal distribution of relevant resources, it should be stressed that **non-domination** is itself a form of power. It **represents a control that a person enjoys in relation to their own destiny** and such control constitutes one familiar type of power: the power of the agent who can prevent various ills happening to them (see appendix to this chapter). Another way of stressing the power-involving aspect of nondomination, to return to a theme of the last chapter, is to emphasize that **non-domination involves** a sort of immunity or **security against interference on an arbitrary basis, not the mere absence of such interference. Suppose that** for a certain range of choices I happen to enjoy the absence of all interference by arbitrary powers in the actual world: **no one with** such a **power gets in the way of my** making my preferred **choice**, and no one of that kind would get in the way had I chosen differently among the relevant options. **It is possible**, consistently with this supposition, **that the non-interference I enjoy is extremely insecure and that I am** a relatively **powerless** individual. **I may enjoy it only for the very contingent reason that** while **the**re are **agents around who dominate me**—agents with an arbitrary power of interference— it happens that they **like me and leave me alone**; or it happens that I am able to ingratiate myself with them and placate them as they become ill-disposed towards me; **or** it happens **that I am cunning and** manage to **keep out of their way** when trouble is brewing; or whatever. **In such a world, the price of my liberty is** not eternal vigilance but, as Gore Vidal once said, **eternal discretion.**

Unrestricted pursuit of self-interest destroys freedom and community, so economic rights can’t be absolute side-constraints on state action

**Waltman 2** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

Critics sometimes contend that civic republicanism, by granting the state such extensive powers, can suffocate the individual. Of course, it is theoretically possible that it could, but that is a faint threat in a viable republic. Republican politics endeavors to construct a society in which individuals are free to make the choices that they wish, to be truly free from domination today and the threat of domination tomorrow. If the citizenry, though, becomes selfish and irresponsible, then, yes, republican governments could become arbitrary and destructive of liberty. It is often, though, a **rampant individualism** that **undermines** individual **freedom**. In part, this is because **it turns a blind eye to** the **domination** that can be inherent in individuals' relations with each other. But it is also because that by **asserting that there is no higher good than self-interest** it **destroys the whole**. Tocqueville, it is worth recalling, was strongly in favor of "individuality," attainable only when people are free from domination, but deeply skeptical of "individualism," where people acknowledge no higher good than the pursuit of their own self-interest. In fact, one of the major concerns voiced throughout his writing was whether republican liberty could be maintained as democracy spread, or whether the offspring would swallow the parent. (10) Consequently, "rights,"whether the **economic rights favored by Friedmanites** or the privacy rights cherished by the left, **cannot stand as impenetrable barriers to policies designed to achieve the public good**. (11) **To do so is to champion** an **individualism that is the path to isolation and** ultimately to **anarchy. Rights are** a **means to** the **accomplishing** of **liberty, not zones that by absolutely restricting state action are subversive of it.**

Thus, the standard is non-domination, defined as minimizing the capacity for arbitrary interference. 3 more reasons.

First, nondomination is the primary moral good.

**Pettit 99** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

The first of the further benefits becomes visible when we reflect on a salient way in which **arbitrary interference is worse** **than nonarbitrary**. To suffer the reality or expectation of arbitrary interference is to suffer an extra malaise over and beyond that of having your choices intentionally curtailed. **It** is to have to endure a high level of uncertainty, since the arbitrary basis on which the interference occurs means that there is no predicting when it will strike. Such uncertainty **makes planning much more difficult** than it would be under a corresponding prospect of non-arbitrary interference. And, of course, it is also likely to produce a high level of anxiety. Freedom as non-domination requires us to reduce the capacities for arbitrary interference to which a person is exposed, while freedom as non-interference requires us to minimize the person's expectation of interference as such. But this means that, while the non-domination ideal would tend to require conditions where certainty is high, the non-interference ideal is consistent with a great loss on this front. It is quite possible that the maximal non-interference possible for someone will be available under an arrangement where that person has to suffer much uncertainty. But it is hardly conceivable that the same is true for the maximal non-domination that they might achieve. Imagine that we have a choice between leaving employers with a lot of power over employees, or men with a lot of power over women, and using state interference to reduce such power. Maximizing overall non-interference is perfectly compatible with taking the first option. While we do not guard against interference by the stronger under that option, we may not think that it is very likely to occur; and because we do not guard against interference by the stronger, we will count the absence of state interference as a great boon. Thus maximizing overall non-interference is perfectly compatible with forcing the individual employee or the individual woman to have to live with much uncertainty. What is true at the overall or aggregate level may also hold at the individual level. For related considerations may mean that maximizing the individual's own non-interference would require exposing them to a high level of uncertainty. Perhaps the recourse to the law would be so interventionist in their own lives and so ineffective in stopping interference by others that it would mean more interference, not less. Perhaps the way to maximize the person's expected non-interference is to leave them in subjection to others, then, in a position where they suffer much uncertainty. Their expectation of non-interference would be at a maximum, but at the maximal point envisaged the interference to which they are exposed would be the arbitrary sort that induces uncertainty: the sort that occasions anxiety and makes planning difficult. The project of increasing a person's freedom as non-domination could not tolerate this uncertainty, because it would baulk at accepting any degree of subjection to another. Devotees of freedom as nondomination emphasize the advantage of their ideal in this respect when they say that the unfree person is exposed to the inconstant, uncertain will of another and consequently suffers anxiety and wretchedness. 'Having always some unknown evil to fear, though it should never come, he has no perfect enjoyment of himself, or of any of the blessings of life' (Priestley 1993: 35). Their assumption is that if we try to further someone's freedom as **non-domination** then we **will remove** the spectre of such **uncertainty. Maybe the person has to live by** the standing rule of **a constitution** and a law, a rule that makes for a degree of coercion in their lives. **But they do not** have to **live under constant fear of** unpredictable **interference**, and so they can organize their affairs on a systematic basis and with a large measure of tranquillity. The second benefit associated with freedom as non-domination, and not with freedom as non-interference, becomes visible when we reflect on another way in which arbitrary interference is worse than non-arbitrary. To suffer the reality or expectation of arbitrary interference is not only to have to endure a high level of uncertainty. It is also to have to keep a weather eye on the powerful, anticipating what they will expect of you and trying to please them, or anticipating where they will be and trying to stay out of their way; it is to have strategic deference and anticipation forced upon you at every point. You can never sail on, unconcerned, in the pursuit of your own affairs; you have to navigate an area that is mined on all sides with dangers. Advancing someone's freedom as non-domination means reducing other people's capacities for arbitrary interference in their lives, and will reduce their need for strategic deference or anticipation, as it will reduce the level of uncertainty with which they have to live. But advancing someone's freedom as non-interference is not guaranteed to have this effect. For it may very well be that the best way to maximize someone's expectation of non-interference is to rely in good part on their native wit and cunning: to get them to look after their own freedom by forcing them to develop and exercise strategies of placating and anticipating the powerful. A world in which strategic flattery and avoidance is rampant—a world in which women become adept at placating their men folk, for example, or at not crossing their paths—may represent the best prospect for keeping interference as such at a minimum. Having to practise strategic deference and anticipation, however, like having to live with uncertainty, is a serious cost. For the strategic disposition imposed requires the agent to curtail their own choices: to tug the forelock at appropriate moments and, when that promises not to be enough, to keep out of sight. Such enforced self-denial, of course, does not represent a form of interference, even of arbitrary interference, for interference has to be intentionally perpetrated by another; that, indeed, is why the cause of freedom as non-interference can be promoted by an arrangement involving a lot of strategic deference and anticipation. But nonetheless it is clearly bad that people should have to resort to denying themselves various choices in order to achieve non-interference. And it is a clear advantage of the ideal of freedom as non-domination that in targeting arbitrary interference as the enemy, and in seeking to reduce the capacities of others to interfere arbitrarily in anyone's affairs, it presents a picture of the free life in which the need for strategy is minimized. The Third benefit associated with freedom as non-domination but not with freedom as non-interference is one that I have already highlighted in arguing that the fact that someone enjoys non-domination is likely to become a matter of common knowledge and to generate associated subjective and inter-subjective benefits. While someone's freedom as non-interference may be at a maximum in a situation where they have to recognize that they are vulnerable to the whim of another, and have an inferior social status to that other, the enjoyment of freedom as non-domination goes with the possibility of their seeing themselves as non-vulnerable in that way and as possessed of a comparable social standing with the other. They can look the other in the eye; they do not have to bow and scrape. That two people enjoy the same freedom as non-interference, that they even enjoy the same expectation of such freedom, is consistent with one of them, and only one of them, having the power to interfere in the life of the other. Consistently with possessing the power to interfere, the more powerful may have no interest in interfering; this may be because of indifference or preoccupation or devotion: it may even be because the less powerful people are good at keeping them happy or at keeping out of their way. Thus the powerful person may be as unlikely to interfere with others as the less powerful. But even if both parties enjoy equal non-interference, and an equal expectation of non-interference, they are likely to develop a shared awareness of the asymmetry of power, and indeed an awareness shared with others in the community: this was a major theme of the last chapter. And once it is a matter of common awareness that one of them is powerful enough to be able to interfere more or less arbitrarily in the life of the other, then that is going to affect their relative status. It is going to be a matter of common knowledge that the one is weaker than the other, vulnerable to the other, and to that extent subordinate to the other. Why should I be forced to think of myself in this way, it may be asked, if the other person is really no more likely to interfere with me than I with them? The answer takes us back to a consideration already mentioned in the last chapter. Seeing an option as an improbable choice for an agent, even as a vanishingly improbable choice, is different from seeing it as a choice that is not accessible to the agent: seeing it as a choice that is not within the agent's power. Thus the fact that another person is unlikely to interfere with me, just because they happen to have no interest in interfering, is consistent with their retaining access to the option of interfering with me. Now it is the attribution of accessible choices, not the attribution of probable choices, that determines how I and others view a person and, in particular, whether we view them as someone on whom I depend for enjoying non-interference (Pettit and Smith 1996). And so it is quite possible for me to be forced to think of myself as subordinate to someone who is no more likely to interfere with me than I am to interfere with them. More generally, it is possible for this way of thinking to be established as a matter of common recognition, so that my status, my standing in public perception, becomes that of a subordinate. Advancing someone's freedom as non-domination is bound to mean reducing this sort of subordination, as it is bound to mean reducing the uncertainty with which they have to live, and the strategy to which they have to have recourse. For while it is possible to enjoy the highest degree of non-interference available in a situation where you are subordinate to another, every increase in your non-domination is going to mean decreasing the subordination to which you are exposed. After all, increasing your non-domination means reducing the capacity of others for interfering with you on an arbitrary basis, and that means reducing their access to such interference. To sum up these reflections, then, freedom as non-domination may seem to do less well than freedom as non-interference in servicing unrestricted choice; after all, it is opposed only to arbitrary interference—specifically, to others having the capacity for such interference—not to interference as such. But freedom as non-domination does much better in three other respects, all of them of intuitively great importance. It promises to do better in delivering a person from uncertainty, and from the associated anxiety and inability to plan; from the need to exercise strategy with the powerful, having to defer to them and anticipate their various moves; and from the subordination that goes with a common awareness that the person is exposed to the possibility of arbitrary interference by another: that there is another who can deploy such interference, even if they are not likely to do so. As against my line of argument so far, it may be said that those who espouse freedom as non-interference are not generally known for welcoming or even acknowledging the uncertainty, the strategy, and the subordination I have been documenting. How to explain this? The answer may be that those who espouse the ideal often take it for granted that it is best furthered by traditional, non-dominating institutions—say, by the institutions of the common law—that are most readily justified, as they were traditionally justified, by the desire to avoid arbitrariness. Thus what the people in question effectively embrace is not what they officially embrace: it is not freedom as noninterference, neat, but rather freedom as non-interference under the rule of such a common law.2 This constrained version of the non-interference ideal is close enough to the ideal of freedom as non-domination to make it seem that uncertainty, strategy, and subordination are ruled out. They are ruled out, it is true, in the forum where people's relations are effectively directed by the relevant legal injunctions. But the constrained ideal still falls short of freedom as non-domination, since it is consistent with allowing domination—and the attendant uncertainty, strategy, and subordination—within those spaces where the relevant legal injunction leaves people to other devices. Thus it is consistent, in a way that freedom as non-domination would not be, with domination occurring in the workplace or in the home or in any of a multitude of so-called private spaces. I do not think that anyone can be indifferent to the benefits that freedom as non-domination promises. To be able to live your life without uncertainty about the interference you will have to endure; to be able to live without having to stay on your toes in dealing with the powerful; and to be able to live without subordination to others: these are great and palpable goods and they make a powerful case for the instrumental attractions of freedom as non-domination. A primary good They make a case, indeed, not just for the instrumental attractions of the ideal but for its status, in John Rawls's (1971) phrase, as a primary good. A primary good is something that a person has instrumental reasons to want, no matter what else they want: something that promises results that are likely to appeal to them, no matter what they value and pursue. The considerations rehearsed so far show that advancing someone's freedom as non-domination is likely to help them escape from uncertainty, strategy, and subordination; certainly, it is more likely to do this than advancing their freedom as non-interference. But something stronger also holds true. **Suppose we** take steps to **reduce** a person's **uncertainty** about interference, to reduce their need for exercising a strategy of deference and anticipation with others, **and** to reduce the **subordination** associated with vulnerability. **It is hard to see how we could** take such steps **without at the same time advancing** their freedom as **non-domination.** Freedom as **non-domination appears to be**, **not just** a more or less **sufficient** instrument for promoting those effects, **but** a more or less **necessar**il**y** associated factor. There is no promoting non-domination without promoting those effects; and there is no promoting those effects without promoting non-domination. This may not hold in every possible world, but it certainly seems to hold under plausible assumptions about how the actual world works. Given that freedom as non-domination is bound up in this way with the effects discussed, **how could anyone** fail to want it for themselves, or **fail to recognize it as a value?** Short of embracing some religiously or ideologically motivated doctrine of self-abasement, **people will** surely **find their ends easier of attainment to the extent that they enjoy non-domination.** Certainly they will find those ends easier of attainment if they are ends conceived and pursued under the pluralistic conditions that obtain in most developed democracies and, of course, in the international world at large. Freedom as **non-domination** is not just an instrumental good, **then**; it also **enjoys the status**, at least in relevant circumstances, **of a primary good.** This point is easily supported. **For almost all** the **things** that **a person is likely to want, the pursuit** of those things **is** going to be **facilitated by** their having **an ability to make plans** (Bratman 1987). **But short of** enjoying **non-domination,** the person's ability to make **plans will be undermined by** the sort of **uncertainty** we discussed. Hence, to the extent that it involves a reduction in uncertainty, non-domination has the firm attraction of a primary good.

Second, nondomination comes first under util for state actors.

**Pettit 99** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

Republicanism is a consequentialist doctrine which assigns to government, in particular to governmental authorities, the task of promoting freedom as non-domination. But suppose that the authorities endorse this goal in a zealous, committed manner. Does that not raise the problem that they may seek in the name of the republican goal to breach the very forms that we, as system designers, think that the goal requires (Lyons 1982)? Does it not mean that they may often be motivated to take the law into their own hands—to dirty their hands (Coady 1993)—and to advance republican ends by non-republican means? It is often said that **a utilitarian sheriff** who is committed to promoting overall happiness **might** be required to **frame an innocent person** in order **to avoid** the worse consequences associated with **a riot** (McCloskey 1963). Is there not a parallel reason for thinking that republican officials who are committed to promoting overall nondomination will be subject to similar rule-breaking requirements? **It would** be a very serious problem if republicanism was morally infeasible in this way, for it would **undermine the capacity of constitutional** and institutional **designers**—ultimately it would undermine the capacity of a people—**to plan** for the effects they want to achieve. Whatever is to be said of the utilitarian goal of overall happiness, **however,** the republican goal of freedom as **non-domination does not raise a** serious **problem of moral infeasibility** (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990: 71-8). People enjoy freedom as non-domination to the extent that no other is in a position to interfere on an arbitrary basis in their lives. The zealous agents who break faith with an assigned brief in order to promote non-domination assume and achieve resources of arbitrary power, for they behave in a way that gives their own unchallenged judgement sway over others. And this assumption of resources affects, not just the non-domination of those affected in this or that case, but the non-domination of most of the society; zealous agents set themselves up over all, not just over some. **If** certain **agents** think that they can **maximize non-domination by transgressing** the **obligations** of their brief, then, they are almost certain to be mistaken. **Whatever non-domination they hope to bring about** by departing from their brief, it **is unlikely to be greater than the massive domination they** thereby **perpetrate over the population in general.** Against this, it may be objected that the sort of domination that official agents exercise over me and my like in virtue of covertly interfering with someone else is not itself harmful, so long as we remain unaware of the fact of being dominated. The agents may have reason to think, therefore, that it will be worth their while interfering if the chances of the interference becoming recognized are sufficiently small. I reply that no agent will ever be certain of not being caught out, and that the cost of being caught out is so enormous that, still, there is very unlikely to be a case for transgression sufficient to move a zealous agent. The cost of being caught out is that someone else will come to see that their lives are subject to the more or less arbitrary interference, not just of the agent in question, but of any other official agent: and, if someone else, then everyone else, since anyone who detects transgression is more than likely to make it public. What if the chance of being caught out is really very small indeed? Why shouldn't a zealous agent conclude that however great the cost of being apprehended, the improbability is such that he or she should bend the law in this case: bend the law, for example, as in covering up the offences of an important public personage, and seeking thereby to advance the interests of the country? There may be the very exceptional circumstances where zealotry is pardonable—pardonable and perhaps even commendable—but a very serious consideration argues against there being many. This is that the more unlikely it is that an agent will be apprehended, the clearer it will be to people at large that this case is an acid test of whether they are living under a proper rule of law or under the arbitrary sway of officials who put themselves, out of whatever high motives, above that law. Let apprehension be likely and people may well reckon that the errant official just nodded. Let apprehension be unlikely and they will all the more certainly think that the errant official typifies a general, dominating frame of mind. Short of catastrophic circumstances, then, there is unlikely to be any serious reason why a zealous agent should be tempted in the name of non-domination to break with the very rules of behaviour—the republican forms of government—that are designed to promote it. The considerations I have raised show that, **given the power of official agents, and** given **their potential for domination, there is every reason why zealous agents should** want to go out of their way to show people at large that there is no possibility of their taking the goal of nondomination into their own hands. There is every reason why they should **look for institutional means of making it** salient and credible that they are pre-committed to sticking with their brief, and to sticking with their brief even in cases where there is a prima facie case for zealous opportunism. There is every reason why they should want to make it **salient and credible that their hands are tied**: that they are agents with little or no independent discretion.

And third, Kantianism requires nondomination.

**Ripstein 9** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

The right to freedom as independence provides a model of interaction that reconciles the ability of separate persons to use their powers to pur- sue their own purposes. In so doing, it also provides a distinctive concepttion of the wrongs that interfere with this independence. **Wrongdoing takes the form of domination.** Both your right to **independence** and the violations of it **can only be explicated by reference to the actions of others.** Wrongs against your person are not outcomes that are bad for you which other people happen to cause. Unlike the familiar “harm principle” put forward by Mill, which focuses exclusively on out comes that can be characterized without reference to the acts that bring them about, the right to freedom focuses exclusively on the acts of others. It is not that somebody does something that causes something bad to happen to you; it is that somebody does something to you. The idea of freedom as nondomination has a distinguished history in political philosophy. Recent scholars have pointed out that Berlin’s dichotomy between negative and positive liberty leaves out a prominent idea of liberty, sometimes referred to as the “republican” or neo-Roman conception of liberty, according to which liberty consists in independence from others. These scholars argue that this conception was central to the political thought of the civic republicans of the Renaissance, who were centrally concerned with the dangers of despotism. On this reading, the early modern republicans did not object to despotism because it interfered with their negative or positive liberty (to use anachronistic terms they would not have recognized). **A despot who was** benevolent, or even **prudent**, **might allow people**, especially potentially powerful ones, opportunity **to do what they wanted** or be true to themselves. **The objection was** to the fact **that it was up to the despot to decide**, to his having the power, quite apart from the possibility that he would use it badly. Unless someone has a power, there is no danger of it being used badly, but the core concern of the civic republicans was the despot’s entitlement to use it, and the subjugation of his subjects that followed regardless of how it was used.18 [Footnote 18. **See** generally Philip **Pettit,** Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). In “A Third Concept of Liberty,” Proceedings of the British Academy 117 (2002): 239, Skinner points out that Berlin’s idea of positive liberty is not an idea of self-mastery but of mastering yourself.] Berlin is aware of this difference when he writes, “It is perfectly conceivable that a liberal-minded despot would allow his subjects a large mea sure of personal freedom.”19 **Freedom as independence carries this same idea** of independence further, **to relations among citizens.** It insists that everything that is wrong with being subject to the choice of a powerful ruler is also wrong with being subject to the choice of another private person. As a result, **it can explain the nature of wrongdoing even when no harm ensues.** One person is subject to another person’s choice; I use your means to advance purposes you have not set for yourself. Most familiar crimes are examples of one person interfering with the freedom of another by interfering with either her exercise of her powers or her ability to exercise them. They are small- scale versions of despotism or abuse of office.

Thus the **advocacy**: Just governments ought to require employers pay a living wage adjusted to local cost of living differences. I reserve the right to clarify.

**Contention 1** is Poverty

Non-domination requires reducing poverty. This is a prerequisite to the viability of civic republicanism

**Waltman 2** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

In sum, **to be a citizen one must have a certain basic level of economic well-being**, and that level must be judged by the standards of each society. Without it, no person can be free, and when people are not free the republican polity disintegrates. Adrian Oldfield has summed it up this way: **For activity of any kind**, including that involved in the practice of citizenship, **people need** certain **resources**. Some of these have to do with . . . civil, political, and legal rights. Others have to do with economic and social resources. **Without** health, education, and **a reasonable living income**, for instance, individuals do not have the capacity to be effective agents in the world, and the **possibilities of** a practice of **citizenship are** thus **foreclosed in advance**. Such rights and resources have to be secured for citizens, for **citizenship is an egalitarian practice**." (25) Richard Petit put the same point more briefly. "**If a republican state is committed to advancing** the cause of freedom as **non-domination** among its citizens, then **it must** embrace a policy of **promot**ing **socioeconomic independence**."(26) A good case can be made, of course, that poverty is an evil in itself and requires a moral response. Every major American religious tradition, in fact, includes that position, to one degree or another. Catholicism, mainstream Protestantism, evangelical Protestantism, and Judaism all concur that poverty is a blot on God's world and that there is a duty to respond, disagree though they may about the causes of poverty and the appropriateness of public versus private means of addressing it. (27) The point here is different. **Poverty is an evil because of its political consequences**. By stunting the mind and warping the spirit, it makes people unfit for republican citizenship. Since the freedom of all citizens is dependent on the health of the political system, which in turn is dependent on the continuing practice of citizenship, **the viability of a republican polity is** threatened, and ultimately **destroyed**, **by** the threat of **poverty**.

Autonomy is a question of requisites to freedom, not maximizing freedom of choice for its own sake, so reducing poverty is key

**Waltman 2** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

Autonomy is not a dichotomous variable, however, something either present or absent. "**Autonomy**, like other abilities," Dagger explains, " is not something we either do nor do not have; it **is something we** may **possess to a greater or lesser extent, just as the ability to speak English or play chess** varies considerably among English speakers and chess players." (13) It is a continuum, therefore, and **it is not necessary that every citizen have an identical amount;** what is required instead is merely that no citizen should be below a certain threshold of autonomy. Above that, "increasing someone's autonomy by widening the range of choices available . . . becomes less and less valuable. Rather than maximize autonomy, either in a select few individuals or in some abstract sense, as if we could pile up units of autonomy, we ought to be concerned with bringing as many people as possible up to that threshold. **The idea is to** promote autonomy by **recogniz**ing **the right of autonomy, not** to **produce more and more autonomy for its own sake**." (14) What must we as citizens have, then, to reach **this threshold of autonomy**? First, of course, we must possess certain basic civil liberties, such as those found in the Bill of Rights. We must be free from unjust criminal prosecutions; we must be free to speak our minds and write what we wish; we must be free to exercise freedom of conscience; our private effects must be shielded from arbitrary intrusions; and our property must not be taken without just compensation. Additionally, we must have a guarantee of political participation, participation in which each counts as one and only one. In a representative democracy, this means voting, running for office if we choose, petitioning government, and organizing with others to promote our views. But it also **requires** something more, namely **the ability to live without depending on others**. James Harrington, the foremost of the English republican writers of the seventeenth century, included these among his "Aphorisms" regarding politics: The man that cannot live upon his own must be a servant; but he that can live upon his own may be a freeman. Where a people cannot live upon their own, the government is either a monarchy or aristocracy; where a people can live upon their own, the government may be a democracy. (15) Or, as Richard Petit put it in more modern language, "To be independent in the intended sense is to have the wherewithal to operate normally and properly in your society without having to beg or borrow from others, and without having to depend on their beneficence." (16) If you do not live upon your own, therefore, your citizenship is wanting. Not only are you not free of the domination your purse-string holders have over you; your capacity for developing the independence of mind needed for the expeditious and just conduct of public business is also called into serious question. You must have the capacities to make choices both in your private sphere and when you participate in public affairs.

Living wage reduces poverty. Recent studies and economist consensus goes aff

**Konczal 14** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

Some minimum wage advocates don’t care much about income inequality per se. Instead, they are focused on alleviating poverty. Poverty has significant consequences for human flourishing, with especially pronounced effects on children. A major mistake of the War on Poverty was its assumption that the economy would be capable of employing all people at generous wages as long as they had the right skills and as long as discriminatory obstacles were surmounted. Thus job training was a priority. However, **during the ’70s, ’80s, and 2000s, wages at the bottom** part of the income distribution **fell**, especially for men, even as the low-wage workforce became more educated. **Education and tech**nological advances alone **could not solve poverty. Recent research strongly indicates that raising the minimum wage reduces poverty. Dube finds that a 10 percent hike** in the minimum wage would reduce the number of people living in poverty by a modest but significant 2.4 percent. It also **shrinks the poverty gap**—how far people are below the poverty line—**by 3.2 percent. And** it reduces the poverty-squared gap, a measure of **extreme poverty, by 9.6** percent. So it provides meaningful benefits for the poorest individuals. **Larger increases would offer even more impressive gains**. Raising the minimum wage to $10.10 would lift 4.6 million people out of poverty. It would also boost the incomes of those at the 10th percentile of the income distribution by $1,700 annually. That is a significant benefit for workers who have seen declining wages during the past forty years. **In a review of the lit**erature since the 1990s, **Dube finds fifty-four estimates** of the relationship between poverty and the minimum wage. **Forty-eight** of them **show that a minimum wage reduces poverty. This reflects a remarkable consensus** among economists. The effect of an increased minimum wage on poverty is real, and it would be positive.

Prefer my evidence. It cites Dube et al.’s study which is the most robust and generalizable

**Schmitt 13** writes[[13]](#footnote-13)

Probably **the most important** and influential **paper** written **on the minimum wage in the last decade was Dube, Lester, and Reich** (2010)'s study,21 which offered a comprehensive reappraisal of both the new minimum wage research and its critics. **The study was** built around **a key** methodological **innovation, which** essentially **generalized Card and Krueger's** New Jersey **study to make it nationally representative, and identified a significant weakness in** much of the **earlier** minimum-wage **research** based on the analysis of state employment patterns, which had failed to control for regional differences in employment growth that were unrelated to the minimum wage. The most convincing critique of Card and Krueger's (1994, 2000) study of the increase in the New Jersey minimum wage (relative to Pennsylvania, where the minimum wage did not go up) was that it is difficult to generalize from a single case study. Even a perfect experiment will have random error that could affect the results in a single experiment. Imagine that the minimum wage had a small, but real, negative employment effect. Random errors will lead the results of separate tests to be distributed around this hypothetical negative employment effect, sometimes producing a larger disemployment effect than the "true" level, sometimes producing a smaller disemployment effect than what is "true" – even zero or positive measured disemployment effects. By this thinking, Card and Krueger's experiment could have been perfectly executed, but still represent only one result from a distribution of possible outcomes. Absent other information, the best estimate of the true effect of the minimum wage would be Card and Krueger's actual results, but we cannot convincingly rule out, based on that single case, that the effects were in truth larger or smaller than what was observed in the case of New Jersey in 1992. In recognition of this problem, **Dube**, Lester and Reich (2010) essentially **replicated Card and Krueger's** New Jersey-Pennsylvania **experiment thousands of times**, by comparing employment differences across contiguous U.S. counties with different levels of the minimum wage. The three economists carefully constructed a data set of restaurant employment in every quarter **between 1990 and 2006 in** the **1,381 counties** in the United States for which data were available continuously over the full period.22 They also matched these employment data with the level of the federal or state minimum wage (whichever was higher) in the county in each quarter of each year in the sample. They then compared restaurant employment outcomes across a subset of 318 pairs of bordering counties where the prevailing minimum wage could differ, depending on the level of the federal and state minimum wage. Their methodology effectively generalizes the Card and Krueger New Jersey-Pennsylvania study, but with several advantages. First, **the much larger number** of cases **allowed Dube**, Lester, and Reich **to look at a much larger distribution of** employment **outcomes** than was possible in the single case of the 1992 increase in the New Jersey minimum wage. **Second, since they followed counties over a 16-year period, the researchers** were also able to **test for** the possibility of **longer-term effects. Finally,** because the relative minimum wage varied across counties over time, the **minimum wage** in a particular county **could, at different points in time, be lower**, identical to, **and higher** than the minimum wage in its pair, **providing substantially more** experimental **variation than** in the New Jersey-Pennsylvania (and many **similar) studies.** Using this large sample of border counties, and these statistical advantages over earlier research, Dube, Lester, and Reich "...find strong earnings effects and no employment effects of minimum wage increases."23

**Contention 2** is Inequality

Income inequality is a threat to the political equality of civic republicanism—3 warrants.

**Waltman 2** writes[[14]](#footnote-14)

Nevertheless, too much inequality in material possessions is an equally serious problem. Again, both the moral case and the economic efficiency case against too much inequality, powerful though they may be, must yield to the political case. **Severe inequalities in material conditions**, to put it straightforwardly, **can destroy** the very bases on which legal and **political equality** are built. This is true for three reasons. **First, when citizens enjoy vastly different incomes, they** begin to **lose the sense of seeing each other as equals**. When housing, clothes, vacations, food, and so forth differ enormously, people invariably become detached from those who are on the other side of the chasm. Their experiences cannot help but disconnect them, and they begin to see fellow citizens as somehow the "other," different from themselves, unapproachable and perhaps vexing. Everyone need not be able to afford an identical house, but the square footage and the acreage on which it sits should not be too far apart. If it is a matter of choice, of course-citizen A spends his discretionary income on a large house while citizen B enjoys expensive wines in a smaller house-that is altogether different. That very act of choice makes them similar. **Second, too much** economic **inequality can** lead to **ske**wed **political participation**. Any form of clientelism is obviously incompatible with republicanism. However, even far short of that, marked economic inequalities open up the possibility that **some can**, if not the guarantee that they will, **buy** ever **larger megaphones** to amplify their voices. In a healthy republic, every citizen's views need to be heard and considered, much as in a Quaker meeting. If one group of citizens can drown out others' voices, then a republic cannot be maintained. It is inevitable that economic power is going to lead to political power. And with the disparities that accompany a market economy, it is also inevitable that in a republic some are going to have more wherewithal to invest in the political debate than others. But that gap should be narrow rather than large. If we cannot eliminate megaphones, we can at least restrict their size. **Third, vast** economic **inequalities impair** the **public institutions** that are a vital component of republican life. **Republics require more domains** than the courtroom and the polling station **where citizens meet as equals, unaffected by wealth** and income. **Public parks**, for example, are much more than attractive and pleasant locales. They **are places where citizens can** see each other and **interact as equals. When those with superior wealth erect** their **private enclaves to enjoy** tennis, picnics, and **the outdoors, a link in the citizenship chain is broken. The same is true for public transport and public schools**. When people do not see their personal fate linked to public institutions, they lose interest in them. Why should, I, the wealthy begin to think, pay for these facilities which I do not use? When that happens a vital thread of a common citizenship is cut. Of even more central concern is the military. Citizen service in the military is the hallmark of a republic. When the army becomes largely a semi-mercenary force of those for whom it presents an attractive economic alternative, one of the central vestiges of citizenship is removed.

Income inequality is growing now. Living wage reduces it.

**Trumka and Owens 13** write[[15]](#footnote-15)

(CNN) -- For the first time since the Great Depression, the U.S. Census Bureau tells us, **middle class family incomes have lost ground for more than a decade**. The sad truth is that the rewards for productivity and hard work such as health care coverage, retirement security, opportunity -- rewards that used to make America's workers "middle class" -- are on the rocks. **All** the **wage increases over the past 15 years have gone to the wealthiest 10%**, according to the Economic Policy Institute. All of them. And almost all, **95%**, **of** the **income gains from** 20**09 to 2012**, the first three years of recovery from the Great Recession, **went to the** very **richest 1%.** Something else has happened, too. The bottom has fallen out of America's wage floor. And the **erosion of the minimum wage has lowered pay and working standards for all of us**. An increase in the minimum wage -- which hasn't risen since 2009 -- is long overdue. **If the minimum wage had** just **kept pace with inflation since 1968, it would be $10.77 an hour today** instead of $7.25. For tipped workers, the rate's been stuck at a scandalous $2.13 for 20 years. Congress is considering a proposal, called the Fair Minimum Wage Act, from Sen. Tom Harkin of Iowa and Rep. George Miller of California, supported by President Barack Obama. The act would raise the minimum wage over two years to $10.10 an hour and let it grow with inflation. The Senate is expected to consider the proposal the week after Thanksgiving. If the minimum wage had kept up with the growth of workers' productivity, it would be $18.67. And if it had matched the wage growth of the wealthiest 1%, it would be more than $28. The share of workers in "good jobs" -- paying more than $37,000 a year and providing health care and retirement benefits -- has fallen, even though workers' average age and education level have grown. **And today, most job growth** -- and six in 10 jobs expected to be added over the next decade -- **are in low-wage fields. A raise in the minimum wage would give 30 million workers a little more money to pay for rent, food and other needs**. But from other quarters, a different suggestion is on the table.

Decline in purchasing power is affecting income inequality.

**Boushey 14** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

Finally, the level of the minimum wage has a considerable effect on the distribution of wages in the United States. As mentioned above, the minimum wage used to be much closer to the average wage. But **since 1968,** the average wage grew as the **purchasing power of** the **minimum wage declined by 23 percent**. At the same time, the **distance between wage earner at the 10th percentile and** median wage earner, or the earner at **the 50th percentile, grew by 18 percent from** 19**79 to 2009. Economists have found** that the **declining inflation-adjusted value of the minimum wage had a considerable effect on wage inequality** for those workers in the bottom half of the wage distribution. A 1996 paper by economists John DiNardo, of the University of Michigan, Nicole Fortin, of the University of British Columbia, and Thomas Lemieux, also of the University of British Columbia, found that the decrease in the minimum wage from 1979 to 1988 had a considerable effect on the wage distribution. They found the decline over that time could explain up to 25 percent of the change in the standard deviation in the logarithm of male wages and up to 30 percent for female wages. In plain English, this means the decline in the minimum wage explained up to a fourth of increasing wage inequality for men and up to three-tenths of increase wage inequality for women. In more recent work, MIT economist David **Autor**, London School of Economics economist Alan Manning, **and** Federal Reserve Board economist Christopher **Smith find that** about **75 percent of the increase in low-end inequality from** 19**79 to** 19**91 is due to** the **decline in the value of the minimum wage, but** the decline **only explains 45 percent** of the increase **from** 19**79 to** 20**09**. While the literature has not come to an agreement on the exact size of the effect, the decline of the minimum wage was a significant factor in the increase in inequality for lower half of the income distribution.

Higher minimum wage is key to purchasing power for millions and job growth. And, it won’t cause outsourcing or automation

**Hanauer 13** writes[[17]](#footnote-17)

The fundamental law of capitalism is that **if workers have no money, businesses have no customers**. That’s why the extreme, and widening, wealth gap in our economy presents not just a moral challenge, but an economic one, too. In a capitalist system, **rising inequality creates a death spiral of falling demand that** ultimately **takes everyone down**. Low-wage jobs are fast replacing middle-class ones in the U.S. economy. Sixty percent of the jobs lost in the last recession were middle-income, while 59 percent of the new positions during the past two years of recovery were in low-wage industries that continue to expand such as retail, food services, cleaning and health-care support. By 2020, 48 percent of jobs will be in those service sectors. Policy makers debate incremental changes for arresting this vicious cycle. But perhaps the most powerful and elegant antidote is sitting right before us: a spike in the federal minimum wage to $15 an hour. True, that sounds like a lot. When President Barack Obama called in February for an increase to $9 an hour from $7.25, he was accused of being a dangerous redistributionist. Yet consider this: If the minimum wage had simply tracked U.S. productivity gains since 1968, it would be $21.72 an hour -- three times what it is now. CULTIVATING CONSUMERS Traditionally, arguments for big minimum-wage increases come from labor unions and advocates for the poor. **I make the case as a businessman and entrepreneur** who sees our millions of low-paid workers as customers to be cultivated and not as costs to be cut. Here’s a bottom-line example: My investment portfolio includes Pacific Coast Feather Co., one of the largest U.S. manufacturers of bed pillows. Like many other manufacturers, pillow-makers are struggling because of weak demand. The problem comes down to this: My annual earnings equal about 1,000 times the U.S. median wage, but I don’t consume 1,000 times more pillows than the average American. Even the richest among us only need one or two to rest their heads at night. An economy such as ours that increasingly concentrates wealth in the top 1 percent, and where most workers must rely on stagnant or falling wages, isn’t a place to build much of a pillow business, or any other business for that matter. **Raising** the **minimum wage to $15** an hour **would inject** about **$450 billion into the economy each year. That would give more purchasing power to millions** of poor and lower-middle-class Americans, **and would stimulate buying, production and hiring**. Studies by the Economic Policy Institute show that a $15 minimum wage would directly affect 51 million workers and indirectly benefit an additional 30 million. That’s 81 million people, or about 64 percent of the workforce, and their families who would be more able to buy cars, clothing and food from our nation’s businesses. **This** virtuous cycle effect **is described in the research of** economists David **Card and** Alan **Krueger** (the current chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers) showing that, contrary to conventional economic orthodoxy, increases in the minimum wage increase employment. **In 60 percent of** the **states that raised** the **minimum wage during** periods of **high unemployment, job growth was faster than the national average**. Some business people oppose an increase in the minimum wage as needless government interference in the workings of the market. In fact, a big increase would substantially reduce government intervention and dependency on public assistance programs. FEDERAL BENEFITS No one earning the current minimum wage of about $15,000 per year can aspire to live decently, much less raise a family. As a result, almost all workers subsisting on those low earnings need panoply of taxpayer-supported benefits, including the earned income tax credit, food stamps, Medicaid or housing subsidies. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the federal government spent $316 billion on programs designed to help the poor in 2012. That means the current $7.25 minimum wage forces taxpayers to subsidize Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and other large employers, effectively socializing their labor costs. This is great for Wal-Mart and its shareholders, but terrible for America. It is both unjust and inefficient. A higher minimum wage would also make low-income families less dependent on government programs: The CBO report shows that the federal government gives about $8,800 in annual assistance to the lowest-income households but only $4,000 to households earning $35,500, which would be about the level of earnings of a worker making $15 an hour. **An objection** to a significant wage increase **is that it would force employers to shed workers. Yet** the **evidence points the other way: Workers earn** more **and spend more,** increasing demand and **helping businesses grow. Critics** of raising the minimum wage **also say** it will lead to more **outsourcing** and job loss. **Yet virtually all** of these **low-wage jobs are service jobs that can neither be outsourced nor automated**. Raising the earnings of all American workers would provide all businesses with more customers with more to spend. Seeing the economy as Henry Ford did would redirect our country toward a high-growth future that works for all.

The least well-off come first under the standard.

**Pettit 99** writes[[18]](#footnote-18)

The primary consideration that leads me to defend structural egalitarianism is that the intensity of freedom as non-domination which a person enjoys in a society is a function of other people's powers as well as of their own. Take a person's powers to include all those factors that are liable to affect political, legal, financial, and social clout. The intensity of someone's freedom as **non-domination**—if you like, the level of their protection—**is not just** a function of **the power**s that enable the person **to resist** or deter arbitrary **interference** by others. **It is also a function of the power**s at the disposal **of** those **others, for, depending on the** nature and **size of the power**s **of others,** what **their own power**s enable them to achieve in the way **of resistance** and deterrence **will vary. In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king.** The point is that a person's absolute score in relation to the intensity of non-domination is a function of their relative score in regard to powers: it is a function of their power-ratio in the society as a whole. The fact that each person's freedom as non-domination is a function of their relative powers has an immediate impact on the possibility of increasing the overall intensity of non-domination by introducing a greater inequality in its distribution. **Any anti-equality initiative will** make at least two parties less equal in their intensity of nondomination. It will do this either by increasing the advantaged person's powers or by decreasing the powers of the other party or by doing both at once: in whatever way, it will **worsen the power-ratio of the disadvantaged party.** But if the initiative is intended to raise the overall intensity of non-domination by the same margin by which it raises the intensity of non-domination of the favoured party, it is illdesigned. For the shift in the power-ratio that raises the advantaged party's absolute intensity of non-domination by interval A (for advantage) will serve at the same stroke to lower the disadvantaged person's intensity of non-domination, in absolute terms, by interval D (for disadvantage). The weaker party's absolute intensity of non-domination is a function of their relative powers, and the anti-equality initiative is bound to worsen it. An anti-equality initiative can succeed in maximizing the expected intensity of non-domination, then, only if the margin or margins by which it increases the expected non-domination of the advantaged compensate for the margins by which it decreases the expected nondomination of the disadvantaged. But there is no reason to think that A-margins are generally going to be larger than D-margins. There is no reason to think that those who benefit in absolute terms from an anti-equality initiative are going to enjoy an increase that compensates for the loss to those who suffer in absolute terms from that initiative. This observation already teaches us a relevant lesson. It means that, in the unlikely event that we are starting from an egalitarian base where everyone enjoys the same intensity of non-domination, it will make little or no sense to think of resorting to anti-equality initiatives in order to increase the overall intensity of non-domination enjoyed. The chances are that such a resort will reduce the overall intensity of non-domination at the same time as it makes its distribution less equal. But what if we are starting, as it is more plausible to suppose, from an inegalitarian base? Is there any reason, then, to think that anti-equality policies may increase the overall intensity of nondomination? No, there is not. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that in general any anti-equality intervention will be inferior to some pro-equality one. Here I am moved by a consideration additional to the consideration that a person's absolute intensity of nondomination is a function of their relative powers. The **second**ary consideration is, as we may put it, that the capacity of a person's power-ratio to produce intensity of **non-domination is subject to diminishing marginal productivity.** Where someone's power-ratio is poor, any improvement in their position will make for a comparatively large increase in their intensity of non-domination. Where the starting ratio is good, any improvement will make for a comparatively small increase in their intensity of non-domination. More generally, as the ratio in question improves, the function from ratio to intensity will decrease; it will take more and more of an improvement in the ratio to produce a given increase in non-domination. Improvements in the ratio are subject to diminishing marginal productivity in regard to the intensity of non-domination that they make possible. Imagine that we are dealing with just two individuals, A and B. **Suppose that A is** sufficiently well resourced to be generally **able to resist interference from B** or to deter B from interfering. Suppose, in other words, that **A enjoys** a high intensity of **non-domination** in the society constituted by A and B, not being subject to interference at will and with impunity from B. In such a case, **it will not do much** for A's non-domination **to increase their powers even further**; in fact, it may do nothing at all: A may be at a point where extra powers have zero marginal productivity.1 The increases may be more or less redundant, providing A with powers that are not really needed for the purposes of non-domination. The case contrasts with what those increases would have achieved **had A been** comparatively **powerless** and generally unable to resist B's interference or deter B from interfering. In such a situation, **the value of the increases would have been much greater.** The fact that improvements in a person's power-ratio are subject to diminishing marginal productivity in regard to intensity of nondomination means that if we are starting from an inegalitarian base, then no anti-equality initiative can hope to do as well in the production of overall non-domination as a corresponding pro-equality one. Any anti-equality intervention has to increase the difference in intensities of non-domination enjoyed by at least two individuals. That implies that it has to improve the power-ratio of a better-off individual rather than improving the power-ratio of a worse-off one. But since the function from power-ratio to intensity of non-domination is subject to diminishing marginal productivity, the anti-equality intervention must be generally expected not to do as well as the rival intervention that would have improved the power-ratio of the worseoff individual.2 The anti-equality intervention involves an expenditure in power-conferring resources that is designed to increase overall intensity of non-domination, and it appears that those **resources would** have **be**en **more efficiently spent on the less well-off** individual than on the better-off.

**Contention 3** is Bargaining Power

A living wage corrects for an imbalance in bargaining power between wage earners and employers

**Bernstein 13** writes[[19]](#footnote-19)

Same with the minimum wage.  In fact, its introduction in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938—75 years old this year—was predicated on this premise.  **Left unattended,** the **vast imbalance in bargaining power between wage setters and** the **low**est-**wage workers would drive their wages down to privation levels, and thus Congress sets a wage floor**.  It complements that wage floor with other policies, like the Earned Income Credit, to help raise the paychecks of low-income workers to level wherein they can get closer to meeting their families basic needs. Of course, many policy makers do not in good faith on the issue, today’s crop especially (during the Reagan years, the real value of the minimum fell by 30%).  That’s one reason why, as Dube documents, there’s so much action on minimum wages at the sub-national level. In my view, **there’s nothing wrong**, and a lot right, **with the idea that work** for able-bodied adults **is a**n important **pathway out of poverty.  But the** only, and I mean **ONLY**, **way that works is if ample living wage jobs are available** to all comers.  If labor demand in the low-wage sector outpaces, or at least tightly matches, labor supply.  If the minimum wage is set at a supportive level and other work supports, like the EITC and affordable health care, are solidly in place. Otherwise, “work as a pathway out of poverty” is nothing more than a cruel construct, mindlessly repeated by ideologues with little connection to the real world.

A higher minimum wage increases bargaining power of workers. This solves poor working conditions which are a product of arbitrary interference.

**Konczal 14** writes[[20]](#footnote-20)

When low-wage workers protest at fast food restaurants, low wages are not necessarily their sole concern. The working conditions may be equally important. **Between** a **lack of sick days, random shift scheduling, and working without pay, there is a host of problems** and humiliations **from which workers seek redress**. **Civic republicanism presses against these practices**. Philip **Pettit**, the philosopher most associated with this strain of thinking, **defines its goal in terms of “**freedom as **non-domination**,**”** freedom “as a condition under which a person is more or less immune to interference on an arbitrary basis.” In what sense can people be considered free if their means of survival places them at the mercy of an erratic schedule, thereby preventing the formation of civic and communal ties? **Surveys of N**ew **Y**ork **C**ity**’s low-wage workers find that 84 percent** of them **are not paid for their entire workday. When bosses can flout labor contracts** and arbitrarily impose working conditions in this way, **workers lack** the kind of **freedom** that civic republicans celebrate. **By making the labor market tighter through lower turnover and vacancies, a higher minimum wage creates bargaining power for workers** and will help **to eliminate these kinds of domination.**

Counterplans can’t solve. They don’t provide bargaining power for workers to earn a higher wage.

**NYT 14** writes[[21]](#footnote-21)

WHAT’S THE POINT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE? Most people think of the minimum wage as the lowest legal hourly pay. That’s true, but it is really much more than that. As defined in the name of the law that established it — the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 — the minimum wage is a fundamental labor standard designed to protect workers, just as child labor laws and overtime pay rules do. Labor standards, like environmental standards and investor protections, are essential to a functional economy. Properly set and enforced, these standards check exploitation, pollution and speculation. In the process, they promote broad and rising prosperity, as well as public confidence. The minimum wage is specifically intended to take aim at the inherent imbalance in power between employers and low-wage workers that can push wages down to poverty levels. An appropriate wage floor set by Congress effectively substitutes for the bargaining power that low-wage workers lack. When low-end wages rise, poverty and inequality are reduced. But that doesn’t mean the minimum wage is a government program to provide welfare, as critics sometimes imply in an attempt to link it to unpopular policies. An hourly minimum of $10.10, for example, as Democrats have proposed, would reduce the number of people living in poverty by 4.6 million, according to widely accepted research, without requiring the government to tax, borrow or spend. IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE? No. **Other programs, including** food stamps, Medicaid and the **e**arned-**i**ncome **t**ax **c**redit, also **increase** the **meager resources of low-wage workers, but they do not provide bargaining power to claim a better wage.** In fact, they can drive wages down, because employers who pay poorly factor the government assistance into their wage scales. This is especially true of the earned-income tax credit, a taxpayer-provided wage subsidy that helps lift the income of working families above the poverty line. Conservatives often call for increases to the **E.I.T.C.** instead of a higher minimum wage, saying that a higher minimum acts as an unfair and unwise tax on low-wage employers. That’s a stretch, especially in light of rising corporate profits even as pay has dwindled. It also ignores how the tax credit **increases** the supply of **low-wage labor by encouraging more people to work, holding down** the **cost of labor for employers**. By one estimate, increasing the tax credit by 10 percent reduces the wages of high-school educated workers by 2 percent. There are good reasons to expand the tax credit for childless workers, as President Obama recently proposed. It is a successful antipoverty program and a capstone in the conservative agenda to emphasize work over welfare. But an expanded E.I.T.C. is no reason to stint on raising the minimum wage — just the opposite. **A higher minimum wage could** help **offset the wage-depressing effect of a bolstered E.I.T.C**., and would ensure that both taxpayers and employers do their part to make work pay.

Next is theory pre-empts.

**Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR time skew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot at substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat advocacy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism, permissibility, and presumption.

**Nelson 8** writes[[22]](#footnote-22)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution. If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to **deny our ability to make truth-statements or** to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole. Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. **By making the issue one of** desirability of **competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way. **Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

I’m willing to clarify or alter my advocacy in cross-ex.

Finally, the neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

# Contention

## Overview

Case outweighs unemployment, that’s Bernstein 14. Even if they win their turns, only my evidence quantifies their impacts and says the vast majority of workers will still benefit.

Neg studies are skewed; they don’t control for regional growth rates

**Schmitt 13**

John Schmitt (Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C.) “Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect on Employment?” Center for Economic and Policy Research. February 2013. <http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage-2013-02.pdf>

Dube, Lester, and Reich's study also identified an important flaw in much of the earlier minimum-wage research based on the analysis of state-level employment patterns. The three economists demonstrated that overall employment trends vary substantially across region, with overall employment generally growing rapidly in parts of the country where minimum wages are low (the South, for example) and growing more slowly in parts of the country where minimum wages tend to be higher (the Northeast, for example). Since no researchers (even the harshest critics of the minimum wage) believe that the minimum wage levels prevailing in the United States have had any impact on the *overall* level of employment, failure to control for these underlying differences in regional employment trends, Dube, Lester, and Reich argued, can bias statistical analyses of the minimum wage. Standard statistical analyses that do not control for this "spatial correlation" in the minimum wage will attribute the better employment performance in low minimum-wage states to the lower minimum wage, rather than to whatever the real cause is that is driving the faster overall job growth in these states (good weather, for example). Dube, Lester, and Reich use a dataset of restaurant employment in all counties (for which they have continuous data from 1990 through 2006), not just those that lie along state borders and are able to closely match earlier research that finds job losses associated with the minimum wage. But, once they control for region of the country, these same earlier statistical techniques show no employment losses. They conclude: "The large negative elasticities in the traditional specification are generated primarily by regional and local differences in employment trends that are unrelated to minimum wage policies."24, 25 Independently of Dube, Lester, and Reich, economists John Addison, McKinley Blackburn, and Chad Cotti used similar county level data for the restaurant-and-bar sector to arrive at similar conclusions. Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti found no net employment effect of the minimum wage in the restaurant-and-bar sector. More importantly, using reasoning similar to Dube, Lester, and Reich, they also concluded that the standard state panel-data techniques that have typically yielded negative employment effects of the minimum wage appear to be biased toward finding that result: "Our evidence does not suggest that minimum wages reduce employment once controls for trends in county-level sectoral employment are incorporated. Rather, employment appears to exhibit an independent downward trend in states that have increased their minimum wages relative to states that have not, thereby predisposing estimates towards reporting negative outcomes."26

## Faster Job Growth

States with high minimum wage see faster job growth

**Covert 14**

Citing Ben Wolcott (Center for Economic and Policy Research)

Bryce Covert (Economic Policy Editor for ThinkProgress; She was previously editor of the Roosevelt Institute’s Next New Deal blog and a senior communications officer; she is also a contributor for The Nation and was previously a contributor for ForbesWoman. Her writing has appeared on The New York Times, The New York Daily News, The Nation, The Atlantic, The American Prospect, and others). “States That Raised Their Minimum Wages Are Experiencing Faster Job Growth.” ThinkProgress. 3 July 2014. http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/07/03/3456393/minimum-wage-state-increase-employment/

Think a higher minimum wage is a job killer? Think again: The states that raised their minimum wages on January 1 have seen higher employment growth since then than the states that kept theirs at the same rate. The minimum wage went up in 13 states — Arizona, Connecticut, Colorado, Florida, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington — either thanks to automatic increases in line with inflation or new legislation, as Ben Wolcott reports in his analysis at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. The average change in employment for those states over the first five months of the year as compared with the last five of 2013 is .99 percent, while the average for all remaining states is .68 percent. Digging deeper, all but one of those states are experiencing increases in employment, and nine of them have seen growth above the median rate. Wolcott’s analysis builds on a previous one from Goldman Sachs, which did the same evaluation for just January and compares it to December of last year. It found that the states that had minimum wage increases experienced faster job growth than those without a raise. This doesn’t mean that increasing the minimum wage necessarily creates more jobs. “While this kind of simple exercise can’t establish causality, it does provide evidence against theoretical negative employment effects of minimum-wage increases,” Wolcott writes. Indeed, it adds to the evidence that higher minimum wages may not hurt job growth as much as some have warned. Washington has the highest minimum wage and saw the biggest increase in small business jobs last year. Its job growth has also remained steady and above average in the 15 years since it raised its wage. When economists studied state-level minimum wage increases over two decades they didn’t find any conclusive evidence that the raises impacted job creation.

## AT Neg Authors

### Neumark and Wascher

**Neumark and Wascher’s review is cherry-picked and excludes key studies**

**Schmitt 13**

John Schmitt (Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C.) “Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect on Employment?” Center for Economic and Policy Research. February 2013. <http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage-2013-02.pdf>

The Neumark and Wascher review, however, is considerably more subjective and arguably less relevant to the United States than the two meta-studies discussed earlier. Only 52 of the 102 studies reviewed by Neumark and Wascher analyzed U.S. data. Of these, Neumark and Wascher designated 19 as "most credible," five of which were their own studies.19 The Neumark and Wascher (2006) review also excludes several important papers that were not published until after the review was completed, including the important contributions of Arindrajit Dube, William Lester, and Michael Reich (2010) and Sylvia Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) (to which we will return to below).20 Wolfson and Belman (forthcoming) also produced an extensive qualitative review of minimum wage research since 2000, including a significant number of studies published too late for inclusion in Neumark and Wascher (2006, 2008). Of the studies they reviewed, 40 analyzed U.S. data. Fourteen of these found negative employment effects; thirteen found no effects; one found positive effects; and twelve, a mixture of negative, positive, and no effects. To sort out these conflicting findings, Wolfson and Belman appealed to their meta-study, which as noted earlier, concluded that there were no statistically and economically meaningful employment losses associated with the minimum wage.

Neumark and Wascher were too subjective—meta-analysis is more objective and goes aff

**Schmitt 13** writes[[23]](#footnote-23)

The problem here is that **Neumark and Wascher make a** decidedly **subjective selection of studies** to draw their conclusion. We actually have objective evaluations of the full body of recent minimum wage research and these point strongly in the direction of no significant effects on employment. In their analysis,\* Neumark and Wascher reviewed 102 studies of the minimum wage, 33 of which they declared “credible.” Of the 102 studies examined, **only 53**, however, **used data for the U**nited **S**tates, which would seem to be an important criteria for evaluating the employment impact here. **Of these 53** U.S. studies**, 19 earned** the rating of **"credible"** from Neumark and Wascher. But, fully five of these 19 — **more than one-fourth** — **were ones that Neumark and Wascher** had **conducted themselves**. This raises real questions about the objectivity of Neumark and Wascher's evaluations. Neumark and Wascher are long-time opponents of the minimum wage. I have, for a long-time, been a supporter of regular, moderate increases in the minimum wage. So, who are you going to believe? Well, fortunately, we have statistical techniques designed to use objective criteria to sift through and evaluate situations where there are a large number of separate statistical studies on the same topic. These "meta-study" techniques are widely used in medicine, for example, where they help doctors to draw more reliable results from a large number of clinical studies than is possible from any individual study. In a 2009 paper (behind a paywall) in the peer-reviewed, British Journal of Industrial Relations, Hristos **Doucouliagos and** T.D. **Stanley report** the results of **their meta-study** of 64 studies of the effects of the minimum wage on teenage employment in the United States. The chart below, taken from their paper, presents their key finding. The estimated employment effects, which are displayed along the x-axis, include both negative and positive values. Following standard statistical procedures, however, the researchers have also weighted each estimate by its statistical precision, which is measured on the y-axis. The higher up an estimate lies, the more precise it is. doucouliagos-stanley-2009-figure2 What is most striking about the chart is that **all of the most precise estimates are at or** very **close to zero** — the point where the minimum wage has no effect on teen employment. **Doucouliagos and Stanley's more objective approach leads them to conclude that the minimum wage has "an insignificant employment effect** (both practically and statistically)." And these results do not depend on anyone's subjective judgment of the “credibility” of the underlying studies.

### Clemens and Wither

Clemens and Wither’s data is skewed by the ’08 recession

**Lefberg 14** writes[[24]](#footnote-24)

Jeffrey **Clemens and** Michael **Withers’** minimum wage **study**, featured at length on the most recent episode of the Voice of San Diego podcast, **is** so **deeply flawed**, it shouldn’t have even received a National Bureau of Economic Research “working papers” definition. First, **the study** period **begins in** 20**07**, just before the financial collapse and Great Recession, **and ends in** 20**09, not quite before the recovery begins**, but more like when the uncontrolled bleeding stops. **Trying to evaluate** the impacts of **a small,** gradual **increase in minimum wage** affecting a small portion of the workforce **in the midst of** an **earthshaking** set of **economic events is** pure **scientific folly**. Under the best of conditions – meaning a period of economic stability with few or no cataclysmic events – it is extremely difficult to reach “conclusions” about the impact of a change in a single economic variable, like minimum wage. But trying to do that when the sky is falling is really bad social science. That’s why the research out there on minimum wage impact is peppered with cautions, caveats and qualifications. **Trying to study this over** the precise period of **the Great Recession** is like trying to study the environmental effects of fracking during a brief period that coincided perfectly with a major earthquake. It **doesn’t even pass the laugh test.**

Clemens and Wither use flawed survey data

**Lefberg 14** writes[[25]](#footnote-25)

**A** third, **serious flaw** in the study **concerns the source of its data: the Survey of Income and Program Participation**. Self-reported income and wages in surveys are notoriously faulty. Administrative data, like unemployment insurance and social security administration, is not perfect, but **decades of research on the quality of the Survey of Income and Program Participation** and other survey data for wage reporting **overwhelmingly conclude that survey data significantly understates wages**, compared to administrative data. The author would no doubt reply, “The **survey data** may underreport wages, but I’m not looking at absolute levels; I’m looking at ‘trends.’” Sorry, that doesn’t cut it. Survey of Income and Program Participation wage data not only underestimates wages, but **is also notoriously unstable** and volatile year to year. The survey may give good trend results over a 10- or 20-year time span, but to try to use it for pinpointing the impacts of a small change in the economy like increasing minimum wage over two years is amazingly irresponsible. By the way, **the Survey** of Income and Program Participation wage data **also includes tips for tipped workers** – that is, the respondents are asked to include tip income. Now, there’s something that the typical respondent is going to report with great accuracy. Right? And many workers directly affected by the minimum wage also receive material tip income. **Don’t you think that in the midst of the great**est **recession** since the great depression**, the size of tips** inevitably **fell? That’s quite apart from any minimum wage change**. All that being said, I’m glad the study is out there for debate. Both good and bad research need exposure, as long as there is opportunity for expression of other view points.

### Gitis 14

This dude’s not qualified

**Deutsch 14** writes[[26]](#footnote-26)

How did they make such an amateur mistake? Possibly because this study was conducted by an amateur. Ben **Gitis**, who conducted the AAF study, **graduated from college** (undergraduate) **less than a year ago**, according to his AAF bio. **Gitis majored in econ, but he’s not an economist, and he doesn’t know how to objectively measure effects of** the **minimum wage.**

Meta-analysis proves Gitis is an outlier

**Deutsch 14** writes[[27]](#footnote-27)

I’ve read it, and I don’t think it’s persuasive, for two reasons: First, it’s an outlier, and second, its methodology compares apples and oranges, because it compares entire states rather than economically similar regions. 1) In 2009, Hristos **Doucouliagos and** T. D. **Stanley – both PhD economists** who are published experts in meta-analysis (they literally wrote the book on the subject, har har har) – “**conducted a meta-study of 64 minimum-wage studies** published between 1972 and 2007 measuring the impact of minimum wages on teenage employment in the United States. When they graphed every employment estimate contained in these studies (over 1,000 in total), weighting each estimate by its statistical precision, **they found that the most precise estimates were** heavily **clustered at or near zero employment effects**.”1 Doucouliagos and Stanley concluded, “Two scenarios are consistent with this empirical research record. First, minimum wages may simply have no effect on employment… Second, minimum-wage effects might exist, but they may be too difficult to detect and/or are very small.” Here’s their graph: minimum-wage-effects-on-tee **So this AAF study is**, at best, **an outlier**. The evidence from 64 minimum-wage studies shows that the minimum wage either has no effect on teen unemployment, or that whatever effect it does have is extremely small.23

Gitis doesn’t account for regional growth rates

**Deutsch 14** writes[[28]](#footnote-28)

2) In 2010, in a study published in The Review of Economics and Statistics (pdf link), Arindrajit **Dube,** T. William **Lester, and** Michael **Reich showed that** minimum wage studies “that do not account for local economic conditions tend to produce spurious negative effects due to” regional effects in employment “that are unrelated to minimum wage policies.”4 In other words, **if you don’t control for regional differences in employment, it will look as if** the **minimum wage is correlated with higher unemployment; but the moment you account for regional differences, that finding disappears**. This is why the best studies of the minimum wage compare contiguous counties in neighboring states. The counties used to test minimum wage effects are, as much as possible, within a single economic region, except that one is in a state that has just raised its minimum wage. In other words, good studies compare apples with apples. **The AAF’s** hamhanded **study, in contrast,** simply **compares entire states, as if the only significant economic difference** between (say) Oregon and George **were minimum wage levels. They’re comparing apples and oranges**. (To be fair, the AAF study also controls for high school graduation rates. But that is literally the only confounding factor they consider. Nothing else – not region, not college graduation rates, not industry – is controlled for.)

### ALEC 14

ALEC is a conservative lobbying group in the tank for businesses

**Harris 13** writes[[29]](#footnote-29)

The **conservative lobbying group Alec has been behind a major push against** the **pay rates of low-wage** American **workers** by sponsoring or supporting scores of new laws aimed at weakening their protections, a new survey has found. Since 2011, politicians backed by the American Legislative Exchange Council, which has hit the headlines for previous campaigns on voting rights and gun laws, have introduced 67 different laws in 25 different states on the issue. The proposed laws are generally aimed at reducing minimum wage levels, weakening overtime protection or stopping the local creation of minimum wage laws in cities or states. Using language similar to "model bill" templates drafted by Alec, they were put forward by local politicians who are almost always Republican and affiliated with the powerful conservative group. Critics say **Alec is backed by powerful corporate groups** that are **seeking to draft legislation that serves their business interests**. "**Public scrutiny is the best weapon against their agenda**," said Jack Temple, a policy analyst at the National Employment Law Project, which advocates on workers' rights and drew up the report. Eleven of the 67 bills eventually became law. They included an Arizona bill weakening public sector wage contracts, an Idaho bill preventing state and local government from adopting some wage laws and New Hampshire legislation that repealed that state's minimum wage law. The phenomenon has come as the US economy struggles to recover from the impact of the Great Recession. Even though corporate profits are high and the stock market has soared to new record levels, job growth has been tepid and real wages largely stagnant as the economy has shifted in a low-wage direction. One study has found that around 60% of jobs lost during the recession were middle or high wage while some 58% of new jobs in the recovery have been in low-wage sectors. "With real wages for low wage workers already declining in the post-recession recovery, the last thing America's workers need is frontal assault on pay and overall compensation by state legislatures," said Christine Owens, Nelp's executive director. Indeed, President Barack Obama called for a rise in the minimum wage in his state of the union address in January, though many experts see such a move as unlikely to pass Congress. Alec, meanwhile, denies it is attacking workers' rights. "I feel that the Nelp report unfairly casts Alec as a suppressor or oppressor of American workers. We are not against employees of companies. Rather, we believe the market should dictate wages," said an Alec spokesman. **Alec has come under fire several times** in recent years for its campaigns. After drawing serious criticism from civil rights groups **for** its **backing** of **stand-your-ground** gun **laws and** also **voter ID legislation**, Alec decided last year to abandon campaigning on social policy issues in favour of concentrating on economic policies.

### Meer and West

Meer and West’s estimates are massively overstated

**Schmitt 13** writes[[30]](#footnote-30)

The first red flag is that the negative effect of the minimum wage estimated by **Meer and West applies to the entire workforce** (not just workers affected by the minimum wage) **and** appears to lie **well outside** the range of **almost all earlier research** on the minimum wage. Meer and West find that “a real minimum wage increase of 10 percent reduces job growth in the state by around 0.53 percentage points (during these years, the average state employment growth rate was 2.0 percent annually).” (p. 16) So, **according to Meer and West,** a **10 percent increase in** the **minimum wage would reduce** the **growth** rate **in total state employment by** about **25 percent**, roughly from an average of 2.0 percent in the absence of the minimum wage to 1.5 percent after a 10 percent increase. This is a very large effect. Economists typically treat policies that might raise or lower economic growth by 0.1 or 0.2 percentage points as a very big deal. What is especially surprising is that **their** estimated **effect does not refer to** the **employment growth for groups that typically earn low wages**, such as teenagers and restaurant workers, who have been the main focus of almost all minimum-wage research. These estimated effects apply to the entire workforce, not just the 5 percent or so of workers directly affected by the typical increase in the minimum wage. (The last seven increases in the federal minimum wage, for example, directly affected between 1 and 6 percent of workers, and, indirectly, perhaps a few percentage points more. See Table 1 in this document.) Even **researchers** who are **most critical of** the **minimum wage** typically **find that a 10-percent increase** in the mandated wage floor **would reduce** current **employment among teens** (or, in some analyses, fast-food restaurant workers, or in a few studies, adults with less than a high school degree) **by 1 to 2 percent**. (For a summary of employment effects written from a point of view that is generally critical of the minimum wage, see David Neumark and William Wascher's 2008 book Minimum Wages. My reading of the evidence is that employment effects of moderate increases hover near zero.) **It is hard to see how a policy that has that small an impact on directly affected workers could have such a large effect on the overall population.**

Meer and West’s findings on employment dynamics are empirically denied

**Schmitt 13** writes[[31]](#footnote-31)

The second red flag is that Meer and West's key result --that minimum wages reduce employment growth-- does not hold for teenagers or fast-food restaurant employees, the two groups that researchers overwhelmingly use to analyze the impact of the minimum wage. In a new working paper, Sylvia Allegretto, Arindrajit Dube, Michael Reich, and Ben Zipperer (**ADRZ**) **use two** different **data sets to test Meer and West**'s conjecture. **One** data set **covers teen employment; the other, fast-food workers. In both cases, following procedures** that are **similar** in spirit **to Meer and West, they find “no evidence that minimum wages reduce employment growth.”** For both groups, the estimated effects on employment growth are “close to zero” (p. 28) ADRZ conclude that these results “from low-wage groups actually affected by the policy suggests that the **negative association found by Meer and West is unlikely** to be **causal**.” ADRZ believe that the **Meer and West results may reflect “their lack of controls for the overall** state of the **labor market.”** (p. 28) **Another** working **paper**, **by Dube,** William **Lester, and Reich** (DLR), **looks at** exactly the kinds of **employment dynamics that interest Meer and West** (separations and hires in the wake of a minimum-wage increase), but focuses specifically on teens and fast-food workers. **DLR “find striking evidence that separations, hires, and turnover** rates for teens and restaurant workers **fall substantially** following a minimum wage increase” --**but with no significant net effect on employment**. (p. 2)

### Sabia et al.

Sabia et al. are wrong. Living wage has no impact on employment; consensus of research

**Schmitt 13**

John Schmitt (Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C.) “Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect on Employment?” Center for Economic and Policy Research. February 2013. <http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage-2013-02.pdf>

The Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen study, however, is subject to the same critique applied to Hirsch, Kaufman, and Zelenska (and Card and Krueger before them). Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen analyzed only one experience of the minimum wage. Even if the effects of the minimum wage were, in truth, zero, we would expect to see a distribution of estimates around zero, including both positive and negative estimates. As Doucouliagos and Stanley demonstrated in their large meta-study of employment effects through the middle of the 2000s, the minimum-wage literature on teenagers showed a range of positive and negative effects, but also a large spike of the most accurate estimates at, or very near, zero. Wolfson and Belman’s meta-study, which focused on the period from about 1990 through 2010, confirms Doucouliagos and Stanley's findings with more recent research. Given how far the Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen estimates lie outside this consensus range, the burden of proof would seem to fall on Sabia, Burkhauser, and Hansen to explain why their study of a single experiment with the minimum wage should outweigh the cumulative experience of scores of studies of the U.S. minimum wage since the early 1990s.

### CBO

The CBO data is skewed against living wage

**Bernstein 14**

Jared Bernstein (senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in Washington and a former chief economist to Vice President Joseph R. Biden). “The Impact of a Minimum-Wage Increase.” New York Times. 18 February 2014. http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/the-impact-of-a-minimum-wage-increase/?\_r=0

To derive the job-loss effects, the report does not do any original research. It just uses estimates from a wide range of studies on the impact of past minimum-wage increases. (For the technically inclined, it applies a negative employment elasticity that reflects the percent decline in jobs given a percent increase in the minimum wage.) It is important to recognize that there is a very wide range of estimates from which the budget agency can choose, as shown in the chart below, which plots results of the employment effect from dozens of studies (from a recent set of slides from the White House Council of Economic Advisers). This wide range does not imply that the budget office made a mistake, though it looks to me as if it applied a higher job-loss estimate than is the current consensus among economists who’ve closely studied the issue.

The CBO report supports a wage increase

**Bernstein 14**

Jared Bernstein (senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in Washington and a former chief economist to Vice President Joseph R. Biden). “The Impact of a Minimum-Wage Increase.” New York Times. 18 February 2014. http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/the-impact-of-a-minimum-wage-increase/?\_r=0

There is no policy I can think of that generates only benefits without any costs, and policy makers always have to weigh the two sides. In the case of the minimum wage, on the benefits side of ledger, the budget office shows that 16.5 million low-wage workers would directly get a much-needed pay increase at no cost to the federal budget. Though the budget agency did not analyze longer-term results for these workers, it’s also the case that when those displaced by the increase get their next low-wage job, they too will benefit from a higher paycheck than would otherwise be the case. As I’ve stressed many times on this blog, policy makers need to be concerned about the quantity of jobs, and pursue policies that will increase that number. But they also have to worry about job quality, especially in the low-wage sector, where the decline in the real value of the minimum wage, the increase in earnings inequality (meaning less growth finds its way to the low end of the wage scale), and the low bargaining power of the work force have placed strong, negative pressure on wage trends for decades. With such job-quality concerns in mind, I’d say the long history of research shows that increasing the minimum wage is a simple, effective policy that achieves its goal of raising the value of low-wage work with minimal distortions at no cost to the federal budget. The Congressional Budget Office report further confirms that conclusion.

## Prefer Meta-Analysis

Prefer meta-analyses

**Cullen and Gendreau 2k** write[[32]](#footnote-32)

There are, however, advantages to using the meta-analytic technique to organize research findings. **First, meta-analysis can detect effects that traditional** narrative or ballot box **reviews fail to capture**. **Because the statistical power of many** evaluation **studies is low due to** use of **small sample sizes, real effects are** often **missed as studies are counted one by one** (Schmidt 1996). By summing effect sizes across a sample of studies regardless of their statistical significance, however, meta-analysis avoids this problem. Thus, as Lipsey (1999, 619) notes, meta-analysis is able: to identify effects not clearly visible to traditional reviewers . . . because research findings come to us in the form of signal-to-noise ratios, where the signal is the intervention effect we are attempting to estimate and the noise is the background, sampling error, measurement error, and betweenstudy variability that tends to obscure the signal. Meta-analytic techniques allow some of that background noise to be controlled statistically in ways not available to traditional reviewers and, hence, may reveal effects not previously detected. **Second,** it is possible **to assess whether methodological factors** (e.g., the quality of the research design) **influence the size of a treatment effect** by introducing them into a multivariate analysis. **If a** treatment **effect is robust after these factors are taken into account**, then **confidence is increased** that the effect is real and not a methodological artifact. **Third,** and relatedly, through a multivariate analysis, it also is possible to assess whether the magnitude of a treatment effect is conditioned by substantively important “moderating factors,” such as the risk level of offenders or the type of treatment modality employed. Fourth, various statistical procedures (e.g., “fail safe N”) have been developed to provide guidance on the likelihood that the findings of a meta-analysis are, or are not, vulnerable to being reversed as unpublished studies are uncovered and future evaluation studies are conducted (Orwin 1983; Rosnow and Rosenthal 1993). No such statistics, of course, exist for traditional reviews. Fifth, **any given meta-analysis is open to replication by other scholars,** either on the same data set or on a different data set. In this way, **coding decisions or the sample of studies** chosen for review **can be assessed independently**. Again, if a treatment effect is sustained in these replications, then we can have confidence that we have found that something does indeed work to reduce recidivism. Sixth, and perhaps most noteworthy, by presenting information in a precise, parsimonious way, meta-analysis facilitates the process of constructing knowledge about a topic, such as correctional treatment. Narrative reviews are unwieldy and tend to permit only broad generalizations. In contrast, meta-analysis is better able to convey information that shows, in a more delimited and clear way (e.g., listing effect sizes and their confidence intervals in a table), what does not work, what does work, and (as noted) what factors moderate what works. Let us hasten to say that these data do not allow definitive answers; nonetheless, they do illuminate what we currently know from the existing body of research and what data need to be collected to advance our knowledge base. They also provide clearer guidance on what factors effective programs have in common and, in turn, on what empirically based features correctional personnel should consider including in the treatment interventions they initiate.

## AT MW Laws=Racist (:22)

1. Not intrinsic to living wage. My aff doesn’t rely on the same intentions as past laws.

2. Living wage reduces the wage gap among races; studies prove

**Reich et al 14**

Michael Reich, (UC Berkeley Professor of Economics and Director, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, UC Berkeley), Ken Jacobs (UC Berkeley, Chair, Center for Labor Research and Education, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment), Annette Bernhardt (UC Berkeley Visiting Professor of Sociology and Visiting Researcher, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment). “Local Minimum Wage Laws: Impacts on Workers, Families and Businesses.” Report prepared for the Seattle Income Inequality Advisory Committee. March 2014. http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/104-14.pdf

For example, drawing on results in Reich and Laitinen (2003), Lantsberg (2003) conducted a prospective study of San Francisco’s first minimum wage increase in 2004 (from $6.75 to $8.50). He estimated that about 55,700 workers (14 percent of private sector workers) would benefit from the law, with 70 percent age 26 or older. Lantsberg also found differences by race and ethnicity. He estimated that while 9 percent of white workers would be affected, the corresponding figures were 18 percent of African American workers, 21 percent of Asian workers, and 22 percent of Hispanic workers. In his prospective study of Santa Fe’s 2004 minimum wage law, Pollin (2004) similarly found that the increase would benefit mainly adult workers (many of them primary bread-winners) and especially workers of color.

3. I solve inequality by empowering minorities to challenge their conditions via purchasing and bargaining power.

4. Economic consensus goes aff

**Reich et al 14**

Michael Reich, (UC Berkeley Professor of Economics and Director, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, UC Berkeley), Ken Jacobs (UC Berkeley, Chair, Center for Labor Research and Education, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment), Annette Bernhardt (UC Berkeley Visiting Professor of Sociology and Visiting Researcher, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment). “Local Minimum Wage Laws: Impacts on Workers, Families and Businesses.” Report prepared for the Seattle Income Inequality Advisory Committee. March 2014. http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/104-14.pdf

**Economists agree** that minimum wage laws have large positive effects on workers’ pay and their families’ living standards. Raising the minimum wage increases earnings for workers at the low end of the labor market, the majority of whom are adults. **Women and workers of color benefit disproportionately.** In addition, new research on the effect of minimum wage increases documents important reductions in family poverty rates. Moreover, low-wage workers and their families are often forced to rely on public assistance programs; new research on food stamps finds that raising the minimum wage reduces their reliance on this program.

## AT Small Businesses Women Turn (:10)

Living wage empowers women

**Riordan 13** writes[[33]](#footnote-33)

**Living wage is a feminist issue. Feminists** from the second wave on through present day **have strived for** the **independence of women**, and our right to choose our own lifestyles and careers, and to do so without being dependent on men. If we truly believe each woman should be able to live her life freely and as she chooses we need to raise the minimum wage to a living wage. When **someone** is **not paid a living wage** they **cannot afford to pay for housing** and **food** and **childcare and healthcare**. Instead they must make choices between all of these, prioritizing some over others. **For a woman paid less than a living wage birth control** is not a basic medical expense, it **is a luxury**. And **without birth control it is harder to control the** size and **future of one’s family, something that dramatically impacts one’s economic reality**. Healthcare decisions are harder, and for many people healthcare isn’t a reality at all. Childcare decisions are complicated, and women making minimum wage are more likely to work multiple jobs to make ends meet. Women work 2/3 of minimum wage jobs. If we want women to have the freedom to live their lives as they choose and to do so independently, we need to pay women a living wage.

## AT Mobility Turn (:28)

1. Non-unique. Mobility is low now due to lack of bargaining power and corporate exploitation. that’s Gupta 15. The aff solves, that’s NYT 14.

2. No link. Ripple effect means there’s still a wage scale, so people will still have ability and incentive to move up the ladder; that’s Harris and Kearney 14.

3. Recent research proves higher wages improve social mobility

--New survey of research for Oxfam America

--Low wages mean workers can’t invest in education or job training

--Low wages cause poor health and family instability which are additional barriers

--Low wages hinder affordability of childcare; workers have to choose between caring for kids and working

--Income inequality means people inherit wealth while the poor fall behind

**Yarrow 4-9** writes[[34]](#footnote-34)

**Low wages** for workers **today** are **likely** to **predict low wages** for those same workers **tomorrow** (and for many years after), as a **new** survey of **research** for Oxfam America by Shawn Fremstad, a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, **reveals**.  **Poverty**-level **wages** not only mean that workers live in poverty; they also have a host of other negative effects that **relegate** these **workers to a lifetime stuck in America’s** growing **low-wage economy**. With more than 4 in 10 children who start life at the bottom of the income distribution staying at the bottom in adulthood, it is clear that America’s once-vaunted reputation for rags-to-riches mobility is no longer so deserved. Republicans and Democrats both recognize that upward social mobility is too low and has fallen behind that of most Western European countries. While more has been written about the flagging American Dream of inter-generational mobility (whether children are able to do better than their parents), intra-generational mobility (whether individuals ascend the socio-economic ladder in their own lifetimes) is also sparse. **Low-wage workers are in jobs that are insecure and make it** virtually **impossible for them to invest in education or training**, or to buy a car, to get to a better job. In addition, studies have found that **low-wages have** particularly **harmful effects on** families, children, and workers’ **health, which**, in turn, **are additional barriers to** workers **getting better jobs**. Much research suggests that workers in low-wage careers are less likely to marry and more likely to divorce and experience family instability. Single parents generally have lower living standards than two-parent households, and this hits single mothers especially hard. Eliminating the gender pay gap would cut the poverty rate in half for working single mothers, according to the Institute for Women’s Policy Research, and—not surprisingly—**higher wages generally lead to more stable families. Low wages make child care unaffordable**, causing enormous strains on families and single parents. For working parents who are paid poverty-level wages, 30 percent of their income goes to child care, the Census Bureau reports. For “near poor” workers—those paid between the poverty line and double that level—child care consumes about 20 percent of income. **Higher wages**, together with more generous public subsidies or tax credits for low-income families, make child care more affordable, significantly **reduc**ing **the** impossible **“choice”** that many low-wage workers have to make **between caring for** their **children and working**. Low wages are unhealthy. While arduous work and unsafe working conditions take their own toll, low-wage workers are less likely to get decent health care simply because they cannot afford it. J. Paul Leigh, a University of California-Davis epidemiologist also found a strong relationship between low wages and increased obesity and hypertension, particularly among women and workers under age 44. Low wages are associated with increased stress, low self-esteem, and a greater tendency to engage in unhealthy behaviors like smoking. The health effects of low wages become a vicious cycle, in which poor health hinders employment and income growth. By contrast, higher wages and better health give workers a greater chance of getting promotions, education and training, and consequently, the ability to achieve upward mobility. While Fremstad focuses on intra-generational mobility, considerable, better-known research on inter-generational mobility has found that upward mobility is less attainable in the United States than in other developed countries due to advantages conferred by parents’ relative well-being and reinforced by policies that hinder children’s opportunities for advancement. Robert Putnam, the Harvard political scientist and author of the influential book, Bowling Alone (2000), writes in his new book, Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis: “**As** income **inequality expands, kids from** more **privileged backgrounds start and** probably **finish** further and further **ahead** of their less privileged peers, **even if** the rate of socioeconomic **mobility is unchanged**.” **Raising** the **minimum wage** is not the only solution to America’s low-wage economy and low social mobility, but it **could set in motion** a virtuous cycle of **stronger families**, children who are better cared for, **and healthier workers**—thus helping hard-working Americans get and keep still better-paying jobs.

## AT Poorly Targeted (:31)

1. Living wage spills over to help everyone in poverty; their evidence ignores the ripple effect. That’s Harris and Kearney 14.

2. Best data goes aff. Living wage targets the poorest.

**Bernstein and Parrott 14** write[[35]](#footnote-35)

Some **critics** also **argue that** the **minimum wage is poorly targeted**, meaning that many people who benefit from a minimum-wage increase do not live in low-income households. This argument is typically made in conjunction with claims that there are large downsides to raising the minimum wage and that those “costs” are not worth absorbing because the beneficiaries do not really need the extra earnings. **E**conomic **P**olicy **I**nstitute **figures** on the workers whom the FMWA would affect **contradict this simplistic picture:**[16] About 17 million workers would receive a wage boost; 8 million children live in families with an affected worker. The majority of beneficiaries are women (58 percent). Most are adults (84 percent are over age 20; 47 percent are over 30). Most are non-Hispanic whites (57 percent), but African Americans and Hispanics are over-represented among those affected by the proposed increase: these groups make up 11 percent and 16 percent of the total workforce, respectively, but represent 16 percent and 21 percent of workers who would see their wages rise under the FMWA. Just under half (47 percent) of affected workers work full-time (35+ hours per week); another 36 percent work 20-34 hours per week. Some **54 percent of** the benefits of **the increase would flow to the bottom third of the workforce**, with family income below $40,000. Some **25 percent** of the benefits **would flow to the bottom 10 percent** of the workforce, with family income below $20,000.[17] **The average affected worker brings home half of** the **family earnings**. In addition, the low-wage workforce has gotten older and better educated over time. One study found that the share of low-wage workers (those earning less than $10 an hour in 2011 dollars) who are aged 16-24 fell from 47 percent in 1979 to 36 percent in 2011, while the share aged 25-64 rose from 48 percent to 60 percent.[18] The share of low-wage workers who were high-school dropouts fell from 40 percent to 20 percent during this period, while the share with at least some college rose from 25 percent to 43 percent. Clearly, the beneficiaries of a minimum-wage increase are older and better educated than the beneficiaries of an increase several decades ago. The claim that the minimum wage is largely a teenagers’ issue is not supported by these demographic trends.

3. I solve bargaining power, so workers can fight for rights that protect all employees; that’s Konczal 14.

(:16)

**[Stop here for time]**

4. Living wage primarily benefits poor and low-income families. Empirics prove

**Fairris et al 5** write[[36]](#footnote-36)

Given their characteristics, living wage workers are likely to be low-income. More than 70 percent have a high school education or less. Only 4 percent are teenagers, compared to 14 percent of low-wage workers in the county. The average affected worker has been in the labor force for 19 years, and nearly 90 percent are working full time. Living wage workers are more likely than other low-wage workers to be female (nearly 60 percent), to be African-American (30 percent), and to be single parents (16 percent). Indeed, nearly 45 percent of living wage workers surveyed said they use a government assistance program or claimed the Earned Income Tax Credit, even while earning the living wage. **We used data on low-wage workers in L.A County** to estimate poverty levels and lowincome status for living wage workers. **Only fifteen percent** of low-wage workers in the county are in severe poverty, **fall**ing **below** the **federal poverty guidelines**. Most people below the poverty guidelines are not working, so it is not surprising that the living wage does not primarily affect this group. **Using** the standard of **200 percent of** the **poverty guidelines as a more realistic measure** of poverty status**, 43 percent** of low-wage workers **are poor. These workers meet** the **income eligibility criteria for various government** antipoverty **programs.** Finally, **the majority of workers**, or 69%, can be considered lowincome. They **fall below a self-reliance standard** for Los Angeles County, **and would likely have difficulty making ends meet** without sharing housing or relying on government assistance or informal childcare. The remaining 31% of low-wage workers are not low-income. Compared to low-wage workers in the county, living wage workers are likely to have lower family incomes because they are less likely to be teenagers, and more likely to be female, African-American, and single mothers. The **income gains from** the **living wage, then, predominantly affect poor and low-income families**, who can likely use the extra income to help meet the high cost of living in Los Angeles.

## AT Benefit Reductions (:28)

Benefit reductions are non-unique and will be minimal

**CBO 14** writes[[37]](#footnote-37)

**Employers might respond** to an increase in the minimum wage in ways other than boosting prices or substituting other inputs for low-wage workers. For example, they might partly offset a minimum-wage increase **by reducing** other costs, including workers’ fringe **benefits** (such as health insurance or pensions) and job perks (such as free meals). As a result, a higher minimum wage might increase total compensation (which includes benefits and perks) less than it increased cash wages alone. That, in turn, would give employers a smaller incentive to reduce their employment of low-wage workers. **However,** such **benefit reductions would probably be modest**, in part **because low-wage workers generally receive few benefits related to pensions or** health **insurance**. In addition, **tax rules specify that employers who reduce** low-wage workers’ **nonwage benefits can face unfavorable tax treatment for higher-wage workers’ nonwage benefits**. Employers can also partly offset higher wages for low-wage workers by reducing either formal training or informal mentoring and coaching. The evidence on how much employers reduce benefits, training, or other costs is mixed. (For examples of such evidence, see Appendix B.)

Reductions in public assistance will be tiny, so workers will still benefit

**Cooper 14** writes[[38]](#footnote-38)

**In the simulation method, researchers** essentially **take a snapshot of current benefit receipt, and** try to **estimate how those values would change** if the reported hourly wages of individuals in the study were to change, holding all else constant. Giannarelli, Morton, and Wheaton (2007) use a microsimulation model of all U.S. tax, transfer, and health programs to estimate the effects of a package of labor and anti-poverty policies, including raising the federal minimum wage from $5.15—its level in 2007—to $7.25. They predicted that such an increase would decrease public assistance costs or raise federal revenues by over $2 billion (roughly $2.5 billion in 2013 dollars). Zabin, Dube, and Jacobs (2004) also used a simulation approach to estimate changes in California’s 10 major means-tested public assistance programs that would occur if the state increased its wage floor, finding that if the state raised its minimum wage from $6.75, where it stood at that time, to $8 per hour, it would save $2.7 billion ($3.3 billion in 2013 dollars). Natural experiments are unquestionably the gold standard for assessing the direct causal effect of exogenous policy changes; however, simulations are still useful for providing some insight into the magnitude of potential policy impacts. In this section, a simulation approach is used to compare benefit receipt among low-wage workers with receipt among higher-wage workers in order to estimate how lifting wages for those in the range likely to be affected by a minimum-wage increase to $10.10 might affect utilization of public assistance programs. **Simulation results Raising** the **minimum wage** to $10.10 would provide nearly $32 billion in additional wages to more than 27 million workers.11 The resulting increase in family incomes **would** unquestionably **improve living standards for millions** of working families. At the same time, many families that were forced to rely on safety net programs may no longer qualify for assistance, or may see their benefit levels reduced. **Most** of the means-tested **public assistance programs are designed such that benefits phase out gradually** as incomes rise**; therefore, benefit reductions are not so steep as to leave workers no better off than** they were **before their wage** income **increased**. However, one could certainly argue that these results show a need to reduce the phase-out rates for public programs to provide low-wage workers the maximum income boost from legislated minimum-wage increases. Table 2 describes how raising hourly wages is predicted to change public assistance utilization rates and benefit amounts among workers likely to be affected by a minimum-wage increase to $10.10. As the table shows, among these workers, a $1 increase in hourly wages is predicted to reduce the share receiving any government assistance by 3.9 percentage points. The share of workers receiving the Earned Income Tax Credit is expected to decline by 3.8 percentage points, and participation in SNAP is predicted to fall by 1.6 percentage points. The **predicted declines in participation rates for** the other **public assistance** programs **are relatively small**, but this is **because even among low-wage workers, the number** and shares **participating** in these programs **are fairly small to begin with.**

## AT Seattle’s Failing (:12)

Sounding the alarm about Seattle is premature and restaurants fail frequently regardless

**Becker 3-24** writes[[39]](#footnote-39)

Is the Emerald City in its twilight? That’s the question making the rounds in the wake of a recent article published in Seattle Magazine, which prods into whether or not a rash of restaurant closings around the city can be blamed, at least in part, on the city’s imminent minimum wage hike. Naturally, there has been backlash across the spectrum, with conservatives merrily adopting an “I told you so” approach, while liberals and supporters of the initiative are busy pointing out some clear flaws in the analysis. So, is that the case? **Is Seattle’s minimum wage increase leading to** a **sudden** increase in **small business shutterings?** Short answer: **no**. For one, **the minimum wage hasn’t even increased yet. Seattle’s plan is to phase in** the increase **bit by bit**, with the first increment scheduled to hit on April 1. That bump will set the minimum wage at $11 per hour, up from $9.47 per hour. Again, it’s hard to make the case that an increase in the minimum wage is ravaging an economy when it has yet to even happen. Still, that’s not to say that some business owners aren’t preparing for the worst, or simply quitting now while they have some money in the bank and are foregoing the option to attempt to stay afloat after the rules change. There’s also another issue with the Seattle Magazine article, and it’s even addressed up-front by the piece’s author, Sara Jones. “Even great-tasting restaurants battle tough odds — especially new ones,” Jones writes. “The National Restaurant Association doesn’t have exact failure rates for restaurants in their first few years, but media relations and public affairs director Christin Fernandez reports that **according to census data,** about 60,000 restaurants open and about **50,000 restaurants close in an average year**.” To add on to those figures, Jones also reports that with approximately 2,300 restaurants within the Seattle city limits, it can be expected that around 400 of them will go out of business in a given year. Clearly, small businesses, and **restaurants in particular, have a hard time staying open. It’s hard to blame that on** the **minimum wage** which, again, has yet to even be increased. Taking that into account, this doesn’t mean that businesses won’t go under once things change. The bump to $15 for minimum wage workers is going to cause some upheaval, that’s a given. That will mean that some companies go through a period of turbulence, and that some jobs will be lost. Structural unemployment levels will be impacted at the very least.

# DAs

## Automation (Scarsfail Version)

### General (:56)

#### 1. No link. Living wage jobs can’t be automated; that’s Hanauer 13.

#### 2. Automation is locked in and driven by non-wage alt causes

Thibodeau 14

Patrick Thibodeau (Senior editor). “Automation arrives at restaurants (but don’t blame rising minimum wages).” Computer World. 24 October 2014. http://www.computerworld.com/article/2837810/automation-arrives-at-restaurants-but-dont-blame-rising-minimum-wages.html

McDonald's this week told financial analysts of its plans to install self-ordering kiosks and mobile ordering at its restaurants. It isn't the only food chain doing this. The company that owns Chili's Grill & Bar also said this week it will complete a tablet ordering system rollout next month at its U.S. restaurants. Applebee's announced last December that it would deliver tablets to 1,800 restaurants this year. The pace of self-ordering system deployments appears to be **gaining speed**. But there's a political element to this and it's best to address it quickly. The move toward more automation comes at the same time pressure to raise minimum wages is growing. A Wall Street Journal editorial this week, "Minimum Wage Backfire," said that while it may be true for McDonald's to say that its tech plans will improve customer experience, the move is also "a convenient way...to justify a reduction in the chain's global workforce." The Journal faulted those who believe that raising fast food **wages** will boost stagnant incomes. "The result of their agitation will be more jobs for machines and fewer for the least skilled workers," it wrote. The elimination of jobs because of **automation will happen anyway**. Gartner says software and **robots will replace one third of all workers by 2025**, and that includes many high-skilled jobs, too. Automation is hardly new to retail. Banks rely on ATMs, and grocery stores, including Walmart, have deployed self-service checkouts. But McDonald's hasn't changed its basic system of taking orders since its founding in the 1950s, said Darren Tristano, executive vice president of Technomic, a research group focused on the restaurant industry. The move to kiosk and mobile ordering, said Tristano, is happening because it will improve order accuracy, speed up service and has the potential of reducing labor cost, which can account for about 30% of costs. But automated self-service is a convenience that's now expected, particularly among younger customers, he said. "It's keeping up with the times, and the (McDonald's) franchises are going to clamor for it," said Tristano, who said any labor savings is actually at the bottom of the list of reasons restaurants are putting in these self-service systems.

#### 3. He has zero spillover ev from service sector automation to AI.

#### 4. AI is inevitable, but fast pace is key to solve nano-tech, which is comparatively more existential

Bostrom 2

Nick Bostrom (Professor at Oxford; founder of Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute). “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards.” Journal of Evolution and Technology. Vol 9, No. 1. 2002. http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html

Creating a broad-based consensus among the world’s nation states is time-consuming, difficult, and in many instances impossible. We must therefore recognize the possibility that cases may arise in which a powerful nation or a coalition of states needs to act unilaterally for its own and the common interest. Such unilateral action may infringe on the sovereignty of other nations and may need to be done preemptively. Let us make this hypothetical more concrete. Suppose advanced nanotechnology has just been developed in some leading lab. (By advanced nanotechnology I mean a fairly general assembler, a device that can build a large range of three-dimensional structures – including rigid parts – to atomic precision given a detailed specification of the design and construction process, some feedstock chemicals, and a supply of energy.) Suppose that at this stage it is possible to predict that building dangerous nanoreplicators will be much easier than building a reliable nanotechnological immune system that could protect against all simple dangerous replicators. Maybe design-plans for the dangerous replicators have already been produced by design-ahead efforts and are available on the Internet. Suppose furthermore that because most of the research leading up to the construction of the assembler, excluding only the last few stages, is available in the open literature; so that other laboratories in other parts of the world are soon likely to develop their own assemblers. What should be done? With this setup, one can confidently predict that the dangerous technology will soon fall into the hands of “rogue nations”, hate groups, and perhaps eventually lone psychopaths. Sooner or later somebody would then assemble and release a destructive nanobot and **destroy the biosphere**. The only option is to take action to prevent the proliferation of the assembler technology until such a time as reliable countermeasures to a nano-attack have been deployed. Hopefully, most nations would be responsible enough to willingly subscribe to appropriate regulation of the assembler technology. The regulation would not need to be in the form of a ban on assemblers but it would have to limit temporarily but effectively the uses of assemblers, and it would have to be coupled to a thorough monitoring program. Some nations, however, may refuse to sign up. Such nations would first be pressured to join the coalition. If all efforts at persuasion fail, force or the threat of force would have to be used to get them to sign on. A preemptive strike on a sovereign nation is not a move to be taken lightly, but in the extreme case we have outlined – where a failure to act would with **high probability lead to existential catastrophe** – it is a responsibility that must not be abrogated. Whatever moral prohibition there normally is against violating national sovereignty is overridden in this case by the necessity to prevent the destruction of humankind. Even if the nation in question has not yet initiated open violence, the mere decision to go forward with development of the hazardous technology in the absence of sufficient regulation must be interpreted as an act of aggression, for it puts the rest of the rest of the world at an even greater risk than would, say, firing off several nuclear missiles in random directions. The intervention should be decisive enough to reduce the threat to an acceptable level but it should be no greater than is necessary to achieve this aim. It may even be appropriate to pay compensation to the people of the offending country, many of whom will bear little or no responsibility for the irresponsible actions of their leaders. While we should hope that we are never placed in a situation where initiating force becomes necessary, it is crucial that we make room in our moral and strategic thinking for this contingency. Developing widespread recognition of the moral aspects of this scenario ahead of time is especially important, since without some degree of public support democracies will find it difficult to act decisively before there has been any visible demonstration of what is at stake. Waiting for such a demonstration is decidedly not an option, because it might itself be the end.[20] 9.4 Differential technological development If a feasible technology has large commercial potential, it is probably impossible to prevent it from being developed. At least in today’s world, with lots of autonomous powers and relatively limited surveillance, and at least with technologies that do not rely on rare materials or large manufacturing plants, it would be exceedingly difficult to make a ban 100% watertight. For some technologies (say, ozone-destroying chemicals), imperfectly enforceable regulation may be all we need. But with other technologies, such as destructive nanobots that self-replicate in the natural environment, even a single breach could be terminal. The limited enforceability of technological bans restricts the set of feasible policies from which we can choose. What we do have the power to affect (to what extent depends on how we define “we”) is the rate of development of various technologies and potentially the sequence in which feasible technologies are developed and implemented. Our focus should be on what I want to call differential technological development: trying to retard the implementation of dangerous technologies and accelerate implementation of beneficial technologies, especially those that ameliorate the hazards posed by other technologies. In the case of nanotechnology, the desirable sequence would be that defense systems are deployed before offensive capabilities become available to many independent powers; for once a secret or a technology is shared by many, it becomes extremely hard to prevent further proliferation. In the case of biotechnology, we should seek to promote research into vaccines, anti-bacterial and anti-viral drugs, protective gear, sensors and diagnostics, and to delay as much as possible the development (and proliferation) of biological warfare agents and their vectors. Developments that advance offense and defense equally are neutral from a security perspective, unless done by countries we identify as responsible, in which case they are advantageous to the extent that they increase our technological superiority over our potential enemies. Such “neutral” developments can also be helpful in reducing the threat from natural hazards and they may of course also have benefits that are not directly related to global security. Some technologies seem to be especially worth promoting because they can help in reducing a broad range of threats. Superintelligence is one of these. Although it has its own dangers (expounded in preceding sections), these are dangers that we will have to face at some point no matter what. But getting superintelligence early is desirable because it would help diminish other risks. A **superintelligence could advise us on policy.** Superintelligence would make the progress curve for nanotechnology much steeper, thus shortening the period of vulnerability between the development of dangerous nanoreplicators and the deployment of adequate defenses. By contrast, getting nanotechnology before superintelligence would do little to diminish the risks of superintelligence. The main possible exception to this is if we think that it is important that we get to superintelligence via uploading rather than through artificial intelligence. Nanotechnology would greatly facilitate uploading [39].

#### (:39)

#### 5. Every past wage increase should have triggered the link. His ev is awful and doesn’t come close to proving the aff is the brink for extinction-level AI.

#### 6. Aff’s shift from ruthless business competition to collective bargaining solves shoddy AI, which is uniquely worse

**Tomasik 14**

Brian Tomasik (graduated from Swarthmore, former programmer at Bing). “International Cooperation vs. AI Arms Race.” Last updated April 3rd, 2014. http://utilitarian-essays.com/ai-arms-race.html#section7

Government AI development could go wrong in several ways. Probably most on LW feel the prevailing scenario is that governments would botch the process by not realizing the risks at hand. It's also possible that governments would use the AI for malevolent, totalitarian purposes. It seems that both of these bad scenarios would be exacerbated by international conflict. Greater hostility means countries are more inclined to use AI as a weapon. Indeed, whoever builds the first AI can take over the world, which makes building AI the ultimate arms race. A USA-China race is one reasonable possibility. Arms races encourage risk-taking -- being willing to skimp on safety measures to improve your odds of winning ("Racing to the Precipice"). In addition, the weaponization of AI could lead to worse expected outcomes in general. CEV seems to have less hope of success in a Cold War scenario. ("What? You want to include the evil Chinese in your CEV??") With a pure CEV, presumably it would eventually count Chinese values even if it started with just Americans, because people would become more enlightened during the process. However, when we imagine more crude democratic decision outcomes, this becomes less likely. 5. Ways to avoid an arms race Averting an AI arms race seems to be an important topic for research. It could be partly informed by the Cold War and other nuclear arms races as well as by other efforts at nonproliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Forthcoming robotic and nanotech weapons might be even better analogues of AI arms races than nuclear weapons because these newer technologies can be built more secretly and used in a more targeted fashion. Apart from more robust arms control, other factors might help: Improved international institutions like the UN, allowing for better enforcement against defection by one state. In the long run, a scenario of global governance would likely be ideal for strengthening international cooperation, just like nation states reduce intra-state violence. Better construction and enforcement of nonproliferation treaties. Improved game theory and international-relations scholarship on the causes of arms races and how to avert them. (For instance, arms races have sometimes been modeled as iterated prisoner's dilemmas with imperfect information.) How to improve verification, which has historically been a weak point for nuclear arms control. (The concern is that if you haven't verified well enough, the other side might be arming while you're not.) Moral tolerance and multicultural perspective, aiming to reduce people's sense of nationalism. (In the limit where neither Americans nor Chinese cared which government won the race, there would be no point in having the race.) Improved trade, democracy, and other forces that historically have reduced the likelihood of war. 6. Are these efforts cost-effective? World peace is hardly a goal unique to effective altruists (EAs), so we shouldn't necessarily expect low-hanging fruit. On the other hand, projects like nuclear nonproliferation seem relatively underfunded even compared with anti-poverty charities. I suspect more direct MIRI-type research has higher expected value, but among EAs who don't want to fund MIRI specifically, encouraging donations toward international cooperation could be valuable, since it's certainly a more mainstream cause. I wonder if GiveWell would consider studying global cooperation specifically beyond its indirect relationship with catastrophic risks. 7. Should we publicize AI arms races? When I mentioned this topic to a friend, he pointed out that we might not want the idea of AI arms races too widely known, because then governments might take the concern more seriously and therefore start the race earlier -- giving us less time to prepare and less time to work on FAI in the meanwhile. From David Chalmers, "The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis" (footnote 14): When I discussed these issues with cadets and staff at the West Point Military Academy, the question arose as to whether the US military or other branches of the government might attempt to prevent the creation of AI or AI+, due to the risks of an intelligence explosion. The consensus was that they would not, as such prevention would only increase the chances that AI or AI+ would first be created by a foreign power. One might even expect an AI arms race at some point, once the potential consequences of an intelligence explosion are registered. According to this reasoning, although AI+ would have risks from the standpoint of the US government, the risks of Chinese AI+ (say) would be far greater. We should take this information-hazard concern seriously and remember the unilateralist's curse. If it proves to be fatal for explicitly discussing AI arms races, we might instead encourage international cooperation without explaining why. Fortunately, it wouldn't be hard to encourage international cooperation on grounds other than AI arms races if we wanted to do so. Also note that a government-level arms race could easily be preferable to a Wild West race among a dozen private AI developers where coordination and compromise would be not just difficult but potentially impossible. Of course, if we did decide it was best for governments to take AI arms races seriously, this would also encourage private developers to step on the gas pedal. That said, once governments do recognize the problem, they may be able to impose moratoria on private development. How concerned should we be about accidentally accelerating arms races by talking about them? My gut feeling is it's not too risky, because It's hard to contain the basic idea. Super-powerful AI is already well known not just by governments but even in popular movies. Developing verification measures, technology restrictions, and so on require governments knowing what technology they're dealing with. If governments can think about these issues ahead of time (decades before strong AI becomes feasible), they're more likely to go for cooperation and less likely to panic and build up their own defenses, because they see that there's time for negotiations to potentially work before losing that much ground. Right now most AI research appears to be done in public, so there's not a huge cost for a given country in delaying at this point. Most risk analysts don't express concerns like these too much when talking about military arms races. Of course, there's selection bias; maybe most of the military does think it's dangerous to talk about these issues in public, and we only hear form the minority that defects from this view. But I've never heard criticism against people who talk too much about arms races in public, except this one comment from my friend. Talking about arms-race scenarios specifically makes it much more clear why we need global governance and improved cooperation. It's more persuasive than just saying, "Wouldn't it be great if the world could sing Kumbaya?" That said, I remain open to being persuaded otherwise, and it seems important to think more carefully about how careful to be here. The good news is that the information hazards are unlikely to be disastrous, because all of this material is already publicly available somewhere. In other words, the upsides and downsides of making a bad judgment seem roughly on the same order of magnitude. 8. How do our prospects look? In Technological change and nuclear arms control (1986), Ted Greenwood suggests that arms control has historically had little counterfactual impact: In no case has an agreement inhibited technological change that the United States both actually wanted to pursue at the time of agreement and was capable of pursuing during the intended duration of the agreement. Only in one area of technological innovation (i.e., SALT II constraints on the number of multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs, on existing missiles) is it possible that such agreements actually inhibited Soviet programs, although in another (test of new light ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]) their program is claimed by the United States to violate the SALT II Treaty that the Soviets have stated they will not undercut. In "Why Military Technology Is Difficult to Restrain" (1987), Greenwood adds that the INF Treaty was arguably more significant, but it still didn't stop technological development, just a particular application of known technology. In other domains we also see **competition prevail over cooperation**, such as **in most markets,** where usually there are at least several companies vying for customers. Of course, this is partly by social design, because we have anti-trust laws. **Competition in business** makes companies worse off while making consumers better off. Likewise, competition to build a quick, hacky AI makes human nations worse off while perhaps making the unsafe AIs better off. If we care some about the unsafe AIs for their own sakes as intelligent preference-satisfying agents, then this is less of a loss than it at first appears, but it still seems like there's room to expand the pie, and reduce suffering, if everyone takes things more slowly. Maybe the best hope comes from the possibility of global unification. There is just one US government, with a monopoly on military development. If instead we had just one world government with a similar monopoly, arms races would not be necessary. Nationalism has been a potent force for gluing countries together and if channeled into internationalism, perhaps it could help to bind together a unified globe. Of course, we shouldn't place all our hopes on a world government and need to prepare for arms-control mechanisms that can also work with the present-day nation-state paradigm. 9. Robot arms races Robots require AI that contains **clear goal systems** and an ability to act effectively in the world. Thus, they seem like a reasonable candidate for where artificial general intelligence will first emerge. Facebook's image-classification algorithms and Google's search algorithms don't need general intelligence, with many human-like cognitive faculties, as much as a smart robot does. Military robotics seems like one of the most likely reasons that a robot arms race might develop. Indeed, to some degree there's already an arms race to build drones and autonomous weapons systems. Mark Gubrud: Killer robots are not the only element of the global technological arms race, but they are currently the most salient, rapidly-advancing and fateful. If we continue to allow global security policies to be driven by advancing technology, then the arms race will continue, and it may even reheat to Cold War levels, with multiple players this time. Robotic armed forces controlled by AI systems too complex for anyone to understand will be set in confrontation with each other, and sooner or later, our luck will run out.

### Extra Weighing Ev (:20)

#### Bio-warfare outweighs; it’s offense dominant which negates all checks on warfare.

Mark Walker 9, assistant professor at New Mexico State University and holds the Richard L. Hedden Chair of Advanced Philosophical Studies, 2/5, “Ship of Fools: Why Transhumanism is the Best Bet to Prevent the Extinction of Civilization”, http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10682/Default.aspx

Option: relinquishment. Starting with relinquishment, let us think first about what it means to forgo any use of 21st century technologies for both world-engineering and person-engineering purposes. Notice here that the question is not whether we ought to permit the development of 21st century technologies. The reason of course is that **it is already too late for that**. We have developed at least one, genetic engineering, to the point that it potentially **could be used for** the purpose of **ending civilization**. Now it may be thought that these extrapolations about the possible effects of genetic engineering are a little histrionic. Perhaps, but the fact of the matter is that very few have studied the problem of civilization extinction. Among those who have thought about the problem in any detail, there is almost universal agreement that the probability here is significant, and certainly not where we would like it, namely at 0.[12](http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10682/Default.aspx#_edn12),[13](http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10682/Default.aspx#_edn13) And it is not just tweedy academics who take seriously the possibility of bioterrorism and other technological disasters. On December 5th 2008, while I was in the middle of writing this paper, the following headline appeared in my inbox: “U.S. intel panel sees WMD attack in next five years”.[14](http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10682/Default.aspx#_edn14) Former senators Bob Graham and Jim Talen headed the panel. According to the report, the panel “acknowledges that terrorist groups still lack the needed scientific and technical ability to make weapons out of pathogens or nuclear bombs. But it warns that gap can be easily overcome, if terrorists find scientists willing to share or sell their know-how”.[15](http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10682/Default.aspx#_edn15) Also of relevance is that the report suggests, “the United States should be less concerned that terrorists will become biologists and far more concerned that biologists will become terrorists." And our concern should only be increasing, since every year it is a little easier to acquire and apply the relevant technical advancements. So, relinquishment requires us to not only stop future developments but also to turn back the hands of time, technologically speaking. If we want to keep ourselves completely immune from the potential negative effects of genetic engineering we would have to destroy all the tools and knowledge of genetic engineering. **It is hard to imagine how this might be done**. For example, it would seem to demand dismantling all genetics labs across the globe and burning books that contain information about genetic engineering. Even this would not be enough since knowledge of genetic engineering is in the minds of many. What would we do here? Shoot all those with graduate and undergraduate degrees in genetics and allied disciplines along with all the basement biohackers we can roundup? Think of the alcohol prohibition experiment in the early part of the century in the U.S. Part of the reason that prohibition was unsuccessful was because the knowledge and rudimentary equipment necessary for brewing was ubiquitous. It is these two features, availability of knowledge and equipment, that has made biohacking possible. And where would a relinquishment policy be implemented? If it is truly a viable and long-term strategy then relinquishment will have to be adopted globally. Naturally very few countries with advanced genetic technologies are going to be enthusiastic about genetically disarming unless they have some pretty good assurances that all other countries will also genetically disarm. This leads us to the usual disarmament impasse. In addition to national interests, the relinquishment strategy has to contend with large commercial and military interests in developing and using 21st century technologies. I would rate the chances for relinquishment as a strategy pretty close to zero. In addition to the aforementioned problems, it seems to fly in the face of the first law of the ethics of technology: technology evolves at a geometric rate, while social policy develops at an arithmetical rate. In other words, changing societal attitudes takes a much greater time than it does for technology to evolve. Think of the environmental movement. It is almost fifty years since the publication of The Silent Spring*,* a book often linked with the start of the contemporary environmental movement. Only now are we seeing the first portends of a concerted international effort to fight global warming. And **unlike polluters, genetic research has the potential to be virtually invisible, at least until disaster strikes**. Bill Joy, as noted, calls for relinquishment. But how relinquishment is to be implemented, Joy does not say. It is much like the environmentalist who proposes to stop environmental degradation by stopping pollution. As far as a concrete plan goes, it is missing just one thing: a concrete plan.

## Outsourcing (:34)

1. No link. Living wage targets jobs that can’t be outsourced; that’s Hanauer 13.

2. Zero uniqueness. Every outsourceable job is already gone. The aff’s not key.

**Moore 14** writes[[40]](#footnote-40)

The third argument is that increased labor costs will lead to outsourcing of American jobs. Well, in case everyone hasn’t realized, this has already happened. Basically **any job that can be outsourced already has been. Jobs that can’t be outsourced — cleaning, manual labor,** service industry, **retail etc. —** are the ones that **pay minimum wage. There’s no reason to expect that $2 or $3 per employee would cause more** **outsourcing.**

3. No link to my aff. If countries adopt living wage on balance, the outsourcing from each country would cancel out.

4. Labor cost isn’t key. Poll data agrees.

**Simone 10** writes[[41]](#footnote-41)

**Saving money is not so important when it came to** the **outsourcing** of tasks to external service providers. **Greater flexibility is now** in **the focus.** That is the result of a poll. The costs for outsourcing are that important to only every second decider – 2009, there were still three quarters. These are the results of a survey of Steria Mummert Consulting in Hamburg. In contrast, desire for flexibility increased: Four of ten (**40 percent**) **want to ensure that they can quickly respond to changing orders** by using outsourcing. Last year, only three of ten (27 percent) wanted this. **They interviewed 204** decision makers from **companies** with more than 100 employees.

5. TURN – outsourcing is all hype. Turnover and productivity outweigh.

**Stern and Camden 13** write[[42]](#footnote-42)

The most common objection to raising the minimum wage is that it destroys jobs. But a slew of recent studies have pointed out that although raising the minimum wage does increase earnings and reduce poverty, it has a limited, almost negligible, effect on employment. **Studies** have also **illustrated that** restoring the dignity of work through **higher wages reduces worker turnover and increases productivity. Some make the overstated claim that increasing** the **minimum wage would accelerate** companies' **off-shoring** of jobs. **But most low-wage jobs** today **are geographically fixed**, or as economists call them, "non-tradable." **A janitor or home-care worker**'s job, for example, **can't be outsourced to China.**

## Inflation (:27)

1. Empirics prove the increase in inflation is ridiculously small

**Wicks-Lim 13** writes[[43]](#footnote-43)

This fear of inflation from the minimum wage is not based on any reasonable description of how these minimum wage hikes will likely impact businesses, or the economy more generally. The potential impact of minimum wage hikes on the overall price level is simply too small to have any appreciable impact on inflation. One way to assess the threat of inflation posed by a minimum wage hike is to estimate directly how much it could raise businesses’ costs. This would give us a sense of what the potential impact of a minimum wage hike would be on prices, assuming businesses would pass these costs onto their consumers. Of course, there are other ways firms can adjust, aside from raising prices. For example, employers may experience some labor-cost savings as their higher wages lower turnover rates and motivate greater worker productivity. But for the sake of simplicity, let’s assume that firms pass the entire cost increase from a minimum wage hike to consumers. **Past research** on how business costs rise with minimum wage hikes **indicates that a 10-percent minimum wage hike can** be expected to **produce a cost increase** for the average business of **less than one-tenth of one percent** of their sales revenue. This cost figure includes three components. First, mandated raises: the raises employers must give their workers to meet the new wage floor. Second, “ripple-effect” raises: the raises employers give some workers to put their pay rates a bit above the new minimum in order to preserve the same wage hierarchy before and after minimum wage hike. And third, the higher payroll taxes employers must pay on their now-larger wage bill. If the average businesses wanted to completely cover the cost increase from a 10-percent minimum wage hike through higher prices, they would need to raise their prices by less than 0.1 percent.[1] A price increase of **this** size **amounts to marking up** a **$100** price tag **to $100.10**. COLA increases are much, much smaller than 10 percent. The average rate of annual inflation, as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers, averaged 2.6 percent over the last two decades (1991-2011). The average business therefore could easily cover the cost increase from a typical COLA by raising prices less than 0.03 percent.[2] This amounts a price tag of $100 going up by less than three pennies. Price increases **this** small **would have a negligible impact on** a **2.6 percent average inflation** rate. **This** basic conclusion **is supported by a** 2008 **study that reviewed the economic studies** on the impact of minimum wage hikes on prices and inflation.[3] The estimates from these studies cover a relatively wide range, suggesting that a 10-percent increase in the minimum causes overall prices to rise somewhere between 0.2 percent and 2.16 percent, with most estimates falling below 0.4 percent. These estimates are larger, but in the range of how much businesses’ costs increase as discussed above. Even the higher estimate of a 0.4 percent rise in price level with a 10 percent minimum wage hike suggests that a typical COLA adjustment to the minimum wage rate would only push up the price level by 0.1 percent.[4] Recall that this amounts to adding just one dime to a $100 price tag. The bottom line: these minimum wage hikes pose no inflationary threat. The potential contribution of the minimum wage COLAs to inflation would be to raise the rate of inflation by less than 0.1 percent. This would raise, for example, the average annual inflation rate of 2.6 percent to 2.7 percent—a change so small that the rate is effectively unchanged in any meaningful way. In fact, **this** potential **impact** on inflation **is smaller than the margin of error** for the Department of Labor’s estimate of inflation.

2. TURN – living wage is key to purchasing power, so the poor can afford to cope with price hikes.

3. No link or impact to inflation; the effect would be tiny.

**MacEwan 14** writes[[44]](#footnote-44)

The point is that, with the increase of the minimum wage, **firms** that face higher costs **cannot** maintain profits **simply** by **rais**ing **prices** regardless of demand for their products. While the **increase of the minimum wage** will increase demand for those products purchased by low-income people, it **will not** yield an equal **increase** in **demand for all products**. If **low-income people tend to buy goods produced with low-wage labor—e.g.,** at **McDonald’s**—part of the increased wages will be eroded by increased prices. However, there is no reason to think that this erosion will wipe out much of the wage increase. On the other end of the income distribution—consider the purchases and prices of luxury cars. Certainly the rise of the minimum wage will not raise demand; it may even lower demand if profits are negatively affected. **The price of luxury cars could even fall** (but not by much!). The upshot of all this: first, **any inflation generated** by an increase of the minimum wage **is likely** to be **small;** second, **inflation affects different goods** and thus different people very **differently.**

## Inflation DA (Greenhill Version)

1. The increase in inflation will be small and affect different goods differently

**MacEwan 14** writes[[45]](#footnote-45)

The point is that, with the increase of the minimum wage, **firms** that face higher costs **cannot** maintain profits **simply** by **rais**ing **prices** regardless of demand for their products. While the **increase of the minimum wage** will increase demand for those products purchased by low-income people, it **will not yield an equal increase in demand for all products**. If **low-income people tend to buy goods produced with low-wage labor—e.g.,** at **McDonald’s**—part of the increased wages will be eroded by increased prices. However, there is no reason to think that this erosion will wipe out much of the wage increase. On the other end of the income distribution—consider the purchases and prices of luxury cars. Certainly the rise of the minimum wage will not raise demand; it may even lower demand if profits are negatively affected. **The price of luxury cars could even fall** (but not by much!). The upshot of all this: first, **any inflation generated** by an increase of the minimum wage **is likely** to be **small;** second, **inflation affects different goods and thus different people** very **differently.**

2. They haven’t read a uniqueness card.

The global economy will improve this year despite a rocky start

**Chan 15** writes[[46]](#footnote-46)

**Even though the new year got off to a rocky start** — shaken by higher volatility, plummeting oil prices and concerns about Europe’s economic woes — **it’s important to put these issues into perspective**. As investors, we get so caught up in the moment that we forget how far we’ve come. Since the S&P 500 Index hit its low in 2009, it has more than tripled, rewarding patient investors handsomely. As the expansion enters its sixth year, we see that **sustainable U.S. economic growth is** finally **within reach and will** continue to **support the global recovery. Solid evidence suggests that** economic **growth will remain strong in the U.S. through 2015 as we make our way back to normal. Robust job growth** and improving consumer confidence and spending **will contribute to accelerated U.S. economic growth** in the year ahead. However, that doesn’t mean there won’t be some bumps along the way. Volatility is typically associated with a more mature investment cycle as stocks become more highly valued, so we shouldn’t be surprised to experience some unsteadiness. In addition, the prospect of rising U.S. interest rates contributes a degree of uncertainty. When we look to other parts of the world, we expect economic growth to be sporadic as markets recover at different rates. While we will continue to grapple with geopolitical risks — uncertainty in Europe, regime shifts in Saudi Arabia, and escalating tensions in Russia and Ukraine — some developed and emerging markets show signs of promise. The recent announcement by the European Central Bank (ECB) to buy government bonds (the eurozone’s equivalent of quantitative easing), a weaker euro and cheaper oil should support economic growth in the region. Also, we expect Japan to benefit from its quantitative easing efforts, structural reforms and a weaker yen. As fundamentals in Europe and Japan strengthen, conditions in many emerging market economies also should improve. **Overall, our global outlook calls for slow but steady improvement and we expect 2015 to be better than 2014.**

3. Their author explicitly says hyperinflation is different from increased inflation

**Lira 10** writes[[47]](#footnote-47)

But **hyperinflation is not an** extension or **amplification of inflation**. Inflation and hyperinflation are two very distinct animals. **They look the same**—because in both cases, the currency loses its purchasing power—**but they are not the same. Inflation is** when the economy overheats: It’s **when** an economy’s **consumables** (labor and commodities) **are so in-demand because of economic growth**, coupled with an expansionist credit environment, **that the consumables rise in price**. This forces all goods and services to rise in price as well, so that producers can keep up with costs. It is essentially a demand-driven phenomena. **Hyperinflation is** the **loss of faith in the currency. Prices rise** in a hyperinflationary environment just like in an inflationary environment, but they rise **not because people want more money for their labor** or for commodities, **but because** people are trying to get out of the currency. It’s not that they want more money—**they want less of the currency**: So they will pay anything for a good which is not the currency.

4. Empirics prove the increase in inflation is ridiculously small

**Wicks-Lim 13** writes[[48]](#footnote-48)

This **fear of inflation from the minimum wage is not** based on any **reasonable** description of how these minimum wage hikes will likely impact businesses, or the economy more generally. The potential impact of minimum wage hikes on the overall price level is simply too small to have any appreciable impact on inflation. One way to assess the threat of inflation posed by a minimum wage hike is to estimate directly how much it could raise businesses’ costs. This would give us a sense of what the potential impact of a minimum wage hike would be on prices, assuming businesses would pass these costs onto their consumers. Of course, there are other ways firms can adjust, aside from raising prices. For example, employers may experience some labor-cost savings as their higher wages lower turnover rates and motivate greater worker productivity. But for the sake of simplicity, let’s assume that firms pass the entire cost increase from a minimum wage hike to consumers. **Past research** on how business costs rise with minimum wage hikes **indicates that a 10-percent minimum wage hike can** be expected to **produce a cost increase** for the average business of **less than one-tenth of one percent** of their sales revenue. This cost figure includes three components. First, mandated raises: the raises employers must give their workers to meet the new wage floor. Second, “ripple-effect” raises: the raises employers give some workers to put their pay rates a bit above the new minimum in order to preserve the same wage hierarchy before and after minimum wage hike. And third, the higher payroll taxes employers must pay on their now-larger wage bill. If the average businesses wanted to completely cover the cost increase from a 10-percent minimum wage hike through higher prices, they would need to raise their prices by less than 0.1 percent.[1] A price increase of **this** size **amounts to marking up** a **$100** price tag **to $100.10**. COLA increases are much, much smaller than 10 percent. The average rate of annual inflation, as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers, averaged 2.6 percent over the last two decades (1991-2011). The average business therefore could easily cover the cost increase from a typical COLA by raising prices less than 0.03 percent.[2] This amounts a price tag of $100 going up by less than three pennies. **Price increases this small would have a negligible impact on** a **2.6 percent average inflation** rate. **This** basic conclusion **is supported by a** 2008 **study that reviewed** the economic **studies on** the impact of **minimum wage hikes** on prices **and inflation**.[3] The estimates from these studies cover a relatively wide range, suggesting that a 10-percent increase in the minimum causes overall prices to rise somewhere between 0.2 percent and 2.16 percent, with most estimates falling below 0.4 percent. These estimates are larger, but in the range of how much businesses’ costs increase as discussed above. Even the higher estimate of a 0.4 percent rise in price level with a 10 percent minimum wage hike suggests that a typical COLA adjustment to the minimum wage rate would only push up the price level by 0.1 percent.[4] Recall that this amounts to adding just one dime to a $100 price tag. The bottom line: these minimum wage hikes pose no inflationary threat. The potential contribution of the minimum wage COLAs to inflation would be to raise the rate of inflation by less than 0.1 percent. This would raise, for example, the average annual inflation rate of 2.6 percent to 2.7 percent—a change so small that the rate is effectively unchanged in any meaningful way. In fact, this **potential impact on inflation is smaller than the margin of error for the Department of Labor’s estimate** of inflation.

5. Hyperinflation’s unlikely

**Economist 13** writes[[49]](#footnote-49)

That mundane point helps illustrate the more important point, which is that **hyperinflation is really, really**, really **unlikely to occur in America**. We can talk about how American government is gridlocked and Congress is robbing future generations by accumulating massive debts, but the fact remains that the development of **hyperinflation** in America **implies a breakdown in governance so complete that a single** man or **interest can drive everyone** else **to destitution** in order to keep its share of the spoils from shrinking. **This, in a country where the government freaked out about the deficit and** almost **instantly balanced the budget in the** 19**90s**, in response to a 10-year Treasury rate just a shade above 7%, and in which the government is freaking out about the debt and actively reducing the deficit now despite a 10-year Treasury rate around 2%. Look, I wouldn't be surprised at all if American financial mismanagement led the country to behave irresponsibly, or to end up with a higher rate of inflation. It could inflate, or inflate and repress, or even partially default (on statutory obligations if not on bond payments). I don't know that I see inflation and financial repression as the most probable route out of high debt (which, in my view, will instead consist mostly of mild austerity and growth). But it's none of it out of the question. By hyperinflation is a different animal, and one which implies a complete breakdown in the political and social order. **America** is actually very different from Zimbabwe. Yes, America occasionally budgets recklessly. But it **has** a very deep, very broad, and very strong civil society, buttressed by **levels upon levels of** private and public, formal and informal **institutions**. These institutions, and many like them across rich economies, are **generally very good at preventing governments from doing disastrous things**. To extrapolate from the admittedly ugly scene on Capitol Hill to hyperinflation is to misunderstand what it is, fundamentally, that makes American democracy work: a strong system of civil, social, and political norms that defines acceptable political behaviour and which reacts strongly to deviations from that behaviour. Now, sometimes we might not like the norms that these institutions reinforce. They might tolerate institutional racism for long stretches of time. They might not adequately take account of the costs of climate change. Or they might just be too damn liberal, for some tastes anyway. But it is the strength of these institutions, that work to advance a vague but meaningful conception of the greater societal good, that keeps the wilder impulses in check. **Hyperinflation is not an economic outcome**. It isn't something that emerges, mechanically, from some macroeconomic process gone wrong. **It is a symptom of total social and political collapse**. And while it would be unwise to say that it could never happen in America, it is simply mistaken to say that it could happen because Congress was too foolish to balance its budget.

6. No impact to economic decline – prefer new data

**Drezner 14** writes[[50]](#footnote-50)

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple **analysts asserted** that **the** financial **crisis would lead states to** increase their **use of force** as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether **through** greater internal repression, **diversionary wars, arms races, or** a ratcheting up of **great power conflict.** Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. **The aggregate data suggest otherwise**, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "**the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is** approximately **the same as** it was in **2007**."43 **Interstate violence** in particular has **declined** since the start of the financial crisis, **as have military expenditures** in most sampled countries. Other **studies confirm** that **the** Great **Recession has not triggered** any increase in **violent conflict**, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "**the crisis has not** to date **generated** the surge in **protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion** that might have been expected."43

7. Their Auslin 9 evidence doesn’t actually say wars will escalate; it says that “small explosions could coalesce into a big bang” but their author means that metaphorically.

## Youth Unemployment (:45)

All of my general unemployment answers apply—no reason youth are uniquely likely to get laid off.

The best studies show living wage helps teens

**Schmitt 13**

John Schmitt (Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C.) “Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect on Employment?” Center for Economic and Policy Research. February 2013. http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage-2013-02.pdf

The "New Minimum Wage" research also emphasized research methods based on important differences in the "bite" of the federal minimum across the states. Any given increase in the federal minimum, the thinking went, should have more impact in low-wage states, where many workers would be eligible for an increase, than it would in high-wage states, where a smaller share of the workforce would be affected. Card, for example, divided the U.S. states into three groups – low-impact, medium-impact, and high-impact – according to the share of their teenage workforce that would be affected by the 1990 and 1991 increases in the federal minimum wage. His analysis concluded: "Comparisons of grouped and individual state data confirm that the rise in the minimum wage raised average teenage wages... On the other hand, there is **no evidence** that the rise in the minimum wage significantly lowered teenage employment rates..."8

Card and Krueger's book Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage is the best (though early) summary of these two strands of the "new minimum wage" research. Their detailed review of studies using a variety of methods and datasets to examine restaurant workers, retail employment, and teenagers, concludes: "The weight of this evidence suggests that it is very unlikely that the minimum wage has a large, negative employment effect."9

Case outweighs.

Teens are only a small portion of low-wage workers

**Harris and Kearney 14**

Benjamin H. Harris (Policy Director of The Hamilton Project, Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, and Deputy Director of the Retirement Security Project at Brookings) and Melissa S. Kearney (Kearney is the Director of the Hamilton Project; a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; and a Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Maryland, where she has been on the faculty since 2006. She is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a Faculty Affiliate of the Lab for Economic Opportunities. Kearney's research focuses on issues of social policy, poverty, and inequality). “The “Ripple Effect” of a Minimum Wage Increase on American Workers.” Brookings Institution. 10 January 2014. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/01/10-ripple-effect-of-increasing-the-minimum-wage-kearney-harris>

The argument that only a small share of workers is actually paid the minimum wage misses a key point: many of those who would be impacted by a raise in the minimum wage are actually low-wage workers making slightly above the minimum wage. In addition to this broader scope of the workforce, economist Arin Dube of the University of Massachusetts-Amherst points out that **a shrinking share of low-wage workers is comprised of teenagers**. His work shows that among those earning no more than the federal minimum wage of $7.25 in 2011, fewer than a quarter were teenagers. Among those earning less than $10 an hour, **only 12 percent were teenagers**, as compared to 26 percent in 1979.

**[Stop Here for Time, :19]**

Living wage has no impact on teen employment; other studies don’t control for regional trends

**Schmitt 13**

John Schmitt (Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C.) “Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect on Employment?” Center for Economic and Policy Research. February 2013. <http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage-2013-02.pdf>

Sylvia Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) applied the insights of Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) to teen employment over the period 1990-2009. Their work made at least two important contributions to the policy debate. First, they analyzed teen employment, rather than industry employment, making their results more directly comparable to the bulk of earlier research on the minimum wage. Second, they included data covering the deep recession that ran from December 2007 through June 2009, allowing them to measure any possible interactions between the minimum wage and strong economic downturns.27

Allegretto, Dube, and Reich analyzed data on teenagers taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1990 through 2009.28 Because the CPS sample is smaller than the QCEW data used in the county-analysis, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich instead tracked teen employment at the state level. When they produced standard statistical analyses of the kind used in much of the research since the mid-1990s on teen employment, the three economists found results similar to those found in that earlier research (a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage reduces teen employment slightly more than 1 percent). But, once they controlled for different regional trends, the estimated employment effects of the minimum wage disappeared, turning slightly positive, but not statistically significantly different from zero.

Alt causes to youth unemployment

**Thompson 14** writes[[51]](#footnote-51)

Rather than pick on Puzder, I'll pick on his shoehorn: **Why can't young people find work, really?** There are three reasons.The **first** reason that young people can't find work is that **they're not looking for work, because they're in school**. Puzder notes that the BLS just recorded the lowest percentage of 16- to 19-year-olds working or looking for work since it started counting such things in 1948. But look what else changed since the 1940s: The share of the population with less than a high school education fell from 76 percent to 12 percent, while the share of Americans with a bachelor's degree septupled to 32 percent. The BLS itself says that "the major factor producing this significant [change in labor participation] has been an increase in school attendance at all levels." The **second** reason that young people can't find work is that they're young. Young workers today are under-employed at high levels, but they've been under-employed at high levels for decades. Because they're young. **Young people have long suffered higher unemployment** than the rest of the country**, unless they have a college degree. Because they're young.** Graduates are moving from unemployment (school) to employment (workforce). Finding a job is always harder than keeping a job. The **third** reason that young people can't find work is that **they're having the same trouble that other job-seekers are having following** the deep recession and **slow recovery**. One way to measure whether the youth job market is particularly sick is to investigate whether the youth unemployment rate is rising faster than the rate for overall workers. Here's the youth unemployment multiple going back to 1985... The first thing you might see is that the overall youth unemployment rate (in light blue) hasn't budged from its historical average. **There is nothing uniquely wrong with the youth** job **market**. Youth unemployment is exactly as high as you might expect. The second thing you'll see is that there is something uniquely wrong with the job market for young grads who never went to college. Their unemployment rate is clearly elevated—a sign that a college degree is a necessary rung on the ladder to the quality career. **Young people**—including college grads—**take time to establish themselves in the economy, and they always have**. The most important concern today shouldn’t be whether they find work, but what kind of work they find. "It has become more common for underemployed college graduates to find themselves in low-wage jobs” since the 2001 recession, according to a recent New York Fed report. The problem isn't that Obama killed entry level jobs, as Puzder argues. It's that he lacks the power to enrich those entry level jobs.

## Beef DA

Status quo can’t solve. Plenty of people eat meat regardless of overall poverty levels, so the impact’s inevitable.

Beef’s environmental impact is overstated and there are many alt causes

**Niman 10** writes[[52]](#footnote-52)

Helene York's at it again: determinedly arguing that beef, even when entirely grass-fed, can't be "green." But her recent post falls far short of proving this provocative claim. She argues, essentially, that because cattle belch and fart a lot, beef is bad for the environment, focusing entirely on methane emissions, to the exclusion of all else. But **zeroing in on a single environmental consequence is nonsensical**. (Since **rice farming contributes** as much as **29 percent of** the world's **anthropogenic methane**, one may well wonder why she is not urging us to cut back our rice consumption.) As with all foods, the **environmental impact of beef varies widely**, depending on many factors. Let's start with greenhouse gasses. While it's true that some research indicates that methane emissions from grass-fed cattle are the same as or greater than feedlot beef, there's also credible research showing that their emissions can be lower than corn-fed. That's because the frequency with which cattle are rotated to new pastures, the quality of forages, and the use of dietary supplements can all dramatically affect how much methane a grass-fed beef operation produces. Simply put, **good management reduces methane**. Moreover, it's important to note that **there were plenty of animal methane emissions** in this country **long before cattle**. Prior to European colonization of North America, enormous herds of large ruminant mammals covered the continent, including millions of deer, an estimated 10 million elk, and somewhere between 30 and 75 million bison. "The moving multitude ... darkened the whole plains," Lewis and Clark wrote of bison in 1806. The total number of large ruminants was surely greater than the 40 million mature breeding beef cows and dairy cows in the United States today. As for the other major greenhouse gases, there's no contest: grass-fed beef fares much better than conventional meats of all kinds. Carbon dioxide, which makes up the majority of climate change emissions from agriculture, has various causes. **In the U**nited **S**tates**, carbon dioxide is mostly due to** fuel burned by **machinery and vehicles**. Unlike feedlot beef (and pork, chicken, and turkey), which relies heavily on machinery for the plowing, planting, harvesting, drying, transporting, and feeding of grains, grass-fed beef can be done virtually without machinery. At our ranch, we use a small truck for some ranch chores and have a utility tractor for periodic mowing. That's about it. The other grass-fed cattle ranches I've visited function much the same way. Likewise, **nitrous oxides, the other** major **greenhouse gasses from farming, are** closely **connected to** commodity agriculture, not grass ranching. More than three-quarters of U.S. farming's nitrous oxides are from **commercial fertilizers**. Corn and other grains are usually heavily fertilized. On our ranch (and other grass ranches we know), we use absolutely no manmade fertilizers. None. York cites reports from the University of Chicago and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. But neither of these reports support her argument against the "greenness" of grass-fed beef. Both merely examine prevailing methods for raising beef and conclude that these methods are environmentally damaging. I agree. As the UN report shows, Brazil, Sudan, India, and other parts of the developing world are deforesting to raise beef. True: that's bad. In fact, deforestation in developing nations accounts for almost half—48 percent—of the total 18 percent figure so frequently cited from the UN report. But **in the U.S., there is little to no deforestation occurring to raise beef** cattle. Forest **acreage** in the United States **is** actually **increasing.**

The ongoing and everyday suffering caused by poverty outweighs on probability. That’s the tiebreaker if they aren’t very ahead on “poverty good.”

Overall meat-eating in the US is declining and rich people no longer eat more meat than the poor.

**Charles 12** writes[[53]](#footnote-53)

Now, though, there's a sense that things may be changing. Each year, for the last four years, **Americans have been eating less meat** per person. There's no consensus on why. Economist Jayson Lusk believes that it's due mostly to the recession and high food prices. Ground beef is 30 percent more expensive today than it was just two years ago. "If something increases in price by 30 percent, we'd certainly expect consumers to buy a whole lot less of it," he says. Yet **there's** also some **evidence that tastes are** actually **changing. In a** new **poll conducted by NPR** and Truven Health Analytics, just out this week, **39 percent** of the respondents **say they're eating less meat than** they did **three years ago —** and **the main reason**, they say, **is a desire to eat heathier** food. (Check out The Salt tomorrow for more on the survey.) In another historical shift, **rich Americans no longer eat more meat than poor Americans. They do still eat more expensive meat**, just as they always have. "If you're a wealthy person in New York in the 1880s, you would not put barrelled pork on the table when guests came over. You put a roast on the table, or you'd be humiliated," Horowitz says. "That's not different from people in New York today, if you have guests over, maybe you get your lamb from Niman Ranch. It's grass-fed, humanely slaughtered, and you pay 70 dollars a pound for it." What hasn't changed at all, he says, is the significance of meat. If it's a special occasion in America, there's meat on the table.

The environment is resilient.

**Easterbrook 95** writes[[54]](#footnote-54)

IN THE AFTERMATH OF EVENTS SUCH AS LOVE CANAL OR THE Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. **The environment** that contains them **is** close to **indestructible.** The living environment of **Earth has survived ice ages;** bombardments of cosmic **radiation more deadly than atomic fallout**; solar radiation **more powerful than** the worst-case projection for **ozone depletion;** thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air **pollution far worse than** that made by **any factory**; **reversals of** the planet's magnetic **poles;** the **rearrangement of continents**; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; **300-foot** vacillations in **sea levels**; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of **asteroids** and comets **bearing far more force than** man's **nuclear arsenals**; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. **Human assaults** on the environment, though mischievous, **are pinpricks** compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

No extinction.

**Easterbrook 3** writes[[55]](#footnote-55)

**If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up**. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. **Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain**. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

## BizCon DA (Greenhill)

### TOC Elim Day UQ

#### U.S. Econ Low Now; Takes Out The Internal Link

Crutsinger, 4/27:

(With US Economy Still Uncertain, A Fe Rate Increase Seems Unlikely Before Fall AT Earliest. Martin Crutsinger, Journalist For The Asociated Press. April 27, 2014)

For 6½ years, the Federal Reserve has held its key interest rate near zero, and for nearly that long the financial world has speculated about when the Fed will start raising it. Don't look for it soon. That's the view of most economists, who say a still-subpar economy and still-low inflation will keep rates at record lows at least until September. On Wednesday, the Fed could clarify its plans after ending its latest policy meeting. Analysts caution, though, against expecting any specific guidance on the Fed's timetable for a rate hike. Too many uncertainties still surround the U.S. economy. The Fed's policymakers may want to leave themselves maneuvering room until their view of the economy's health becomes clearer. After its March meeting, the Fed opened the door to a rate increase this year by no longer saying it would be "patient" in starting to raise its benchmark rate. Most economists had said that dropping "patient" from its statement would mean the Fed could raise rates as soon as June — a step that would course through the economy and could slow borrowing and squeeze stocks and bonds. Yet at a news conference later, Chair Janet Yellen stressed that while the Fed had removed "patient" to describe its approach to raising rates, it still hadn't decided when to start raising them. Yellen said any decision would depend mainly on what the latest economic data showed. And the data since then has been disappointing. Employers added just 126,000 workers last month, the fewest since December 2013, breaking a 12-month streak of gains above 200,000. Gauges of manufacturing, housing and consumer spending of late have been weak to modest. A sharp drop in oil and gasoline prices had been expected to help boost consumer spending. So far, it hasn't. The economic impact has been mainly negative — layoffs by oil-industry states and cutbacks in investments by energy companies. As a result, economists have been downgrading their growth estimates for the January-March quarter. Many now peg growth last quarter at a sluggish annual rate below 1 percent. That would be the weakest since the economy shrank in last year's first quarter amid a brutal winter.

## Cali Ptx DA (Greenhill)

### TOC R5 F/L

#### The aff is federal

#### A. “United States” means the federal government; that’s Ballentine 95

Ballentine's Legal Dictionary and Thesaurus, "United States," 1995, p. 689

United States 1. The federal government. 2. A sovereign nation or sovereign state called the "United States." 3. Territory over which this sovereign nation called the "United States" exercises sovereign power.

#### B. “Living wage” is federal.

Stevens 15

Rachel Stevens (Top 8 National NFA LD Debater 2011; supervisor of Debate Central). “LD January/February 2015 Analysis.” Debate Central. 2015. http://debate-central.ncpa.org/januaryfebruary-2015-ld-topic-analysis-is-published/

“Living wage” is related, but not identical, to “minimum wage.” The United Sates has a federal minimum wage, which is $7.25/hour. However, it may be higher in certain states or cities which have chosen to pass legislation to raise their own minimum wage. “Living wage,” on the other hand, does not legally refer to any specific dollar amount. Some areas may have living wage ordinances, which require its businesses to pay a wage indexed to the current cost of living in that area. However, because cost of living differs depending on where one is, the living wage could be dramatically different in one area to the next. So, **if we are discussing things on a national scale (which most debates on this topic** probably **will),** it is important to recognize that the living wage would not be a consistent number of dollars per hour throughout an entire country, but rather would be set at different amounts depending on the cost of living in various areas. (Another area of ambiguity in the topic: how much discrepancy is appropriate? Should the wage be set by county? City? Neighborhood? Block?) To determine what a living wage might be in a particular location, check out this living wage calculator. Technically, a living wage *IS* a minimum wage, in the sense that both establish the smallest amount of money a business can legally pay an employee. They are both what can be called a “wage floor” in economic literature. So, while the federal minimum wage is not necessarily a living wage (data shows that, in many cities, the cost of living dramatically outpaces the federal minimum wage), a legally-required **living wage *would become the new minimum wage*** *in its corresponding area*. In other words, theoretical arguments about how wage floors affect economies would apply to debates about both the federal minimum wage and any given living wage. But, arguments specific to the federal minimum wage generally will not be directly 4 applicable to discussions of a living wage, and vice versa. This is because living wages are tied to the cost of living in a specific area, while the same is not always true of the legal minimum wage.

#### Drought pounder

LA Times 4/3/15, “Drought will prove a formidable opponent in Brown's final term,” http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-brown-drought-20150403-story.html.

During the drive from the Capitol to Lake Tahoe this week, Gov. Jerry Brown could see the damage wrought by four years of drought. Rivers have turned to dribbles, parched forests threaten to ignite with a fateful spark, and meadows where snow should be piled high are instead completely bare.¶ When Brown stepped out of the car, he made history by announcing the first statewide mandatory water restrictions, ordering Californians to slash their water use by 25%.¶ It wasn't the way he intended to make his mark in his final term as governor, but Mother Nature had other plans. With no relief from the drought in sight, his most critical tasks will be rallying Californians to conserve water, navigating the state's fractious water politics and preparing for what could be a much drier future in America's most productive agricultural region.¶ "It's going to require every ounce and every moment of his political attention and his political skill," said Sonoma State political science professor David McCuan.¶ The governor also is dealing with stark regional differences, and the drought threatens to inflame an urban-rural divide in California. Conservationists have already raised concerns that Brown isn't doing enough to curb agricultural water use, which accounts for 80% of the state's total.¶ "This is not going to be the kind of coalition that's going to be easily built," said Raphael J. Sonenshein, executive director of the Pat Brown Institute of Public Affairs at Cal State L.A.¶ Brown has faced drought before: There was a two-year dry spell in 1976 and 1977 when he was governor the first time. But that lasted only half as long as the current drought, and it didn't lead to the same mandatory restrictions on water use.¶ In addition to those limits, Brown's executive order includes stricter enforcement and the removal of 50 million square feet of lawns.¶ "We're in a historic drought, and that demands unprecedented action," he told reporters Wednesday. "People should realize we're in a new era. The idea of your nice little green grass getting water every day — that's going to be a thing of the past."¶ Brown is determined to manage the drought while pursuing other goals such as building the bullet train and expanding renewable energy generation — "government is not just one thing," he said.¶ But there's no doubt that he faces a heavy burden in the months and years ahead.Mark Cowin, director of the California Department of Water Resources, said administration officials were working out details with the governor late into the night before the announcement.¶ Brown had asked residents last year to cut water use by 20%, but they consistently fell short even as the drought persisted. When February conservation statistics continued to lag, officials said, it drove home the need for a more restrictive approach.¶ In addition, snow in the Sierra Nevada, which usually provides a third of California's water when it melts in the spring, has been nearly nonexistent.¶ "Considering the potential for a fifth or sixth year of drought, we want to start pulling up the stick of the plane so we don't have a crash landing," Cowin said.¶ Brown will need Californians' cooperation to save water, and it appears that residents are increasingly aware of the drought's toll. A March survey by the Public Policy Institute of California showed that water issues have become as important in voters' minds as jobs and the economy. Two-thirds of respondents said water supply is a big problem in their area and more should be done to respond to the drought.¶ "It's been frustrating that it's taken this long to get on the public's radar," said Annie Notthoff, director of California advocacy for the Natural Resources Defense Council. "But now people are starting to see this is not business as usual."¶ The governor said Wednesday that he's trying to do his part by "turning off that faucet a little quicker, getting out of the shower a little faster, not flushing the toilet every time."¶ Pushing for water conservation is nothing new for Brown, who has railed against environmental dangers throughout his political career. He battled Los Angeles smog in the 1970s, ran for president in 1980 by promising to "protect the Earth" and has since traveled the world to urge action on climate change.¶ "He has always said, right from the start, we have to pay attention to environmental impacts, that natural resources are not unlimited," said Bruce Cain, professor of political science at Stanford University. "These are Jerry Brown's themes."¶ Given Brown's record, Cain said, the drought is "in his wheelhouse."¶ But Cain and other analysts warned that the problem could quickly grow time-consuming and politically treacherous. Implementing Brown's executive order will require new and extensive regulations and careful monitoring of thousands of local water agencies to ensure restrictions are being enforced.

#### Modeling’s empirically denied

Lisa Bennett 15, “Author and Communications Strategist”, 2015, 1/14, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lisa-bennett/will-cas-new-energy-propo_b_6470184.html>

One, critics may say, as some have, so what? Even if California succeeds in meeting this most ambitious renewable energy goal in the nation, but the rest of the world does not follow suit, the Golden State's efforts will make no dent in global warming for our children and our children's children. So bully for California for trying, but we could still be cooked. Two, with California having been in the lead on the fight against climate changefor decades, one could say there is something "been there, done that" about this development. (See "Rays of Hope in California.")

#### Plan’ popular

**Swanson 14**

Emily Swanson (staff writer). “Raising the Minimum Wage Is More Popular Than Capitalism.” Huffington Post. February 6th, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/06/minimum-wage-poll\_n\_4733302.html

Raising the minimum wage is about as popular an economic policy position as any in America. In fact, more people want to increase the minimum wage than have a positive view of the capitalist system that underpins the nation's economy. A new HuffPost/YouGov poll found that 62 percent of Americans support raising the minimum wage from $7.25 to $10.10 an hour, while 26 percent are opposed. Meanwhile, 53 percent have a positive opinion of capitalism, while 19 percent have a negative view. Democratic lawmakers and President Barack Obama support increasing the minimum wage to $10.10 an hour. Obama announced during his State of the Union address last week that he would use an executive order to raise pay for federal contractors. Although most Americans surveyed said they favor raising the minimum wage, responses were divided along party lines. Eighty-five percent of Democrats and 60 percent of independents think the minimum wage should be increased, but only 31 percent of Republicans agree. A majority of Americans in all income groups said they support an increase, including 67 percent of those whose families make less than $40,000 a year and 55 percent of those whose families make more than $100,000 a year. Fans of capitalism were more likely than not to support a wage hike for low-income workers, with 51 percent backing an increase. Six hundred economists have signed on to an Economic Policy Institute letter urging Congress to raise the minimum wage. Though the question of whether an increase would help or hurt workers is the subject of some debate, the poll finds Americans are mostly unswayed by arguments that an increase might hurt workers because businesses would respond by hiring fewer people. Only 30 percent said they thought a minimum wage hike would hurt workers, while 52 percent said it would help them. Fifty-five percent of those with a family income of less than $40,000 and 50 percent of those making more than $100,000 agreed. On this question, too, respondents were split along party lines, with 76 percent of Democrats saying that a minimum wage increase would help workers and 60 percent of Republicans saying it would hurt them. Independents were more likely to say it would help them, by a 49 percent to 33 percent margin.

#### XO solves

Julie Cart 1-7, reporter, "Gov. Brown's renewable energy plan could boost solar, wind industries" LA Times, www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-renewable-goals-20150108-story.html

And Brown could make the 50% standard happen simply by issuing an executive order.The California Public Utilities Commission has the authority to compel the state's three big utilities — Southern California Edison, Pacific Gas & Electric and San Diego Gas & Electric — to procure 50% of their energy through renewables. But such an edict would not apply to large municipal companies like the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.

#### Won’t spend capital

Chris Megerian 14, Los Angeles Times Reporter, Jerry Brown plans final touches on legacy as California governor, 11/5, http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-brown-legislature-20141106-story.html

This time around, the governor has taken steps to ensure that political surprises don't knock him off course. He still has a considerable war chest, which could be used for ballot-measure campaigns — a hedge against lame-duck "infirmities," as he put it in a recent interview. Brown also said he would try to carefully balance his relationships with members of his own party. The trick, he said, is to remain faithful to Democratic ideals without succumbing to budget deficits. "Combining the hopes for what government can do with putting reins on what it should not do will define a lot of what I'm going to do in the next four years," he said, "and will determine how successful I will be." He'll be working with a new crop of top lawmakers, state Senate leader Kevin de León (D-Los Angeles) and Assembly Speaker Toni Atkins (D-San Diego). But Robin Swanson, a political consultant who previously worked for Assembly Democrats, said Brown had proven he could work with the Legislature. "It's nice to have somebody in the driver's seat who knows the way," she said. Brown offered no indication that he would spend political capital for a full-frontal assault on controversial issues like an overhaul of the state's tax code or a revision of teacher tenure rules. "I'm always open to changes, but I do recognize the political realities," he said.

#### Laundry list pounders

White and Rosenhall 15, Jeremy and Laurel, staff writers, 1/4, "Key issues for returning California Legislature" Sacramento Bee, www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/article5417739.html

Another massive freshman class was already inaugurated in December amid speeches and glittering special interest-sponsored receptions. Those state government neophytes will join a substantial class of second-term lawmakers elected in 2012. Elected under new term limit rules, the two waves of relatively inexperienced legislators could together shape California policy for a decade. Related Gov. Jerry Brown pressed to increase safety-net spending California ready to cope with rainy-day budget fund Bills, oaths and receptions mark California Legislature’s first day There will be no shortage of issues to occupy them. Some of the debates likely to arise this year, such as how California funds public universities and handles medical marijuana, have smoldered for years. Others, such as questions about the new “sharing economy,” reflect the rise of new industries and increasingly influential interest groups. This list is not comprehensive. Likely pushes to tackle California’s public pension liabilities or hold police officers accountable with body cameras, for example, will also occupy the Capitol. But these are five prominent issues likely to consume the Legislature’s attention and political capital. MEDICAL MARIJUANA Two decades after California legalized medical marijuana, Sacramento has proved consistently unwilling to enact state-level regulation of the cultivation, transportation and sale of the quasi-legal plant. A key difference this year: with other states having sanctioned recreational pot, advocates are determined to put full legalization on the 2016 ballot in California. Those who favor broad regulation hope the looming ballot initiative will motivate lawmakers to rein in the medical market before voters potentially launch a new green rush. There are already two bills in the pipeline that would create a statewide cannabis system: one by Assemblyman Rob Bonta, D-Alameda, and one by Assemblyman Reggie Jones-Sawyer, D-Los Angeles. Key players: California Police Chiefs Association/California Narcotics Officers Association, the League of California Cities, cannabis advocates UC TUITION November elections had scarcely ended when University of California President Janet Napolitano initiated the first major budget battle of 2015, floating a plan to raise UC tuition annually for five years. She immediately drew a backlash from lawmakers and Gov. Jerry Brown, who believed the university was reneging on a deal to freeze tuition in exchange for Proposition 30 dollars. Leaders in the Senate and the Assembly have since announced alternative plans to avert tuition bumps, and Assembly Speaker Toni Atkins, D-San Diego, has proposed hauling UC officials in to have them justify their budgets line by line. With California’s coffers flush again, this could be the main pressure point for lawmakers imploring Brown to loosen the purse strings. Key players: Brown, Napolitano, Atkins, Senate President Pro Tem Kevin de León, D-Los Angeles, budget committee chairs TAXES With his first bill as a state senator, former Assembly Speaker Bob Hertzberg has proposed a massive shift in California tax policy, one he says better reflects a 21st century economy where information and services make up a huge portion of economic activity. The Los Angeles Democrat proposes extending the state’s sales tax to many services and devoting the money to education and local governments. As a tax hike, the bill requires two-thirds approval – a heavy lift in a Legislature where Democrats have lost their supermajority. But Hertzberg chairs the committee that oversees tax bills and is widely seen as an ambitious politician. Taxes will also figure big this year as political operatives prepare ballot measures for the 2016 election. Education advocates are calling for an extension of the temporary tax increases voters approved with Proposition 30 in 2012, and liberal activists want to change 1978’s Proposition 13 to increase taxes on commercial property. Public health advocates have said they will pursue a new tax on cigarettes this year, through either legislation or the ballot box. Key players: Hertzberg, anti-tax advocate Jon Coupal, union-backed advocate Lenny Goldberg TECHNOLOGY Expect debates about consumer data, Internet privacy and regulation of some Web-based businesses to loom large this session. The tech lobby beefed up its presence in Sacramento last year, with the Internet Association opening an office here – its first office outside Washington, D.C. The group was instrumental in rallying ride-sharing services like Uber and Lyft to oppose legislation increasing their insurance requirements. A similar effort to regulate home-sharing services is likely to emerge in the Legislature this year; one such company, Airbnb, recently retained a Sacramento lobbyist for the first time. The Assembly has established a new committee devoted to privacy and consumer protection, chaired by Assemblyman Mike Gatto. He is carrying a bill that would change the way Californians can use the Internet – it would permit playing poker online. Key players: Gatto, Internet Association lobbyist Robert Callahan and the growing tech lobbying corps IMMIGRATION After legislation stalled last year to provide undocumented immigrants subsidized health care, Sen. Ricardo Lara is making another go of it. SB 4 would give immigrants who are in the country illegally – a group that is not covered by the federal Affordable Care Act – access to health insurance in California. Lara, a Bell Gardens Democrat, has also proposed creating a new state office to help immigrants acclimate to life in California. He’s been given a powerful position as chairman of the Senate’s appropriations committee, and will play a big role in deciding which spending bills live or die. The Legislature’s Latino caucus has been instrumental in backing legislation to expand the freedoms undocumented immigrants can enjoy in California. The caucus gets a new chairman this year: Assemblyman Luis Alejo, D-Watsonville, who in 2013 carried a bill offering driver’s licenses to immigrants who are in the country illegally. He has already introduced legislation for this session that could allow undocumented immigrants to work legally.

## China DA (Brentwood)

#### China Economic Decline Now; Post-Dates By Four Years

Magnier et al., 2015:

(Mark Magnier, Lingling Wei, and Ian Talley, Journalists For The Wall Street Journal. January 19, 2015. China Economic Growth Is Slowest In Decades)

BEIJING—China’s economic growth slowed to 7.4% in 2014, downshifting to a level not seen in a quarter century and firmly marking the end of a high-growth heyday that buoyed global demand for everything from iron ore to designer handbags. The slipping momentum in China, which reported economic growth of 7.7% in 2013, has reverberated around the world, sending prices for commodities tumbling and weakening an already soft global economy. China’s economy grew 7.3% in the fourth quarter from a year earlier, the National Bureau of Statistics said, buttressed by targeted moves to ease borrowing. But it continued to face a housing glut, soaring debt and overcapacity in many industries, factors likely to erode growth in 2015. Beijing had said it expected “about” 7.5% growth in 2014. The chief of the statistics bureau said Tuesday the rate was within that range. Chinese stocks rose on the news, a day after their largest one-day drop in more than six years following a crackdown on margin trading. While 7% growth would be the envy of most economies, Beijing says at least this level is needed to create enough jobs for China’s huge population. The Communist Party sees social stability as an essential component in maintaining its grip on power. The results follow decades of growth that has hovered around 10%, one of the broadest, most rapid economic ascents in history that helped raise Chinese living standards and propel global growth and trade to new heights. Slipping economic momentum in China has had far-flung implications, squeezing Australian government budgets and Chilean copper mines that grew increasingly dependent on China’s ascent. The slowdown comes at a vulnerable time for the world economy. The eurozone is at risk of a third recession in six years. Abenomics policies have failed to lift Japan out of stagnation. And output in many major emerging markets—that provided most of the impetus for global growth over the past decade—is slowing faster than expected. The U.S. economy remains the one global bright spot, but it will struggle to make up for growing weakness elsewhere. Economists see the slowdown of 2014 as the prelude to an extended deceleration of growth. The often bullish International Monetary Fund on Monday forecast 6.8% growth for China in 2015, a number below the 7.0% target economists expect Beijing to set.

#### Prefer My Evidence; Expert Analysis

He, 2014:

(Not So Fsat On China Economic Predictions: Experts. Amy He, Journalist For China Daily. 10/28/2014)

Harvard economists Lawrence Summers and Lant Pritchett said in a new research paper that China's economic growth is likely to decline even more "than general experience would suggest", despite being the only country in history to have such sustained economic development in the last three decades. Summers and Pritchett write that nothing in their analysis suggests that "a sharp slowdown is inevitable" in China, but that forecasters should widen the range of expected outcomes in regards to the second-largest economic power in the world. "Consensus forecasts for the global economy over the medium and long term predict the world's economic gravity will substantially shift towards Asia and especially towards the Asian giants, China and India," they said. "While such forecasts may pan out, there are substantial reasons that China and India may grow much less rapidly than is currently anticipated. Most importantly, history teaches that abnormally rapid growth is rarely persistent, even though economic forecasts invariably extrapolate recent growth." The two economists said in their paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research that China's growth has been incomparable with that of other countries, but it will still "slow substantially", they said.

## Informal Sector

#### 1. The unemployment answers take out the DA; if there’s no unemployment, then there’s no one to shift to the informal sector.

#### 2. TURN – Informal sector is high now; living wage is key to solve it. Studies prove.

**Lemos 4**

Sara Lemos (University of Leicester and IZA Bonn). “The Effects of the Minimum Wage in the Formal and Informal Sectors in Brazil.” Institute for the Study of Labor. March 2004. http://ftp.iza.org/dp1089.pdf

6. Policy Implications The evidence here suggests that the poorest are not out of the reach of the legislation, **despite being** over-represented **in the informal sector, where the legislation is not complied with.** The minimum wage is effective throughout the bottom half of the distribution. **Spillover effects are substantial and robust** at the lowest percentiles, benefiting even those below the minimum wage. Although the effect on wages is sizeable, the employment effects of the minimum wage are small for Brazil when compared to the -1% in the international literature (Brown, 1999). The employment rate effect (job effects) is at the most -0.04% in the formal and -0.17% in the informal sector. Camargo (1989) and Carneiro and Henley (2001) argue that a policy such as this might be more effective to reduce poverty than policies that attempt to incorporate informal sector workers into the 15 formal sector, which might generate higher unemployment. Furthermore, the informal sector, as a way of avoiding the inefficiencies of labour market regulation (Soto, 1989; Loayza, 1997; Maloney, 1999), is large and growing in Brazil as a result of successive stabilization plans (Fox and Morley, 1989). The excess of regulations increase non-compliance, and non-compliance increases the de facto size of the informal sector (Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979). Neri (1997) argues that minimum wage increases are more likely to informalize than to destroy jobs. In a developing country, with very little social security, people cannot afford to stay out of work and will move into lower paid informal sector jobs (Macedo, 1981; Amadeo et al., 1995; Carneiro and Henley, 1998). McIntyre (2002) reported evidence confirming that the minimum wage increases the size of the informal sector in Brazil. 7. Conclusion There is very little evidence on the effects of the minimum wage in developing countries and in particular on these effects on the formal and informal sectors of such countries. The informal sector is not only large and overpopulated by minimum wage workers in Brazil, but it is also where most of the poor workers are. Extending the understanding of minimum wage effects both in developing countries and in particular in the informal sector is crucial if the minimum wage is to be used as a policy to help poor people in poor countries. This paper estimates wage and employment effects in both the formal and informal sectors for a key developing country, namely Brazil. The minimum wage was found to compress the wage distribution of both sectors. The compression effect extends higher in the informal sector wage distribution, but it is stronger at the bottom of the formal sector distribution. This suggests that the minimum wage redistributes in favour of the poorer in both sectors, but that it redistributes in favour of those in the very bottom of the distribution in the formal sector, while it redistributes more widely in favour of those in the half bottom half of the distribution in the informal sector. Consistent with the presence of a spike, spillover effects, and the associated compression effect in both sectors, employment was found to decrease in both sectors. Negative employment rate effects (jobs effects) were found to be negative in both sectors – stronger in the informal sector – and aggregate unemployment rate effects was found to be positive. The compression effect together with the disemployment effect of the minimum wage in the informal sector in Brazil is the novelty here. This suggests a downwards sloping labour demand curve 16 in both sectors, challenging the standard Two Sectors Model as inadequate to explain the effect of the minimum wage on the formal and informal sectors in Brazil and in Latin America more generally. Most importantly, the novelty here is that the poorest are not out of the reach of the legislation. The findings here have important policy implications because they entail that the minimum wage is effective **not only in the formal, but also** in **the informal sector**, where legislation is not complied with. Furthermore, the minimum wage affects the wage of those above and even of those below the minimum wage in the informal sector, where the poorest workers are.

#### 3. Enforcement is irrelevant. Living wage creates a norm of fairness which solves the informal sector.

**Dinkelman and Ranchhod 10**

Taryn Dinkelman (Princeton) and Vimal Ranchhod (University of Cape Town). Evidence on the impact of minimum wage laws in an informal sector: Domestic workers in South Africa. July 2010. https://www.princeton.edu/rpds/papers/dinkelman\_ranchhod\_minwages\_0710.pdf

The introduction of a new minimum wage law in a previously unregulated informal market presents a unique opportunity to examine important issues around responses to legal wage floors. It also allows us a window into how informal labor markets operate and the conditions under which they might formalize. Although conditions in and characteristics of the domestic worker industry in South Africa were stable before the introduction of a minimum wage, wages in this sector rose significantly and substantially -- at least 10% compared with other workers -- POST-law. When we consider the difference-in-differences results, it is clear that domestic workers who work in areas where the pre-law median wage is below the minimum (i.e. where the new law has more “bite") experienced even larger increases in wages in the POST-period. **Despite the absence of full compliance** and a sharp wage spike at the minimum, we find evidence of a strong wage response to the law, and little statistical evidence that the law had a negative effect on work on the intensive or extensive margin. The main purpose of our paper has been to document these changes and to provide evidence that labor market regulation in an informal sector of considerable importance can have real impact, **even without monitoring or enforcement**. Given that issues of compliance are not often at the center of empirical work on minimum wages42, it is worthwhile considering how our results should be interpreted. One possible reason that the law had an effect is that some fraction of employers erroneously believed that the government was going to enforce the new minimum and penalize non-compliers. A difficulty with this explanation is that it cannot account for wage or earnings increases for domestic workers already paid more than the minimum before the law. Although we do not have a panel data set of workers to test this directly, the fact that the wage and earnings distribution fanned out (the variance increased) rather than compressing after the law suggests that some employers increased wages in excess of the minimum, despite already being compliant with the law. A second reason that an unenforced law may have been effective relates to models of fairness in wage-setting. A theoretical literature in labor economics posits that the notion of a fair wage is important in incentivizing workers to provide high effort in tasks for which effort is unobservable (Akerlof, 1982, 1984 and Akerlof and Yellen, 1988). These models are difficult to test empirically, since defining and measuring a fair wage, or a reference wage, is tricky in practice.43 Experimental studies have separately established the importance of gift exchange and fairness intentions in employer-employee relationships.44 In the case of the domestic worker industry in South Africa, it is plausible that the announcement of a wage floor defined, or re-defined, what the fair wage was and set in motion voluntary employer responses, even though the two traditional channels for encouraging compliance-- enforcement and penalties-- were closed off.45 What we take from our analysis is that in the initial stages of labor market formalization, governments may need to accept partial compliance with new legislation in order to bring about real changes in outcomes without significant disemployment.46 Even without enforcement, such **legislation can move the market towards a more formal setting**, if, for example, it increases contract coverage, as in the South African case. We emphasize that our conclusions are valid for the domestic worker industry, which is one example of an informal sector. The dynamics of the employment relationship between a single employer and a single employee no doubt condition the response to the law and so may only be relevant in some types of informal enterprizes. However, this characterization of the informal sector may not be too far from a description of the typical small-scale firm that generates much informal sector employment in developing countries.47 Also, our analysis is only relevant for the short-run effects of a new minimum wage policy: while we find clear effects in the 16 months after the law, as employers face annual increases in this minimum (often above inflation in the case of South Africa) and as workers sort across space in response to these new protections, the wage, earnings and employment effects of the policy may change as the sector itself becomes more formal over time. For example, employers may decide to contract child-care out to day-care centers which could have feedback effects on equilibrium wages, earnings, hours of work and number of jobs for domestic workers. We leave questions about the longer-term effects of formalizing the domestic worker market for future research. source of income for the poor.

27

#### 4. Their authors rely on flawed models

**Rogers and Swinnerton 4**

Carol Ann Rogers (Department of Economics, Georgetown University) and Kenneth A. Swinnerton (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs). “A Model of Informal Sector Labor Markets.” Department of Labor. 3 December 2004. http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/InformalSectorRevised.pdf

In many models of informal-sector formation, the informal sector results from, and is the source of, undesirable economic distortions.1 For example, James Rauch (1991) shows how the informal sector arises in a neoclassical model when some firms choose to remain small to enjoy legal exemption from a mandated minimum wage policy that distorts resources away from first best allocations. A larger informal sector is associated with a more restrictive minimum wage, and greater economic distortions. Tito Boeri and Pietro Garibaldi (2002) show how the informal sector can result from excessive taxation. The government loses tax revenues when firms become informal in order to evade taxes, which forces even higher tax burdens on the tax-paying formal firms. Norman V. Loayza (1996) shows how tax evasion by informal firms inhibits long-term economic growth by reducing productive government expenditures. Two presumptions run through this literature. One is that formal firms would prefer to be free of regulation or taxation from the government. The other is that social welfare would be higher if the regulations on these firms were removed or relaxed. A small and growing literature questions these presumptions, by showing that formal firms may voluntarily choose formality so as to receive some positive benefit, and that the informal sector has some intrinsic value to the economy.2 Alec R. Levenson and William F. Maloney (1998) develop a model in which allowing informal operation encourages the start up of new business. Over time, the most productive of these new firms grow and the least productive shut down. Growing firms evolve into formal firms as the benefits of formality - - such as access to various legal protections for increasingly complex business relationships - - become more important to them. Yoshiaki Azuma and Herschel Grossman (2002) develop a model in which allowing an informal sector to opt out of paying taxes may increase government revenues and aggregate output. In their model, there is a distribution of productivity across firms and each firm has strictly private information about its own productivity. A high tax coupled with the provision of government services only to firms that choose to pay can be Pareto superior to a lower tax forcibly levied on all firms.

## Politics

### Generic

1. Fiat means the aff happens immediately, so there’s no debate in Congress and no loss of polcap.

2. Studies disprove polcap theory.

**Edwards 9** writes[[56]](#footnote-56)

Even presidents who appeared to dominate Congress were actually facilitators rather than directors of change. They understood their own limitations and explicitly took advantage of opportunities in their environments. Working at the margins, they successfully guided legislation through Congress. When their resources diminished, they reverted to the stalemate that usually characterizes presidential-congressional relations. As legendary management expert Peter Drucker put it about Ronald Reagan, "His great strength was not charisma, as is commonly thought, but his awareness and acceptance of exactly what he could and what he could not do."134 These conclusions are consistent with **systematic research** by Jon Bond, Richard Fleisher, and B. Dan Wood. They have focused on determining whether the presidents to whom we attribute the greatest skills in dealing with Congress were more successful in obtaining legislative support for their policies than were other presidents. After carefully controlling for other influences on congressional voting, they **found no evidence that** those **presidents who** supposedly **were** the most **proficient in persuading Congress were more successful** than chief executives with less aptitude at influencing legislators.135 **Scholars studying leadership** within Congress **have reached similar conclusions** about the limits on personal leadership. Cooper and Brady found that institutional context is more important than personal leadership skills or traits in determining the influence of leaders and that there is no relationship between leadership style and effectiveness.136

3. The plan wouldn’t be top of the docket. The bill will pass before living wage is even considered by Congress.

4. TURN – Winners win in Obama’s second term. Obama gains polcap from taking a firm stance, whether or not the plan is popular.

**Ignatius 12** writes[[57]](#footnote-57)

Barack **Obama will** be **get**ting **advice** by the boatload over the next few weeks, but **the best** guidance **may be** what emerges from Caro’s biography “The Passage of Power”: **Think big.** Find strategies and pressure points that can **break the gridlock in Congress**, which was as rigid in 1963 as it is today. **Surprise your adversaries with bold moves** and concessions that create new space on which to govern.¶ As I watched Tuesday’s triumph, it seemed obvious that Obama needs the policy equivalent of David Plouffe, his senior campaign adviser. Plouffe’s genius was to decide early on that the race depended on nine battleground states; if he could deliver those states by **a relentless** and sometimes ruthless **assault**, he **would win the larger victory.** He was like a general who concentrates his forces at the points of greatest vulnerability and then prevails through sheer force of will.¶ Obama’s performance as president has often lacked this decisive, strategic quality. The notes are there but not the policy “music.” In both foreign and domestic policy, the impression of **Obama**, after his blunderbuss, first-year battles on health care and the Israeli-Palestinian issue, **has been** of **a careful president who** reacts to events, waits for others to make the first moves and **plays to avoid losing rather than** to **win.** Well, Mr. President, what the hell’s the presidency for? **A strategic second term would** begin by **identify**ing a list of necessary and achievable **goals, and** then **pursu**ing **them with the** **unyielding** manipulative **skill** of a Lyndon Johnson. On the top of everybody’s list would be a budget deal. Everybody knows, more or less, what it will require: changes in Social Security and Medicare that slow the growth of entitlement spending; reform of the tax code that produces a fairer and simpler system that raises revenue without limiting growth.¶ A road map is there in the Simpson-Bowles deficit-reduction plan, and Obama administration officials have been thinking privately for months about how to tweak the plan so it’s better and fairer. Mitt Romney’s generous concession speech Tuesday night opened a possible door, and the president should follow up his statement that he will “look forward to sitting down with Governor Romney to talk about where we can work together to move this country forward.” The president and his new Treasury secretary (Jack Lew?) should take the next step and ask Romney to help close the budget deal the country needs.¶ In foreign policy, Obama will need to be equally strategic. What does he want to accomplish? My list: a deal with Iran that verifiably limits its nuclear program and avoids war; a deal in Afghanistan that averts civil war when U.S. forces leave in 2014; a deal for a political transition in Syria (a shorthand Syria summary would be to organize the opposition so that it’s strong enough to bargain, then help win a Nobel Peace Prize for Vladimir Putin). And, finally, a deal to create a Palestinian state so that Israel has secure borders and the Arab world can get on with the process of becoming modern and democratic.¶ All these primary foreign policy goals are “deals,” and it follows that the president needs a dealmaker as secretary of state. Who could do that, after Hillary Clinton leaves, probably at the end of January? John Kerry is an experienced man who thinks outside the box and is willing to take risks. Even if the president is said to have found him somewhat windy as the stand-in for Romney during debate preparation, Kerry has shown over the past four years a willingness to negotiate with adversaries, in secret, to achieve results.¶ A longtime Democratic adviser argues that Obama needs the “Bolten Plan,” as in Josh Bolten, the White House chief of staff who mobilized the machinery of government to get it moving in the same direction in George W. Bush’s second term. This will never be a happy model for Democrats, but it captures an important point: **A successful second term is less about ideology than about results.** Think big. Take risks. Get it done. Maybe someone should slip a note in Obama’s desk drawer that asks: What would Lyndon Johnson have done to make it happen?

5. Voting neg means the plan was brought up for a vote and defeated.

6. No polcap. Obama is a cactus. **Onion 10** writes[[58]](#footnote-58)

WASHINGTON—According to a poll released Tuesday, nearly **20 percent** of U.S. citizens now **believe** Barack **Obama is a** cactus, the most Americans to identify the president as a water-retaining **desert plant** since he took office. A growing segment of the population believes the president is **pollinated by moths and hummingbirds.** The poll, conducted by the Pew Research Center, found a sharp rise in the number of Americans who say they firmly believe Obama was either born a cactus, [or] became a cactus during his youth, or has questionable links to the *Cactaceae* family. "We asked people of varying races, ages, and backgrounds the same question: 'What is President Barack Obama?'" Pew spokeswoman Jodi Miller told reporters. "And a fifth of them responded, 'A cactus.'" According to the poll, Obama has lost favor among many voters who supported his candidacy in 2008 but have since come to doubt he is a mammal. While these Americans concede Obama may not specifically be a cactus, most believe he is a plant of some kind, with 18 percent saying the president is a ficus, 37 percent believing him to be a grain such as wheat or millet, and 12 percent convinced he is an old-growth forest in Northern California. When asked why they agreed with the statement "President Obama is a large succulent plant composed of specialized cells designed for water retention in arid climates," many responded that they "just know," claiming **the pres**ident **only acts like a human** being **for political purposes and is truly a cactus at heart.** A number of polled Americans identified the above as a photo of President Obama. White House officials have asserted that the nation's 44th president is a person. "You can't go a day without hearing how Obama's a radical cactus sympathizer who wants to sap America of all its drinking water, or how he was actually born in the Kalahari Desert," said media critic Lynn Pelmont, referring to cable news outlets that suggest the president has prickly spines he uses to protect himself from thirsty animals. "For a man who prides himself on delivering a coherent message, **there's a**n awful **lot of confusion** out there **about whether he's a Harvard** Law **grad**uate **or a leafless** flowering **shrub."** "He must speak frankly to the American people about his mammalian background," Pelmont added. "If not, it's only a matter of time before people start believing those fringe bloggers who claim the president of the United States is actually an old washing machine." Some Beltway observers have accused Republicans of tacitly encouraging the cactus rumor, pointing out that if millions of voters believe Obama produces buds through spirally arranged areoles situated along his stem, the GOP has a much better chance of retaking Congress in November. "If the president says he is a human being, I'll take him at his word," Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell said Sunday on *Meet the Press*. "Though I've never heard him complain about being thirsty. Not once. That could be a coincidence, I suppose, but it's really not my place to say."

7. Not intrinsic. A logical policymaker would just pass the plan and also support the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ bill.

8. TURN – Raising the minimum wage is popular

**Swanson 14** writes[[59]](#footnote-59)

**Raising** the **minimum wage is** about as **popular** an economic policy position as any in America. In fact, more people want to increase the minimum wage than have a positive view of the capitalist system that underpins the nation's economy. A new HuffPost/YouGov poll found that 62 percent of Americans support raising the minimum wage from $7.25 to $10.10 an hour, while 26 percent are opposed. Meanwhile, 53 percent have a positive opinion of capitalism, while 19 percent have a negative view. Democratic lawmakers and President Barack Obama support increasing the minimum wage to $10.10 an hour. Obama announced during his State of the Union address last week that he would use an executive order to raise pay for federal contractors. Although most Americans surveyed said they favor raising the minimum wage, responses were divided along party lines. Eighty-five percent of Democrats and 60 percent of independents think the minimum wage should be increased, but only 31 percent of Republicans agree. **A majority of Americans in all income groups said they support an increase**, including 67 percent of those whose families make less than $40,000 a year and 55 percent of those whose families make more than $100,000 a year. Fans of capitalism were more likely than not to support a wage hike for low-income workers, with 51 percent backing an increase. Six hundred economists have signed on to an Economic Policy Institute letter urging Congress to raise the minimum wage. Though the question of whether an increase would help or hurt workers is the subject of some debate, the poll finds **Americans are mostly unswayed by arguments that an increase might hurt workers** because businesses would respond by hiring fewer people. Only 30 percent said they thought a minimum wage hike would hurt workers, while **52 percent said it would help them**. Fifty-five percent of those with a family income of less than $40,000 and 50 percent of those making more than $100,000 agreed. On this question, too, respondents were split along party lines, with 76 percent of Democrats saying that a minimum wage increase would help workers and 60 percent of Republicans saying it would hurt them. Independents were more likely to say it would help them, by a 49 percent to 33 percent margin.

Minimum wage increases are extremely popular, even with the GOP

**Trumka and Owens 13** write[[60]](#footnote-60)

**A recent national survey** conducted for the National Employment Law Project **by Hart Research Associates finds that 80% of the public -- including 62% of Republicans -- support a minimum wage increase. Just 25% think that raising America's wage floor would cost jobs**, a view that's also falling out of favor with economists. Raising the minimum wage does not result in job losses, respected academic research shows, even during bad economic times.

### AT EITC NB

EITC kills Obama’s polcap. Minimum wage increase is less likely to do so.

**Drum 13** writes[[61]](#footnote-61)

Did I miss something? **Are conservatives** now **pretending to praise** the **EITC? They've** mostly **been sworn foes for** the past **two decades**, so if they're now big fans I must have missed the conversion. Hell, **last year they were** mostly **complaining about the poor not paying enough in income taxes,** something **that's true mostly because of** the **EITC**. In any case, I'll bet that Obama would be delighted to raise the EITC instead of the minimum wage. The reason he didn't bother suggesting it is that he knows perfectly well that Republicans would vote it down instantly. Conversely, **raising the minimum wage has a slightly better chance of passage because** (a) **it's popular and** (b) **employers have to pay** it**, not the** federal **government**. Right? Am I missing anything here?

### Iran Deal

Iran deal has zero chance of passing

**Hensch 4-19** writes[[62]](#footnote-62)

**Sen.** Lindsey **Graham** (R-S.C.) on Sunday **said** President **Obama’s** tentative nuclear **agreement with Iran would not survive** its review by **Congress. “I don’t think there’s a snowball’s chance in Hell** this framework will get approved by Congress after review,” Graham told host Chris Wallace on “Fox News Sunday.” “It is so weak in a time we need to be strong,” the potential 2016 GOP presidential candidate added of the draft agreement’s details. **“I don’t think any Republican or Democrat is going to allow that to become final,”** he concluded. **Graham said Obama’s** potential **accord lacked** the **necessary safeguards for preventing a Tehran with nuclear arms**. It needed “anytime, anywhere” atomic inspections and more restrictions on Iran’s nuclear reactors, he argued. “At the end of the day, you can’t lift sanctions until the behavior of Iran changes,” Graham added. The South Carolina lawmaker additionally charged that the deal’s many flaws were proof Obama’s diplomatic strategy was lacking. “President Obama’s deal is deteriorating before our eyes,” Graham claimed. Graham added that 2016 Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and his party’s own White House hopefuls are not any more prepared for handling the situation. “I’ve been more right than wrong on foreign policy,” Graham said, rating his chance of entering the next presidential race at “91 percent.” “The Lindsey Graham view of foreign policy will beat Rand Paul’s view of foreign policy, Barack Obama’s view of foreign policy and Hillary Clinton’s view of foreign policy,” he added. Obama said Friday he would allow congressional review of the final Iran deal, which faces a June 30 deadline. A bill making its way through Congress would give lawmakers 30 days to review any deal reached with Iran before sanctions are lifted. Iran has promised it will allow more frequent atomic inspections in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. It has also vowed it will accept limits on its centrifuge and uranium stockpiles.

Iran deal causes major prolif in the Middle East—it also undermines the credibility of US deterrence

**Clyne 15** writes[[63]](#footnote-63)

What began as talks by an international coalition to deny Iran a military nuclear option has devolved to the Obama administration negotiating with Tehran to limit its nuclear stash, an approach that "will be to move from preventing proliferation to managing it," former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told to the Senate Armed Services Committee. In an editorial on **Kissinger**’s Jan. 29 remarks to the Senate, The Wall Street Journal points out that "the dean of American strategists who negotiated nuclear pacts with the Soviets in the 1970s," who "always speaks with care not to undermine a U.S. administration" — has **voiced grave concerns about** the **Obama** administration**’s** anemic **negotiations with Iran**. "[Kissinger] is clearly worried about how far the U.S. has moved from its original negotiating position that Iran cannot enrich uranium or maintain thousands of centrifuges," according to Journal. "And he is concerned that these concessions will lead the world to perceive that such a deal would put Iran on the cusp of being a nuclear power." A March 31 deadline is looming for an agreement to strike a comprehensive deal between Tehran and the P5+1 nations, which is comprised of Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States, to contain Iran's suspected nuclear program. Talks have been ongoing since an interim accord was reached in November 2013. Even if the world believes Iran’s nuclear sites have undergone valid inspections and all of its capabilities are known, it will forever alter the region, Kissinger said. "**If** the **other countries** in the region **conclude that America has approved** the development of **an enrichment capability within one year of a nuclear weapon**, and if they then insist on building the same capability, **we will live in a proliferated world in which everybody** — even if that agreement is maintained — **will be very close to the trigger point**," he said. According to the Journal, by allowing Iran to have nukes, "the Obama administration may be underwriting a new era of global nuclear proliferation." **Saudi Arabia could buy a bomb from Pakistan**, according to the Journal, **and Turkey**, who "won’t sit by and let Shiite Iran dominate the region," **would** surely **become nuclear. Add in Egypt**, "which has long viewed itself as the leading Arab state; **and perhaps** one or more of **the Gulf emirates**, which may not trust the Saudis. "That’s **in addition to Israel**, which is assumed to have had a bomb for many years without posing a regional threat." Kissinger’s sage concerns and the newspaper’s certitude that President Barack Obama is "so bent on an Iran deal that he will make almost any concession to get one," are further evidence that Congress needs to "vote on any agreement." "This is a very different world than the one we have been living in since the dawn of the nuclear age," the Journal said. "**A world with multiple nuclear states, including some with revolutionary religious impulses or hegemonic ambitions, is** a very **dangerous** place. "**A proliferated world would limit** the **credibility of U.S. deterrence on behalf of allies**. It would also imperil U.S. forces and even the homeland via ballistic missiles that Iran is developing but are not part of the U.S.-Iran talks."

Middle East prolif causes nuclear war

**Bar 11** writes[[64]](#footnote-64)

How will **a polynuclear Middle East** function? It is nearly certain that it **will not look like** the **latter years of the Cold War**. The **religious and political drivers** that will determine nuclear decision-making in the countries of the region **will preclude** integration of many of the **checks and balances** which evolved between the superpowers in the Cold War era. The most powerful driver that has the potential to impel the region to nuclear war is religion. Both **Sunni and Shiite traditions** of Jihad **view** the **willingness to challenge superior force as** an **exemplary** deed. In Shiite Islam, this is augmented by the idealization of suffering and martyrdom.  **Given weak command and control** structures in the region**, nuclear weapons may filter down to quasi-states** (such as Kurdistan or the Palestinian Authority), **terror**ist **organizations, and rival ethnic groups** for whom the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a hostile state would be an incentive to acquire at least a limited WMD capability.  The **countries** of the region **will probably be more predisposed** than the Cold War protagonists **to brandish their** nuclear **weapons** not only rhetorically but **through** nuclear **alerts or** nuclear **tests, leading to** situations of **multilateral** nuclear **escalation**. However, such multilateral escalation will not be mitigated by Cold War-type hotlines and means of signaling, and the **absence of a credible secondstrike** capability **may** well **strengthen the tendency to opt for a first strike.**

### TPA

TPP accelerates LNG exports and fracking—that increases warming

**Sierra Club 13** writes[[65]](#footnote-65)

How the TPP could increase fracking In order for the United States to export natural gas to another country, the Department of Energy (DOE) must first conduct a public analysis to determine whether those exports are consistent with the public interest. This analysis is critical to understanding the environmental and economic impacts associated with natural gas exports and to building a deliberate energy policy that protects the interests of the American public. Unfortunately, the **DOE loses its authority to regulate exports of natural gas to countries with which the U**nited **S**tates **has a free trade agreement that includes** so-called ―**national treatment for trade in gas**.‖ The **TPP, therefore, would mean automatic approval of LNG export permits**—without any review or analysis—to TPP countries. And many TPP countries would likely be quite interested in importing LNG from the United States. This is particularly true of **Japan—the word’s** single **largest LNG importer—**which **is one of the 12 TPP countries**. Already, the DOE is considering applications to export approximately 45% of the total U.S. domestic gas production. **Exporting this** volume of U.S. LNG **would** in turn **mean increased fracking**, the dirty and violent process that dislodges gas deposits from shale rock formations. It would also likely cause an increase in natural gas and electricity prices—up to three times their current price by some estimates—impacting consumers, manufacturers, and workers, while increasing the use of dirty coal power. Environmental impacts of natural gas exports **Exporting natural gas is polluting at every stage of its life** cycle. The process begins with extracting the gas, the vast majority of which will come from fracking. A dangerous and intrusive process, fracking involves pumping millions of gallons of a mixture of water, sand, and chemicals underground to create pressure which forces out natural gas.1 The **fracking** process **can spew** large amounts of hazardous, smog-forming, and **climate-disrupting air pollutants** into our air**, and is** also **linked to serious threats to our water supply**. Fracking operations also pollute and fragment forests, parks, and communities across the country as they spread across the landscape. But the environmental impacts associated with natural gas exports don’t stop here. Once the gas is extracted, it needs to travel from production sites to coastal export terminals through hundreds of miles of pipelines. Whether exporters are expanding old pipelines or building new ones, these major construction projects can cut across private property and public land, further fragmenting landscapes and increasing pollution. Then there are the environmental impacts associated with the building of the natural gas export terminals. New terminals will require the dredging of sensitive estuaries to make room for massive LNG tankers. Expanding facilities and ship traffic will also take their toll on coastal communities and the environment. Finally, **liquefied natural gas itself is** a **carbon-intensive fuel**,2 **with life-cycle emissions** significantly **greater than** those of **natural gas**. The energy needed to cool, liquefy, and store natural gas for overseas shipment makes LNG more energy- and greenhouse-gas-intensive than ordinary pipeline gas and even some fuel oils.3 Moreover, natural gas production and infrastructure, including wells and pipelines, have been found to leak methane, a potent greenhouse gas that traps nearly 86 times as much heat as carbon dioxide over the crucial 20-year period, and 34 times as much heat over a 100-year period.4 More natural gas exports, therefore, means more climate-disrupting pollution.

Ocean studies prove warming causes extinction. **Sify 10** writes[[66]](#footnote-66)

Sydney: Scientists have sounded alarm bells about how growing concentrations of **greenhouse gases are driving irreversible** and dramatic **change**s **in** the way the **oceans** function, providing evidence that humankind could well be on the way to the next great extinction. **The findings** of the comprehensive report: 'The impact of climate change on the world's marine ecosystems' **emerged from a synthesis of recent research** on the world's oceans, carried out **by two of the world's leading marine scientists**. One of the authors of the report is Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at The University of Queensland and the director of its Global Change Institute (GCI). 'We may see sudden, unexpected changes that have serious ramifications for the overall well-being of humans, including the capacity of the planet to support people. This is **further evidence that we are well on the way to** the next great **extinction** event,' says Hoegh-Guldberg. 'The findings have enormous implications for mankind, particularly **if the trend continues.** The earth's ocean, which produces half of the oxygen we breathe and absorbs 30 per cent of human-generated carbon dioxide, is equivalent to its heart and lungs. This study shows worrying signs of ill-health. It's as if the earth has been smoking two packs of cigarettes a day!,' he added. 'We are entering a period in which the ocean services upon which humanity depends are undergoing massive change and in some cases beginning to fail', he added.

Independently, LNG tanker explosions cause catastrophic damage – outweighs nuclear war

**Lovin 1** writes[[67]](#footnote-67)

About nine percent of such **a tankerload of LNG will** probably, **if spilled onto water, boil to gas in about five minutes.** 3 (It does not matter how cold the water is; it will be at least two hundred twenty-eight Fahrenheit degrees hot- ter than the LNG, which it will therefore cause to boil violently.) The result- ing gas, however, will be so cold that it will still be denser than air. It will therefore flow in a cloud or plume along the surface until it reaches an ignition source. Such a plume might extend at least three miles downwind from a large tanker spill within ten to twenty minutes. 4 It might ultimately reach much farther—perhaps six to twelve miles. 5 If not ignited, the gas is asphyxiating. **If ignited, it will burn to completion with a** turbulent diffusion **flame reminiscent of the** 1937 **Hindenberg** disaster **but** about **a hundred times as big. Such** a fireball **would burn everything** within it, and by its radiant heat would cause third-degree burns and start fires a mile or two away. 6 **An LNG fireball can blow through a city**, creating “a very large number of ignitions and explosions across a wide area. No present or foreseeable equipment can put out a very large [LNG]... fire.” 7 **The** energy **content of a single standard LNG** tanker (one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters) **is equivalent to** seven-tenths of a megaton of TNT, or about **fifty-five Hiroshima bombs**.

TPP and TTIP will be devastating for the environment

**Sierra Club 14** writes[[68]](#footnote-68)

**Our planet is in trouble.** Widespread deforestation has accelerated rates of biodiversity loss and soil erosion; 1 world fisheries are on the verge of collapse; 2 and climate disruption stands to destabilize world food supplies, undercut economic development, and threaten communities with extreme weather and sea level rise. As we move toward planetary tipping points, strong climate policies, ambitious environmental laws, and decisive governmental action are desperately needed. **Unfortunately, right when we need active policymaking most**, investment rules in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) are restricting the ability of governments to set policies in the interest of the public. While foreign investment can be an important driver of economic development, **current investment rules** go too far in **grant**ing **broad privileges to corporations at the expense of** the public welfare and **the environment**. And, **the most harmful** of the investment rules **stand to be expanded in** the **T**rans-**P**acific **P**artnership free trade agreement that the U.S. is currently negotiating with 11 countries across the Pacific Rim **and** in the **T**ransatlantic **T**rade and **I**nvestment **P**artnership between the U.S. and the European Union (EU). 4 Among the most harmful components of investment rules are vaguely worded provisions that guarantee investors a ―minimum standard of treatment‖ and ―fair and equitable treatment.‖ When a corporation feels that its rights have been violated or the monetary value of its investment has been reduced by the introduction of a new law or policy, **the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism allows foreign firms to bypass domestic court systems and sue governments** in private trade tribunals that lack transparency and public accountability. **Corporations have used investor-state dispute settlement** provisions **to challenge environmental**, land-use, energy, and other socially beneficial **laws** passed by democratically elected governments. To date, corporations have launched nearly 600 cases against nearly 100 governments.5 Of the 274 cases that have been concluded, nearly 60% either settle or are decided in favor of the investor.6 The impacts of these cases are harmful not only to the environment, but also to economies. In 2012, for example, the government of Ecuador was ordered to pay Occidental Oil nearly U.S. $2.4 billion including compound interest (described below).7 Finally, it is important to note that numerous studies have found no significant correlation between a country’s level of foreign direct investment and its decision to adopt treaties with broad investor protections, including investor-state dispute resolution. 8 Moreover, there is significant evidence that broad investor protections threaten communities and the environment. 9 The Rules Investment rules have become a significant threat to the functioning of democracies, the safety of the public, and the protection of the environment. The following are some of the rules—only a subset of the standard investment rules included in FTAs and BITs—that have allowed foreign corporations to attack critical public interest measures. Definition of Investment: The **definition of investment in FTAs** and BITs **goes far beyond** real property and **capital investments and includes**, for example, the ―**expectation of** gain or **profit**.‖ 10This broad definition of investment opens up governments to a wide range of cases not even related to actual investments. Minimum Standard of Treatment: Among the standard investment rules are **provisions** that **guarantee investors** ―minimum standard of treatment‖ and ―**fair and equitable treatment**.‖ These **vaguely worded provisions have been interpreted by** some **international tribunals as a standstill on regulation**, meaning that governments are vulnerable to lawsuits from foreign corporations simply for introducing or amending laws and policies while an investor is present. For example, a ban on a chemical found to be harmful to the health of communities and the environment, or new regulations in the oil, gas, or coal industries, could be considered a violation of minimum standard of treatment and challenged by a corporation for financial compensation in a private trade tribunal. Indirect Expropriation: Under today’s investment agreements, foreign corporations are often protected from ―indirect‖ expropriation, which can include laws or regulatory measures that merely reduces the value of a foreign firm’s future expected profits.11 **For example, a new regulation in** the **natural gas** industry **which reduces** the **profits** of an investor, such as additional permit requirements, **could be considered** not only **a violation of fair and equitable treatment** described above, but also expropriation. Investor State Dispute Settlement: Perhaps the most damaging component of investment rules is the investorstate dispute settlement mechanism that allows foreign corporations to circumvent domestic courts and sue a host country’s government in private trade tribunals. Not only do these tribunals give private corporations the same legal standing as democratically-elected governments, but they also lack transparency and public oversight.12 Moreover, since there is no cap on the amount of damages a tribunal can award to a corporation, the mere threat of an investor-state suit can be enough to dissuade governments from enacting important publicprotecting measures.

Environmental destruction risks extinction

**Milman 15** writes[[69]](#footnote-69)

[Brackets in original] **Humans are “eating away** at **our** own **life support systems”** at a rate unseen in the past 10,000 years by degrading land and freshwater systems, emitting greenhouse gases and releasing vast amounts of agricultural chemicals into the environment, new research has found. **Two** major **new studies** by an international team of researchers **have pinpointed** the **key factors that ensure a livable planet for humans**, with stark results. **Of nine worldwide processes that underpin life** on Earth**, four have exceeded “safe” levels –** human-driven **climate change, loss of biosphere integrity, land system change and** the **high level of phosphorus and nitrogen** flowing into the oceans due to fertiliser use. Researchers spent five years identifying these core components of a planet suitable for human life, using the long-term average state of each measure to provide a baseline for the analysis. They found that the **changes of the last 60 years are unprecedented in the previous 10,000** years, a period in which the world has had a relatively stable climate and human civilisation has advanced significantly. Carbon dioxide levels, at 395.5 parts per million, are at historic highs, while loss of biosphere integrity is resulting in species becoming extinct at a rate more than 100 times faster than the previous norm. Since 1950 urban populations have increased seven-fold, primary energy use has soared by a factor of five, while the amount of fertiliser used is now eight times higher. The amount of nitrogen entering the oceans has quadrupled. All of these changes are shifting Earth into a “new state” that is becoming less hospitable to human life, researchers said. “These indicators have shot up since 1950 and there are no signs they are slowing down,” said Prof Will Steffen of the Australian National University and the Stockholm Resilience Centre. Steffen is the lead author on both of the studies. “When economic systems went into overdrive, there was a massive increase in resource use and pollution. It used to be confined to local and regional areas but we’re now seeing this occurring on a global scale. These changes are down to human activity, not natural variability.” Steffen said direct human influence upon the land was contributing to a loss in pollination and a disruption in the provision of nutrients and fresh water. Advertisement “We are clearing land, we are degrading land, we introduce feral animals and take the top predators out, we change the marine ecosystem by overfishing – it’s a death by a thousand cuts,” he said. “That direct impact upon the land is the most important factor right now, even more than climate change.” There are large variations in conditions around the world, according to the research. For example, land clearing is now concentrated in tropical areas, such as Indonesia and the Amazon, with the practice reversed in parts of Europe. But the overall picture is one of deterioration at a rapid rate. “It’s fairly safe to say that **we haven’t seen conditions in the past similar to ones we see today and there is strong evidence that there [are] tipping points we don’t want to cross**,” Steffen said. “If the Earth is going to move to a warmer state, 5-6C warmer, with no ice caps, it will do so and that won’t be good for large mammals like us. **People say the world is robust and that’s true,** there will be life on Earth, **but the Earth won’t be robust for us**. “Some people say we can adapt due to technology, but that’s a belief system, it’s not based on fact. There is no convincing evidence that a large mammal, with a core body temperature of 37C, will be able to evolve that quickly. Insects can, but humans can’t and that’s a problem.” Steffen said the research showed the economic system was “fundamentally flawed” as it ignored critically important life support systems. “It’s clear **the economic system is driving us towards an unsustainable future** and people of my daughter’s generation will find it increasingly hard to survive,” he said. **“History has shown that civilisations** have risen, stuck to their core values and then **collapsed because they didn’t change**. That’s where we are today.” The two studies, published in Science and Anthropocene Review, featured the work of scientists from countries including the US, Sweden, Germany and India. The findings will be presented in seven seminars at the World Economic Forum in Davos, which takes place between 21 and 25 January.

Free trade’s worse for the economy—Asia proves

**FOE 3** writes[[70]](#footnote-70)

Box 3: All the World's a loser. **The** 19**97 Asian economic collapse** - a global crisis with global effects **caused by** a **global trade** system Cause: **Speculative capital poured into** the relatively immature **Asian** financial **markets** to take advantage of the growth in the tiger economies. **At** the **first signs of economic problems,** this **capital flowed out** again **almost overnight. This was** made **possible because of deregulated financial markets**. Effects: It is estimated that **over 50 million** more people in Asia **fell in**to **poverty**. In East Asia alone, unemployment increased by 3.3 million. The only major growth economy in the developed world - the US - had to absorb surplus and cheap production from Asia causing unemployment and a very large trade deficit in the US. Impacts were also felt elsewhere around the world, for example, cheaper exports from Thailand also caused the closure of a German Electronics company in the UK with the loss of 1,100 jobs. Following the Asian crisis, **global** economic **growth slowed down to** about **2%, its lowest** level **for five years. Export commodity prices** also **declined, with severe impacts on African countries** dependent on primary raw materials. Source: UNDP, 1999

TPA kills democracy and prevents checks on extinction-level environmental threats

**ADA 7** writes[[71]](#footnote-71)

“Fast Track” or “Presidential Trade Promotion Authority” is a mechanism by which Congress gives the executive branch the right to dictate trade policy and formulate trade agreements. **Under FastTrack,** the president and the USTR (United States Trade Representative) have the power to select our trading partner nation(s), negotiate a trade agreement, then submit the agreement to Congress for a simple 'up' or 'down' vote. **Discussion time is limited to 60 days. No amendments are permitted. Therefore**, under Fast Track, our **representatives in Congress have virtually no say** concerning trade policy and the contents or language of trade agreements. Fast Track was introduced by the Nixon administration in 1974. President Clinton used Fast Track to speed NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) through Congress in 1993. The process was re-christened “Presidential Trade Promotion Authority” by the George W. Bush administration. Through a process of misrepresentation of consequences and unconscionable railroading through Congress, the Bush Administration succeeded in having Fast Track renewed in 2001. George W. Bush used it to pass CAFTA (Central America Free Trade Agreement) in 2005, as well as several other less contentious deals. Global trade agreements do not simply regulate the exchange of goods; they increasingly facilitate international corporate investment. Agreements like NAFTA and CAFTA have functioned to increase the power and profits of corporations, to the detriment of workers’ livelihood and environmental sustainability. Trade agreements negotiated during the past two decades include control over services (such as provision of natural resources), over laws passed at the local and state levels (such as living wage laws, or environmental protections) and over intellectual property rights (including distribution of generic pharmaceuticals). Simply stated: trade agreements reach into all aspects of our lives and those of the populations of our trading partner nations.  **Trade agreements can be** written and **negotiated to raise living standards for workers and** to **enforce environmental protections vital to survival of the planet**. The evidence is clear that, **acting on its own, the administration wil**l continue to **craft trade agreements that benefit corporate investors instead**. (see ADA Resolutions #350, #371 & #378 for further details on global trade) Fast Track will expire at the end of June, 2007, and Congress again will be asked to authorize the Bush administration to choose our trading partners, negotiate the agreements without transparency, then present them to Congress for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote. It is the position of ADA that it is inappropriate for any president to request or be granted Fast Track authority. The process constitutes an abrogation of power and responsibility by the people’s elected representatives in Congress. **Democracy requires checks and balances** by the branches of government. **Fast Track is not democracy.**

Democracy solves extinction.

**Diamond 95** writes[[72]](#footnote-72)

**Nuclear**, chemical and biological **weapons continue to proliferate**. The very source of life on Earth, **the** global **ecosystem, appears** increasingly **endangered.** Most of **these** new and unconventional threats to security **are associated with** or aggravated by **the weakness or absence of democracy**, **with its provisions for legality, accountability**, popular sovereignty **and openness**. The experience of this century offers important lessons. **Countries that govern** themselves **in a** truly **democratic fashion do not go to war with one another**. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. **Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse**" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. **Democracies** do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They **do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on** or to threaten **one another**. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. **They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens**, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments**.**

TPP and TTIP pose substantial risks for the environment

**FOE no date** writes[[73]](#footnote-73)

Environmental **risks of the TPP and TTIP The TPP and TTIP pose many threats to the environment** and public health, including**:** Pesticide deregulation in U.S.-EU deal threatens bees. The **TTIP could thwart U.S. and European efforts to stop** the use of **bee-killing** neonicotinoid (also called **neonic**) **pesticides**. Neonics are believed to be a leading cause of bee declines. Europe has temporarily banned the use of three neonics, and cities across the U.S. have taken steps to eliminate them. But chemical companies like Syngenta and Bayer want to use the TTIP to roll back this progress and stop future action to save the bees. Increased fossil fuel exports. The U.S. trade negotiator and the **Republican congressional leadership are determined to use TPP and TTIP to increase U.S. coal, oil and gas exports that will fue**l global **warming.** These deals are designed to protect “free trade” in dirty energy products such as tar sands oil, coal and liquefied natural gas shipped out of West Coast, East Coast and Gulf ports. The result would be more climate change from carbon emissions across the Pacific. TPP and TTIP would undermine sound climate policy. These trade deals not only increase trade in dirty fossil fuels, they also can undercut policies designed to curb climate change. For example, **pressure to “get ready” for a trade deal** with the U.S. **has already pressured European officials to weaken an EU** fuel quality **directive that would limit shipments** to Europe **of dirty tar sands** oil. TPP and the TTIP undermine democracy. **TPP and TTIP** would **allow firms** to access **secretive international tribunals where they could sue governments** for millions or billions of dollars **if** environmental or public **health regulations interfere with** expected future **profits. This would discourage government action like** restricting oil and gas drilling, imposing pollution controls, **limiting** the use of **fracking** (hydraulic fracturing), **or** even **stopping** construction of the **Keystone XL** pipeline. Deregulation of chemicals threatens public health. TTIP could drag down effective European chemical regulations so that they approach low standards in the U.S. In coming years, TTIP could stymie congressional action to more effectively regulate chemicals associated with breast cancer, autism and infertility. More immediately, it could undercut efforts in Oregon to more effectively protect children from toxic chemicals. TPP and TTIP undercut prudent food safety regulations. A USTR report identified EU food safety measures — including restrictions on imports of beef treated with growth hormones, chicken washed in chlorine, and meat produced with growth stimulants — as “trade barriers.” Conversely, the Europeans could use TTIP to attack higher U.S. standards related to mad cow disease. The TPP in the same way will undercut food safety standards. It also promises to unleash a tsunami of unsafe seafood exports to the United States. Vietnam and several other Pacific basin countries are notorious for their unclean factory fish farms, which use antibiotics and chemicals banned in the U.S.

# Iran Straight Turns (ToC)

## 1AR Short

### **INL/T (Squo Deal Bad)**

#### **Squo Negotiations Are Useless; Sanctions Key To Solve Iranian Proliferation**

Cotton, 2015:

(As The Iranian Nuclear Talks Drag On, Congress Must Act. January 29, 2015. Tom Cotton, U.S. Senator And Member Of The Senate Banking And Intelligence Committees)

Yet the nuclear negotiations have become an endless series of concessions to Iran. As it stands, American negotiators have conceded to Iran the right to enrich uranium, for which Iran has no legitimate need, much less a right. The negotiators have also conceded to Iran its plutonium-producing reactor and possession or development of thousands of advanced centrifuges. Nor are the negotiators even addressing Iran’s ballistic-missile program. In return, Iran has received billions of dollars in sanctions relief. To end this appeasement, the Senate Banking Committee on Thursday approved legislation that would impose new conditional and prospective sanctions on Iran if nuclear negotiations fail. The proposed legislation also calls for congressional approval of any nuclear agreement. It would have been preferable never to have eased the economic sanctions on Iran to begin with, but 20 months of negotiations is more than enough time for a process that Secretary of State John Kerry once predicted would take three to six months. Many Senate Democrats oppose the proposed legislation, agreeing with President Obama that it might cause Iran to “walk away” from negotiations. Yet sanctions brought Iran to the table in the first place. The threat of future sanctions would cause the Iranians to walk away only if that is what they planned to do all along. The regime in Tehran could easily avoid new sanctions by making a deal.

### INL/T (KT Good Deal)

#### Status Quo Deal Fails; Sanctions Are A Comparatively Better Option

Tobin, 2/6:

(Can Iran Be Trusted On Nukes? Can Obama? Jonathan S. Tobin, Journalist For Commentary Magazine. 2/6/2015)

As the Post points out, the danger inherent in the administration’s Iran policy is that by letting them keep thousands of centrifuges and a nuclear stockpile that could be quickly re-activated to allow it to build a weapon, the terms currently being discussed will, at the very least, allow the Islamist regime to become a threshold nuclear power. Though he continues to insist, as he has since he first started running for president in 2007, that he won’t let Iran get a nuclear weapon, the president doesn’t seem to have a problem with that. Why? The answer is that Obama believes that the U.S. and Iran have common interests that will allow them to cooperate together in the region and that the ayatollahs have too much to gain from a reconciliation with the West in terms of their nation’s economy to want to risk it all by building a bomb. But the problem with that formulation is that it is fundamentally mistaken. Iran has no interest in America’s need for regional stability and preserving moderate Arab regimes allied with the West, let alone protecting the existence of the state of Israel. To the contrary, it hopes to threaten both the Arab states and Israel via the threat of a nuclear weapon as well as keeping the pressure on them through the use of its Hezbollah terrorist auxiliaries and allied terror groups like Hamas. Yet Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon as well as its progress on ballistic missiles means that this is a problem that concerns the entire West and not just Israel and the Arabs. That is why the bipartisan sanctions bill proposed by Senators Mark Kirk and Robert Menendez is so important. It provides at least a measure of accountability to the process since it raises the price for Iran for dragging out negotiations or for continuing to refuse to accept even another weak deal with the West like the interim agreement signed in November 2013. Even more to the point, is the question of whether even a weak deal, such as the one Obama and Kerry embraced in 2013 can be enforced by this or subsequent administrations. To date, the administration has refused to take seriously charges that the Iranians are already cheating on the interim deal. The dynamic of the process is such that the president views any such questions or even threats of more sanctions with hostility because he sees them as a threat to his goal of a rapprochement with Iran. This is problematic because so long as Iran believes that Washington won’t take violations of a nuclear deal seriously, it will feel free to push the envelope on more cheating. Since the president has already conceded that, as the Post wrote, “a process that began with the goal of eliminating Iran’s potential to produce nuclear weapons has evolved into a plan to tolerate and restrict that capability,” it is difficult to believe the Islamist regime will think it need worry about the president abandoning a process to which he has become so devoted no matter what they do.

### **INL/T (Sanctions Good)**

#### U.S. Appeasement Undermines The International Sanctions Regime; The Impact Is Iranian Prolif

Phillips, 2014:

(James Phillips, Senior Research Fellow For Middle Eastern Affairs At The Heritage Foundation. January 15,2014. Iran: More Sanctions Pressure Needed To Salvage An Acceptable Nuclear Deal)

Such sanctions would be an “insurance policy,” in the words of Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Robert Menendez (D–NJ), that would increase the Administration’s bargaining leverage by raising the potential costs Tehran would have to pay if it fails to resolve the nuclear issue through diplomacy. Instead, the White House has bowed to Iranian threats to withdraw from the talks in the event that Congress passes more sanctions and has escalated pressure on congressional advocates of sanctions rather than on Iran. Instead, the White House has bowed to Iranian threats to withdraw from the talks in the event that Congress passes more sanctions and has escalated pressure on congressional advocates of sanctions rather than on Iran. Meanwhile, there is growing concern that the Administration’s relaxation of U.S. sanctions is eroding the strength of international sanctions against Iran. Russia is reportedly negotiating a $1.5 billion per month oil-for-goods swap that would further undermine sanctions. Iran’s oil exports have also surged after the signing of the November interim agreement, rising from 789,292 barrels per day in November to 1,059,605 per day in December. If current trends continue, Iran not only will escape the full brunt of sanctions but will retain the infrastructure to build nuclear weapons at its own convenience. Congress has an opportunity to put sanctions in place that will force Iran and its potential trade partners to pay a heavy price if Iran continues down its nuclear path.

### **INL/T (ME War)**

#### Negotiations Fail; Independently Risks Middle East Prolif

The Washington Post, 2/5:

(The Emerging Iran Nuclear Deal Raises Major Concerns. The Washington Post. February 5, 2015)

First, a process that began with the goal of eliminating Iran’s potential to produce nuclear weapons has evolved into a plan to tolerate and temporarily restrict that capability. ●Second, in the course of the negotiations, the Obama administration has declined to counter increasingly aggressive efforts by Iran to extend its influence across the Middle East and seems ready to concede Tehran a place as a regional power at the expense of Israel and other U.S. allies. ●Finally, the Obama administration is signaling that it will seek to implement any deal it strikes with Iran — including the suspension of sanctions that were originally imposed by Congress — without a vote by either chamber. Instead, an accord that would have far-reaching implications for nuclear proliferation and U.S. national security would be imposed unilaterally by a president with less than two years left in his term. The first and broadest of these problems was [outlined by Mr. Kissinger](http://www.c-span.org/video/?323996-1/hearing-national-security-strategy) [in recent testimony](http://www.henryakissinger.com/speeches/012915.html) to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The talks, he pointed out, began as a multilateral effort headed by the European Union and backed by six U.N. Security Council resolutions intended “to deny Iran the capability to develop a military nuclear option.” Though formally the multilateral talks continue, “these negotiations have now become an essentially bilateral negotiation” between the United States and Iran “over the scope of that [nuclear] capability, not its existence,” Mr. Kissinger said. Where it once aimed to eliminate Iran’s ability to enrich uranium, the administration now appears ready to accept an infrastructure of thousands of Iranian centrifuges. It says its goal is to limit and monitor that industrial base so that Iran could not produce the material for a warhead in less than a year. As several senators pointed out last month during a hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee, the prospective deal would leave Iran as a nuclear-threshold state while theoretically giving the world time to respond if Tehran chose to build a weapon. Even these limited restrictions would remain in force for only a specified number of years, after which Iran would be free to expand its production of potential bomb materials. Mr. Kissinger said such an arrangement would very likely prompt other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, to match Iran’s threshold capability. “The impact . . . will be to transform the negotiations from preventing proliferation to managing it,” he said. “We will live in a proliferated world in which everybody — even if that agreement is maintained — will be very close to the trigger point.” A related problem is whether Iran could be prevented from cheating on any arrangement and acquiring a bomb by stealth. Mr. Kaine (D) underlined that an attempt by the United States to negotiate the end of North Korea’s nuclear program failed after the regime covertly expanded its facilities. With Iran, said Mr. Kaine, “a nation that has proven to be very untrustworthy . . . the end result is more likely to be a North Korean situation” if existing infrastructure is not dismantled. The administration at one time portrayed the nuclear negotiations as distinct from the problem of Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism, its attempts to establish hegemony over the Arab Middle East and its declared goal of eliminating Israel. Yet while the talks have proceeded, Mr. Obama has offered assurances to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that the two countries have shared interests in the region, and the White House has avoided actions Iran might perceive as hostile — such as supporting military action against the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad.

#### Extinction

Kam, 2007:

**(**Deputy Head-Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Ephraim Kam, A Nuclear Iran, p. 50, http://d.scribd.com/docs/2o4yoqqhx2btgchcpfug.pdf)

The statements by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad about wiping Israel off the map are not qualitatively new and resemble those by other Iranian leaders. Their reiteration at a time when Iran is under pressure on the nuclear issue, however, suggests increasing extremism on the part of the Iranian leadership towards Israel, as well as diminished sensitivity towards international public opinion. Even if it is unlikely, **the possibility that a fanatical group**, whether within the regime or a faction emerging from a split in the leadership, **will gain control of nuclear weapons and decide to use them against Israel cannot be categorically ruled out**. Moreover, **the Middle East is a volatile region that has witnessed much violence and military force. Ballistic missiles and chemical weapons have already been used on a large scale, including in wars between Muslim countries. The risk that nuclear weapons will be used in the Middle East is greater than in other regions and is greater than the risk between the superpowers during the Cold War. Rules of behavior and channels for dialogue capable of reducing the risk do not yet exist.**

## 1AR Long

### **INL/T (Squo Deal Bad)**

#### Squo Deal Is Appeasement; The Impact Is Iran Prolif

Zuckerman, 2/6:

(Mortimer Zuckerman, Chairman and Editor-in-chief Of U.S. News & World Report. Time Is On Iran’s Side. February 6, 2015)

The Arab countries are profoundly worried about the appeasement they see in Washington. They have no faith that western diplomats know how to deal with Persians and remarkably see Israelis as their best defensive shield against Iran. The administration has acted in such a way as to ensure that Iran will pay no price for negotiating in bad faith. What is Obama’s message? It seems to be more to want an accommodation with Iran than preventing its expansion, to avoid even a confrontation over its ability to attack the U.S. with a nuclear-tipped ICBM. We must have a clear message to Iran. If it thinks it need not budge on a nuclear program and that the sanctions will collapse of their own weight, it must think again. And think hard. As for the U.S., it must not be so concerned about diplomatic failure that it will accept a bad deal and leave Iran with breakout capacity. We must make them understand what we consider an unacceptable deal: anything that fails to roll back their program to small numbers of centrifuges; anything that permits more than one bomb’s worth of enriched uranium in country; or allows a heavy-water plant and, vitally, any deal that does not allow for scrutiny and understanding of what the consequences of cheating would be. We have a limited amount of time and the real issue is what we do with it. The optimists have to address the concerns of those who lament the deal instead of dismissing them. The fears of the Israelis and the Saudis go to the heart of whether this deal loses us critical leverage and whether we have the will and the means to press the Iranians. We cannot live with a just-in-time Iranian nuclear program that leaves it with the option of going for a weapon at a moment of its choosing.

#### **Squo Negotiations Are Useless; Sanctions Key To Solve Iranian Proliferation**

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Yet the nuclear negotiations have become an endless series of concessions to Iran. As it stands, American negotiators have conceded to Iran the right to enrich uranium, for which Iran has no legitimate need, much less a right. The negotiators have also conceded to Iran its plutonium-producing reactor and possession or development of thousands of advanced centrifuges. Nor are the negotiators even addressing Iran’s ballistic-missile program. In return, Iran has received billions of dollars in sanctions relief. To end this appeasement, the Senate Banking Committee on Thursday approved legislation that would impose new conditional and prospective sanctions on Iran if nuclear negotiations fail. The proposed legislation also calls for congressional approval of any nuclear agreement. It would have been preferable never to have eased the economic sanctions on Iran to begin with, but 20 months of negotiations is more than enough time for a process that Secretary of State John Kerry once predicted would take three to six months. Many Senate Democrats oppose the proposed legislation, agreeing with President Obama that it might cause Iran to “walk away” from negotiations. Yet sanctions brought Iran to the table in the first place. The threat of future sanctions would cause the Iranians to walk away only if that is what they planned to do all along. The regime in Tehran could easily avoid new sanctions by making a deal.

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#### Sanctions Key To Iran Deal; They Won’t Back Out Of Negotiations

Jafarzadeh, 1/29:

(Alirea Jafarzadeh, Deputy Director Of The Washington Office Of The National Council Of Resistance Of Iran, Credited With Exposing. Januay 21, 2015. Iran Sanctions Fight: Three Myths No Lawmakers Should Believe)

Myth #1: More sanctions on Iran will prompt the regime to unilaterally walk away from the talks. Iran cannot afford to walk away because it is desperate and vulnerable. It has a genuine interest to secure the lifting of existing sanctions, which provided the initial impetus for the regime to talk. Then, too, cynics argued that sanctions would prompt Tehran to accelerate its nuclear activities. The regime is playing a game of attrition, aiming to weaken U.S. resolve, win more concessions, and maintain its nuclear infrastructure. The bipartisan sanctions bill will force Tehran to consider speedy compliance. This month, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani reiterated, "Breaking the anti-Iran sanctions is the only way to achieve national progress," acknowledging that Iran's devastated economy cannot endure the weight of further sanctions, especially after the recent decline in oil prices. The mullahs are paranoid of a disenchanted population already on edge. With rampant unemployment, inflation, and loss of oil revenues, walking away from the talks is not an option, especially if a sanctions-in-waiting bill is hovering over their head.

#### Sanctions Are Key; Iran Is Militarizing Now

Jafarzadeh, 1/29:

(Alirea Jafarzadeh, Deputy Director Of The Washington Office Of The National Council Of Resistance Of Iran, Credited With Exposing. Januay 21, 2015. Iran Sanctions Fight: Three Myths No Lawmakers Should Believe)

Myth #2: With more sanctions, Tehran will blame Washington for sabotaging diplomacy, and start on the path towards war. Even with slumping oil revenues - slashed by at least 45% - the official defense budget has jumped 30%, mostly allocated to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC). And, more money is being funneled into Syria and Iraq to execute Tehran's designs - a budget that is twice that of all the country's publically funded universities combined. If sanctions fail to force Tehran to abandon key parts of its nuclear program after over a year of negotiations, then continued talks with no additional leverage will fail as well. The IAEA still has no access to suspect nuclear sites and its questions remain unanswered. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said in November 2014, “Iran has not provided any explanations that enable the Agency to clarify the outstanding practical measures, nor has it proposed any new practical measures in the next step of the Framework for Cooperation, despite several requests from the Agency.” Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that even without additional sanctions the chances for reaching an agreement with Iran is less that 50 percent. So, as Iran tries to wear out western negotiators, clearly, additional leverage from Congress is necessary, not counterproductive.

### **INL/T (Sanctions Good)**

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(James Phillips, Senior Research Fellow For Middle Eastern Affairs At The Heritage Foundation. January 15,2014. Iran: More Sanctions Pressure Needed To Salvage An Acceptable Nuclear Deal)

Such sanctions would be an “insurance policy,” in the words of Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Robert Menendez (D–NJ), that would increase the Administration’s bargaining leverage by raising the potential costs Tehran would have to pay if it fails to resolve the nuclear issue through diplomacy. Instead, the White House has bowed to Iranian threats to withdraw from the talks in the event that Congress passes more sanctions and has escalated pressure on congressional advocates of sanctions rather than on Iran. Instead, the White House has bowed to Iranian threats to withdraw from the talks in the event that Congress passes more sanctions and has escalated pressure on congressional advocates of sanctions rather than on Iran. Meanwhile, there is growing concern that the Administration’s relaxation of U.S. sanctions is eroding the strength of international sanctions against Iran. Russia is reportedly negotiating a $1.5 billion per month oil-for-goods swap that would further undermine sanctions. Iran’s oil exports have also surged after the signing of the November interim agreement, rising from 789,292 barrels per day in November to 1,059,605 per day in December. If current trends continue, Iran not only will escape the full brunt of sanctions but will retain the infrastructure to build nuclear weapons at its own convenience. Congress has an opportunity to put sanctions in place that will force Iran and its potential trade partners to pay a heavy price if Iran continues down its nuclear path.

### **Scenario (ME War)**

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First, a process that began with the goal of eliminating Iran’s potential to produce nuclear weapons has evolved into a plan to tolerate and temporarily restrict that capability. ●Second, in the course of the negotiations, the Obama administration has declined to counter increasingly aggressive efforts by Iran to extend its influence across the Middle East and seems ready to concede Tehran a place as a regional power at the expense of Israel and other U.S. allies. ●Finally, the Obama administration is signaling that it will seek to implement any deal it strikes with Iran — including the suspension of sanctions that were originally imposed by Congress — without a vote by either chamber. Instead, an accord that would have far-reaching implications for nuclear proliferation and U.S. national security would be imposed unilaterally by a president with less than two years left in his term. The first and broadest of these problems was [outlined by Mr. Kissinger](http://www.c-span.org/video/?323996-1/hearing-national-security-strategy) [in recent testimony](http://www.henryakissinger.com/speeches/012915.html) to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The talks, he pointed out, began as a multilateral effort headed by the European Union and backed by six U.N. Security Council resolutions intended “to deny Iran the capability to develop a military nuclear option.” Though formally the multilateral talks continue, “these negotiations have now become an essentially bilateral negotiation” between the United States and Iran “over the scope of that [nuclear] capability, not its existence,” Mr. Kissinger said. Where it once aimed to eliminate Iran’s ability to enrich uranium, the administration now appears ready to accept an infrastructure of thousands of Iranian centrifuges. It says its goal is to limit and monitor that industrial base so that Iran could not produce the material for a warhead in less than a year. As several senators pointed out last month during a hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee, the prospective deal would leave Iran as a nuclear-threshold state while theoretically giving the world time to respond if Tehran chose to build a weapon. Even these limited restrictions would remain in force for only a specified number of years, after which Iran would be free to expand its production of potential bomb materials. Mr. Kissinger said such an arrangement would very likely prompt other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, to match Iran’s threshold capability. “The impact . . . will be to transform the negotiations from preventing proliferation to managing it,” he said. “We will live in a proliferated world in which everybody — even if that agreement is maintained — will be very close to the trigger point.” A related problem is whether Iran could be prevented from cheating on any arrangement and acquiring a bomb by stealth. Mr. Kaine (D) underlined that an attempt by the United States to negotiate the end of North Korea’s nuclear program failed after the regime covertly expanded its facilities. With Iran, said Mr. Kaine, “a nation that has proven to be very untrustworthy . . . the end result is more likely to be a North Korean situation” if existing infrastructure is not dismantled. The administration at one time portrayed the nuclear negotiations as distinct from the problem of Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism, its attempts to establish hegemony over the Arab Middle East and its declared goal of eliminating Israel. Yet while the talks have proceeded, Mr. Obama has offered assurances to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that the two countries have shared interests in the region, and the White House has avoided actions Iran might perceive as hostile — such as supporting military action against the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad.

#### Extinction

Kam, 2007:

**(**Deputy Head-Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Ephraim Kam, A Nuclear Iran, p. 50, http://d.scribd.com/docs/2o4yoqqhx2btgchcpfug.pdf)

The statements by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad about wiping Israel off the map are not qualitatively new and resemble those by other Iranian leaders. Their reiteration at a time when Iran is under pressure on the nuclear issue, however, suggests increasing extremism on the part of the Iranian leadership towards Israel, as well as diminished sensitivity towards international public opinion. Even if it is unlikely, **the possibility that a fanatical group**, whether within the regime or a faction emerging from a split in the leadership, **will gain control of nuclear weapons and decide to use them against Israel cannot be categorically ruled out**. Moreover, **the Middle East is a volatile region that has witnessed much violence and military force. Ballistic missiles and chemical weapons have already been used on a large scale, including in wars between Muslim countries. The risk that nuclear weapons will be used in the Middle East is greater than in other regions and is greater than the risk between the superpowers during the Cold War. Rules of behavior and channels for dialogue capable of reducing the risk do not yet exist.**

### Scenario (Nuke Terror)

#### Sanctions Good; Squo Deal Risks ME War And Nuclear Terrorism

Steinitz, 2014:

(Yuval Steinitz, Minister Of Intelligence For The State Of Israel. Don’t Make A Bad Deal With Iran. October 19, 2014)

Second, a flawed deal would hand Iran practical advantages in return for almost nothing. In return for an insignificant and temporary reduction of its enrichment capacities, Iran stands to reap $100 billion per year when the sanctions are lifted; gain formal legitimacy for its uranium enrichment activities; and, despite its history of nuclear fraud and concealment, preserve the capability to produce nuclear weapons at a time it deems appropriate. Three factors will determine the breakout time needed for Iran to produce nuclear weapons: the quantity and quality of its remaining operational centrifuges; the amount of 3.5 percent enriched uranium that it is permitted to stockpile; and the final destiny of its remaining centrifuges and their infrastructure. The international community must have full and complete clarity on these fundamental issues. Finally, a bad deal would pave the road to nuclear proliferation and herald the dawn of a nuclear arms race in the unstable Middle East. Other countries in the region will rush to build equivalent enrichment programs, which the international community will no longer be able to resist in good conscience, and which will drastically increase the risk of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of radical Islamists. This actually leaves the negotiators with only two real options at the moment: a bad deal, or no deal at all. Barring a surprising change in Iran’s negotiating stance, there is zero chance of reaching a satisfactory good deal before the Nov. 24 deadline. Choosing the “no deal” option will very likely produce extra pressure — including some new sanctions — on Iran and, subsequently, might pave the way for a better deal in the near future. Standing our moral ground will transmit a clear message to the leaders in Tehran that the only way to escape mounting pressure will be through ultimately making the necessary significant compromises. Not reaching a nuclear deal at this stage must not be considered a failure. It can even be regarded a qualified success, since it would represent the integrity of an international community adhering to its principles rather than sacrificing the future of global security because it is distracted by the worthy fight against Islamic State terrorists.

#### Extinction

Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, <http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf>)

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.

# TPA Straight Turns (ToC)

## Uniqueness

### U/Q (TPP)

#### TPP Will Pass Now; Mexico Cooperation

Guida, 2015:

(Obama, Mexico’s President To Chart Course For TPP—EU: Here’s The Beef—Former W.H. Official: TPA Vote Could Be TPP Showdown. 1/06/2015.Victoria Guida, Journalist For Politco)

OBAMA, MEXICO’S PRESIDENT TO CHART COURSE FOR TPP: President Barack Obama and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto will discuss the “mechanics” of how to quickly wrap up Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations when the two leaders meet today in Washington, senior administration officials said Monday. “It’s natural in a trade negotiation like this that two governments are going to have specific issues that they’re going to want to focus on in a final phase of negotiation,” one of the officials said in a conference call with reporters. “But a lot of our work with Mexico has really been on each of us positioning so that we’re able to encourage other countries to bring this to a close, and Mexico has been very important in that regard.” Peña Nieto will also meet with Vice President Joe Biden during the U.S.-Mexico High Level Economic Dialogue, also being held today. The dialogue, which was established in 2013, is co-chaired by the Commerce and State departments and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. “The president’s entire economic Cabinet will attend this meeting, which I think is a huge indication of how significant this administration believes our economic cooperation and relationship with Mexico is,” the official said. The two leaders will also discuss the White House decision last month to re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba.

### U/Q (TTIP)

#### TTIP Will Pass Now; Broad Transatlantic Support

Stokes, 1/29:

(Bruce Stokes, Director Of Global Economic Attitudes At Pew Research Center. January 29, 2015. Is Europe On Board For A New Trade Deal With The U.S.)

American and European officials meet February 2 in Brussels for another round of negotiations aimed at creating a free trade agreement between the European Union and the United States. The proposed [Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)](https://ustr.gov/ttip) aims to remove most tariffs affecting the movement of goods across the Atlantic, reduce non-tariff regulatory barriers to transatlantic commerce and to spur more U.S.-EU cross-border investment. But it has sparked criticism, with both [EU and U.S. opponents](http://www.citizen.org/tafta) claiming that TTIP may give too much power to corporations, especially foreign investors, and that it could undermine food safety and environmental standards, lowering U.S. chemical regulations and forcing Europeans to consume genetically-modified American foods and chlorinated chickens. Overall, recent surveys in both the U.S. and the 28-member EU suggest there is widespread support for a deeper transatlantic trade and investment relationship in most EU countries and among publics representing most of the European population, economy and exports to the U.S. More than half (53%) of the American public believes deeper trade and business ties with the EU will be a good thing for their country, according to a March 2014 Pew Research Center [survey](http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/04/09/support-in-principle-for-u-s-eu-trade-pact/). A Eurobarometer [survey](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_first_en.pdf) from fall 2014, conducted by TNS at the request of the European Commission, found that a majority (58%) of Europeans back a free trade and investment agreement between the EU and the U.S. A quarter are opposed to such a deal. Support for such an agreement is shared by half or more of people in 25 EU Member States. The three countries with particularly low support are Austria (39% favor vs. 53% oppose), Germany (39% vs. 41%) and Luxembourg (40% vs. 43%). There are eight countries with very strong support, where more than seven-in-ten people back a transatlantic free trade agreement, including the Netherlands (74%), Poland (73%), Denmark (71%) and Ireland (71%). Moreover, there is majority support in countries that together account for 69% of the EU population, 61% of the EU Gross Domestic Product and 59% of EU merchandise exports to the U.S.

#### TTIP will pass over opposition

Business Times 2/18. Leon Hadar, Obama faces battle over trade deals; An alliance of progressive Democrats and Tea-Party Republicans oppose fast-track powers for the president arguing that the TPP and TTIP will hurt ordinary Americans, Business Times Singapore, February 18, 2015, LN

This alliance of progressive Democrats and Tea-Party Republicans would face off a powerful pro-free trade coalition consisting of the White House and the Republican Party establishment that agree that deals with the economies that account for about two-thirds of the world's gross domestic product (GDP) will help advance America's global economic interests and create new and well-paying American jobs. Hence, the president and his new GOP pals are expected to mobilise their enormous resources to ensure that Congress would approve the TPP and the TTIP before the end of 2015.

## 1AR Short

### INL/T (General)

#### TPA dooms trade agreements- otherwise they’d pass

Watson, 13

 -- Cato Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies trade policy analyst

[Bill, "Stay Off the Fast Track: Why Trade Promotion Authority Is Wrong for the Trans-Pacific Partnership," Free Trade Bulletin No 56, [www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/stay-fast-track-why-trade-promotion-authority-wrong-trans-pacific](http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/stay-fast-track-why-trade-promotion-authority-wrong-trans-pacific), accessed 1-19-14]

The Obama administration has asked Congress to reinstate trade promotion authority in hopes that it will enable passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade agreement being negotiated by 12 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Advocates of free trade generally support trade promotion authority, because it eases the passage of trade agreements through Congress by guaranteeing an up-or-down vote with no amendments. While trade promotion authority can be useful, the current political climate in Washington reduces its benefits, and the late stage of the TPP negotiations raises the risk that *t*rade *p*romotion *a*uthority *will do more harm than good*. Free trade agreements are an important tool to improve U.S. trade policy, and "fast track" trade promotion authority has been helpful in securing the completion and passage of those agreements. 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The TPP, as envisioned by U.S. negotiators, will push forward a lot of unpopular, new U.S. demands as a condition for access to the U.S. market. None of these "ambitious" goals—like stricter intellectual property enforcement, investment protections, and regulatory good governance—helps American consumers or furthers the goal of trade liberalization. They do, however, attract substantial political opposition at home and abroad. Unless trade promotion authority is used to make the TPP a better agreement, there is little point in pursuing it now. The battle over trade promotion authority will likely involve a divisive debate about the value of trade in which support from individual members is bought with guarantees of protection or favor for special interests. Such a debate will surely occur again when Congress votes to pass a completed TPP agreement, so why have it twice? Unless trade promotion authority can be used to simplify the trade debate and improve trade agreements—to make them more about free trade—the American people will be better off without it. What Is Trade Promotion Authority? There are a lot of myths about what fast track is and how it works. A grant of trade promotion authority establishes an agreement between Congress and the president over how trade agreements should be negotiated and ratified. Both the president and Congress take on obligations. Congress agrees to hold an up-or-down vote on trade agreements submitted by the president within established time limits. In exchange for this promise, the president agrees to consult with congressional leaders throughout the negotiations and to adopt a variety of negotiating objectives dictated by Congress.2 After negotiations are completed, the "fast track" component of trade promotion authority kicks in. Under the 2002 Trade Promotion Act, the president was required to notify Congress 90 days before signing any agreement. Then the president would submit the agreement to each house of Congress in the form of a bill implementing the treaty’s obligations. The House and Senate then had a total of 90 days to pass the bill out of committee and hold a floor vote.3 During this time, no amendments could be attached to the bill, and Senate filibuster rules didn’t apply. Trade promotion authority can be very helpful in securing ratification and implementation of trade agreements. By simplifying and streamlining the approval process, and by giving congressional leaders influence over the negotiations from the beginning, trade promotion authority greatly reduces the potential for unhelpful disruption by Congress after an agreement is completed. The procedural restrictions prevent the agreement from being picked apart by every member of Congress whose district is home to an uncompetitive business. Indeed many proponents of trade promotion authority claim that fast track is necessary to get trade agreements through Congress, and with good reason. Trade historian Craig VanGrasstek notes that between 1789 and 1933, the president submitted 27 tariff reduction treaties to the Senate for ratification, and only five of those were approved.4 Most of those that did not pass died after the Senate simply refused to hold a vote on them. Trade promotion authority removes that possibility. The benefits of trade promotion authority, however, come with a substantial cost. Congress generally sees trade promotion authority as a waynot only to expedite the passage of trade agreements but also to influence their content.5 Any agreement that receives fast track treatment is expected to conform to demands imposed by Congress in the trade promotion authority statute. The 2002 Trade Promotion Act, in particular, laid out extensive and detailed negotiating objectives. 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Trade Promotion Authority Is Unnecessary The conventional wisdom, among trade advocates and opponents alike, is that fast track is necessary to get agreements through Congress. But**the most recent experiences** with trade promotion authority following the Democratic takeover of the House of Representatives in 2007 aptly demonstrate how ineffective it can be. At the same time, trade policy has become increasingly partisan in recent decades so that trade promotion authority is now neither necessary nor sufficient to pass free trade agreements. Partisan Congress In theory, trade promotion authority works well to enable the president to pursue an ambitious trade policy despite a typically trade-skeptic Congress. The negotiating objectives Congress includes in trade promotion authority serve as politically necessary restrictions on the president’s power to open the U.S. market. According to conventional wisdom, accepting the need for a watered-down agreement in advance is the only way to avoid having an agreement rejected or delayed after years of difficult negotiations. But support for and opposition to free trade agreements has become especially predictable and partisan over the last few decades. Indeed, the trade policy divide in Congress may be more partisan now than at any time since the 1920s, when protectionist Republicans imposed high tariffs that helped plunge the country into economic depression and war. Today, anti-trade sentiment has become quite powerful within the Democratic Party. The Republican Party, while certainly not dominated by free traders, is strongly committed to reciprocal liberalization through trade agreements. The result of this dynamic is that trade agreements are passed largely along party lines, regardless of what’s in them. For example, the last time there was a Democrat in the White House and Republicans in charge of Congress, **controversy** over labor and environment issues **prevented** Congress from approving **fast-track** legislation for President Clinton in 1998 despite support from Republican leadership. **But** while **Republicans** opposed including strong labor and environment objectives in a grant of fast track authority to a Democratic president in 1998, they **had no trouble approving three agreements**in 2011 that included such provisions. Democrats, on the other hand, have recently demonstrated their willingness to oppose agreements without strong labor and environment provisions, even if the agreements are consistent with agreed upon fast-track objectives. In 2007 when the Democratic Party took control of the House of Representatives, the new leadership reneged on the 2002 fast track grant and demanded that already-completed agreements be renegotiated to include stronger obligations on labor and the environment before holding a vote.7 Even then, three of the agreements weren’t taken up by Congress until Republicans took back the House four years later. Ironically,securing trade promotion authority can end up being politically more difficult than passing trade agreements. In 1998 the House voted 243–180 against granting fast-track authority to President Clinton. One third of the Republican majority joined the bulk of the Democratic members to defeat the bill. In 2002 a Republican House and Democratic Senate approved trade promotion authority for President Bush. The House voted along partisan lines, but the administration had to lobby Democrats in the Senate to secure passage. The 2002 Trade Promotion Act passed the Senate 62–34, a closer margin than all but one of the free trade agreements submitted to Congress under that bill’s procedures. The lesson we should learn from fast track’s recent history is that ideological and partisan differences may be more toxic to trade promotion authority than to gaining approval of completed agreements. While trade agreements offer concrete, measurable benefits, the debate over fast track takes place in the abstract.8 Trade promotion authority is an opportunity for members to score points with constituents and special interests without much consequence. Once a completed agreement is on the table, members of Congress will face much greater pressure to avoid making parochial demands.

#### TPA Is Net-Worse For Free Trade

Ponnuru, 2014:

(Obama On Free Trade: Doing It Wrong. 2/10/2014. Ramesh Ponnuru, Visiting Fellow At The American Enterprise Institute)

Which brings us back to Watson's point. If Obama negotiates a free-trade deal in the Pacific, he will have to hit up his fellow Democrats in Congress again to approve it. It might have been better for the president to dispense with trade-promotion authority altogether: to get an agreement and then move straight to a vote. That way he wouldn't have to make so many requests, and create so many chances to be turned down. It might have been better for free trade, too.

### INL/T (Currency)

#### TPA Dooms Free Trade; Currency Manipulation Provisions

Ponnuru, 2/17:

(Ramesh Ponnuru, Visiting Fellow At The American Enterprise Institute. Don’t Let Currency Fear Obstruct Trade. February 17, 2015)

Both parties in Washington have coalesced on a common demon. They call it "currency manipulation," and they're busy designing bad policies to combat it. Congressmen want the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a major free-trade deal, to include provisions against such manipulation. And they want to use the trade-promotion authority bill -- which would make it easier for presidents to negotiate trade agreements -- to require such provisions in future deals. These are bad ideas. Free-trade agreements enhance our wealth and that of other countries, and they're less likely to be concluded if they're tied to arguments about currencies. The congressmen argue that other countries, especially China, are intentionally cheapening their currencies against the dollar, boosting their exports to the U.S., and reducing imports of American goods. They say that this is a form of protectionism that is costing American jobs. And they want to retaliate by jacking up taxes on imports from the offending countries. One weakness of this case is that you can't draw a straight line from another country's weak currency to its trade balance to harm to Americans, as my American Enterprise Institute colleague Derek Scissors has pointed out. Philip Levy, who studies global economics for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, says that currency manipulation can't be compared to the classical case of protectionism: Either a country is levying tariffs on some American products or it isn't. Currency manipulation, by contrast, is in the eye of the beholder. There is no objective measure of what value a currency should have. The idea that countervailing duties can offset currency manipulation is also flawed. Because economists disagree on whether currency manipulation is happening in particular instances, and to what degree it's happening, it isn't clear how high this duty should be set. Dan Ikenson, a trade-policy analyst at the Cato Institute, notes that if the duty is set too high, the effect will be to distort trade rather than to eliminate a distortion. He also says that a duty can't do anything by itself to boost American exports to the offending country. (It can help U.S. exporters only if the pain it inflicts induces the foreign government to change its conduct.) Other countries have accused the U.S. of being a currency manipulator because of its monetary policy. They argued that the Federal Reserve's bond-buying program, which was halted last year, made the dollar cheaper and gave U.S. exporters an unfair advantage. How should governments distinguish between legitimate monetary policy and illegitimate currency interventions? Rep. Sander Levin, the top Democrat on the House committee that deals with trade policy, has tried to outline some criteria for identifying manipulators that wouldn't make the U.S. into one. One assumes, though, that economic officials in other countries aren't uniformly fools and would realize that these criteria are rigged. Why would they accept an agreement that lets the U.S. devalue its currency but exposes them to sanctions if they do the same? Weak as the case is for punishing alleged manipulators, it commands strong support.

### INL/T (Protections)

#### TPA Dooms Free Trade Agreements; Labor/ Environment Protections

Watson, 2014:

(Challenging The Conventional Wisdom On Fast Track. January 8, 2014. K. William Watson, Trade Policy Analyst With The CATO Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center For Trade Policy Studies.)

If you believe the administration’s claim that the TPP negotiations are in their closing stages, then the impact of fast track could be especially counterproductive. It is true that a bill from Congress laying out its sensitivities will better inform and ensure foreign negotiators, but it will also reduce the flexibility of U.S. negotiators to make the concessions needed to get the deal completed. The real danger that fast track helps alleviate is not completion of the negotiations, but passage of the agreement through Congress. In the past, it made sense to impose Congress’s negotiating objectives through a fast track bill because Congress was unlikely to ratify an agreement that didn’t meet their demands. But today, trade agreements are passed through Congress on largely partisan lines regardless of what’s in them. As O’Grady notes, House Democrats are not even involved in crafting the fast track bill because nothing in the bill will convince them to support the TPP when it finally comes up for a vote. We shouldn’t forget that those same House Democrats, when they were in charge in 2007, ignored the previous fast track arrangement, demanded major changes to already completed agreements, and refused ever to hold a vote on agreements with Colombia, Korea, and Panama. As O’Grady explains: Mrs. Pelosi didn’t want the Colombia FTA to go to the floor for a vote because it had enough support to pass. So even though the law instructed her to send it, she refused and stuck it in a drawer. That amounted to double-crossing the best ally the U.S. has in Latin America. So if trade promotion authority convinces U.S. trading partners that Congress won’t obstruct or meddle with the agreement, they haven’t been paying attention. Senate Democrats are much friendlier toward trade and Republicans hold a majority in the House. It’s hard to imagine this Congress refusing to hold a vote on the TPP even without trade promotion authority. Unfortunately, while fast track is neither necessary nor sufficient to get agreements through Congress, it is certain to reduce the value of the TPP as a vehicle to liberalize trade. Any fast track bill coming out of Congress this year is bound to contain demands to include harmful rules in the TPP related to labor and environmental protection. Republicans are so eager to see progress on trade that they appear ready to accept these restrictions without a fight. O’Grady also hits the nail on the head with this observation about the inevitable inclusion of currency rules in the fast track bill: It also may contain a provision aimed at allowing the U.S. to accuse countries of “currency manipulation” and apply “safe-guards,” i.e. protection. Given the resistance to this concept among many U.S. trading partners, completion of the TPP would become more difficult. All of the observations O’Grady makes about the sad state of the TPP negotiations and trade politics in Washington right now are the very reasons why fast track is not only useless but harmful to the advancement of free trade.

### INL/T (Neg. Objectives)

#### TPA Dooms Free Trade Agreements; Negotiating Objectives

Watson, 2014:

(Republican Trade Policy: Finding The Fast Track Or Circling A Roundabout. August 1, 2014. K. William Watson, Trade Policy Analyst With The CATO Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center For Trade Policy Studies.)

But don’t we need fast track in order to get the best deal from our trading partners in the TPP? Not necessarily. It’s true that trade promotion authority enables foreign negotiators to put more on the table without the fear that Congress will disrupt the bargain with last minute demands. But there’s also [a downside](http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/stay-fast-track-why-trade-promotion-authority-wrong-trans-pacific). At this late stage in the negotiations, the imposition of new, mandatory negotiating objectives could be very disruptive. What’s more, any trade promotion authority bill that could be passed by this Congress is going to include a handful of especially bad negotiating objectives. To pass an avidly trade-skeptic, Democrat-controlled Senate, a fast track bill will likely include strong requirements related to currency manipulation — an issue that foreign governments have flat-out refused to negotiate in a trade agreement. Such a mandate could set back the already struggling negotiations and would, at the very least, require the United States to expend significant negotiating capital. Trade promotion authority will also mandate the inclusion of [enforceable provisions on labor and environment regulation](http://www.nationalreview.com/article/372555/greens-vs-free-trade-bill-watson). We already know that the administration has met significant resistance from our trading partners on this issue. Trade promotion authority would require U.S. negotiators to give up other objectives to secure those provisions. Even if the House Republicans are right that trade promotion authority would indeed secure the “best agreement obtainable,” opposing the second-best agreement is just bad policy. This is especially true considering how [unlikely](http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/196853-reid-rejects-obamas-plea-for-trade-power) it is that Congress will pass a good fast track bill. Their all-or-nothing attitude for the TPP is harmful to the countless American consumers and businesses that would benefit from freer trade. If you have the power to enact a TPP that gives you 90% of what you want, you can blame the president for the missing 10%, but opposing the deal is irrational.

## 1AR Long

### INL/T (General)

#### TPA dooms trade agreements- otherwise they’d pass

Watson, 13

 -- Cato Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies trade policy analyst

[Bill, "Stay Off the Fast Track: Why Trade Promotion Authority Is Wrong for the Trans-Pacific Partnership," Free Trade Bulletin No 56, [www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/stay-fast-track-why-trade-promotion-authority-wrong-trans-pacific](http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/stay-fast-track-why-trade-promotion-authority-wrong-trans-pacific), accessed 1-19-14]

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Topics covered in the objectives included investment protection, intellectual property laws, administrative law, labor law, and environmental protection.6 These objectives are mostly export-oriented and reflect the interests of certain U.S. business interests in foreign markets. Their inclusion may garner additional political support for the agreement, but they also attract opposition. Most importantly, achieving these negotiating goals will not liberalize trade. Nevertheless, **these non-trade issues are often the most politically contentious**aspect of trade agreements. At the same time, **they distract negotiators**from the legitimate goal of lowering U.S. trade barriers and fighting protectionism. Trade Promotion Authority Is Unnecessary The conventional wisdom, among trade advocates and opponents alike, is that fast track is necessary to get agreements through Congress. But**the most recent experiences** with trade promotion authority following the Democratic takeover of the House of Representatives in 2007 aptly demonstrate how ineffective it can be. At the same time, trade policy has become increasingly partisan in recent decades so that trade promotion authority is now neither necessary nor sufficient to pass free trade agreements. Partisan Congress In theory, trade promotion authority works well to enable the president to pursue an ambitious trade policy despite a typically trade-skeptic Congress. The negotiating objectives Congress includes in trade promotion authority serve as politically necessary restrictions on the president’s power to open the U.S. market. According to conventional wisdom, accepting the need for a watered-down agreement in advance is the only way to avoid having an agreement rejected or delayed after years of difficult negotiations. But support for and opposition to free trade agreements has become especially predictable and partisan over the last few decades. Indeed, the trade policy divide in Congress may be more partisan now than at any time since the 1920s, when protectionist Republicans imposed high tariffs that helped plunge the country into economic depression and war. Today, anti-trade sentiment has become quite powerful within the Democratic Party. The Republican Party, while certainly not dominated by free traders, is strongly committed to reciprocal liberalization through trade agreements. The result of this dynamic is that trade agreements are passed largely along party lines, regardless of what’s in them. For example, the last time there was a Democrat in the White House and Republicans in charge of Congress, **controversy** over labor and environment issues **prevented** Congress from approving **fast-track** legislation for President Clinton in 1998 despite support from Republican leadership. **But** while **Republicans** opposed including strong labor and environment objectives in a grant of fast track authority to a Democratic president in 1998, they **had no trouble approving three agreements**in 2011 that included such provisions. Democrats, on the other hand, have recently demonstrated their willingness to oppose agreements without strong labor and environment provisions, even if the agreements are consistent with agreed upon fast-track objectives. In 2007 when the Democratic Party took control of the House of Representatives, the new leadership reneged on the 2002 fast track grant and demanded that already-completed agreements be renegotiated to include stronger obligations on labor and the environment before holding a vote.7 Even then, three of the agreements weren’t taken up by Congress until Republicans took back the House four years later. Ironically,securing trade promotion authority can end up being politically more difficult than passing trade agreements. In 1998 the House voted 243–180 against granting fast-track authority to President Clinton. One third of the Republican majority joined the bulk of the Democratic members to defeat the bill. In 2002 a Republican House and Democratic Senate approved trade promotion authority for President Bush. The House voted along partisan lines, but the administration had to lobby Democrats in the Senate to secure passage. The 2002 Trade Promotion Act passed the Senate 62–34, a closer margin than all but one of the free trade agreements submitted to Congress under that bill’s procedures. The lesson we should learn from fast track’s recent history is that ideological and partisan differences may be more toxic to trade promotion authority than to gaining approval of completed agreements. While trade agreements offer concrete, measurable benefits, the debate over fast track takes place in the abstract.8 Trade promotion authority is an opportunity for members to score points with constituents and special interests without much consequence. Once a completed agreement is on the table, members of Congress will face much greater pressure to avoid making parochial demands.

#### TPA Is Net-Worse For Free Trade

Ponnuru, 2014:

(Obama On Free Trade: Doing It Wrong. 2/10/2014. Ramesh Ponnuru, Visiting Fellow At The American Enterprise Institute)

Which brings us back to Watson's point. If Obama negotiates a free-trade deal in the Pacific, he will have to hit up his fellow Democrats in Congress again to approve it. It might have been better for the president to dispense with trade-promotion authority altogether: to get an agreement and then move straight to a vote. That way he wouldn't have to make so many requests, and create so many chances to be turned down. It might have been better for free trade, too.

### INL/T (Currency)

#### TPA Dooms Free Trade; Currency Manipulation Provisions

Ponnuru, 2/17:

(Ramesh Ponnuru, Visiting Fellow At The American Enterprise Institute. Don’t Let Currency Fear Obstruct Trade. February 17, 2015)

Both parties in Washington have coalesced on a common demon. They call it "currency manipulation," and they're busy designing bad policies to combat it. Congressmen want the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a major free-trade deal, to include provisions against such manipulation. And they want to use the trade-promotion authority bill -- which would make it easier for presidents to negotiate trade agreements -- to require such provisions in future deals. These are bad ideas. Free-trade agreements enhance our wealth and that of other countries, and they're less likely to be concluded if they're tied to arguments about currencies. The congressmen argue that other countries, especially China, are intentionally cheapening their currencies against the dollar, boosting their exports to the U.S., and reducing imports of American goods. They say that this is a form of protectionism that is costing American jobs. And they want to retaliate by jacking up taxes on imports from the offending countries. One weakness of this case is that you can't draw a straight line from another country's weak currency to its trade balance to harm to Americans, as my American Enterprise Institute colleague Derek Scissors has pointed out. Philip Levy, who studies global economics for the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, says that currency manipulation can't be compared to the classical case of protectionism: Either a country is levying tariffs on some American products or it isn't. Currency manipulation, by contrast, is in the eye of the beholder. There is no objective measure of what value a currency should have. The idea that countervailing duties can offset currency manipulation is also flawed. Because economists disagree on whether currency manipulation is happening in particular instances, and to what degree it's happening, it isn't clear how high this duty should be set. Dan Ikenson, a trade-policy analyst at the Cato Institute, notes that if the duty is set too high, the effect will be to distort trade rather than to eliminate a distortion. He also says that a duty can't do anything by itself to boost American exports to the offending country. (It can help U.S. exporters only if the pain it inflicts induces the foreign government to change its conduct.) Other countries have accused the U.S. of being a currency manipulator because of its monetary policy. They argued that the Federal Reserve's bond-buying program, which was halted last year, made the dollar cheaper and gave U.S. exporters an unfair advantage. How should governments distinguish between legitimate monetary policy and illegitimate currency interventions? Rep. Sander Levin, the top Democrat on the House committee that deals with trade policy, has tried to outline some criteria for identifying manipulators that wouldn't make the U.S. into one. One assumes, though, that economic officials in other countries aren't uniformly fools and would realize that these criteria are rigged. Why would they accept an agreement that lets the U.S. devalue its currency but exposes them to sanctions if they do the same? Weak as the case is for punishing alleged manipulators, it commands strong support.

#### TPA Bad; Currency Manipulation Dooms Negotiations

Weisman, 2015:

(Currency Battle Is Tethered To Obama Trade Agenda. February 15, 2015. Jonathan Weisman, Journalist For The New York Times)

A number of countries — China most prominent among them — have long acted to hold down the value of their currencies against the dollar, helping their industries by keeping exports to American consumers cheaper and making goods from the United States more expensive. And while every president from Bill Clinton on has repeatedly criticized the practice, none have ever taken formal action against China or any other nation to try to stop it. Now, a growing bipartisan majority in Congress is coalescing around a demand that could derail [President Obama](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/o/barack_obama/index.html?inline=nyt-per)’s ambitious trade agenda before it really gets moving: include a robust attack on international currency manipulation or no deal. The push for strong currency provisions — in legislation to grant the president “fast track” trade negotiating authority, in a major trade deal with a dozen Pacific Rim countries, or in both — has presented the White House with what it fears is something of a Catch-22. If members of Congress are to be believed, unless the president’s trade negotiator includes strict, enforceable prohibitions on policies to intentionally hold down the value of currencies, any completed trade accord will die on Capitol Hill. But, administration officials say, demanding the inclusion of such prohibitions would kill the trade deals before they were completed. “You cannot be pro trade and pro this kind of currency mechanism,” warned Tony Fratto, a former official in the George W. Bush administration who is working against the congressional currency push. “They are completely incompatible. It will in fact kill a deal.” None of the officials representing the 12 nations, including the United States, want to see such prohibitions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is near completion, and negotiators working on a follow-up deal with Europe are similarly unenthusiastic. “We agree with many in Congress that more needs to be done and are working with them to figure out if there is something that can be accomplished in the context of our trade agreements that is consistent with our overall strategy of bilateral and multilateral engagement,” Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew said in a statement. “We remain concerned that an enforceable provision on currency could have a negative impact on our ability to protect American workers and firms and set back our international efforts.”

### INL/T (Protections)

#### TPA Dooms Free Trade Agreements; Labor/ Environment Protections

Watson, 2014:

(Challenging The Conventional Wisdom On Fast Track. January 8, 2014. K. William Watson, Trade Policy Analyst With The CATO Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center For Trade Policy Studies.)

If you believe the administration’s claim that the TPP negotiations are in their closing stages, then the impact of fast track could be especially counterproductive. It is true that a bill from Congress laying out its sensitivities will better inform and ensure foreign negotiators, but it will also reduce the flexibility of U.S. negotiators to make the concessions needed to get the deal completed. The real danger that fast track helps alleviate is not completion of the negotiations, but passage of the agreement through Congress. In the past, it made sense to impose Congress’s negotiating objectives through a fast track bill because Congress was unlikely to ratify an agreement that didn’t meet their demands. But today, trade agreements are passed through Congress on largely partisan lines regardless of what’s in them. As O’Grady notes, House Democrats are not even involved in crafting the fast track bill because nothing in the bill will convince them to support the TPP when it finally comes up for a vote. We shouldn’t forget that those same House Democrats, when they were in charge in 2007, ignored the previous fast track arrangement, demanded major changes to already completed agreements, and refused ever to hold a vote on agreements with Colombia, Korea, and Panama. As O’Grady explains: Mrs. Pelosi didn’t want the Colombia FTA to go to the floor for a vote because it had enough support to pass. So even though the law instructed her to send it, she refused and stuck it in a drawer. That amounted to double-crossing the best ally the U.S. has in Latin America. So if trade promotion authority convinces U.S. trading partners that Congress won’t obstruct or meddle with the agreement, they haven’t been paying attention. Senate Democrats are much friendlier toward trade and Republicans hold a majority in the House. It’s hard to imagine this Congress refusing to hold a vote on the TPP even without trade promotion authority. Unfortunately, while fast track is neither necessary nor sufficient to get agreements through Congress, it is certain to reduce the value of the TPP as a vehicle to liberalize trade. Any fast track bill coming out of Congress this year is bound to contain demands to include harmful rules in the TPP related to labor and environmental protection. Republicans are so eager to see progress on trade that they appear ready to accept these restrictions without a fight. O’Grady also hits the nail on the head with this observation about the inevitable inclusion of currency rules in the fast track bill: It also may contain a provision aimed at allowing the U.S. to accuse countries of “currency manipulation” and apply “safe-guards,” i.e. protection. Given the resistance to this concept among many U.S. trading partners, completion of the TPP would become more difficult. All of the observations O’Grady makes about the sad state of the TPP negotiations and trade politics in Washington right now are the very reasons why fast track is not only useless but harmful to the advancement of free trade.

### INL/T (TPP)

#### TPA Dooms TPP

Ponnuru, 2014:

(Obama On Free Trade: Doing It Wrong. 2/10/2014. Ramesh Ponnuru, Visiting Fellow At The American Enterprise Institute)

Even so, the old argument for trade-promotion authority has lost some of its force. K. William Watson, who studies trade for the Cato Institute, a libertarian research group, [argued](http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/stay-fast-track-why-trade-promotion-authority-wrong-trans-pacific) in December that passing the trade-promotion authority just to conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership didn't make sense. Talks were already well under way, and could be slowed down by the new negotiating demands Congress would make as a condition for passing the authority. Watson points out that the standard procedure for freeing trade requires winning two votes in Congress: First the authority has to be granted, and then the final deal passed. "Why have the same debate twice?" he asks. It's actually worse than that, because it's harder to get the trade-promotion authority than to enact a deal. Congress hasn't granted the authority since 2002, when a Republican House passed it by a 215-212 vote. It lapsed in 2007. Yet Congress has been able to pass several notable trade agreements by wide margins since then. In 2011, a free-trade deal with Colombia got 262 votes in the House, one with South Korea got 278, and one with Panama got 300. The congressional debate over trade-promotion authority tends to turn on the abstract question of whether free trade is a good idea. Protectionists can conjure up all kinds of grim scenarios about where liberalization will lead. In the debate over actual trade agreements, on the other hand, proponents can point to concrete benefits -- this specific market will be opened in this specific way to our exports -- to set against such fears. It's an easier fight for the pro-trade side. And other countries can't count on trade-promotion authority to mitigate the risks of negotiating with the U.S. When Democrats had control of the House in 2008, they [voted against](http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/trade/2008-04-10-colombia-house-pelosi-bush_N.htm) complying with the commitment to make a quick decision on trade agreements. The "fast track" took three more years.

### INL/T (Neg. Objectives)

#### TPA Dooms Free Trade Agreements; Negotiating Objectives

Watson, 2014:

(Republican Trade Policy: Finding The Fast Track Or Circling A Roundabout. August 1, 2014. K. William Watson, Trade Policy Analyst With The CATO Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center For Trade Policy Studies.)

But don’t we need fast track in order to get the best deal from our trading partners in the TPP? Not necessarily. It’s true that trade promotion authority enables foreign negotiators to put more on the table without the fear that Congress will disrupt the bargain with last minute demands. But there’s also [a downside](http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/stay-fast-track-why-trade-promotion-authority-wrong-trans-pacific). At this late stage in the negotiations, the imposition of new, mandatory negotiating objectives could be very disruptive. What’s more, any trade promotion authority bill that could be passed by this Congress is going to include a handful of especially bad negotiating objectives. To pass an avidly trade-skeptic, Democrat-controlled Senate, a fast track bill will likely include strong requirements related to currency manipulation — an issue that foreign governments have flat-out refused to negotiate in a trade agreement. Such a mandate could set back the already struggling negotiations and would, at the very least, require the United States to expend significant negotiating capital. Trade promotion authority will also mandate the inclusion of [enforceable provisions on labor and environment regulation](http://www.nationalreview.com/article/372555/greens-vs-free-trade-bill-watson). We already know that the administration has met significant resistance from our trading partners on this issue. Trade promotion authority would require U.S. negotiators to give up other objectives to secure those provisions. Even if the House Republicans are right that trade promotion authority would indeed secure the “best agreement obtainable,” opposing the second-best agreement is just bad policy. This is especially true considering how [unlikely](http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/196853-reid-rejects-obamas-plea-for-trade-power) it is that Congress will pass a good fast track bill. Their all-or-nothing attitude for the TPP is harmful to the countless American consumers and businesses that would benefit from freer trade. If you have the power to enact a TPP that gives you 90% of what you want, you can blame the president for the missing 10%, but opposing the deal is irrational.

## Misc. Scenarios

#### TPA Bad; Destroys U.S. Manufacturing

Lipinski, 2015:

(1/26/2015. Lipinski: Don’t Give Up Congressional Authority. U.S. Representative Dan Lipinski, Representing Illinois’ 3rd Congressional District)

Unfortunately, Republicans seem ready, if not eager, to give the president this authority. But Congress already has ceded too much power to the executive and judicial branches, and Americans deserve more transparency and an opportunity for input, not less. It would be especially problematic for the American people – especially the middle class – if Congress gave up its authority when it comes to trade agreements, considering how harmful many of these deals have been to American workers over the past 20 years. Since NAFTA was signed, Illinois alone has lost 293,000 manufacturing jobs. These were quality jobs with high wages and good benefits that supported middle-class families. Since that time, we’ve seen Democratic and Republican presidents continue to negotiate trade agreements with policies that have led to a soaring trade deficit, stagnant wages and continued outsourcing. President Obama lobbied Congress to pass the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement a few years ago. We were promised 70,000 new jobs and soaring exports, but the cold reality is a loss of 60,000 in jobs in the past two years and a 25 percent increase in the manufactured goods trade deficit with Korea. Right now, the president is negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership with 11 major Asian countries that comprise 40 percent of the United States’ goods trade. The United States already has a more than $40 billion manufacturing trade deficit with these countries, and past experience with trade deals indicates this could get much worse, costing more American jobs. Making matters worse, U.S. manufacturers, such as automakers and the steel industry, have serious concerns about currency manipulation by Japan and others, which directly undercuts American jobs and export opportunities, and there’s no assurance the president’s trade negotiators will fight to prevent this type of economic deceit in the trade pact. I’ve always said that American manufacturers are the best and most innovative globally, but they can’t compete if we keep ramming through free trade agreements with countries that aren’t being held to a high standard and a level playing field. The passage of my bipartisan manufacturing strategy legislation last Congress was an important step forward for reinvigorating this sector; but even the passage of legislation like that doesn’t change the reality that America’s workers and businesses cannot prosper if our trade policies force them to compete with one hand tied behind their backs. That’s why Congress needs to consider any trade agreement through regular order procedures that include real debate and the ability to offer amendments, not just one up-or-down vote on an agreement that was negotiated without transparency. Otherwise, we’re just passing an agreement that repeats the mistakes of the past, putting Americans out of work, threatening our environment, weakening food standards and lowering workers’ rights globally.

#### Manufacturing Key To Tech Innovation

Swezey, 2011:

(Devon Swezey, Project Director for Breakthrough Institute where he works as an energy and climate policy analyst and Ryan McConaghy, pg online @ <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/BTI_Third_Way_Idea_Brief_-_Manufacturing_Growth_.pdf>)

New manufacturing thrives on and drives innovation. Manufacturing is a core component of the nation’s innovation ecosystem. Firms engaged in manufacturing re-invest a significant portion of revenues in research and development (R&D). Overall, the manufacturing sector comprises two-thirds 9 of industry investment in R&D and employs nearly 64% of the country’s scientists and engineers. 10 Manufacturers also have unique opportunities to apply new technologies for specialized functions and achieve economies of scale at the plant or firm, 11 making the return on manufacturing R&D significant. The transition to advanced manufacturing will enhance the sector’s role in fostering innovation and developing and commercializing new technologies. Advanced manufacturing industries, including semiconductors, computers, pharmaceuticals, clean energy technologies, and nanotechnology, play an outsized role in generating the new technologies, products, and processes that drive economic growth. Advanced manufacturing is also characterized by the rapid transfer of science and technology into manufacturing processes and products, which in and of itself drives innovation. The research-to-manufacturing process is cyclical, with multiple feedbacks between basic R&D, pre-competitive research, prototyping, product development, and manufacturing. This opens new possibilities for product development and manufacturing. 12

#### Extinction

Heaberlin, 2004:

(Scott W, Nuclear Safety and Technology Applications Product Line @ Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, “A Case for Nuclear-Generated Electricity,” Battelle Press, 2004 \*\*\* we don’t endorse the gendered language if any in this card)

Cohen looked at all the various population estimates and concluded that most fell into the range of 4 to 16 billion. Taking the highest value when researchers offered a range, Cohen calculated a high median of 12 billion and taking the lower part of the range a low median of 7.7 billion. The good news in this is 12 billion is twice as many people as we have now. The bad news is that the projections for world population for 2050 are between 7.8 and 12.5 billion. That means we have got no more than 50 years before we exceed the nominal carrying capacity of the earth. Cohen also offers a qualifying observation by stating the "First Law of Information," which asserts that 97.6% of all statistics are made up. This helps us appreciate that application of these numbers to real life is subject to a lot of assumptions and insufficiencies in our understanding of the processes and data. However, we can draw some insights from all of this. What it comes down to is that if you choose the fully sustainable, non-fossil fuel long-term options with only limited social integration, the various estimates Cohen looked at give you a number like 1 billion or less people that the earth can support. That means 5 out of 6 of us have got to go, plus no new babies without an offsetting death. On the other hand, if you let technology continue to do its thing and perhaps get even better, the picture need not be so bleak. We haven't made all our farmland as productive as it can be. Remember, the Chinese get twice the food value per hectare as we do in the United States. There is also a lot of land that would become arable if we could get water to it. And, of course, in case you need to go back and check the title of this book, there are alternatives to fossil fuels to provide the energy to power that technology. So given a positive and perhaps optimistic view of technology, we can look to some of the high technology assumption based studies from Cohen's review. From the semi-credible set of these, we can find estimates from 19 to 157 billion as the number of people the earth could support with a rough average coming in about 60 billion. This is a good time to be reminded of the First Law of Information. The middle to lower end of this range, however, might be done without wholesale social reprogramming. Hopefully we would see the improvement in the quality of life in the developing countries as they industrialize and increase their use of energy. Hopefully, also this would lead to a matching of the reduction in fertility rates that has been observed in the developed countries, which in turn would lead to an eventual balancing of the human population. The point to all this is the near-term future of the human race depends on technology. If we turn away from technology, a very large fraction of the current and future human race will starve. If we just keep on as we are, with our current level of technology and dependence on fossil fuel resources, in the near term it will be a race between fertility decrease and our ability to feed ourselves, with, frankly, disaster the slight odds-on bet. In a slightly longer term, dependence on fossil fuels has got to lead to either social chaos or environmental disaster. There are no other end points to that road. It doesn't go anywhere else. However, if we accept that it is technology that makes us human, that technology uniquely identifies us as the only animal that can choose its future, we can choose to live, choose to make it a better world for everyone and all life. This means more and better technology. It means more efficient technology that is kinder to the planet but also allows humans to support large numbers in a high quality of life. That road is not easy and has a number of ways to screw up. However, it is a road that can lead to a happier place, a better place.

# NCs

## AT Branse

### Error NC (Lavin)

#### 1. This is non-unique defense. There’s always a risk of the aff.

#### 2. Lavin misunderstands logic

Kisilevsky 6

Sari Kisilevsky (Visiting Assistant Professor in Department of Philosophy). “NORMATIVE FORCE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ERROR: A REPLY TO DOUGLAS LAVIN.” March 2006.

My central worry **with Lavin’s objection** to the possibility of a perfectly rational agent is this. It is not clear that where an agent cannot but will in accordance with the practical law, we cannot properly say that she is not responsible or subject to it at all, and that she is like a mere machine. Consider, for example, the rules of theoretical reason. It might turn out that it is psychologically impossible for us to, say, believe p and not p (in the same thought), or, say, it might be impossible for us to fail to take modus ponens to be a valid rule of inference, and so on. If this were so, then we couldn't but follow these rules of rationality. Nonetheless, it seems to me that we would still say that we are judging well, or that we are rational when we deny contradictions or infer correctly. The mere fact that we cannot but judge in accordance with these rules does not seem to render them inapplicable in this context, nor does it exempt us from responsibility when we do. Nor, further, is it sufficient to conclude that we are acting as mere machines. To put the point slightly differently, we are happy to continue to say that we are properly subject to the norms of rationality even though the possibility of violating them is an open question; **nothing about** the **impossibility** of violating them seems to **impugn their normative status.**

#### 3. This links to the neg. Proves the converse false. Presume aff on timeskew.

#### 4. Branse is a troll, and the on balance interp solves.

**Nebel 14**

Jake Nebel (Oxford philosophy student, TOC ’09 semifinalist, hates plans). “Jake Nebel on Specifying “Just Governments.”” vBriefly. December 19th, 2014. http://vbriefly.com/2014/12/19/jake-nebel-on-specifying-just-governments/

One of the most trolly observations to make in a debate on this topic is that just governments do not exist. It strikes me as plausible that no actually existing government is just. But most debaters will rightly trust their linguistic intuitions (in this case, but not in others!) and assume that this point is irrelevant to the resolution. The question is: why is it irrelevant? If “just governments” gets an existential reading, then the point should be relevant. If there are no just governments, then it is not the case that there are some just governments that ought to require employers to pay a living wage. So the resolution is not true. Reading “just governments” as a generic bare plural, then, is key to avoiding the **trolly** observation as a knockdown negative argument (or a knockdown presumption trigger, if presupposition failure makes the resolution neither true nor false). One might object that not even the generic reading can avoid the problem. After all, if there are no just governments, then how could it be true that just governments in general ought to do anything? Some linguists have held that generics never presuppose the existence of the kind of thing in question. But others, such as von Fintel (1996) and Greenberg (2003), have endorsed a more modest point, which is still enough for my purposes. This point starts with the fact that the resolution states a rule—namely, that just governments require employers to pay a living wage. Consider the rule, Trespassers ought to be prosecuted. **We can affirm this rule even if there are no trespassers**. But consider next, Some trespassers ought to be prosecuted. This statement is not true if there are never any trespassers. The lesson is that normative generics do not presuppose the existence of members of the relevant kind. Since the resolution is a normative statement, it does not presuppose that there actually are any just governments.

#### 5. Just because a state is *in fact* just doesn’t mean it’s *necessarily* just or can’t make future errors any more than the term “living person” implies that someone will necessarily never die.

#### 6. Even if an agent is perfectly just, Lavin ignores error from intervening actors

Kisilevsky 6

Sari Kisilevsky (Visiting Assistant Professor in Department of Philosophy). “NORMATIVE FORCE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ERROR: A REPLY TO DOUGLAS LAVIN.” March 2006.

Note finally that, the requirement that we leave open the possibility of this kind of error does indeed rule out the possibility of a certain kind of perfect agent, namely, one who can guarantee successful compliance with the practical law by mere force of will. There can be no one for whom appreciation of the practical law alone is sufficient for success. This follows immediately from the possibility of error requirement as conceived above. If we take the possibility that **the world fails to cooperate** with our best-laid plans to be a practical error, then it seems that a complete account of the force of practical reason does indeed require that we leave open the possibility of a certain kind of practical error. However, **it is not** clear that this is **the kind that Lavin has in mind** in advancing his argument. This is because although the world going awry may certainly result in error in the sense that it may well result in a failure to satisfy the requirements of the practical law, and although this error may be a practical one in the sense that it is one that arises in practice rather than through the exercise of our theoretical capacities, it is not necessarily an error that we can attribute to the agent.

### Enoch NC

#### 1. The AC framework slays this case because I’m the only one with meta-level framing. He relies on the non-interference model because he assumes that doing nothing is the default. He’s conceded 4 long cards saying that’s both incoherent and can’t apply to states; that’s Pettit. He’s conceded that under non-domination, the default must be non-arbitrary coercion, which is the aff; that’s Waltman.

#### 2. We know for certain not everyone likes the squo, so it’s try or violate for the aff.

#### 3. This is morally repugnant. It would prohibit punishing a murderer if they didn’t consent to prison.

#### 4. It’s mis-cut. Enoch votes aff and thinks this case is so awful it should be rejected on face. Here’s the full article.

Enoch 9

David Enoch. “On Estlund’s Democratic Authority.” 2009.

**\*\*\*[FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE]\*\*\***

1. Overview of the Book For a state to be legitimate is for it to be permissible for the state to issue and enforce its commands (mostly laws), and for this to be permissible “owing to the process by which they were produced” (2).1 For a state to have authority is for it to have the power to morally require or forbid actions through commands, or the power to create duties (2).2 It seems that a state’s being democratic—in somewhat like the way in which the democracies we are familiar with are democratic—has something to do with its having both authority and legitimacy. But what, exactly? There is, after all, nothing obvious about the relation between democracy on the one hand and legitimacy and authority on the other. One may think that consent has something to do with it. But this would be wrong, because most of those supposedly under the authority of the state haven’t consented to anything of relevance (9). Implicit consent, if it is too implicit, so that the agent may not realize she is consenting, is no substitute for real consent, and if it is more explicit than that then, again, hardly anyone has consented to the state’s authority, not even in democracies (9). And most hypothetical consent theories fall prey to their own difficulties. So consent theory of the typical kind cannot ground political legitimacy and authority. (A very atypical kind of consent will nevertheless eventually emerge victorious.) 35 © Iyyun • The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 58 (January 2009): 35–48 1 David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). All references to page or chapter numbers below are to this book, unless otherwise stated. 2 If I understand him correctly, Estlund introduces these definitions as stipulations, and so I won’t dispute them below, even though I think that as attempts to capture our natural-language notions they are not obviously fully successful. 36 David Enoch A more thoroughly proceduralist account may be tempting, then. Perhaps it can be claimed that democratic decision procedures gain respectability for their results (for instance, in terms of legitimacy and authority) only because of intrinsic features of these procedures—say, their fairness, or their deliberative nature. But this won’t do, not just because of problems with the details of such views, but mostly because it is very hard to accept the claim that some intrinsic features of democratic procedures could render them sufficiently legitimate and authoritative, unless these procedures tended—at least somewhat—to generate the right decisions (chapters 4–5). After all, if they do not so tend, why not use the perfectly fair but presumably not legitimacy- and authority-conferring procedure of a coin-toss? It seems, then, that a necessary requirement for the legitimacy- and authority-conferring status of democratic decision-making mechanisms is that they tend to lead to correct decisions. Why not, then, go shamelessly instrumentalist? (This term is not Estlund’s.) Why not just state the true criteria for good decisions (like the true conception of political justice, the truth about the good life, etc.), and then argue for democracy by claiming that of all possible decision-making mechanisms it is the one that is in fact most likely to yield the decisions most in line with the truth of the relevant matters? The problem with shameless instrumentalism is that there is wide-ranging disagreement, indeed disagreement even among those whose opinions count here (like, perhaps, the reasonable) about the relevant substantive truths. And while such disagreement does not show that there is no relevant truth here—if anything, the nature of the disagreement counts, together with some other considerations, for the existence of relevant truth (chapter 2)—truth is not the only thing that matters here. Thinking that only truth matters here “would not explain the thought that even if the pope has a pipeline to god’s will, it does not follow that atheists may permissibly be coerced on the basis of justifications drawn from the Catholic doctrine” (5). What we need here is something along the lines of Rawls’s requirement in Political Liberalism to the effect that grounds for political action must be in reasonable consensus, they must be such that they could be justified to all reasonable citizens, whatever their (reasonable) comprehensive doctrines. Of course, perhaps Rawls was wrong about reasonableness here, and it’s not as if it’s completely clear what this qualification means. But he was right about the need for some acceptability requirement, and he was also right about including some On Estlund’s Democratic Authority 37 qualification here—after all, there is no reason to hold legitimacy hostage to the whims of the morally corrupt, or the irrational, or some such (and so doing would leave nothing as a legitimate ground for political action in modern pluralistic societies). Without committing ourselves to something more specific at this stage, we can say that shameless instrumentalism is ruled out by the qualified acceptability requirement (chapter 3). This very requirement also rules out epistocracy (30–36): We cannot let all decisions be made by the knowers of the good because even though there are truths here (at least in a minimal, deflationary sense), and quite plausibly there are people who are better at knowing them than others (because, well, there most clearly are people who are worse than others), still there is bound to be disagreement about who those are, even among the qualified. So epistocracy is ruled out by the qualified acceptability requirement. We want, then, to justify democracy by focusing on its tendency to lead to correct decisions. But our ability to rely on the correctness criteria here is restricted by the qualified acceptability requirement. So it’s tempting to go for a purely formal solution—perhaps we can show that democratic decision procedures will tend to yield correct results, whatever those are? You may think that this is so, because of the effects of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, when applied to voting situations. But this won’t work, because contemporary voting situations do not have the features that Condorcet’s reasoning takes as given (for instance, probabilistic independence and individual competence, at least in the case of multi-option decisions) (chapter 12). And there are important disanalogies between democratic decision-making situations and contractualist choice situations (in terms of the motivations of the parties and so of the need for a veto power), so we can’t argue that the similarities between the two, together with the truth of a contractualist framework in the theory of justice, ensures that democratic procedures will yield decisions that approximate justice (chapter 13). The solution is different, then. We can show that democratic procedures are at least somewhat more likely than random procedures or other competing possible procedures at leading to correct decisions, where correctness is itself understood in qualifiedly acceptable terms. We can show this in two stages. First, we can note how there would be epistemic payoffs to a certain hypothetical ideal deliberation, where there’s enough time for all, access to the forum, only good-faith presentation of reasons, equal bargaining power, everyone recognizes a good reason when they see one, etc. (175–76). Then 38 David Enoch we can show that a real-world democratic procedure is likely to be close enough to the ideal one in its epistemic payoffs (chapter 10). In the ideal epistemic deliberation we show epistemic payoffs rather easily (chapter 9). This is where the insights of those thinking about deliberative democracy are helpful: If voters vote (at least also) on principle, drawing on their knowledge, experience, and so on, then the public discussion can pool their wisdom and experience, and is likely to yield better decisions. And we start the second stage with a set of “primary bads” (160–63)—things like famine and genocide, the badness of which no qualifiedly acceptable view will reject. We can then show that democracy will tend to lead to decisions that minimize primary bads. And we can then extrapolate (170–71)—a decision procedure that tends to get it right when it comes to primary bads will tend to get it right in general. Of course, this won’t show that this procedure will always get it right. And if you are among the knowers, the democratic decision won’t give you a strong reason to change your mind. But we don’t need any of these strong claims. We can settle for fairly modest advantages of democratic procedures in order to establish their authority and legitimacy (167–68), advantages that give even the knowers practical reasons to comply (even if not theoretical reasons to change their mind). And with this modest conclusion, the argument works. Now, perhaps voters will not vote on principle. But they can so vote, and they should. And we are, after all, doing normative political philosophy here. It is no constraint on a theory of this kind that people are likely to behave in the ways it claims they should. To think otherwise would be to fall victim to Utopophobia. When we want to engage in the details of the science of institutional design and engineering, we need to take into account, of course, details about people’s likely behavior. But this is not our project here. Here we are engaged in the more abstract parts of normative political philosophy. And here we should avoid utopophobia (chapter 14). Thus we get Estlund’s Epistemic Proceduralism (chapter 6, and throughout the book). Specific political decisions in a democracy—whether correct or incorrect—are legitimate because they are the outcomes of a democratic procedure, and that procedure itself is legitimate because it is likely—in a way that cannot be rejected by the qualifiedly acceptable—to lead to correct, that is, qualifiedly acceptable, decisions. The analogy with trial-by-jury is telling here (chapter 8). Surely, whatever other merits this procedure has, its normative status at least partly depends on its tendency to lead to correct On Estlund’s Democratic Authority 39 decisions. And the normative status of a specific jury verdict depends not on its correctness but rather (perhaps among other things) on the general epistemic virtues of this procedure. On Epistemic Proceduralism, then, the epistemic credentials of the democratic procedure, constrained as they are by the qualified acceptability requirement, establish—perhaps together with some other conditions—its legitimacy. But for authority—the state’s ability to create moral obligations with its laws, roughly—we need one more step. We know from discussions of consent that sometimes consent is null (say, under duress). In such cases, the normative situation is as if no consent has been given. However, on most accounts, non-consent is never null. But nothing justifies this asymmetry. In fact, we can think about cases where non-consent is null, cases where even though there was no consent, consent ought to have been given, or, as Estlund puts it, there is normative consent (chapter 7). In some of these cases, the normative situation is as if consent—real, good, genuine, non-null consent—has been given. A democratic state has authority because—given its epistemic and legitimacy credentials, and the humanitarian obligations to avoid all sorts of catastrophes—we all ought to consent to its authority, and so it has authority just as if all of us did in fact consent. This is a hypothetical consent theory, but a normative one. Hence its uniqueness. There is much more that is of philosophical value in Estlund’s rich book, both in its central themes (for instance, the emphasis on there being nothing obvious about democracy, but also on there being nothing obvious about the expertise model, as expertise simply does not entail authority (3)), and in some of its smaller details (like the small and extremely interesting observation about the main role of the criminal law not being punishment but rather final exoneration (141)). And I cannot hope to do justice here to all that is of value in the book, nor shall I try. I now proceed, then, to criticize some of the main themes of the book, as sketched above. 2. Avoiding Decision Fetishism Suppose that the political system in the country Get-It-Right gets right more of the decisions (holding importance constant, and perhaps by standards that pass the qualified acceptability requirement) than the political system in the country All-for-the-Best; but that the consequences of the political system in All-for-the-Best are on the whole better than those in Get-It-Right. This 40 David Enoch is surely possible: Right decisions tend to make things go better, but the rightness of the output of a procedure are certainly not the only feature of the procedure that can have such effects. Perhaps, for instance, the political system in All-for-the-Best gives its citizen a sense of participation, or even of dignity and autonomy, regardless (to an extent, at least) of the correctness of its decision; or perhaps it just pleases them to see the goings on in parliament, or whatever. Which system of government should we go for, the one in Get-It-Right, or the one in All-for-the-Best? If you’re a pure proceduralist (of the kind that argues that the justification of the relevant decision procedures derives only from the normative status of intrinsic features of that procedure), the answer should not seem clear to you. Perhaps I haven’t given you enough information about our two countries. But for someone like Estlund who rejects pure proceduralism, and who has the (quite healthy, I think) tendency to justify procedures (partly) by their consequences, wouldn’t it be a kind of fetish with decisions to go for Get-It-Right’s system rather than for that of All-for-the-Best? What, after all, is so special about decisions? Why should we care whether things turn for the best because of the correctness of the decision or because of some other feature of the decision-making mechanism (say, its aesthetic value)?3 I think we should avoid decision fetishism. And if so, it becomes clear that the epistemic justification of democracy is an instance of the good old instrumental justification of democracy, grounding its justification in the good consequences of a democratic government (compared to the alternatives). Furthermore, the epistemic justification of democracy is not even a privileged instance of instrumentalism, for—once we are clear on avoiding decision fetishism—on this view the epistemic credentials of democracy only matter for its justification because of their consequences. Of course, Estlund may argue that one way of showing that a decision procedure can have better effects is by showing that it will tend to lead to 3 A related worry arises with regard to Estlund’s claim that some transgressions from the conditions of the ideal speech situation should be allowed in democracies in order to remedy the power imbalance that influences the decision-making procedures (193). But why the restriction to just those transgressions that will remedy such procedural flaws? Why not allow transgressions whenever they have on the whole good—or at least qualifiedly acceptably good—consequences? Here too Estlund seems to me to flirt with decision fetishism. On Estlund’s Democratic Authority 41 better decisions, and if that can be shown, this surely counts strongly in favor of such a decision procedure. But this still means that the epistemological justification is a (perhaps particularly interesting) particular instance of the general instrumental justification, a point that will be important below. 3. Consequentialism Think of a consequentialist who shamelessly judges political decision-making mechanisms instrumentally (and so also, but not just, epistemically). How implausible would her view be? And how far would it be from Estlund’s? Estlund seems to think that such a view would be highly implausible, and— naturally—very far from his. I differ on both of these (with a major caveat regarding the latter, shortly to take center stage). It may be thought—and I think that Estlund does think—that consequentialists (though not only them) would be committed to what he calls a correctness theory of legitimacy (99), one that loses the gap between legitimacy and correctness. But of course, this is a gap we cannot do without: we think that often an incorrect decision (say, by a jury) can be legitimate and authoritative. This gap is something that a true theory should accommodate and explain, not deny. For this reason, then, it is important to stress that nothing commits the consequentialist to a correctness theory of legitimacy. To see this, think, first, of an indirect consequentialist—a rule utilitarian, for instance. A rule utilitarian can happily introduce the gap between legitimacy and correctness, just as she can in general opt for the action that is in accordance with the utility-maximizing rules, and not the one that actually maximizes utility (the ability to do that is, after all, the defining feature of indirect consequentialism). Indeed, we can think about an indirect consequentialist whose intermediate factor—analogous to that of rules in rule-utilitarianism—is precisely political decision procedures. Indirect consequentialists, then, can unproblematically avoid a commitment to a correctness theory of legitimacy. But, I now want to argue, a consequentialist need not be an indirect consequentialist in order to avoid such a troubling commitment. For even direct consequentialists distinguish between their direct criterion of rightness, and the justified decision procedures. With regard to the latter, they recommend that we adopt whatever decision procedures are such that our adopting them will maximize utility. And, of course, in our context—that 42 David Enoch of evaluating democracy and other political arrangements—we are talking about decision procedures. So even the direct consequentialist can introduce a gap between correctness and legitimacy: A decision is correct if it is the one that, roughly speaking, will maximize the good; and it is legitimate if it is, roughly speaking, the product of a political decision-making mechanism that is on the whole optimal compared to possible alternative procedures. So consequentialists—direct and indirect alike—can easily avoid a correctness theory of legitimacy.4 And notice that in the process of arguing for this claim nothing depended on the relevant consequentialist theory being nonstandard in any interesting sense: the argument is neutral with regard to the details of the relevant conception of the good, for instance. Pretty much any consequentialist theory I can think of can happily introduce the gap between correctness and legitimacy. I have to confess that there is nothing in this sketch of a consequentialist story that sounds implausible to me. Perhaps more interestingly, this sketched story sounds very similar to Estlund’s own story, which is also a two-staged one: Legitimacy on his account is distinct from correctness when it comes to a specific decision, but is closely related to a general tendency of the procedure to yield correct answers.5 Indeed, especially if our friendly consequentialist’s conception of the good includes something about the value 4 In the context of rejecting a correctness theory of legitimacy, it seems to me that Estlund lets himself shift between his stipulated meaning for “legitimate” and a more commonsensical one. On his official definition, legitimacy implies the moral permissibility of the state’s acting on the relevant decision. But it seems to me that if the state’s decision is incorrect, it is not permissible for the state to act on it. Of course, it may be permissible for other agents to act on it: Estlund’s example of the permissibility of acting on an incorrect jury ruling is of this latter kind, where it is permissible for one agent (the hangman, say) to act on the incorrect but legitimate judgment of another or others (the jury). No such example can establish the much less plausible claim, that the very same agent can permissibly act on a legitimate (in Estlund’s sense) but incorrect decision. This implausible claim gains plausibility, I think, from reading it not with Estlund’s stipulated meaning for “legitimacy” in mind, but rather with a more commonsensical one. I take it that the most important parts of Estlund’s discussion can be abstracted from this difficulty, though (if not in terms of Estlund’s legitimacy, perhaps in terms of authority instead). 5 The structural similarity between Estlund’s view and the consequentialist view sketched in the text is especially clear on pp. 149–50, where he discusses Simmons and the global/local model. On Estlund’s Democratic Authority 43 of autonomy (and why wouldn’t it?), she can also easily accommodate the intuition that there’s something wrong in subjecting atheists to the doctrines of the Catholic church even if the pope does have a pipeline to god’s will (a point to which I return below). Now, in a couple of quick paragraphs (164–65) Estlund explicitly discusses consequentialism, and how his account differs from consequentialist ones. One of the things he mentions here is that on his account governments are not permitted to do whatever will maximize the good. But we already know that a consequentialist can get something like this result too, if holding governments to non-consequentialist standards in fact maximizes the good, as it clearly may. The other reasons Estlund mentions why his account is not a consequentialist one all have to do with the qualified acceptability requirement. Consequentialists will opt for the decision procedure that will maximize the good, that is, what is really, truly, good. Disagreement will only enter their calculations when it is instrumentally relevant. (We can imagine consequentialists with a conception of the good that includes disagreement as some intrinsic bad, but this doesn’t seem to me to be a part of a promising conception of the good.) But Estlund thinks that we should opt for the decision procedure that will yield (roughly) the acceptable results. And the two kinds of results—those that are truly good, and those that are acceptable—may not, of course, coincide. I agree that this is a real difference between Estlund’s theory and the sketched consequentialist one (though officially, only regarding legitimacy; the qualified acceptability requirement is not, on Estlund’s account, a necessary condition for authority (134)). But this difference is not—I now want to argue—one that counts in favor of Estlund’s account. 4. The Qualified Acceptabilty Requirement The centrality of the qualified acceptability requirement to Estlund’s view cannot be overstated. He says, for instance: An epistemic approach to politics, morally constrained by a general acceptability requirement, generates a philosophically adequate and recognizably democratic basis for political authority. This, in the most basic terms, is the thesis of this book. (38) Now, I am going to proceed to reject the qualified acceptability requirement. Before doing that, though, I want to note that given Rawls’s influence, it 44 David Enoch is Estlund, not I, that is among the vast majority of contemporary political philosophers in the analytic tradition. Given this state of the literature, Estlund may be content to introduce the qualified acceptability requirement as an explicit premise of his argument for democracy, conditionalizing his conclusions accordingly.6 But I think that it is important to question this premise. Indeed, I think that the Rawlsian influence here is reason for concern about much of contemporary political philosophy. As against Estlund’s qualified acceptability requirement I am going to raise three objections: that it is not supported by argument; that the details of Estlund’s acceptability requirement are objectionably ad hoc; and that there are strong reasons to think that nothing like this requirement can be successfully defended. (It is only this last objection that straightforwardly applies more generally to the Rawlsian theme on which Estlund’s qualified acceptability requirement is a variation.) What, then, does the qualified acceptability requirement come to? The intuitive idea is this: “I defend a certain sort of necessary condition on the legitimate exercise of political power: that it be justified in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view” (41). But what exactly does “justified in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view” mean? There is a worry that the acceptability requirement could be empty. It may be argued, for instance that there’s a sense in which any justification is acceptable in this way, because of some general accessibility constraint on normative truths, like the following, from Raz: “Justifications are in principle publicly available.”7 I’m assuming, then, that Estlund opts for a more robust understanding of the justifiable-to-all requirement—perhaps, for instance, one according to which it says, roughly, that the exercise of political power should be justified in terms all qualified persons can accept without changing their minds about their central beliefs, beliefs it would be unreasonable to require that they change.8 6 Though nothing like this line of thought is mentioned in the book, Estlund hinted at it in discussion. 7 Joseph Raz, “Disagreement in Politics,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 43 (1998): 25–52, at 37. 8 This way of putting things makes explicit the relation to Rawls’s discussion of the burdens of judgment, which play a star role in one of his accounts of the reasonable; see John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 54–58. On Estlund’s Democratic Authority 45 Notice that the qualified acceptability requirement is an instance of what Joseph Raz calls (in a different context) a doctrine of restraint.9 It disqualifies as politically illegitimate some reasons—those that are not justifiable to all qualified persons—without denying that they are good reasons. This is even clearer given Estlund’s own commitment to truth in these matters. Given that there is an acceptance-independent truth in the relevant matters, and assuming that the qualified acceptability is not vacuous, it follows that sometimes it will rule out relying politically on some reasons, even though they are good ones, that is, even though they are reasons that do count in favor of whatever action it is that they are reasons for. Now, this way of putting things may sound paradoxical, but actually there’s nothing necessarily paradoxical about doctrines of restraint: sometimes we have reasons not to act on what we acknowledge are good reasons.10 And in institutional settings it is especially clear that this is so. My point here, rather, is that given the nature of the qualified acceptability requirement as a doctrine of restraint in this sense, it is clear that it has to be supported by rather strong arguments if we are to accept it. In other words, if we are going to be justified in ruling out some good reasons, there had better be very good reasons to do so. Despite the feeling one can get from browsing through the contemporary literature on these issues, then, there is nothing self-evident about anything like the qualified acceptability requirement. It is badly in need of argumentative support. Thus, if anything in the vicinity here should have the status of the default-justified view—one that we should hold to unless strong arguments support an opposing view—it is the rejection of the qualified acceptability requirement, not its acceptance. What arguments, then, does Estlund offer for his qualified acceptability requirement? Not many, I’m afraid. He spends most of the relevant part of chapter 3 arguing against objections (over-inclusion and over-exclusion), rightly noting that it would be crazy to go for an unqualified acceptability requirement. But very little positive support is offered for the acceptability requirement. What does most of the work here are examples like the one already cited: Alternative approaches “would not explain the thought that 9 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 110. 10 For Raz’s defense of exclusionary reasons, see, for instance, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), part 1. 46 David Enoch even if the pope has a pipeline to god’s will, it does not follow that atheists may permissibly be coerced on the basis of justifications drawn from the Catholic doctrine” (5). But this is not good enough, because—as we’ve already seen—going for an acceptability requirement is not the only way of accommodating the desirable result here. So much, then, for my first critical point, namely, that Estlund doesn’t give us much by way of argumentative support for his acceptability requirement, which is a surprising thesis (to those of us whose thoughts are not too contaminated by Political Liberalism) and is badly in need of such support. My second critical point here has to do with the details of the qualification which is a part of Estlund’s qualified acceptability requirement. And here, there is something very appealing—and honest—about Estlund’s strategy: He doesn’t want to commit to Rawls’s qualification (namely, that in terms of the reasonable), or indeed to any other. Rather, he rightly notes that there must be some qualification, uses “qualified” as a place holder, and fills in only the details he needs to fill in from time to time to make the resulting view plausible. Here are some of the constraints we get in the book on the content of the qualification: ● Any view that rejects democracy itself (perhaps as a default position) is unqualified (37–38). ● “One feature that a person must have in order to count as qualified is to accept the acceptance criterion including its correct account of qualified people” (61). ● There can be no qualified disagreement that the juristic system will be better than the anarchic one in Estlund’s imagined “Prejuria” (139). ● No one among the qualified will reject the rationality of modest extrapolation of the kind we find in science, and its application to the move from primary bads to general performance (171). ● No one among the qualified will deny that some specific kind of education can make one better at making political decisions (212). One could worry about the details here. In particular, the second condition above—about whose necessity for the theory Estlund is clearly right— seems to imply that only Rawlsians count as qualified, a result many may find implausible (and some even quite disturbing). Instead of doing that, though, let me emphasize what I take to be the main worry here, and that is that this is all terribly ad hoc. We have a theory; then, whenever an On Estlund’s Democratic Authority 47 objection comes up, we tweak with the qualification on the acceptability requirement in a way that will avoid the objection.11 Because there are no independent restrictions on the qualification—because Estlund doesn’t offer a theory of the reasonable, or some such—any tweaking can be used, and so just about any objection can be avoided. But then Estlund’s procedure here is similar to the introduction of an explicit exception in one’s theory whenever a counterexample is presented. It’s a way of saving the theory from counterexamples, but at the price of making it objectionably ad hoc, losing touch with the philosophical motivations underlying it. And indeed, one can think of each of the hints listed above as to the content of the qualification as an objection silenced by such ad hoc tweaking. Note that the problem here is not that of relying on our pre-theoretic judgments or intuitions in trying to fine-tune our relevant normative theory. I have no quarrel with this methodology, suitably employed. Rather, the problem is that of fine-tuning our theory according to counterexamples in ways that deprive the theory of whatever philosophical rationales motivated it in the first place. My second point, then, is that without a theory of the qualification— one that should itself be philosophically motivated—Estlund’s use of the qualification seems objectionably ad hoc. My third point is that no such theory is likely to emerge. Let’s grant Estlund that there is something objectionable about subjecting atheists to the doctrines of the Catholic church even if the pope has a pipeline to god’s will. I take it that whatever is objectionable here is objectionable because the relevant atheists have certain normatively relevant features, features that make it wrong to subject them to such treatment. They are, say, agents; they are autonomous; they are free; they are rational; they have desires, and preference, and sometimes even life-plans; they hold comprehensive conceptions; they have dignity; they feel pain, including the pain of humiliation; or something along these lines. But, of course, whichever feature or features we focus on here, (at least some) people on the other side of the qualified–unqualified line, or perhaps the unreasonable, also share. And the characterization of the controversies Estlund doesn’t want politics to enter are shared by those he does want it to enter (like, say, the one about Estlund’s theory). So the intuitive rationale offered for the acceptability 11 Estlund comes very close to describing his strategy in these explicit terms (286, note 3). 48 David Enoch requirement applies equally well to the qualified and the unqualified. And I can’t think of a plausible rationale for which this isn’t true. If there is none, then the qualification is unmotivated.12 Of course, in a sense it is motivated. For **we know that an unqualified** acceptability **requirement is crazy, as it would hold all** grounds for **political action hostage to** the actual **acceptance by all**, and so would probably render the set of legitimate grounds for political action null. But this is not good enough. For if an unqualified acceptability requirement is a non-starter (and it is), and if the only plausible rationale for an acceptability requirement is a rationale for an unqualified acceptability requirement, what follows is simply that we should reject all versions of the accessibility requirement. And indeed, this is what I suggest that we do.

**5. Shameless Instrumentalism Vindicated**

I have argued, then, that we should avoid decision fetishism and go instrumentalist more broadly; that therefore the only thing that prevents Estlund’s view from being pretty much a terminological variant of a straightforward consequentialist account of democratic authority and legitimacy is the qualified acceptability requirement; and that we should reject the qualified acceptability requirement. If all of this is true, it seems to me that **we are left with the shameless instrumentalist account** of democratic authority and legitimacy, which—as the discussion of consequentialism showed—can be nuanced and intricate, indeed very close to Estlund’s own, shameless though it is. And I think this may very well be the right thing to say.

#### 5. He’s dropped that non-domination is a pre-req to everything anyone values, which means I meet the burden; that’s Pettit 99.

#### 6. It can’t apply to the topic because a state that took no actions wouldn’t exist. It would just be people in the state of nature.

## AT Libertarianism Kant NC

### Framework Comparison

This debate’s about models of freedom. Everything they’ll say on the line-by-line assumes the non-interference model which none of their cards justify. If I win non-domination, that hijacks their framework and proves the AC turns the NC.

Prefer non-domination—

1. **Institutional humiliation**—non-domination’s key, and it outweighs neg offense because honor is key to personhood—that’s Pettit 97.

2. **Actor-specificity**. Non-interference fails for states because they rely on rightful coercion to enforce freedom – that’s Waltman 2.

3. Kant requires non-domination because independence is relational. The neg ignores how power imbalances deny freedom – that’s Ripstein 9.

4. **Case outweighs** because non-domination is a pre-req to any other values; that’s Pettit 99.

5. **Poverty also outweighs** because no one can exercise true freedom while economically destitute – Waltman 2.

6. **Err aff** because freedom is a sliding scale, so large violations should come first – that’s Waltman 2.

**[Stop here for time]**

7. non-domination’s key to rectify arbitrary interference

**Pettit 99** writes[[74]](#footnote-74)

Whether it is furthered by courtesy of constitutional provision, or in virtue of an equal distribution of relevant resources, it should be stressed that **non-domination** is itself a form of power. It **represents a control that a person enjoys in relation to their own destiny** and such control constitutes one familiar type of power: the power of the agent who can prevent various ills happening to them (see appendix to this chapter). Another way of stressing the power-involving aspect of nondomination, to return to a theme of the last chapter, is to emphasize that **non-domination involves** a sort of immunity or **security against interference on an arbitrary basis, not the mere absence of such interference. Suppose that** for a certain range of choices I happen to enjoy the absence of all interference by arbitrary powers in the actual world: **no one with** such a **power gets in the way of my** making my preferred **choice**, and no one of that kind would get in the way had I chosen differently among the relevant options. **It is possible**, consistently with this supposition, **that the non-interference I enjoy is extremely insecure and that I am** a relatively **powerless** individual. I may enjoy it only for the very contingent reason that while there are agents around who dominate me—agents with an arbitrary power of interference— it happens that they like me and leave me alone; or it happens that I am able to ingratiate myself with them and placate them as they become ill-disposed towards me; or it happens that I am cunning and manage to keep out of their way when trouble is brewing; or whatever. **In such a world, the price of my liberty is** not eternal vigilance but, as Gore Vidal once said, **eternal discretion.**

### Contention

1. Non-unique. SQuo minimum wage violates just as hard.

2. No link. SQuo contracts are invalid because they’re coercive.

**Bowie 5** writes[[75]](#footnote-75)

The overwhelming number of **people need to work to survive**, at least for a large portion of their live. There is a sense in which people are forced to work. **When an assailant says, “Your wallet or your life,” you technically have a choice. However,** for many **this** situation **is the paradigm of coercion**. How close is the analogy between the assailant and the requirements of the employer? Admittedly, in good times the balance of power shifts somewhat, but in hard times the balance of power is with the employer. Most people have to take the terms of employment as they get them (Manning 2003). **Someone wanting employment does not negotiate** about whether or not to be tested for drugs, for example. If drug testing is the company policy, you either submit to the test or forfeit the job. If you want a job, you agree to employment at will and to layoffs if management believes that they are necessary. Survival for yourself and any dependents requires it. As with the assailant, you technically have a choice, but most employees argue they have little choice about multiple important terms of employment. **A Kantian**, in common with the pluralist school of industrial relations, **maintains that the imbalance** between employer and employee **ought to be addressed**. Otherwise, industrial relations rests on an unethical foundation.

3. TURN – aff solves. It’s key to bargaining power; that’s Konczal 14.

**4. TURN – aff is key to solve welfare.**

**Unz 14**

Ron Unz. [Ronald Keeva Unz is a former businessman and political activist, best known for an unsuccessful race in 1994 for the governorship of California, and for sponsoring propositions promoting structured English immersion education, Harvard University] Raising The Minimum Wage Would Be Good For Wal-Mart, And America. 2/11/14

Economists have traditionally feared that **a much higher minimum wage** might cost workers their jobs, but today the vast majority of low-wage Americans are employed in the non-tradeable service sector, usually involving personal contact. These jobs are completely insulated from foreign competition and also very difficult and expensive to automate. Such workers would keep their jobs, but their incomes would rise by 30 or 40 percent, and most companies would cover the higher costs by a one-time price hike averaging much less than 1% across all our goods and services. The American taxpayer would also be a huge beneficiary. Each year, **over $250 billion** in social welfare spending goes to working-poor households via government programs such as Food Stamps, EITC checks, and Medicaid. As millions of those workers became much less poor, they would automatically lose their eligibility for anti-poverty assistance, saving taxpayers many tens of billions of dollars each year. Government programs often function as very leaky buckets, with a substantial fraction of the money spent never reaching its supposed beneficiaries. But wages paid by an employer go straight to the recipient, except for the portion withheld in government taxes.

5. No impact. The side constraint view misconstrues freedom

**Waltman 2** writes[[76]](#footnote-76)

Critics sometimes contend that civic republicanism, by granting the state such extensive powers, can suffocate the individual. Of course, it is theoretically possible that it could, but that is a faint threat in a viable republic. Republican politics endeavors to construct a society in which individuals are free to make the choices that they wish, to be truly free from domination today and the threat of domination tomorrow. If the citizenry, though, becomes selfish and irresponsible, then, yes, republican governments could become arbitrary and destructive of liberty. It is often, though, a **rampant individualism** that **undermines** individual **freedom**. In part, this is because **it turns a blind eye to** the **domination** that can be inherent in individuals' relations with each other. But it is also because that by asserting that there is no higher good than self-interest it destroys the whole. Tocqueville, it is worth recalling, was strongly in favor of "individuality," attainable only when people are free from domination, but deeply skeptical of "individualism," where people acknowledge no higher good than the pursuit of their own self-interest. In fact, one of the major concerns voiced throughout his writing was whether republican liberty could be maintained as democracy spread, or whether the offspring would swallow the parent. (10) Consequently, "rights," whether the **economic rights favored by Friedmanites** or the privacy rights cherished by the left, **cannot stand as impenetrable barriers** to policies designed to achieve the public good. (11) To do so is to champion an individualism that is the path to isolation and ultimately to anarchy. **Rights are** a **means to** the **accomplishing** of **liberty, not zones that by absolutely restricting state action are subversive of it.**

### Case Outweighs (Freedom of Contract)

Solving poverty and inequality precedes side constraint claims. There is no right to wages earned from an unjust institution.

**Murphy and Nagel 2**

Liam Murphy (Professor of Law & Philosophy at NYU) and Thomas Nagel (Professor of Law & Philosophy at NYU). “The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice.” Oxford University Press (2002).

If there is a dominant theme that runs through our discussion, it is this: Private property is a legal convention, defined in part by the tax system; therefore, the tax system cannot be evaluated by looking at its impact on private property, conceived as something that has independent existence and validity. Taxes must be evaluated as part of the overall system of property rights that they help to create. Justice or injustice in taxation can only mean justice or injustice in the system of property rights and entitlements that result from a particular tax regime. The conventional nature of property is both perfectly obvious and remarkably easy to forget. We are all born into an elaborately structured legal system governing the acquisition, exchange, and transmission of property rights, and ownership comes to seem the most natural thing in the world. But the modern economy in which we earn our salaries, own our homes, bank accounts, retirement savings, and personal possessions, and in which we can use our resources to consume or invest, would be impossible without the framework provided by government supported by taxes. This doesn’t mean that taxes are beyond evaluation—only that the target of evaluation must be the system of property rights that they make possible. We cannot start by taking as given, and neither in need of justification nor subject to critical evaluation, some initial allocation of possessions—what people originally own, what is theirs, prior to government interference. Any convention that is sufficiently pervasive can come to seem like a law of nature—a baseline for evaluation rather than something to be evaluated. Property rights have always had this delusive effect. Slaveowners in the American South before the Civil War were indignant over the violation of their property rights that was entailed by efforts to prohibit the importation of slaves into the territories—not to mention stronger abolitionist efforts, like helping runaway slaves escape to Canada. But property in slaves was a legal creation, protected by the U.S. Constitution, and the justice of such forms of interference with it could not be assessed apart from the justice of the institution itself. Most conventions, if they are sufficiently entrenched, acquire the appearance of natural norms; their conventionality becomes invisible. That is part of what gives them their strength, a strength they would lack if they were not internalized in that way. For another pervasive example, consider the conventions governing the different roles of men and women in any society. There may be good or bad reasons for the existence of such conventions, but it is essential, in evaluating them, to avoid the mistake of offering as a justification precisely those ostensibly “natural” rights or norms that are in fact just the psychological effects of internalizing the convention itself. If women are always treated as subordinate to men, the perception inevitably arises that submissiveness is a natural feminine trait and virtue, and this in turn is used to justify male dominance. Aristotle mistook the consequences of an institution for its natural basis in this way when he argued that certain people were natural slaves, and also in his claims about women.1 To appeal to the consequences of a convention or social institution as a fact of nature which provides the justification for that convention or institution is always to argue in a circle. In the case of taxes and property, the situation is more complicated, and it can be even more absurd. The feeling of natural entitlement produced by an unreflective sense of what are in fact conventionally defined property rights can encourage complacency about the status quo, as something more or less self-justifying. But it can also give rise to an even more confused criticism of the existing system on the ground that it violates natural property rights, when, in fact, these “natural” rights are merely misperceptions of the legal consequences of the system itself. It is illegitimate to appeal to a baseline of property rights in, say, “pretax income,” for the purpose of evaluating tax policies, when all such figures are the product of a system of which taxes are an inextricable part. One can neither justify nor criticize an economic regime by taking as an independent norm something that is, in fact, one of its consequences.

No neg offense. The idea of contracts that exist prior to government interference is ridiculous

**Pettit 13** writes[[77]](#footnote-77)

**What constitutes the economy on the republican approach?** The answer is: the sorts of public rules that create private space in general, such as the **public rules that create the possibility of private ownership.** These rules are public in the sense of being accepted across the society as a matter of common awareness, and being normally spelled out in statutory or customary law. And they vary across societies and periods, reflecting the varying assumptions of parliaments and courts and other public forums. They include the property conventions that we have been discussing but also extend much further. Without aspiring to be exhaustive, we should add to the Rules of property at least the following four categories of market-enabling rules. Rules of incorporation. These determine the forms in which individuals can combine to form new economic players. They have evolved greatly over the past two hundred years, giving companies and banks and other such entities life without a sunset clause; liability that is limited to a shared treasury; the possibility of owning other such entities; the possibility of changing location and sphere of operation; and so on. While the rules for the formation and operation of commercial entities have generally become more and more permissive, most countries impose some anti-trust restrictions, guarding against monopoly. And countries vary a great deal, of course, in how far they allow corporations political influence, with the United States growing ever more tolerant of the pretense that corporations have the rights of natural persons. Rules of production. These rules impose restrictions on how far the larger players in an economy, especially in manufacturing industry, are allowed to locate near centers of population, to pollute the ground or water or atmosphere, to contribute to global warming, and to impose negative externalities on other players, individual or corporate. Many of these rules come about via statute while others emerge from the courts in the resolution of common law issues, in particular issues of tort. The Learned Hand rule on such questions of tort would suggest, for example, that producers and other parties ought to take precautions against harming others in any cases where the cost of the precaution is less than the expected cost of the damage: that is, the cost of the damage, discounted by the probability of its occurring. **Rules of contract**. These **determine a variety of matters** that have to be sorted out for the smooth and successful operation of a market. **Who are competent parties** to make contracts**?** What conditions, say in the matter of records of the transaction, are required for a binding contract? How far is the contract to be understood on the basis of the exact words used and how far on the basis of presumptions reasonably ascribed to the parties? **When is a contract null and void?** What damages may a party seek for breach of contract: the loss suffered as a result of reliance on the other or the loss of the benefits that the contract promised? And so on. Rules of finance. By what agencies is the money supply in the economy to be controlled? And what are the guidelines that those agencies should follow? Most countries rely on central banks for controlling the money supply and impose guidelines related to keeping inflation down and employment up. In pursuing its aims, and subject to statutory constraints, the central bank will vary factors such as the base interest rate at which commercial banks can borrow, the ratio they have to preserve between their reserves and their loans, the extent to which their loans can be bundled together in derivatives, the insurance available to depositors in the event of a bank defaulting, and so on. As the rules of property establish a system of ownership, so these and other rules combine with them to establish, more broadly, a full-scale market economy. **This claim**, like the earlier claim about the role of property conventions, borders on the platitudinous. But **by giving it prominence we can avoid** being seduced into **the libertarian view** — now, alas, almost an orthodoxy — **that the market is a relatively autonomous sphere which depends only contingently on** the framework of custom and **law**, and on the role of the state in supporting that framework. **The role of the state** in relation to the market — the role of the community, operating through the state — **is** constitutive and not just regulative, **enabling and not just constraining**. And it is extensive in even a greater measure than my five sets of rules suggest, since it also includes providing for the infrastructure of education, communication, transport and insurance that any contemporary economy requires.

Inequality turns negative rights because corporations are the ones responsible.

**Gilabert 7**

Pablo Gilabert (Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Concordia University). “Contractualism and Poverty Relief.” Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 2007). http://philpapers.org/archive/GILCAP-2.pdf

(1) Derived basic positive duties of justice. The first problem with the libertarian argument is that its factual premise is false. It is hardly the case that the global Rich have not been systematically involved in unduly harming the global Destitute. Even if it were true that destitution in poor countries primarily results from their governments' inefficient and corrupt policies and their lack of encouragement of efficient economic practices, it would be a mistake to think that the world's Rich are not implicated. As Thomas Pogge's recent work forcefully shows, the global Rich have been using their overwhelming bargaining power to shape the international political and economic landscape in a way that makes it possible and desirable for elites in poor countries to act as they do. Two characteristics of that order are what Pogge calls the "international borrowing privilege" and the "international resource privilege" (under which authoritarian or corrupt elites in poor countries are internationally allowed, and even encouraged, to appropriate and sell the natural resources of the countries they rule, and contract public debt in their people's name, with devastating political and economic consequences).^' Moreover, we should not think that only governments, and not the members of the international business community, are to blame. There is ample evidence that some sectors of the latter have supported harmful governments and policies in poor countries.^^ In sum, exploitation and domination are common features of international relations, and destitution cannot be explained without paying attention to them.

(1:41)

### Case Outweighs (Property Rights, 1:00)

The state can’t enforce property rights compatibly with everyone’s freedom without addressing poverty

**Allais 12** writes[[78]](#footnote-78)

Kant thinks that for state a to be legitimate, its monopoly on the means of coercion must be reconciled with each subjects’ right to freedom (Varden 2008). The idea is that no one’s freedom must be subjected to the choices of others, but only to universal law, which means that the state must ensure “that the total system of laws provides conditions under which any private person’s freedom is subject to universal law and not to another private person’s arbitrary choices” (Varden 2008). What is relevant to our question here is that **without** absolute **poverty relief, poor people’s freedom is subject to** the **arbitrary choices of those who have means**. This means that the state is not guaranteeing and enabling their freedom. As Ripstein explains, for Kant, “the problem of poverty is that “the poor are completely subject to the choices of those in more fortunate circumstances” (Ripstein 2009:274). **The poor person’s purposiveness depends on the grace of others**, like a slave or a serf, two of the most archetypally unfree conditions (Ripstein 2009:281). Obviously there will be questions about what constitutes absolute poverty, and how much relief is required. My concern here is not with resolving these complications, but simply with the idea that exercising basic human agency requires means: one cannot have and pursue purposes without any means. On Kant’s view, a person’s innate freedom is undermined if the basic conditions of their agency depend on another person’s arbitrary choiceanother person’s choosing to give or not to give. The justification of the legitimacy of the state depends on the state reconciling its monopoly on the means of coercion with each individual’s innate right to freedom. Avoidable absolute poverty is not compatible with individual’s innate right to freedom. So in a legitimate state, public structures must ensure that there is unconditional poverty relief. Further, it is significant that, on Kant’s view, a legitimate state is required for there to be rightful ownership of property. There is no conclusive ownership of property in a state of nature: you have control of what you can grab and what you can defend, which generates a presumptive right, but it doesn’t follow that you have anything with respect to which the state is obliged to defend your ownership. To have the full-fledged institution of property, it needs to be the case that the state has an obligation to defend your holdings. Rightful ownership of property requires a state with a monopoly on coercion (so that possession of property can be defended), and it requires that the defense of property can be reconciled with everyone’s freedom. Otherwise the state is simply an organisation of powerful groups defending their interests, as opposed to a legitimate state, which enables and defends everyone’s freedom. Making property rights enforceable is one of the functions of the state, and it 5 is important to enabling all of our freedom. But **making property rights enforceable makes it** the case **that those in** absolute **poverty**, where there are no jobs, **have no ways of meeting** their **needs**. This is a consequence of the defence of property: **in a state of nature they could try to take what they need, but a state which defends property forbids them from doing this. Thus, creating property rights** in a way which is **compatible with everyone’s freedom requires public provision against absolute poverty**. As Ripstein says, “the only way that property rights can be made enforceable is if the system that makes them so contains a provision for protecting against private dependence” (Ripstein 2009:228). Thus, ensuring absolute poverty relief is a requirement of anyone rightfully owning property. For Kant, it is crucial that absolute poverty relief is provided by public means: For reasons of state the government is therefore authorised to constrain the wealthy to provide the means of systenance to those who are unable to provide for even their most necessary natural needs. It will do this by way of coercion…by public taxation, not merely by voluntary contributions (3:326).

Rights come from citizenship, not property ownership—means offense to civic republicanism outweighs

**Waltman 2** writes[[79]](#footnote-79)

This is where civic republicanism and political theories based in neoclassical economics (as well as those based on extreme versions of a right to privacy, it should be added to be fair) clash. Take Milton Friedman's argument that the right to buy and sell property at market prices is a fundamental liberty that should be guaranteed in the Constitution. (7) The civic republican would reply that, first, **while a citizen** certainly **has property rights** (and indeed that they are important rights), he/**she** also **has property in rights**. James Madison endorsed this sentiment in 1792 when he wrote that "as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights." Government, he went on, should "impartially secure to every man whatever is his own." (8) What he meant is that the liberty of the person, considered as a citizen, is the central concern. The **right of property refers not merely**, and certainly not exclusively, **to the right to possess** and accumulate **physical goods;** a person's **property includes** the possession and exercise of civil and **political liberties**. Moreover, our civic republican would continue, **economic life is not separable from political life**. It is the pursuit of the collective interest of the citizenry in preserving their liberty that is paramount. Thus, I cannot claim that the state can brook no interference in my right to sell my apples at price X or construct a high-rise office building on my real estate. Of course it may interfere with my doing these, and a host of other activities for that matter. Its only constraints are utilizing proper procedures in adopting the policy, non-arbitrariness in carrying it out, and the maintenance of contestability. **My rights are as a citizen, not as the owner of a lemonade stand**. Thomas Jefferson argued in a letter to a friend in 1816 that governments do not exist to protect property. They exist, rather, to promote access to property, which, he said, is why he changed John Locke's trilogy of "life, liberty, and property" to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." (9)

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### AT Negative Rights (:36)

1. Inequality’s a negative rights violation—that’s above.

2. If I win the framework, that takes out their weighing—their negative rights framing assumes the non-interference model

**Bethala 14** writes[[80]](#footnote-80)

**According to libertarians, the only rights that should be legally recognized are** what are often called **negative rights, or rights of non-interference** (like the rights not to be unjustly or non-consensually killed, enslaved, and bodily violated).[1] **Under this conception** of rights—call it the libertarian conception—**positive rights** or rights to goods or services (**such as** the **rights to** education, **subsistence wages**, and basic healthcare) **should not be legally recognized.**

3. Positive rights are key to freedom in the context of citizenship. Possibilities of citizenship are foreclosed by poverty, so we have a positive right to basic goods, that’s Waltman 2.

4. Freedom can only exist within communities; that’s Waltman 2. That means prefer positive rights; those are key to communities

**Bethala 14** writes[[81]](#footnote-81)

**The libertarian conception** also **fails to account for our common understanding of** another important social institution, **the community**. This failure can be examined with respect to the community’s relation to adolescents and to adults. The primary way in which **the community involves adolescents** is **through the school system**, which, for the purposes of this article, can be understood as including institutions of primary, secondary, and higher education. It goes without saying that many people—particularly the students—believe that the students in these institutions have certain positive rights against these institutions. For instance, **most** people **think** that **it** would be grossly **unjust** for an educational institution **to expel a student without cause** and prior notice**, even if they recompensed the student** for the cost of the education, and that it should not be legal for such an institution to do so.[3] **Yet,** it is difficult to explain why it should be illegal under the libertarian conception since **the institution is not interfering with a**ny **negative right. A similar problem arises for the workplace**, which is the primary way in which the community involves adults. Again, **most people believe that an employee cannot be fired arbitrarily and abruptly** and that it should be illegal for employers to do so. And again, it is difficult to explain why this should be illegal under the libertarian conception. Our belief that these arbitrary expulsions should be illegal only makes sense if we suppose that students and employees should have their positive rights legally recognized. But that requires one to abandon the libertarian conception. It must be admitted that these counterexamples are weaker than the earlier counterexamples involving children and parents and that it is not uncommon today for libertarians simply to concede them. Much of this is to be attributed to the widespread inculcation of individualism in modern generations by the culture at large. Still, many people have retained an intuitive revulsion to the idea that it should be perfectly legal for an employer to fire on a sudden whim his employees, who need the income of their work for their family’s subsistence, even if upon theoretical considerations they suppress it. Hence, **these counterexamples** have some role to play in **undermin**ing **the libertarian conception**, particularly in conversation with those less inclined to concede them. Conclusion It is clear that **the libertarian conception is woefully inadequate as far as explaining our common understanding of society’s basic structures** is concerned. The price, then, of accepting the libertarian conception is to reject this common understanding, radically revise our views on the family and the community, and work to bring about a world in which the mighty and powerful, unshackled from the legal chains that bind them to help those dependent upon them, are free to do as they please so long as they do not infringe upon anyone’s negative rights and regardless of whether anyone’s positive rights cry out otherwise. And this, I think, is a price not worth paying.

### AT Varun’s Anscombe Ev

#### This is an indict to the neg framework, not a contention

Anscombe 58

Modern Moral Philosophy G. E. M. Anscombe Originally published in Philosophy 33, No. 124 (January 1958).

We cannot then, look to Aristotle for any elucidation of the modern way of talking about “moral” goodness, obligation, etc. And all the best-known writers on ethics in modern times, from Butler to Mill, appear to me to have faults as thinkers on the subject which make it **impossible to hope for any direct light** on it **from them.** I will state these objections with the brevity which their character makes possible. Butler exalts conscience, but appears ignorant that a man’s conscience may tell him to do the vilest things. Hume defines “truth” in such a way as to exclude ethical judgments from it, and professes that he has proved that they are so excluded. He also implicitly defines “passion” in such a way that aiming at anything is having a passion. His objection to passing from “is” to “ought” would apply equally to passing from “is” to “owes” or from “is” to “needs.” (However, because of the historical situation, he has a point here, which I shall return to.)

**[Varun’s Card Begins]**

Kant introduces the idea of “legislating for oneself,” which is as absurd as if in these days, when majority votes command great respect, one were to call each reflective decision a man made a vote resulting in a majority, which as a matter of proportion is overwhelming, for it is always 1-0. The concept of legislation requires superior power in the legislator. His own rigoristic convictions on the subject of lying were so intense that it never occurred to him that a lie could be relevantly described as anything but just a lie (e.g. as “a lie in such- and-such circumstances”). **His rule about universalizable maxims is useless** without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it.

**[Varun’s Card Ends]**

Bentham and Mill do not notice the difficulty of the concept “pleasure.” They are often said to have gone wrong through committing the “naturalistic fallacy”; but this charge does not impress me, because I do not find accounts of it coherent. But the other point—about pleasure—seems to me a fatal objection from the very outset. The ancients found this concept pretty baffling. It reduced Aristotle to sheer babble about “the bloom on the cheek of youth” because, for good reasons, he wanted to make it out both identical with and different from the pleasurable activity. Generations of modern philosophers found this concept quite unperplexing, and it reappeared in the literature as a problematic one only a year or two ago when Ryle wrote about it. The reason is simple: since Locke, pleasure was taken to be some sort of internal impression. But it was superficial, if that was the right account of it, to make it the point of actions. One might adapt something Wittgenstein said about “meaning” and say “Pleasure cannot be an internal impression, for no internal impression could have the consequences of pleasure.” Mill also, **like Kant**, fails to realize the necessity for stipulation as to relevant descriptions, if his theory is to have content. It did not occur to him that acts of murder and theft could be otherwise described. He holds that where a proposed action is of such a kind as to fall under some one principle established on grounds of utility, one must go by that; where it falls under none or several, the several suggesting contrary views of the action, the thing to do is to calculate particular consequences. But pretty well any action can be so described as to make it fall under a variety of principles of utility (as I shall say for short) if it falls under any.

### AT Corporate Subsidy (TOC Update)

Society has a collective responsibility to address poverty, so receiving low wages along with welfare is good

**Strain 4-17** writes[[82]](#footnote-82)

**Society should have** as **a goal that no one who works full time** and heads a household **lives in poverty**. But **since this is a social goal, resources from all of society should be marshaled to meet it. The argument that low-wage employers are doing wrong by paying so little that** some of their **workers qualify for government assistance suggests that** the **responsibility of ensuring a**n adequate standard of **living** for these workers **falls solely on** the **businesses** which employ them. This is a very limited vision. McDonald’s and Wal-Mart should bear some of that responsibility, sure. But not just them. Hedge fund managers, corporate CEOs, well-to-do economists and law-firm partners should pitch in, too. **Resources from all of society** — including, but not limited to, low-wage employers — **should be used** to ensure that no one who works hard lives in poverty. **And that**, of course, **is** exactly **how society is currently organized: Wages are** (**largely**) **determined by the market, and government assistance — funded by taxpayers — is used to help low-income families** meet a baseline standard of living. That some low-wage workers receive government assistance isn’t a bug in the system; it’s a feature. The government isn’t subsidizing Wal-Mart; it’s not exclusively Wal-Mart’s responsibility to make sure that Wal-Mart’s workers bring in enough cash every week. Instead, the government is helping workers who can’t command adequate wages to make ends meet. The system doesn’t work perfectly, of course. There are flaws in the assistance we give to low-wage workers, and it is likely the case that at least some government programs do lead to lower wages for some workers. The labor market has flaws in setting workers’ pay and hours. And many non-market factors influence these outcomes as well. But if I had to pick between a system in which the responsibility to help low-wage workers escape poverty falls on all of society or falls merely on their employers, I would go with the former every time.

## AT Property Rights NC (PVP)

### No Intent-Foresight

1. Both sides intend to help the poor, so the debate has to be empirical

**Carter 13** writes[[83]](#footnote-83)

1. Both sides of the debate believe they are arguing in defense of the poor. **Most people who support or oppose minimum wage** laws and/or **increases share a common objective — helping the** working **poor. Because both sides have noble intentions, the merits of the debate** over minimum wage laws and minimum wage increases **should be based on empirical evidence that it will actually help**, rather than harm, **the poor.**

2. Foresight implies intention. If I foresee civilian death as a necessary means to winning a war, I implicitly intend those deaths since I will the end that makes those means necessary.

3. The intent-foresight distinction can’t guard against absurd conclusions

**Di Nucci 14** writes[[84]](#footnote-84)

According to the problem of closeness, **the normative distinction between intending** harm **and** merely **foreseeing harm is unworkable because we can always argue that the relevant harm was merely foreseen** and the Doctrine of Double Effect offers no criterion to rule out any of these cases: so that (to take one of Philippa Foot’s famous scenarios) **if we blow up a fat guy** to pieces **whose body is obstructing the exit of the cave where we are stuck,** then **we can say that the death of the fat guy was a** merely **foreseen** (unintended) **consequence of freeing up the cave**’s mouth**– and the Doctrine has no criterion to stop this and** endless **other implausible applications.**

4. Intentions are unverifiable because people could lie about them. Consequences are easier to prove.

5. No warrant for why argumentation ethics specifically entails an intent-foresight distinction; they just asserted that intentions matter.

### General

1. Their “ethical theories bad” framing is irrelevant. Non-domination isn’t an ethical theory; it’s a primary moral good, that’s Pettit 99.

2. Poverty turns the case—the state has to address it in order to enforce property rights compatibly with everyone’s freedom

**Allais 12** writes[[85]](#footnote-85)

Kant thinks that for state a to be legitimate, its monopoly on the means of **coercion must be reconciled with each subjects’ right to freedom** (Varden 2008). The idea is that no one’s freedom must be subjected to the choices of others, but only to universal law, which means that the state must ensure “that the total system of laws provides conditions under which any private person’s freedom is subject to universal law and not to another private person’s arbitrary choices” (Varden 2008). What is relevant to our question here is that **without** absolute **poverty relief, poor people’s freedom is subject to** the **arbitrary choices of those who have means**. This means that the state is not guaranteeing and enabling their freedom. As Ripstein explains, for Kant, “the problem of poverty is that “the poor are completely subject to the choices of those in more fortunate circumstances” (Ripstein 2009:274). **The poor person’s purposiveness depends on the grace of others**, like a slave or a serf, two of the most archetypally unfree conditions (Ripstein 2009:281). Obviously there will be questions about what constitutes absolute poverty, and how much relief is required. My concern here is not with resolving these complications, but simply with the idea that exercising basic human agency requires means: one cannot have and pursue purposes without any means. On Kant’s view, a person’s innate freedom is undermined if the basic conditions of their agency depend on another person’s arbitrary choiceanother person’s choosing to give or not to give. The justification of the legitimacy of the state depends on the state reconciling its monopoly on the means of coercion with each individual’s innate right to freedom. Avoidable absolute poverty is not compatible with individual’s innate right to freedom. So in a legitimate state, public structures must ensure that there is unconditional poverty relief. Further, it is significant that, on Kant’s view, a legitimate state is required for there to be rightful ownership of property. There is no conclusive ownership of property in a state of nature: you have control of what you can grab and what you can defend, which generates a presumptive right, but it doesn’t follow that you have anything with respect to which the state is obliged to defend your ownership. To have the full-fledged institution of property, it needs to be the case that the state has an obligation to defend your holdings. Rightful ownership of property requires a state with a monopoly on coercion (so that possession of property can be defended), and it requires that the defense of property can be reconciled with everyone’s freedom. Otherwise the state is simply an organisation of powerful groups defending their interests, as opposed to a legitimate state, which enables and defends everyone’s freedom. Making property rights enforceable is one of the functions of the state, and it 5 is important to enabling all of our freedom. But **making property rights enforceable makes it** the case **that those in** absolute **poverty**, where there are no jobs, **have no ways of meeting** their **needs**. This is a consequence of the defence of property: **in a state of nature they could try to take what they need, but a state which defends property forbids them from doing this. Thus, creating property rights** in a way which is **compatible with everyone’s freedom requires public provision against absolute poverty**. As Ripstein says, “the only way that property rights can be made enforceable is if the system that makes them so contains a provision for protecting against private dependence” (Ripstein 2009:228). Thus, ensuring absolute poverty relief is a requirement of anyone rightfully owning property. For Kant, it is crucial that absolute poverty relief is provided by public means: For reasons of state the government is therefore authorised to constrain the wealthy to provide the means of systenance to those who are unable to provide for even their most necessary natural needs. It will do this by way of coercion…by public taxation, not merely by voluntary contributions (3:326).

3. Argumentation ethics isn’t the starting point—it doesn’t help us when we aren’t arguing—philosophy is inner reflection as well as dialogue.

4. Solving poverty precedes property claims. There is no right to wages earned from an unjust institution.

**Murphy and Nagel 2** writes[[86]](#footnote-86)

If there is a dominant theme that runs through our discussion, it is this: Private **property is a legal convention**, defined in part by the tax system; therefore, the tax system cannot be evaluated by looking at its impact on private property, conceived as something that has independent existence and validity. Taxes must be evaluated as part of the overall system of property rights that they help to create. Justice or injustice in taxation can only mean justice or injustice in the system of property rights and entitlements that result from a particular tax regime. The conventional nature of property is both perfectly obvious and remarkably easy to forget. We are all born into an elaborately structured legal system governing the acquisition, exchange, and transmission of property rights, and ownership comes to seem the most natural thing in the world. But **the modern economy in which we earn our salaries**, own our homes, bank accounts, retirement savings, and personal possessions, and in which we can use our resources to consume or invest, **would be impossible without** the framework provided by **government** supported by taxes. This doesn’t mean that taxes are beyond evaluation—only that the target of evaluation must be the system of property rights that they make possible. **We cannot start by taking as given**, and neither in need of justification nor subject to critical evaluation, some initial allocation of possessions—**what people** originally **own**, what is theirs, **prior to government interference.** Any convention that is sufficiently pervasive can come to seem like a law of nature—a baseline for evaluation rather than something to be evaluated. Property rights have always had this delusive effect. **Slaveowners** in the American South before the Civil War **were indignant over** the **violation of their property rights** that was entailed by efforts to prohibit the importation of slaves into the territories—not to mention stronger abolitionist efforts, like helping runaway slaves escape to Canada. **But property in slaves was a legal creation**, protected by the U.S. Constitution, **and the justice of** such forms of **interference with it could not be assessed apart from the justice of the institution itself.** Most conventions, if they are sufficiently entrenched, acquire the appearance of natural norms; their conventionality becomes invisible. That is part of what gives them their strength, a strength they would lack if they were not internalized in that way. For another pervasive example, consider the conventions governing the different roles of men and women in any society. There may be good or bad reasons for the existence of such conventions, but it is essential, in evaluating them, to avoid the mistake of offering as a justification precisely those ostensibly “natural” rights or norms that are in fact just the psychological effects of internalizing the convention itself. If women are always treated as subordinate to men, the perception inevitably arises that submissiveness is a natural feminine trait and virtue, and this in turn is used to justify male dominance. **Aristotle mistook the consequences of an institution for its natural basis** in this way **when he argued that certain people were natural slaves**, and also in his claims about women.1 To appeal to the consequences of a convention or social institution as a fact of nature which provides the justification for that convention or institution is always to argue in a circle. In the case of taxes and property, the situation is more complicated, and it can be even more absurd. The feeling of natural entitlement produced by an unreflective sense of what are in fact conventionally defined property rights can encourage complacency about the status quo, as something more or less self-justifying. But it can also give rise to an even more confused criticism of the existing system on the ground that it violates natural property rights, when, in fact, these “natural” rights are merely misperceptions of the legal consequences of the system itself. **It is illegitimate to appeal to a baseline of** property rights in, say, **“pretax income,”** for the purpose of evaluating tax policies, **when all such figures are the product of a system of** which **taxes** are an inextricable part. One can neither justify nor criticize an economic regime by taking as an independent norm something that is, in fact, one of its consequences.

5. Devolves to non-domination. Self-ownership is illusory if you can be arbitrarily interfered with; libertarian non-interference alone can’t protect freedom, that’s Pettit 99.

6. Workers’ rights link to the standard.

**Scanlon 11**

TM Scanlon (the professor no one can reasonably reject). “Libertarianism and Liberty: How Not to Argue for Limited Government and Lower Taxes.” Boston Review. 9 October 2011. http://www.bostonreview.net/BR36.5/ndf\_t\_m\_scanlon\_libertarianism\_liberty.php

A second, quite different view is what might be called “motorcycle-helmet libertarianism,” which gives fundamental place to the value of having control over how one’s life goes in important respects. The idea of control that this line of thinking appeals to is not a right but a value—something that individuals have reason to want. The importance of the difference between rights and values is demonstrated by an argument of Robert Nozick’s. In Chapter 8 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia Nozick considers, as a possible objection to his view, that in a society of the kind he is recommending some people would lack control over their lives in important respects. In a skillful rhetorical move, he responds to this objection by asking whether there is “a right to have a say about what affects you,” and he quickly and convincingly shows that there is no such right. As he puts it, few things affect your life more deeply than whom you marry. So a right to have a say over what affects you would include a right to have a say about whether your beloved will marry someone else, thereby becoming unavailable to marry you. But clearly you have no such right. What this argument shows is that the objection Nozick is considering should not put it in terms of a supposed right. It does not show that having control over one’s life in certain respects is not an important value that needs to be taken into consideration in deciding what rights people have. Indeed, Nozick himself seems to appeal to such a value when he says that his system of “libertarian” rights is appropriate for us because we are “distinct individuals each with his own life to lead.” 1 The distinction involved here is one of several that can be referred to, somewhat misleadingly, as between positive and negative rights. As I have said, however, it is not a distinction between two kinds of rights but between rights and considerations that must be taken into account in justifying them. The lesson to draw from it is not that there are no “positive rights”—rights to particular benefits—but rather that not every desirable thing that is relevant to justifying rights can be directly transformed into a “right to” realize that thing. Recognizing control as an important moral value leads to the question of what system of rights—what set of laws and policies—would best secure this important form of control for everyone, since everyone counts morally. It may seem to industrialists that an unregulated market provides the greatest freedom, because regulation and taxation reduce their ability to do what they want. But as I have mentioned, **an unregulated market leaves many workers with little control over** some important aspects of **their lives, and their liberty also matters** morally. So an argument appealing to the moral importance of control over one’s life must take both of these facts into account, along with others.

7. Non-unique. Status quo minimum wage and taxation redistribute wealth already.

8. Dormentano 14’s minimized text says that redistribution’s good if it corrects for advantages obtained from government—that means vote aff because those advantages create the status quo inequality that living wage solves

**Gilabert 7**

Pablo Gilabert (Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Concordia University). “Contractualism and Poverty Relief.” Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 2007). http://philpapers.org/archive/GILCAP-2.pdf

(1) Derived basic positive duties of justice. The first problem with the libertarian argument is that its factual premise is false. It is hardly the case that the global Rich have not been systematically involved in unduly harming the global Destitute. Even if it were true that destitution in poor countries primarily results from their governments' inefficient and corrupt policies and their lack of encouragement of efficient economic practices, it would be a mistake to think that the world's Rich are not implicated. As Thomas Pogge's recent work forcefully shows, the global Rich have been using their overwhelming bargaining power to shape the international political and economic landscape in a way that makes it possible and desirable for elites in poor countries to act as they do. Two characteristics of that order are what Pogge calls the "international borrowing privilege" and the "international resource privilege" (under which authoritarian or corrupt elites in poor countries are internationally allowed, and even encouraged, to appropriate and sell the natural resources of the countries they rule, and contract public debt in their people's name, with devastating political and economic consequences).^' Moreover, we should not think that only governments, and not the members of the international business community, are to blame. There is ample evidence that some sectors of the latter have supported harmful governments and policies in poor countries.^^ In sum, exploitation and domination are common features of international relations, and destitution cannot be explained without paying attention to them.

9. Prioritizing property rights destroys quality of life for many people—independent reason to reject

**Studebaker 12** writes[[87]](#footnote-87)

The most modern iteration of the right’s **property rights prioritisation** comes from libertarian theorist Robert Nozick. His argument goes something like this (a thank you to a recent lecture for organising it in this easily comprehensible format): Each person is the rightful owner of him or herself  The external world, in its original state, is not owned by anyone Therefore, each person may justly appropriate unowned natural resources provided that he does not thereby make anyone worse off Therefore, if a person appropriates resources that are unowned without making anyone worse off, then he is entitled to those resources If a person is entitled to a set of resources, then he is entitled to transfer it to others with their consent (either as a gift or for a fee) If a set of resources is justly transferred to another person, then he becomes entitled to it If a person is entitled to a set of resources, then it is unjust to deprive him or her of any of them without his individual express consent, by taxation or other means. My fundamental problem with this (which went unmentioned in the lecture), is that this theory does not care at all what empirical results it produces. It **justifies property retroactively**, based on how the property came to be held, **rather than based on what** the **impact** of the **holding** of **the property has on** people in the **society**. For example, **imagine** if you will that there is a group of agricultural **villagers** who are **struggling to compete with** the **low prices of a neighbouring industrial farm**. If things continue as they appear to be going, the villagers will no longer be able to make a living and will become deeply impoverished. Another nearby farmer who had a spectacular harvest the previous season wishes to help. He believes his exceptional crop yield was due to new seeds he purchased the previous year. He takes the excess seeds produced by his previous year’s plants and offers to sell them to the villagers so that they might experience higher yields as well and avoid bankruptcy. The villagers cobble together what little remains of their income to purchase the seeds. They plant the seeds, but, before they can harvest the crop, the village experiences a surprise drought, and the entire crop withers and dies.  The prosperous farmer appropriated the new seeds originally without making anyone worse off, then sold the seeds to the villagers, transferring the seeds to them with their consent. None of them could have known that a drought was coming, yet now **the villagers have insufficient money to plant** again**, and will be forced to sell their farms** (and, consequently, the livelihoods of their families) **to the industrial farmer** in order to survive the next year. **That trade will** also **be made with their consent**, and they may survive another year or two on the proceeds, **but eventually all the villagers will be destitute. Their living standards and quality of life will collapse,** and **all in a manner that is consistent with what Nozick considers just**, because Nozick does not care what results from property rights, only that the process leading up to them is fair. What we see here is that you can easily get a very negative outcome even though all the events in the process are free and fair.

More AC turns the NC:

The aff solves a negative rights violation because the rich are the cause of squo inequality; that’s Gilabert 7.

Cycles of poverty systematically deny the poor access to property. Living wage solves; That’s Konzcal 14.

The aff solves bargaining power, which is key to fair property contracts; that’s NYT 14.

## AT Steirn Rodl NC

1. This entire NC is an extrapolation. The framework cards say moral principles must be a priori, but that doesn’t mean the resolution must be. A priori principles can be applied to real-world circumstances.

2. Devolves to non-domination. My framework doesn’t rely on desire-based principles to say Kantianism entails non-domination, that’s Ripstein 9.

3. The NC doesn’t prove that a competitive advocacy is more desirable than the aff, so it doesn’t negate; that’s Nelson 8.

(:15)

[Read #4 and #5 only if time]

4. Rodl assumes that if you will the end, you will the necessary means. Only consequentialism can explain why this principle holds true

**Sinnot-Armstrong 92** writes[[88]](#footnote-88)

**Deon**tologists **might** try to defend the **claim that** moral reasons are based on promises by claiming that promise keeping is intrinsically good and **there is a moral reason to do what is a necessary enabler of what is intrinsically good**. However, **this** response **runs into two problems. First,** on this theory, **the reason to keep a promise is a reason to do what is** itself **intrinsically good, but the reason to start the mower is not** a reason to do what is intrinsically good. Since these reasons are so different, they are derived in different ways. **This creates a**n incoherence or **lack of unity** which is **avoided in other theories. Second,** this response conflicts with a basic theme in deontological theories. If my promise keeping is intrinsically good, your promise keeping is just as intrinsically good. But then, **if** what gives me a moral reason to keep my promise is that **I have a moral reason to do what**ever **is intrinsically good, I have** just **as much moral reason to do what is a necessary enabler for you to keep your promise**. And, **if my breaking my promise is a necessary enabler for two other people to keep** their **promises,** then **my moral reason to break my promise is stronger** than my moral reason to keep it (other things being equal). **This undermines the** basic **deon**tological **claim that my reasons derive in a special way from my promises.**13 So this response explains moral sub- stitutability at the expense of giving up deontology. A fourth possible response is that any reason to mow the grass is also a reason to start my mower because starting my mower is part of mowing the grass. However, starting my mower is not part of mowing the grass, because I can start my mower without cutting any grass. I might start my mower hours 412 / Walter Sinnott-Armstrong in advance and never get around to cutting any grass. Suppose I start the mower then go inside and watch television. My wife comes in and asks, 'Have you started to mow the lawn?', so I answer, 'Yes. I've done part of it. I'll finish it later.' This is not only misleading but false. Furthermore, mowing the grass can have other necessary conditions, such as buying a mower or leaving my chair, which are not parts of mowing the grass by any stretch of the imagination. Finally, deontologists might charge that my argument begs the question. It would beg the question to assume moral substitutability if this principle were inconsistent with deontological theories. However, my point is not that moral substitutability is inconsistent with deontology. It is not. Deontologists can consistently tack moral substitutability onto their theories. My point is only that **deon**tologists **cannot explain why moral substitutability holds**. It would still beg the question to assert moral substitutability without argument. However, I did argue for moral substitutability, and my argument was independent of its implications for deontology. I even used examples of moral reasons that are typical of deontological theories. Deontologists still might complain that the failure of so many theories to explain moral substitutability casts new doubt on this principle. However, we normally should not reject a scientific observation just because our theory-cannot explain it. Similarly, we normally should not reject an otherwise plausible moral judgment just because our favorite theory cannot explain why it is true. Otherwise, no inference to the best explanation could work. My argument simply extends this general explanatory burden to principles of moral reasoning and shows that deontological theories cannot carry that burden.

5. Rodl’s wrong. No one means is necessary to carry out an end.

(:27)

5. Neuroscience confirms the causal theory of action.

**Schroeder et al 10** writes[[89]](#footnote-89)

Consider first what the instrumentalist might make of the neuroscience. The instrumentalist needs there to be intrinsic desires realized somewhere in the neural architecture. But where? The brain’s reward system makes an excellent candidate, as has been argued by a pair of philosophers (Morillo, 1990; Schroeder, 2004). When one desires that P intrinsically, one has a representation that P (the content of the desire); **by having** the **desire one** both **tends to be**come **motivated to bring it about** that P **and** tends to **feel pleasure at the prospect** of P, or if it comes to be the case that P. **The only structure poised to play** all of **these roles in the brain is the reward system**. The reward system also begins with a representation that P (more carefully, a capacity to represent that P), and when triggered (when the representation is occurrent), the **reward signals** that are caused tend to **cause motivational states and** to cause **pleasure**.1⁴ And further, no other system in the brain could plausibly represent the contents of desires while also causing both motivational states and pleasure. The instrumentalist, then, should hold that intrinsic desires are realized by the reward system. The instrumentalist holds that intrinsic desires combine with beliefs: beliefs about what actions would be instrumental to satisfying intrinsic desires (or would realize the satisfaction of intrinsic desires). Where will these beliefs be realized? Presumably, in the higher cognitive centers of the brain, for what is a belief if not a higher cognitive state? **So the instrumentalist hopes to find** brain **structures by which the reward system** (intrinsic desire) **can interact with** certain **higher cognitions** (beliefs about instrumental actions). Fortunately for the instrumentalist, **such a structure exists:** it is **the motor basal ganglia**. In the motor basal ganglia, information from higher cognitive centers combines with reward information, and also with information from perception and from current motor commands. Thus the instrumentalist should tentatively accept that the beliefs relevant to motivation are found in higher cognitive centers, for if they are, then they are capable of playing something much like the role he requires, and no other candidates present themselves. Furthermore, the instrumentalist holds that intrinsic desires, when combined with relevant beliefs, produce motivational states. Once again, he can be happy with the neuroscience. **Intrinsic desires** (realized by the reward system) **combine with beliefs** (in higher cognitive centers) **to produce activity in the** motor **basal ganglia that releases motor commands and ultimately**, if all is working normally, produces **behavior**. So long as the instrumentalist is willing to say that motivation is realized by either activity in the motor basal ganglia, or by activity in its immediate downstream structures, pre-motor or motor cortex, then his picture would seem to be realized very much as he imagined it would be.1⁵ And there seems to be no good reason for the instrumentalist to deny that motivation is realized in one or more of these structures. These structures have the properties mentioned in Section 1 above: they have occurrent states that are causally real, distinct from intrinsic desires and beliefs, and necessary for the production of voluntary action under normal conditions. Still, a little more than this is needed. These states of the motor basal ganglia and pre-motor and motor cortex should also have the right contents. Suppose Jesse wants to raise her hand. Activity in the motor basal ganglia will release the appropriate motor program for raising her hand, and so cause her hand to rise. In such a scenario, it would seem reasonable to say both that Jesse was motivated to raise her hand and that the content of the motor basal ganglia state that initiated her hand raising (or the state of her pre-motor cortex that was also crucial to her hand raising, or both) was that she raise her hand. But not every case will go as smoothly. If Jesse has a desire to look good for the party, we might be similarly tempted to say that Jesse is therefore motivated to look good for the party. However, as we have discussed, commands issued by the motor cortex and pre-motor cortex are commands for fairly specific bodily movements or otherwise very simple actions, and looking good for the party is not a simple movement or action. What should the instrumentalist say? We suggest that there is no need to throw out his picture. He can maintain, first, that Jesse is also motivated to thrust her left arm into the sleeve of the sweater she is putting on, motivated because she desires to look good and believes that getting her arm into the sweater will be instrumental to that. This very elemental motivation is one that has a content that can credibly be attributed to motor or pre-motor cortex, or to the motor basal ganglia, for it is the sort of content that is reliably made true by the activity of such structures. Second, the instrumentalist can maintain that any other motivation to bring it about that Q attributable to Jesse on the basis of her intrinsic desire to look good for the party—such as a motivation to wear interestingly contrasting colors—is simply a recognition of the fact that Jesse believes that bringing it about that Q would be instrumental to her intrinsic desire (or a realizer of it) and that Jesse’s belief in this instrumentality is in the process of guiding her basic motivations: motivations to thrust this arm into this sleeve, to grasp that pair of pants and this boot, and so on. Or, **the instrumentalist can follow Davidson** (1980: ch. 1) **in holding that** because actions are always ‘‘actions under a description,’’ it is correct to maintain that **among** the **proper descriptions of** the content of **motivational states is** the description of their goal, or of the content of the **desires that cause them**. Thus, although **a particular brain state might command for** a **thrust of an arm**, this command might equally be described, in context, as an attempt at ‘‘putting on an appealing sweater,’’ and under this description make sense as the motivation to put on an appealing sweater. Whichever route the instrumentalist prefers, it seems that there is a way for the instrumentalist to treat the **brain structures** that **are the immediate causes of bodily movement** as the realizers of instrumentalist motivation, which should be just what he wants. We have so far assumed that what we would ordinarily think of as a motivational state exists either in the motor basal ganglia, or downstream of the motor basal ganglia, in the pre-motor cortex (which seems to realize immediate intentions to act). This assumption is required in order for beliefs and desires to be possible causes of motivation, as the instrumentalist holds: after all, these are the structures that produce actions that are ‘‘downstream,’’ so to speak, from association cortex, which realizes belief, and from the reward system, which realizes desire. Can this assumption be defended? **Evidence suggests that** localized **lesions to parts of the basal ganglia result in** the **elimination of motivation**, both motor and intellectual, in the absence of intellectual impairment. Though imperfect, this is certainly some evidence that **we are localizing motivation in the right place**. Consider one case of localized bilateral damage to the head of the caudate nucleus (part of the motor basal ganglia). A case report relates: On admission, [the patient] was clearly hypokinetic with decreased spontaneous movements, facial amimia and Parkinson-like gait. Neurological examination was otherwise normal, except for a moderate limb stiffness. EEG showed mild nonspecific diffuse slowing and CT scan was interpreted as normal for the patient’s age. His general behavior was characterized by a dramatic decrease in spontaneous activity. Totally abulic, he made no plans, showed no evidence of needs, will, or desires. He showed obvious lack of concern about relatives’ as well as his own condition. When questioned about his mood, he reported no sadness or anxiety. Also noteworthy were a loss of appetite (he never asked for food, even if left more than 24 hours without eating) and food preferences (he would eat with the same apparent satisfaction dishes he did or did not like before). Finally, on every instance he was questioned about the content of his mind, he reported a striking absence of thoughts or spontaneous mental activity. Contrasting with these massive behavioral changes, purely cognitive functions seemed relatively spared. (Habib, 2004: 511) In many cases it is difficult to differentiate between motor impairment and motivational impairment. However, this patient with damage to the caudate nucleus of the basal ganglia provides reason to think that severe damage to motor basal ganglia results in a thoroughgoing motivational deficit, encompassing both motivation to act and to think. Similar profiles have been described in cases of discrete lesions of the globus pallidus, another component of the motor basal ganglia (Strub, 1989; Levy & Dubois, 2006; Vijayaraghavan et al., 2008). Patients with lesions in these regions appear to lack desire and motivation. These **case reports are reminiscent of** cases of **akinetic mutism, in which patients have preserved motor and verbal abilities, but lose** the **motivation to act** in any way. Akinetic mutism is usually caused by bilateral lesions to portions of pre-motor cortex, a target of the output of the motor basal ganglia, but also results from damage to parts of the motor basal ganglia and, more rarely, from lesions to other parts of the fronto-striatal circuit we are considering. All this seems to show fairly clearly that ordinary motivation is massively dependent on the motor basal ganglia.

The causal theory of action means practical reason is an insufficient explanation of action.

**Wilson and Shpall 12** write[[90]](#footnote-90)

There are still more fundamental issues about intentions in action and how they are related to intentions directed at the present and the immediate future. In “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” **Davidson seemed to suppose that ascriptions of intention** in action **reduce to** something like **the following**. (7\*) The agent F'ed, and at that time he had a pro-attitude toward Ging and believed that by Fing he would or might promote Ging, and the pro-attitude in conjunction with the means-end belief caused his Fing, and together they caused it ‘in the right way.’ (In Davidson's widely used phrase, the pro-attitude and associated means-end belief constitute a primary reason for the agent to F.) In this account of ‘acting with an intention’ there is, by design, no mention of a distinctive state of intending. Davidson, at the time of this early paper, seemed to favor a reductive treatment of intentions, including intentions for the future, in terms of pro-attitudes, associated beliefs, and other potential mental causes of action. In any case, Davidson's approach to intention in action was distinctly at odds with the view Anscombe had adopted in Intention. She stressed the fact that constructions like (7) and (7′) supply commonsense explanations of why the agent F'd, and she insisted that the explanations in question do not cite the agent's reasons as causes of the action. Thus, she implicitly rejected anything like (7\*), the causal analysis of ‘acting with a certain intention’ that Davidson apparently endorsed. On the other hand, it was less than clear from her discussion how it is that intentions give rise to an alternative mode of action explanation. Davidson's causal analysis is modified in his later article “Intending” [1980, essay 5]. By the time of this essay, he dropped the view that there is no primitive state of intending. Intentions are now accepted as irreducible, and the category of intentions is distinguished from the broad, diverse category that includes the various pro-attitudes. In particular, he identifies intentions for the future with the agent's all-out judgments (evaluations) of what she is to do. Although there is some lack of clarity about the specific character of these practical ‘all-out’ judgements, they play an important role in Davidson's overall theory of action, particularly in his striking account of weakness of will [1980, essay 2]. Despite his altered outlook on intentions, however, Davidson does not give up the chief lines of his causal account of intentions in action — of what it is to act with a certain intention. In the modified version, (7\*\*) **The agent's primary reason for Ging must cause her, in the right way, to intend to G, and** her **intending to G must itself cause**, again in the right way, **the agent's** particular act of **Fing**.[4] The interpolated, albeit vague, conditions that require causation in ‘the right way’ are meant to cover well-known counterexamples that depend upon deviant causal chains occurring either in the course of the agent's practical reasoning or in the execution of his intentions. Here is one familiar type of example. **A waiter intends to startle his boss by knocking over** a stack of **glasses** in their vicinity**, but the** imminent **prospect** of alarming his irascible employer **unsettles the waiter** so badly **that he involuntarily staggers** into the stack **and knocks the glasses over. Despite the causal role of the waiter's intention** to knock over the glass**, he doesn't do this intentionally**. In this example, where the **deviant causation occurs as part of** the performance of **the physical behavior itself**, we have what is known as ‘primary causal deviance.’ When the deviant causation occurs on the path between the behavior and its intended further effects — as in the example of Betty and Jughead above — the deviance is said to be ‘secondary.’ There have been many attempts by proponents of a causal analysis of intention in action (‘causalists,’ in the terminology of von Wright 1971) to spell out what ‘the right kind(s)’ of causation might be, but with little agreement about their success [see Bishop 1989, Mele 1997]. Some other causalists, including Davidson, maintain that no armchair analysis of this matter is either possible or required. However, most causalists agree with Davidson's later view that the concept of ‘present directed intention’ is needed in any plausible causal account of intention in action and acting intentionally. It is, after all, the present directed intention that is supposed to guide causally the ongoing activity of the agent [see also Searle 1983]. The simplest version of such an account depends on what Michael Bratman has dubbed “the Simple View.” This is the thesis that proposition (6) above, [The agent G'd intentionally] and, correspondingly, proposition (7) [The agent Fed with the intention of Ging] entail that, at the time of action, the agent intended to G. Surely, from the causalist point of view, the most natural account of Ging intentionally is that the action of Ging is governed by a present directed intention whose content for the agent is, “I am Ging now.” So the causalist's natural account presupposes the Simple View, but Bratman [1984, 1987] has presented a well-known example to show that the Simple View is false. He describes a type of case in which the agent wants either to φ or to Θ, without having any significant preference between the two alternatives. The agent does know, however, that it is flatly impossible, in the given circumstances, for him to both φ and Θ although, in these same circumstances, it is open to him to try to φ and try to Θ concurrently. (Perhaps, in trying to φ, he does something with one hand, and, in trying to Θ, he does something with the other.) Believing that such a two-pronged strategy of trying to achieve each goal maximizes his chances of achieving his actual goal of either φing or Θing, the agent actively aims at both of the subordinate ends, trying to accomplish one or the other. The example can be spelled out in such a way that it seems clear that the agent is wholly rational, in his actions and attitudes, as he knowingly pursues this bifurcated attack on his disjunctive goal (but see Yaffe 2010 for skepticism about this claim). Suppose now that the agent actually succeeds in, say, φing and that he succeeds in virtue of his skill and insight, and not through some silly accident. So, the agent φ's intentionally. It follows from the Simple View that the agent intended to φ. And yet, the agent was also doing something with the intention of Θing and had this attempt succeeded instead (without the intervention of too much luck), then the agent would have Θ'd intentionally. By a second application of the Simple View, it follows that he also intended to Θ. And yet, just as it is irrational to intend to φ while believing that it is flatly impossible for him to φ, so also does it seem irrational to have an intention to φ and an intention to Θ, while believing that it is flatly impossible to do the two things together. So the agent here should be open to criticisms of irrationality in his endeavor to φ or Θ. Nevertheless, we observed at the outset that he is not. The only way out is to block the conclusion that, in trying to φ and trying to Θ in these circumstances, the agent has the contextually irrational pair of intentions, and rejecting the Simple View is the most direct manner of blocking that conclusion. Even if Bratman's argument defeats the Simple View [see McCann 1986, Knobe 2006], it doesn't rule out some type of causal analysis of acting intentionally; it doesn't even rule out such an analysis that takes the crucial controlling cause to be an intention in every instance. One might suppose, for example, that (i) in a Bratman case, the agent merely intends to try to φ and intends to try to Θ, and that (ii) it is these intentions that drive the agent's actions [Mele 1997]. The analysis in (7\*\*) would be modified accordingly. However, the project of finding a workable and non-circular emendation of (7\*\*) remains an open question. The conceptual situation is complicated by the fact that Bratman holds that (7) [The agent F'd with the intention of Ging] is ambiguous between The agent F'd with the aim or goal of Ging and The agent F'd as part of a plan that incorporated an intention to G. (8) above is an especially clear example in which the second reading is required. The second reading does entail that the agent intends to F, and it is only the first that, according to Bratman's argument, does not. Therefore, Bratman thinks that we need to distinguish intention as an aim or goal of actions and intention as a distinctive state of commitment to future action, a state that results from and subsequently constrains our practical endeavors as planning agents. It can be rational to aim at a pair of ends one knows to be jointly unrealizable, because aiming at both may be the best way to realize one or the other. However, it is not rational to plan on accomplishing both of two objectives, known to be incompatible, since intentions that figure in rational planning should agglomerate, i.e., should fit together in a coherent larger plan. Bratman's example and the various critical discussions of it have stimulated interest in the idea of the rationality of intentions, measured against the backdrop of the agent's beliefs and suppositions. We discuss some of these issues at greater length in Section 4. It has been mentioned earlier that Davidson came to identify intentions for the future with all out judgements about what the agent is to be doing now or should do in the relevant future. **Velleman** [1989]**, by contrast, identifies** an **intention with** the agent's **spontaneous belief, derived from practical reflection**, which says that he is presently doing a certain act (or that he will do such an act in the future), and that his act is (or will be) performed precisely as a consequence of his acceptance of this self-referential belief. Paul Grice [1971] favored a closely related view in which intention consists in the agent's willing that certain results ensue, combined with the belief that they will ensue as a consequence of the particular willing in question. Hector-Neri Castañeda [1975], influenced by Sellars [1966] maintained that intentions are a special species of internal self-command, which he calls “practitions.” Bratman [1987] develops a functionalist account of intention: it is the psychological state that plays a certain kind of characteristic causal role in our practical reasoning, in our planning for the future, and in the carrying out of our actions. This causal role, he argues, is distinct from the characteristic causal or functional roles of expectations, desires, hopes, and other attitudes about the agent's future actions.

(:52)

## AT Levinas NC

### General (:25)

1. Devolves to non-domination. It is the primary moral good no matter what the Other values, that’s Pettit 99.

2. They can’t account for value tradeoffs. There’s no way to weigh between the Other and the other Other and another other Other’s brother’s mother.

3. Every agent has to value freedom as a necessary good, that’s Gewirth 84. That doesn’t totalize the Other since the Other is an agent, and freedom is necessary for agency.

4. The standard is vague and self-defeating. If we can’t know the Other, we can’t know what counts as Otherness.

5. The alternative is worse; abject poverty is a far worse material hindrance to the Other.

6. TURN—Living wage is key to letting the Other choose for themselves because it solves bargaining power, that’s Gupta 15.

7. Non-unique. Status quo minimum wage links just as hard.

8. No link; the aff doesn’t force the Other to take a job or spend money. If they really want low wages, they could just shred their paycheck.

### Ev

#### **Pettit is a pre-req to Levinas**

Ferrarese 9

(Gabba-Gabba, We Acceept You, One Of Us”: Vulnerability And Power In The Relationship Of Recognition. Constellations. Vol. 16, Issue 4, Pages 604-614. December 2009. Estelle Ferrarese, Faculty Of Social Sciences AT The University of Strasbourg)

From the perspective of an (often internal) critique of political liberalism, some schools of thought in political theory have, in recent years, argued for an alternative concept of the subject founded on a distinct social ontology, as opposed to the figure of a rational and sovereign, always-already autonomous subject. This has given new prominence to the theme of vulnerability. One finds this theme in theories of “care,” which insist on having concern for the other in his vulnerability, his intrinsic dependence and his needs.1 The idea of vulnerability can also be found among authors who attempt to found their theories of justice on networks of dependence and interdependence in which subjects find themselves, as in the example of Iris Marion Young. From a different perspective, Martha Nussbaum regards emotions as morally relevant because “they are judgments in which we acknowledge our neediness and incompleteness before those elements that we do not fully control.”2 And Emmanuel Levinas writes primarily about the absolute nudity of the other's face that appeals for my help and assistance. Finally, the idea of vulnerability has also been regarded as a strong moral argument (as questionable as this can be) against cultural relativism, by offering an ontological argument for universalistic theories of rights: all human beings feel pain, and have the capacity to recognize pain in others.3 Contemporary theories of recognition can be considered as participating in this movement to rehabilitate the idea of vulnerability, insofar as they refer to – usually with the intention of reformulating Hegel's struggle for recognition – George Herbert Mead's work, Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, according to which consciousness, “far from being a precondition to the social act … is preconditioned by this very act.4” The self can only develop in a process of interaction: when a self does appear, it always involves an experience of another. Accordingly, for Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas, Ernst Tugendhat and Axel Honneth among others, individuality is constituted both through intersubjective recognition and through one's self-understanding as mediated by intersubjectivity. Hence, the need for the other's recognition experienced by each of us and our vulnerability to its possible denial. Habermas for instance speaks of “extreme vulnerability” as a central aspect of discourse ethics: “unless the subject externalizes in interpersonal relations through language, he is unable to form that inner center that is his personal identity. This explains the almost constitutional insecurity and chronic fragility of personal identity – an insecurity that is antecedent to cruder threats to the integrity of life and limb.”5 It follows with this type of premise that these theories of recognition place us before the fact that personal selves are always available for harming, recalling man's physical vulnerability – i.e. the fact that bodies are always available for wounding. This is clearly exposed in the following well-known passage of Charles Taylor's “Politics of Recognition”: “non-recognition or misrecognition … can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, reduced mode of being. Beyond a simple lack of respect, it can inflict a grievous wound, saddling people with crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy but a vital human need.”6 In Axel Honneth's words, “because the normative self-image of each and every individual human being … is dependent on the possibility of being continually backed up by others, the experience of being disrespected carries with it the danger of an injury that can bring the identity of the person as a whole to the point of collapse.”7 More specifically, at the core of Hegelian theories of recognition is the idea that not being recognized means being unable to maintain a practical relation-to-self; autonomy is regarded as the horizon of recognition. Current Hegelian theories of recognition then draw moral consequences from the constitutional vulnerability they assume. Vulnerability implies more than susceptibility to certain sorts of harm; it implies that harm is avoidable. Hence the possibility of advocating a duty to protect the vulnerable, a duty to prevent harm from occurring, particularly in the form of an individual or a collective “special responsibility,” entailed by the peculiar vulnerability of someone else to our actions and choices, as advocated by Robert Goodin in his book Protecting the Vulnerable.8 Insofar as Honneth's theory relies on the idea of deeply rooted expectations of recognition directed toward multiple others who consequently bear the burden of recognition, it assumes such a duty, at least for the sphere of rights and the sphere of social esteem: “Built into the structure of human interaction there is a normative expectation that one will meet with the recognition of others, or at least an implicit assumption that one will be given positive consideration in the plans of others.”9 For his part, Habermas posits the responsibility generated by this vulnerability in terms of an imperative of solidarity. Beyond the intersubjective and/or social level and the question of responsibility, the elucidation of this principle of vulnerability on a political level appears considerably more problematic. By insisting on the vulnerability of the agent, whose access to autonomy is dependent on intersubjective consideration, Hegelian theories of recognition invite us, although often without explicitly assuming so, to envision a demand for the preservation of personal integrity in terms similar to the preservation of physical integrity, which, at least since Hobbes, has been presented as the primary function of political institutions.10 The transposition of this idea of vulnerability to the political sphere then generally takes on two different forms. On the one hand, vulnerability provides the possibility of founding an institutional basis for the principle of a right to conditions for a positive relationship to self, a right that is just as fundamental as the right to physical integrity. This is notably expressed by the idea of a shield of rights that takes different forms, conceived as either the instrument of individual protection (Honneth) or collective protection (Taylor), limited to cases where weakness is exposed to a force that is excessive (Fraser),11 or extended to guarantee an equal recognition for all (Tully). On the other hand, the politics of recognition is generally considered a series of struggles to impose this right to conditions for a positive relationship to self, to have it respected, and/or to extend the interpretation of its normative content. Hegelian theories of recognition seem to argue that we need to broaden the concept of justice, but such a conception of justice would not, a priori, enable us to carry out a rational deduction of the institutions required for a perfectly just society, like the deduction Rawls sought to make in his Theory of Justice. This concept of justice would be a tool of social criticism, justifying the legitimacy of social transformations to reduce misrecognitions within a real society. The political task would then consist in a pragmatic critique of institutions so as to tend towards the elimination of every denial of recognition or misrecognition through progressive and experimental adjustments.12 This emphasis placed on vulnerability, whose validity is not being called into question as such here, and the analogy which is drawn between physical vulnerability and constitutional vulnerability, leave a certain number of elements on the nature of the harm threatening the person expecting recognition unclarified, as I shall seek to show in this article (I). At the same time, it fails to address the nature of the relationship of recognition, omitting from consideration the exercise of power and the mechanisms inherent to this relationship (II). These omissions, as I will show, cause a particular dimension of recognition-driven struggles to be neglected, a dimension which I will refer to as the politics of exit (III). I. Not To Be Misrecognized, but by Whom? The vanishing point of the reasoning I have sought to highlight in the introduction of this paper, I believe, is the fact that the vulnerability inherent in the concept of recognition results from the need to constitute the other as an authority in order to be recognized. While in the case of physical security becoming a right – where the aim was to banish the specter of bloodthirsty bandits invading people's home unbeknownst to their victims, to rape or kill – the crime of denying recognition cannot be inflicted without the victim being aware. Allow me to explain my point with the help of an example that looks at the question from the other way around, borrowed from Freaks, the cult film directed by Tod Browning in 1932 about strangely shaped “freaks” of the Barnum circus. The key scene of the film comes after the wedding ceremony of the beautiful trapeze artist of the troupe, Cleopatra, with Hans, a dwarf she has married for the fortune he has inherited. During the banquet at which the entire cast of “monsters” is assembled, presented by the narrator as a group invested with a strong identity and sense of solidarity, one of them gets up on the table, takes hold of a glass, and approaches the young woman chanting a short refrain, “Gobble-Gobble, we accept her, we accept her! One of us! One of us!”13 This phrase of recognition, taken up in chorus by the monstrous assembly, brings a devastating reaction from the completely drunk trapeze artist: she breaks into hysterical laughter. This is the turning point of the film: Hans finally becomes aware of his young wife's intentions and falls ill. What this scene clearly shows is that for he who demands or expects recognition, not just any kind of recognition will do. Some providers of recognition count more than others. Their social status or the cultural models of a given society render some providers more indispensable than others, just as some providers’ approval leaves indifferent or, as in the present case, can give rise to rejection. In other words, it is the person who demands recognition who transforms the other into an instance of recognition by granting legitimacy to the forthcoming act of recognition or misrecognition. Even the elementary recognition expressed on the level of discourse attests to the validity of this principle. This is the aspect of recognition, embedded in discourse, which Habermas focuses on, and according to which all that is recognized is the person's status as a subject capable of replying, judging, and criticizing.14 In discussion, a reciprocal constitution of autonomous and responsible subjects occurs through the simple fact of raising and defending claims to validity, submitting them to the judgment of the other and addressing the other with the assumption that he can reply, either in approval or with criticism. This form of recognition, given automatically through simple initiation or in the continuation of a dialogue, provides us with perhaps the greatest number of examples of refusal to consecrate a possible instance of recognition, of refusal to place oneself in the position of the person who could be denied a response: innumerable daily cases of non-response, of withdrawal or abstention from an interaction which would both provide recognition and require it, expecting a response; or more political cases of the refusal to sit down at a negotiating table with an organization, a given group (for example by branding them as terrorists). However, while some providers count more than others and are invested with more expectations than others, it is not – except perhaps in the sphere of affective recognition, to borrow Honneth's typology – stubbornness, passion or excessive vanity which makes people aspire to this particular recognition and not another. Similarly, there is no question here of speaking of strategically “choosing” authorities; one does not change instances of recognition as one changes projects or tactics because the previous one didn't work, until one attains the desired success, if only because change is costly, mentally and socially. I will come back to this point in the third part of this paper. The options are limited precisely as a consequence of “institutionalized patterns of cultural value,” as Nancy Fraser would put it. In other words, certain instances are collectively designated, or socially polarized. First of all, there exist cases in which the instance is presented and accepted as the only possible one, thanks to ideological mystification in the form of persuasion and influence. This is, for example, the case of recognition-based management techniques, and of the procedures which Axel Honneth terms “ideologies of recognition,” which “ensure the motivational willingness to fulfill certain tasks and duties without resistance.”15 This extends to and includes the systems of domination, which completely saturate someone's horizon of evaluation through inducement, mobilization of bias and control. Nonetheless, more subtle constraints define all relations of recognition. The desire or need for recognition should not be imagined as a simple straight line which joins subject and object (i.e. the recognition of the instance ordered as such). The person who demands recognition can and does only claim a restricted number of statuses and qualities, from a limited number of instances, limited by reasons rooted in social practices. The “choice” of the instance is also restricted by history, the forward march of time, or, as Wendy Brown puts it, “the constant effects of what has already been made, including ourselves.”16 Even the highly stylized episode borrowed from Freaks which served as our starting point is written into a historical context: that of the Darwinian will to show the diversity of the human species in its races and forms,17 and the rise of the freak show as a type of entertainment. This history makes Hans’ deformed friends quite improbable instances of recognition. In other words, history forges what appears as obvious, like the instance of whiteness for Blacks as lamented by Frantz Fanon: “There is a fact: White men consider themselves superior to black men. There is another fact: Black men want to prove to white men, at all costs, the richness of their thought, the equal value of their intellect.”18 And the very particular place held by the State as the addressee of most claims for recognition in our complex contemporary societies is only the most trivial example of this process of designating the instance through sedimentation. Even the time inherent in the relationship of recognition between two protagonists imposes its force, defining the passage from an expectation to a demand for recognition, confirming an instance, or making it necessary to shift to another scale. The “choice” of the instance is also socially organized in the sense that generally it only refers to already available models and roles. One could add to the mechanisms which limit the number of possibilities the one which René Girard19 detects in the characters of Proust, Stendhal and Dostoevsky: mediation by a third party, whose desire is copied. It is precisely the other's desire that renders the object desirable. In other words, one cannot dismiss the inherent force of the fact that the desire for recognition from this particular instance, and not another, is also a desire according to the other which purports to be desire according to oneself. This should not simply be seen as evidence of a sort of social vanity; mediation is part of the normal and normalized workings of a society, which no one is exempt from. Historically and socially constituted, the obvious instances are not evenly distributed or universally shared in a given society. As a consequence of “institutionalized patterns of cultural value in whose construction those in need of recognition have not equally participated,”20 the way in which relations of recognition are ordered is socially differentiated. This is something that Appiah's notion of “scripts” could account for, scripts being defined as “narratives that people can use in shaping their projects and in telling their life stories.”21 Provided by collective identities, these scripts explain that the natural or obvious instances of recognition differ from one group to the next. This is why Tod Browning's trapeze artist, although herself a marginal figure and probable object of misrecognition, if only in the form of the negation of the value of a lifestyle excessively linked to the body, can do without and even express scorn for the recognition of the Freaks. In this extremely constrained space, the fact remains that it is up to the person claiming recognition to activate the instance, by admitting its legitimacy. The person who takes the risk of making an act of “recognition,” despite not being accepted as a competent instance by a subject placing himself in a position of request, would not be capable of producing the slightest effect of recognition; he would merely be the author of a more or less coherent speech act that would be lost in the void. But then, once this legitimacy is bestowed by the person expecting recognition upon a given instance, a form of power emerges, immanent to the relationship of recognition. II. A Fresh Look at an Inevitable Correlate of Recognition: Power The existence of a power to which the one who claims recognition is subject is inherent in the act of recognition. There is always such a power, even when he who recognizes, recognizes exactly and unreservedly the claim being addressed to him. He can refuse to grant recognition. It is therefore a power limited to this possibility. It is not defined by the ability to obtain something from he who is subjected to it; it is not verified by the possibility of ensuring obedience, it doesn't even need the intentionality of its holder to emerge. It is simply the other face of vulnerability, a power to strike, to damage the other's ability to develop a positive relationship to himself. It is power in the crudest sense, that one party is at the mercy of the other. At the mercy of a refusal, a denial, whether by action or by omission, but also of an inappropriate recognition, of a misinterpretation of the call for recognition, even of a non-perception of this call. Nonetheless, this is not a case of subjectivation, in the sense where the very creation of the subject is considered as contemporary to and conditioned by an act of subjection. Admittedly, it seems difficult to deny the idea, notably defended by Judith Butler and Patchen Markell, that the act of recognition is a performative act, if one grants that the meaning of a request for recognition is: I need you to recognize me as a human being (or a being different from you). Without your recognition, I cannot become this being. Not only do I require you to acknowledge that I am this being (otherwise it would simply be a cognitive victory), but only you can make it true; this is precisely the reason I am forced to formulate this claim. The act of recognition thus creates the status, the definition, or the self it recognizes. And this creation is the act of the party granting recognition. But if one pays closer attention to Austin's concept of the performative act, one sees that the speech act is not self-sufficient: the uttering of the words is the leading incident in the performance of the act, but it is far from being the sole thing necessary if the act is to be deemed to have been performed. “Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether ‘physical’ or ‘mental’ actions or even acts of uttering further words. Thus, for naming the ship, it is essential that I should be the person appointed to name her, for (Christian) marrying, it is essential that I should not be already married with a wife living, sane and undivorced, and so on: for a bet to have been made, it is generally necessary for the offer of the bet to have been accepted by a taker (who must have done something, such as to say ‘Done’).”22 Austin envisaged the performative act as assuming both conventions and in some way the agreement and participation of persons other than the speaker; the act of granting recognition is limited the same way. In other words, the performative act of recognition limits our room for maneuver, but the speaker himself is constrained by circumstances. One cannot attribute just any identity or characteristic, even if it is positive; the recognizing party cannot rely on its imagination alone: if it does so, the performative act is destined to fail. Not just anything can be attributed as an ability or a status,23 and the party that recognizes is limited in its performative power by existing and/or constraining models and reasons, and from that point of view, is subject to the same constraints as the party claiming recognition. Furthermore, to be successful, the act of recognition must, at least partially, encounter a claim. In other words, in transforming the other into an authority, I recognize his right to inflict upon me a harm that will make it impossible for me to nurture respect for myself, but I am the one who makes this first movement. This is paradoxically why interaction remains possible. By highlighting the role of the party with the expectation of recognition in the constitution of the relationship of recognition and power, my aim is obviously not to assign the responsibility of the harm to the party that suffers this harm. Rather it is to remind what Foucault, and after him, Iris Marion Young, pointed out, namely that power is not the possession or attribute of individuals, “power is a relation rather than a thing.”24 Indeed, while the accumulation by an individual, an institution or a group of a “capital of authority”– to borrow and subvert a Bourdieuian concept – makes their acceptance as providers of recognition more probable, contrary to what Bourdieu would argue, it is not in this accumulation that power resides in fine. It only exists in a relationship, being immanent to the latter, and emerges from the acceptance by one of the two partners of the legitimacy of the other's judgment. Correspondingly, I wish to account for the fact that it is precisely because it is involved in the relationship of power that the party expecting recognition can modify, impair and overthrow it. The central importance which Hegelian theories of recognition attribute to the motif of vulnerability and the metaphor of the wound – articulated with an attempt to theorize a non-utilitarian conflictuality in which the struggle derives from moral motives, as well as with the strong normativity attributed to the idea of struggle for recognition (none of these ideas I seek to call into question here) – have ended up placing the subject in a position of radical outsideness in relation to power. He who demands recognition can be nothing more than prey to a power. Furthermore, this power is generally only considered in pathological terms and/or in terms of domination.25 Yet this tendency is not as harmless as it would seem at first glance: he who expects recognition is placed in a position of reproach to power26 and is consequently made its clear antinomy. In other words, he sees himself being denied the possibility of operating within the “matrix of power,” as Judith Butler would put it. If we cannot extract ourselves from relations of recognition, and if the latter are always doubled by relations of power, the solution cannot be to exclude power from any normative reflection. In taking into consideration the Foucaldian idea of power according to which “a power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two elements which are each indispensable if it is really to be a power: that “the other” (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up,”27 it is, in contrast, possible to identify a lever that the party claiming recognition can play on. In this perspective, what the politics of recognition, understood as a specific way of elaborating and championing political claims, means should be re-formulated, or at very least extended. III. A Few Political Implications: The Politics of Exit If vulnerability is inherent in creatures individuated only through socialization, while at the same time I am the one who transforms the other into an instance and a source of recognition, the struggle for a shield of rights that would protect my integrity only constitutes one part of the topography of struggles for recognition, of their form, and their finalities. This is the case, if for the mere fact that I only suffer harm if I have participated in the institution of the instance of recognition, or approved or confirmed it. These conditions render recourse to such rights unlikely in many cases of denial. Here, it might seem that my analysis is concluding as a plea in favor of theories of empowerment. However, the concept of empowerment suggests that the solution is to be found by the subject suffering misrecognition in his own resources to develop self-esteem, in his inherent ability to constitute himself outside of and against the mechanisms of power. This concept is therefore in flagrant contradiction with the intersubjective presuppositions that are the particularity and force of the theory of recognition. Because if we had such resources available to escape from contempt, we would not even find ourselves in a position which required us to desperately seek recognition, and the problem of misrecognition would then be limited to a “simple lack of respect,” to rephrase the quote from Taylor above. Philip Pettit arrives at a conclusion of a somewhat different type, at the end of a theoretical development that is not without bearing certain similarities with my own.28 Indeed, he defends a conception of domination as “defenseless susceptibility to interference” liable “to inflict a certain damage” that is close to my own conception of the power inherent to constitutive vulnerability, even if this interference is not considered in Pettit's work in terms of humiliation, discrimination, contempt and disqualification. More precisely, Pettit regards an agent as dominating another if he is able to interfere arbitrarily in his choices and actions, whether the interference is effective or not – a master can be benevolent to the point of letting his slaves act without interference. Similarly, as I already said, the power specific to whom a request for recognition is addressed stems from the fact that he can always refuse to answer it. Pettit then deduces a concept of non-domination as a form of power, as a reciprocal power,29 which refers to a person's ability to control his or her own destiny but which does not refuse interference. Such a notion implies a form of positivity, which distinguishes it clearly from negative freedom and the idea of non-interference. In doing so, it seems to allow an idea of insurmountable unfulfilment and openendedness, considered as acceptable, or even desirable, and which it would be possible to articulate on the premises of recognition.

### Capitalism Add-On (:25)

Levinas devolves to rejecting capitalism

**Ferro 13** writes[[91]](#footnote-91)

Levinas points out the ‘separation’ between the Ego and the Other: the latter is not an alter-ego, another subject, but someone radically different. The other person is irreducible to the Ego. Notwithstanding this separation, there is an original relation between them: the subject approaches the other person in a particular ‘economic’ way. Since ‘economy’ means ‘management of a household’ (from the Greek words oikos, ‘house’, and nomos, ‘law’ or ‘rule’), every relation with something or somebody has to do with interiority. While the objects are included in the domestic dimension of the subject (as nourishment, tools or furniture), the other person cannot be grasped. The interhuman relationship is hospitality, is opening one own’s doors to the other. **According to Levinas, ethics is** not only reception, but also **responsibility**. The identity of the subject is orientated to the alterity of the other, ‘without a prior commitment’[13]. **Responsibility precedes freedom**, it is independent from every choice. One is responsible of the other ‘despite oneself’[14], thus nobody can avoid responsibility. From the economic point of view, it is a very important principle: it is not based on what one ‘chooses’ to do, but on what one ‘is’. **Applying Levinas’ statements to capitalism, one could say the following:** if one ‘is’ richer and more powerful, then one ‘will be’ more responsible, despite one’s choices. It does not mean that freedom is not important, but that responsibility founds freedom. Responsibility is the moving principle of ethics, while freedom is what makes it concrete. Behaviour depends on free will, which acts ‘according to’ or ‘against’ responsibility. This is the reason why a single action or a whole behaviour is responsible or irresponsible. Shortly, if ethics is based on responsibility, then moral activity will be responsible and immoral activity irresponsible. Adapting Levinas’ phenomenology to economic analysis, one could state the following: **intentionality and freedom** exactly **correspond to the ‘private ownership’ and ‘free market’ of capitalism. They are based on egotism and** on **an instrumental relation to the other. If egotism coincides**, in capitalism, **with obtaining profit, the other will be seen as a mean to make money. This relation to the other is** absolutely **unethical.** Ethics, instead, is moved by responsibility and sees the other as the main addressee of action.

Fighting for a living wage is key to resisting capitalism

**Oakland Socialist 14** writes[[92]](#footnote-92)

Corporate America argues that this means that it is useless to fight for higher pay. Nothing could be further from the truth. One pay cut simply leads to another, driving down the living standards of the working class to one level grey mass, ultimately heading towards complete immiseration. Accepting pay cuts, or **not fighting for better pay**, **demoralizes workers and makes** many times **more difficult** launching **a counter-offensive for a changed society altogether**. Karl **Marx gave the answer to why workers must fight against low pay**. He wrote: (Should) the working class… abandon their attempts at making the best of the occasional chances for their temporary improvement? If they did, they would be degraded to one level mass of broken wretches past salvation.… **By cowardly giving way in** their **everyday conflict with capital, they would** certainly **disqualify themselves for** the **initiating** of **a**ny **larger movement**. At the same time… the working class ought not to exaggerate to themselves the ultimate working of these everyday struggles. They ought not to forget that they are fighting with effects, but not with the causes of those effects; that they are retarding the downward movement, but not changing its direction; that they are applying palliatives, not curing the malady. They ought, therefore, not to be exclusively absorbed in these unavoidable guerrilla fights incessantly springing up from the never ceasing encroachments of capital or changes of the market.”

## AT Stoicism NC (:49)

1. Devolves to non-domination. Institutional humilitation’s bad for Stoics too, and non-domination’s key to rectify it; that’s Pettit 97.

2. Stoicism kills value to life

**Pigliucci 7** writes[[93]](#footnote-93)

There is much in the above, and in the rest of this short book, that I agree with. However, one cannot help reading through the Meditations and coming away with the feeling that the **Stoics** – much like many Eastern mystics – **have an impoverished view of life** and the human condition. Yes, there is pain in the world and much of it is caused by our fellow human beings; but there is also much joy and love, and it has the same source. It may be good in times of need to be able to detach ourselves from the rest of the world and reflect on how fleeting all of it really is; but **living a full life** also **means being engaged with** that **reality** on a daily basis, **good and bad** things alike. And **while there is much to commend in** the Stoic attitude of withstanding pain and **avoiding** seeking **superficial pleasures, it is hard to imagine** that **one can enjoy life without** a good dose of **those** very same pleasures.

3. The NC’s too individualistic; freedom can only exist within communities, and non-domination is key to that—that’s Waltman 2.

4. Stoicism is psychologically flawed and precludes social change

**Garrett 99** writes[[94]](#footnote-94)

It's not difficult to imagine plausible late 20th-century objections to these notions. OBJECTION 1. **Stoics say we should be indifferent** about life and health. **How**, we are tempted to ask, **can a** good person, who is, say, a **parent, be indifferent about** the life or health of **her child?** And isn't it a bit extreme, we want to say, not to care about one's own life or health? OBJECTION 2. Stoics say we should eliminate the emotions. But **psychological counselors** today **tell us to get in touch with our feelings**. Dr. Bill DeFoore, for example, is author of a recent popular psychology paperback entitled Anger: Deal with It, Heal with it, Stop It from Killing You. He tells his readers to say to themselves "All of my feelings are OK with me" (77). DeFoore holds that at the core of each of us is an "inner child," which is either identical to, or "associated with [,] the more vulnerable emotions of fear, pain, and the need for love." We are supposed to affirm this inner child and to protect it (DeFoore, 67) OBJECTION 3. **Without passion, nothing** creative or progressive **ever gets done. People are** sometimes described as **apathetic** by other people who would have liked to see them more concerned **about racism, peace, the environment, or** other **social problems**. If that's what Stoic apatheia recommends for everyone, well, we don't need it, we've got enough.

5. Low-wage workers will still have materialist impulses whether they make a living wage or not. Reduced wages would make them want money more, not less.

6. Non-unique. No one is stoic now. Their contention card’s about money, not a living wage, and people pursue money in the squo.

7. No neg offense. True stoics wouldn’t work in the first place, so living wage wouldn’t affect them.

8. TURN—A living wage is the opposite of materialist. It’s indexed to basic needs, not superficial pleasures.

9. TURN – without basic needs, workers won’t have time to pursue stoicism because they’ll have to work 3 jobs to feed their families.

10. TURN – The aff creates bargaining power, so workers can challenge their bosses’ materialism; that’s NYT 14.

## AT Skep

### General

1. Skep can’t deny that freedom is a necessary good; every agent must value freedom because it’s key to agency, that’s Gewirth 84.

2. This doesn’t negate. Skep doesn’t justify the desirability of a competitive post-fiat advocacy, and offense-defense is key to fairness and education, that’s Nelson 8.

3. Skep prevents us from criticizing racism or the Holocaust—that’s an independent reason to reject it.

4. Skepticism is avoided by accepting a margin of error in our moral statements.

**Parfit 97** writes[[95]](#footnote-95)

**We may not be able to prove that our normative** epistemic **beliefs are not illusions. We may also be unable to prove that we are not brains in a vat**, or being deceived by some demon. **But if we claim less than absolute certainty, we can** justifiably **reject such skeptical views.** In arguing that we can know some normative epistemic truths, we must appeal to some of these truths. We must claim that we have reasons to believe that we can respond to reasons. Such arguments are in one way circular, but that does not make them fail. Any justification must end somewhere. Justifications of beliefs can best end with intrinsic credibilities and decisive epistemic reasons. We do not have to show that we have further reasons to believe that we have these reasons, and further reasons to believe that we have these further reasons, and so on forever. Some beliefs seem indubitable, and we seem to have decisive reasons to accept many other beliefs. Nor do we seem to have any strong reason to doubt that we do have such reasons. Given these facts, if we can understand how it might be true that we are responding to such reasons, we can justifiably believe that we are responding to such reasons. **We can justifiably believe that there are some truths** about what we ought to believe, **and that we know some of these truths.**

5. Ignore skepticism because non-zero credence in the existence of morality means there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one moral action.

6. Skep is self-defeating. **Wedgwood 10** writes[[96]](#footnote-96)

**If there is no objective fact of the matter** about a certain question p, **it is** surely **pointless to** engage in debate about p, trying to **persuade** other **people who disagree** with you about p. (It would be at least as pointless as trying to persuade someone that vanilla ice cream is yummier than chocolate ice cream.) **These** other **people should just ignore your attempts to persuade them** about p. So Leiter’s argument implies that people who are inclined to believe that there are no meaningful questions on which there are “no objective facts” should just ignore any attempt to persuade them that there are questions of this kind. Several of Leiter’s opponents on this issue will be philosophers who are inclined to believe that there are no meaningful questions on which there is no objectively correct answer. (Indeed, I am one of these philosophers myself.) But Leiter’s argument is itself an attempt to persuade the readers of this web site that there are some questions of this kind – namely, moral questions. **So,** it seems, **the** Nietzschean **argument is** effectively **telling its opponents that** it is an argument **that they should** simply **ignore [it]. In this way,** as it seems to me, **the argument is** entirely **self-defeating.**

### External World Skep

External world skep is implausible and self-defeating

**Bragues 6** writes[[97]](#footnote-97)

Impressive as his synthesis might seem, one wonders whether Rorty actually believes in his own sophism. Beyond a few reflective moments, **not even** the most **enthusiastic anti-objectivists can stop believing that there is** in fact **a world independent of our minds and language** and that it is pretty much the same structure as we sense and describe it. **Nor can they** really **doubt that**, say, **fire causes heat or that unprotected sex with an AIDS-infected individual will cause** the **transmission** of the virus, while sustaining the opinion that such relationships are only narratives we happen to find appealing. It is child’s play randomly to comb Rorty’s works and cite statement after statement in which he does affirm various phenomena as realities. “It is just not true that the sequence of texts which make up the canon of the ontotheological tradition has been imprisoned within a metaphorics . . . unchanged since the Greeks.”8 “It is a familiar fact that the term ‘literary criticism’ has been stretched further and further in the course of our century.”9 “The real and passionate opposition is over the question whether loyalty to our fellow-humans presupposes that there is something permanent.”10 “[M]orality is associated both with human solidarity and tragedy.”11 Telling, too, is how Rorty describes himself as indignant about the extent of greed in our society, repeating the word indignant three times.12 Such strong feelings could hardly be supported if a person truly thought equating greed with vice was just part of a good story, instead of reflecting some fundamental moral reality about the human condition. It is true that **to escape** the **self-referential inconsistency** being alleged here, **of saying “I think it is true that there is no truth,” Rorty would** remind us how his rhetorical stance enables him to **say** instead**: “I’m just selling the idea** that there is no truth**.”** He would also point out that successfully to market his opinions he must work within the dominant worldview of our time, exploiting its tensions by using the very modes of expression that he’s trying to overcome. **Even so, the best salesmen**—and no one can doubt the quality of Rorty’s salesmanship—**believe in the truth of what they are pitching**, leaving us to conclude that Rorty is deceiving himself.

Look at your hands; now back at me. Vote aff.

**Cobb 13** writes[[98]](#footnote-98)

G. E. Moore begins the paper by saying that, even though Kant claimed that there could be only one possible proof of the external world (the one Kant gave), to Moore it seems that many perfectly rigorous arguments can be given. Suppose he holds up his right hand and says, “Here is one hand”; and then he holds up his other hand and says, “Here is another hand.” To Moore, this is a perfectly rigorous proof of the proposition “There now exists two hands.” Here is Moore’s argument: **Here is a hand. Here is another hand. Therefore,** there now exists two hands. (3) implies that **an external world exists**, so the argument proves the existence of the external world. **Three things are necessary for a proof** to be considered rigorous: **The premises must be known. The conclusion must be different than the premise**(s). **If the premises are true,** then **the conclusion must be true**. Moore says that **these arguments are met** in the “Here is a hand argument,” **because**: (The First Requirement) When he is holding up one hand and then another, he certainly **he knows that “here is one hand” and “here is another.”** He knows this as well as he knows that he is standing there. Surely there is nothing more certain than that he is holding up his hands. (The Second Requirement) Although he recognizes that there might be some people who would think the conclusion “There exists a hand” to be no different than the premise “Here is a hand,” Moore argues that the conclusion is different from the premise because the conclusion could be true even if the premise is false. (**If he had his hands amputated, “Here is a hand” would be false, but** “There exists a hand” would be true in our world. In fact, **many hands exist**.) **So, the premise and** the **conclusion are not identical**, since one can be true and the other false. (Third Requirement) **If the premise “Here is a hand” is true,** then **surely the conclusion “A hand exists” is true**. Moore says that, if this argument is perfectly rigorous, as he thinks it is, then it should be obvious that many more can be given.

We should be moderate skeptics and recognize that even if neg evidence is correct, acting as if reality is real is inevitable

**Bragues 6** writes[[99]](#footnote-99)

Yet the moderate skeptic offers a way of acknowledging philosophy’s lack of foundations without having to assume the dangers of Rorty’s rhetorical project. Instead of trying to flee from reason, the skeptic begins by taking seriously the claim made, both by philosophy and common sense, that the mind can grasp truth. The skeptic uses reason to analyze the relations between the facts that are thought to justify commonly made inferences. Except for a few trite observations, however, the skeptic does not find any relations in the realm accessible to our senses that necessitate one fact to follow from another. Reason undermines itself. Thus, **reason shows that** my **having the sensation of the** same **bed** whenever I walk into my bedroom **does not mandate concluding that the bed exists independently of my mind**. Nor does the fact that I have seen a thousand instances of a pool ball hitting another give rise to motion in the impacted ball necessarily mean that the first ball’s movement is the cause of the second. The truth is there is no truth. But this statement ceases to be paradoxical, though not, as Rorty would have it, because one is simply telling a story. Rather, it ceases to be paradoxical because the moderate skeptic understands that statement to only signify the following: there are in fact no significant, inherent connections between the objects of experience. **Having reached this point, though, the moderate skeptic still finds himself with sensations**, desires, and passions **impelling him to make judgments about the world. Sensing it is pointless to fight these natural inclinations, the moderate skeptic forgets about** his **skep**ticism**, accepts the commonsense notion that we are in touch with** a **causally driven reality**, and even, particularly if he is a Humean skeptic, adopts scientific rules of reasoning to better assess the merit of assenting to his sensations and better serve his passions and desires. Where science does not, or cannot, definitively pronounce a verdict, the moderate skeptic will defer to the accumulated experience of humanity, to that which has passed the test of time. As Hume put it, “speculative reasons, which cost so much pains to philosophers, are often form’d by the world naturally, and without reflection.”17 With Edmund Burke, and against postmodernists like Rorty, **the moderate skeptic will thus discern**, amidst the multiplicity and uniqueness of historical events, **a repository of universal** and abiding **insights**, and not just view the past as a scene of utter particularity and contingency.18 All the while, however, the moderate skeptic, whether in appealing to science or history, is very careful in forming his conclusions and is always open to having his views revised by new arguments and experience, ever mindful of the mental limitations uncovered in philosophical analysis. It is in this spirit that the moderate skeptic evaluates democracy.

## AT Northland Markets NC

1. Davis’s markets cards have nothing to do with practice rules. The NC is extrapolated.

2. Practice rules only come logically prior if we take prior institutions for granted. We need my standard to determine if those institutions are actually just before we can participate.

Independently, there is no right to wages earned from an unjust institution, so practice rules can’t justify the status quo and inequality outweighs

**Murphy and Nagel 2**

Liam Murphy (Professor of Law & Philosophy at NYU) and Thomas Nagel (Professor of Law & Philosophy at NYU). “The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice.” Oxford University Press (2002).

If there is a dominant theme that runs through our discussion, it is this: Private property is a legal convention, defined in part by the tax system; therefore, the tax system cannot be evaluated by looking at its impact on private property, conceived as something that has independent existence and validity. Taxes must be evaluated as part of the overall system of property rights that they help to create. Justice or injustice in taxation can only mean justice or injustice in the system of property rights and entitlements that result from a particular tax regime. The conventional nature of property is both perfectly obvious and remarkably easy to forget. We are all born into an elaborately structured legal system governing the acquisition, exchange, and transmission of property rights, and ownership comes to seem the most natural thing in the world. But the modern economy in which we earn our salaries, own our homes, bank accounts, retirement savings, and personal possessions, and in which we can use our resources to consume or invest, would be impossible without the framework provided by government supported by taxes. This doesn’t mean that taxes are beyond evaluation—only that the target of evaluation must be the system of property rights that they make possible. We cannot start by taking as given, and neither in need of justification nor subject to critical evaluation, some initial allocation of possessions—what people originally own, what is theirs, prior to government interference. Any convention that is sufficiently pervasive can come to seem like a law of nature—a baseline for evaluation rather than something to be evaluated. Property rights have always had this delusive effect. Slaveowners in the American South before the Civil War were indignant over the violation of their property rights that was entailed by efforts to prohibit the importation of slaves into the territories—not to mention stronger abolitionist efforts, like helping runaway slaves escape to Canada. But property in slaves was a legal creation, protected by the U.S. Constitution, and the justice of such forms of interference with it could not be assessed apart from the justice of the institution itself. Most conventions, if they are sufficiently entrenched, acquire the appearance of natural norms; their conventionality becomes invisible. That is part of what gives them their strength, a strength they would lack if they were not internalized in that way. For another pervasive example, consider the conventions governing the different roles of men and women in any society. There may be good or bad reasons for the existence of such conventions, but it is essential, in evaluating them, to avoid the mistake of offering as a justification precisely those ostensibly “natural” rights or norms that are in fact just the psychological effects of internalizing the convention itself. If women are always treated as subordinate to men, the perception inevitably arises that submissiveness is a natural feminine trait and virtue, and this in turn is used to justify male dominance. Aristotle mistook the consequences of an institution for its natural basis in this way when he argued that certain people were natural slaves, and also in his claims about women.1 To appeal to the consequences of a convention or social institution as a fact of nature which provides the justification for that convention or institution is always to argue in a circle. In the case of taxes and property, the situation is more complicated, and it can be even more absurd. The feeling of natural entitlement produced by an unreflective sense of what are in fact conventionally defined property rights can encourage complacency about the status quo, as something more or less self-justifying. But it can also give rise to an even more confused criticism of the existing system on the ground that it violates natural property rights, when, in fact, these “natural” rights are merely misperceptions of the legal consequences of the system itself. It is illegitimate to appeal to a baseline of property rights in, say, “pretax income,” for the purpose of evaluating tax policies, when all such figures are the product of a system of which taxes are an inextricable part. One can neither justify nor criticize an economic regime by taking as an independent norm something that is, in fact, one of its consequences.

3. Block 88’s about the government giving people jobs, and that’s not the aff.

4. The market is enabled by the law, so the libertarian idea of interference is ridiculous

**Pettit 13** writes[[100]](#footnote-100)

**What constitutes the economy on the republican approach?** The answer is: the sorts of **public rules** that create private space in general, such as the public rules **that create the possibility of private ownership**. These rules are public in the sense of being accepted across the society as a matter of common awareness, and being normally spelled out in statutory or customary law. And they vary across societies and periods, reflecting the varying assumptions of parliaments and courts and other public forums. They include the property conventions that we have been discussing but also extend much further. Without aspiring to be exhaustive, we should add to the Rules of property at least the following four categories of market-enabling rules. **Rules of incorporation**. These determine the forms in which individuals can combine to form new economic players. They have evolved greatly over the past two hundred years, **giv**ing **companies** and banks and other such entities life without a sunset clause; **liability** that is **limited to a shared treasury**; the possibility of owning other such entities; the **possibility of changing location** and sphere of operation; **and so on**. While the rules for the formation and operation of commercial entities have generally become more and more permissive, most countries impose some anti-trust restrictions, guarding against monopoly. And countries vary a great deal, of course, in how far they allow corporations political influence, with the United States growing ever more tolerant of the pretense that corporations have the rights of natural persons. **Rules of production**. These rules **impose restrictions on how far** the **larger players** in an economy, especially in manufacturing industry, **are allowed to locate near centers of population**, to pollute the ground or water or atmosphere, to contribute to global warming, and to impose negative externalities on other players, individual or corporate. Many of these rules come about via statute while others emerge from the courts in the resolution of common law issues, in particular issues of tort. The Learned Hand rule on such questions of tort would suggest, for example, that producers and other parties ought to take precautions against harming others in any cases where the cost of the precaution is less than the expected cost of the damage: that is, the cost of the damage, discounted by the probability of its occurring. **Rules of contract**. These **determine a variety of matters** that have to be sorted out for the smooth and successful operation of a market. **Who are competent parties** to make contracts**?** What conditions, say in the matter of records of the transaction, are required for a binding contract? How far is the contract to be understood on the basis of the exact words used and how far on the basis of presumptions reasonably ascribed to the parties? **When is a contract null and void?** What damages may a party seek for breach of contract: the loss suffered as a result of reliance on the other or the loss of the benefits that the contract promised? And so on. Rules of finance. By what agencies is the money supply in the economy to be controlled? And what are the guidelines that those agencies should follow? Most countries rely on central banks for controlling the money supply and impose guidelines related to keeping inflation down and employment up. In pursuing its aims, and subject to statutory constraints, the central bank will vary factors such as the base interest rate at which commercial banks can borrow, the ratio they have to preserve between their reserves and their loans, the extent to which their loans can be bundled together in derivatives, the insurance available to depositors in the event of a bank defaulting, and so on. As the rules of property establish a system of ownership, so these and other rules combine with them to establish, more broadly, a full-scale market economy. **This claim**, like the earlier claim about the role of property conventions, borders on the platitudinous. But **by giving it prominence we can avoid** being seduced into **the libertarian view** — now, alas, almost an orthodoxy — **that the market is a relatively autonomous sphere which depends only contingently on** the framework of custom and **law**, and on the role of the state in supporting that framework. **The role of the state** in relation to the market — the role of the community, operating through the state — **is** constitutive and not just regulative, **enabling and not just constraining**. And it is extensive in even a greater measure than my five sets of rules suggest, since it also includes providing for the infrastructure of education, communication, transport and insurance that any contemporary economy requires.

5. The contention’s essentialist. It deems black workers and persons with disabilities as “economically weak actors” which is a huge generalization.

6. The aff doesn’t cause unemployment, that’s Hanauer 13. Case outweighs unemployment as well, that’s Bernstein 14.

# CPs

## UBI

### General – UBI 1AR (:56)

#### 1. Perm, do living wage and UBI.

#### 2. Only aff solves relative inequality, which outweighs absolute wealth – that’s Economist 13.

#### 3. Best stats crush this counterplan.

**Manzi 14**

Jim Manzi (Chief Executive Officer of Applied Predictive Technologies (APT), an authority on using pattern recognition and optimization models for sales and marketing application. Prior to co-founding APT, Manzi was a Vice President at Mercer Management Consulting. He is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and has written on a wide variety of public policy subjects. Manzi received a B.S. in mathematics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was subsequently awarded a Dean’s Fellowship in statistics to the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania as one of the eight top matriculants to the business school’s doctoral programs. He has published in the National Review and The American Scene, among others.) “When the Basic Income Guarantee Meets the Political Process.” CATO Unbound. August 8th, 2014. http://www.cato-unbound.org/2014/08/08/jim-manzi/when-basic-income-guarantee-meets-political-process

It is fairly **extraordinary** to claim that the government could guarantee every adult in America an income even if they did zero work of any kind, and that somehow this would not reduce work effort. Zwolinksi should be able to provide strong evidence for such a claim. But we have **scientific gold standard evidence** that runs exactly the other way. A series of randomized experiments offered a version of Zwolinski’s proposal between 1968 and 1980. These tested a wide variety of program variants among the urban and rural poor, in better and worse macroeconomic periods, and in geographies from New Jersey to Seattle. They **consistently found** that the tested programs reduce the number of hours worked versus the existing welfare system, and the tested levels of progressivity of implicit tax rates did not get around this problem by encouraging work, as Zwolinski’s theoretical argument asserts they should.

#### 4. Can’t solve contention 2. It doesn’t access turnover, that’s Konczal and NYT.

#### 5. Immigration DA. The counterplan closes borders, which spikes poverty globally.

**McArdle 14**

Megan McArdle (bachelor's degree in English literature from the University of Pennsylvania and an MBA from the University of Chicago, she founded the blog “Asymmetrical Information”). “How a basic income in the U.S. could increase global poverty.” PBS Newshour. April 18th, 2014. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/how-a-basic-income-in-the-u-s-could-increase-global-poverty/

The **greatest poverty reduction** program that **the world has ever seen** has been the United States of America. We have, for decades, over a century, been moving people who are extremely poor in the countries where they are, to a country where, just by being here, their wages can double or triple or quadruple. That would not in any way be compatible with a guaranteed minimum income, just politically. If you come here and become a citizen, that entitles you to a check for $15,000 a year for the rest of your life from the U.S. government? A lot of immigrants are low-wage workers. They’re not skilled, a lot of them. They don’t have as much education as most Americans and so they never do get up to the point where they would ever pay enough in taxes to make back that check. Even if you just limited it to their children, the political support for importing people whose children will then be entitled to the same $15,000 a year as your children — I don’t think that would ever be politically viable. So if you want to have a guaranteed minimum income, you need to shut down, pretty much effectively, **shut down immigration**, or at least immigration from lower skilled countries, which on net would do a lot more to increase global poverty than it would to decrease poverty in the United States.

#### 6. There’s a non-domination DA. Aff solves.

**Waltman 2**

Jerry Waltman (taught political science at the University of Southern Mississippi for 25 years; in 15 of those he participated in the British Studies Program.  He currently holds an endowed professorship in political science at Baylor University, where he teaches British politics and comparative public law.  He received his Ph.D. from Indiana University, and is the author of eight books and numerous articles in academic journals on both British and American politics.  In addition to his years spent on the British Studies Program, he has traveled and taught in the UK on many occasions). “Civic Republicanism, The Basic Income Guarantee, and the Living Wage.” USBIG Discussion Paper. No. 25, March 2002.

If the UBI were set high enough to remove people from poverty, what its devotees obviously hope, it would have the further deleterious effect of spawning **a culture of dependency** in the recipients. All the pathologies of the old American AFDC program would develop, with the calamitous political consequences they brought in their train. Republican citizens, recall, need to be able to look each other in the eye. None can be dependent on another, and a UBI, by the straightforward mechanism of a public budgetary transfer, **would make some dependent on others** (unless the amounts were trivial, in which case, what would be the point?). By providing payment for work performed, the living wage removes any possible social, and hence, political, stigma from what is received. **The earner** of the wage **can look anyone in the eye**, both because of the source of the income and the fact that it is adequate to allow him or her to live a decent lifestyle.

#### 7. Neg results are hella skewed

**McArdle 13**

Megan McArdle (bachelor's degree in English literature from the University of Pennsylvania and an MBA from the University of Chicago, she founded the blog “Asymmetrical Information”). “Four Reasons a Guaranteed Income Won’t Work.” Bloomberg View. December 4th, 2013. http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-12-04/four-reasons-a-guaranteed-income-won-t-work

To be fair, some studies seem to show that the negative impact on work is pretty minimal. But **these were short-term studies**, not a permanent program. Quitting your job if you know that the extra checks will end in a year or so is not smart. But it might be quite rational to quit your job if you know that you can have a minimal basic income even if you don’t work at all. In general, I am wary of exciting results from small pilot programs. Most of those programs fail when they’re rolled out statewide, either because the result was spurious or because the exciting work of a small, dedicated group just **can’t be replicated in** a gargantuan **state bureaucracy.**

#### 8. UBI violates the standard, but living wage doesn’t. Aff framework author

**Waltman 2**

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There is also the related problem of political vulnerability. Suppose the UBI were high enough to be a meaningful part of the income of the poor. Suppose further that social values were such that the grant was kept reasonably generous. But the poor are still vulnerable; they have **no guarantee** that the public budgetary process will always be so benign. They would be in the position of servants who worked for a generous master. Well off, relatively anyway, but subject to his or her whim. A citizen's economic well-being simply cannot be in the hands of others, even a sympathetic political majority. The living wage has some problems in this area also, of course. It would have to be set by statute, and that would inject political majorities into its determination. However, the setting of **a wage level would be** two or three **steps removed from direct budgetary politics**, blunting somewhat the us/them divide. Further, those who work would have a far stronger political claim than those who do not. These two facts do not remove political vulnerability, but they do reduce it somewhat.

#### 9. Employers will feel safe cutting wages if they know workers can fall back on UBI.

#### 10. Can’t solve contention 1; wage rates are key. That’s Bernstein.

### Productivity/Cap NB (Waltman, :32)

#### Contention 2 impact turns the link. Productivity focus is key to purchasing power and turnover reduction which wrests control from corporations; prefer my empirical ev to abstract philosophizing.

#### Valorizing wage labor is key to civic republicanism. UBI fails.

**Waltman 2**

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The first major difference is the work feature of the living wage. Advocates of UBI down play the importance of work, Parijs saying that we need to avoid "work fetishism." To be sure, work can be onerous, unpleasant, degrading and productive of stress. But then anything that is good can have a down side. Most people-intellectuals and survey respondents alike-seem to agree that on the whole, the virtues of work, both for the individual and for society, outweigh the drawbacks. (37) For present purposes, those **attributes** of work **that relate to republican citizenship need to be stressed**. First, work provides structure and routine. The tendency to entropy pervades human activity as much as it does the physical world. Only a precious few of our fellows can keep their lives on course without structure and routine. Stories from the Depression almost always stress this. People were lost without routines, and an aimlessness soon infected every corner of life. Orderly life began to crumble. Or, listen to the advice of retirement counselors. Only retire, they stress, if you have something you want to do. Second, work gives many if not most people a sense of accomplishment, which invariably makes people feel better about themselves. Third, and closely related to the second, work provides a sense of identity. We all know what the question "What do you do?" means. I play softball and putter around in my wood shop is not the type of answer most people expect. Of course, this can be overdone; but the feeling that "I am this" cannot be ignored either. Fourth, work forces us to confront the social world. We learn how to interact with others and how to perform in groups, formal and informal. We learn what society's expectations of us are; we also develop expectations of certain behaviors from others. This leads to greater mental health and better social adjustment. All of these aspects of work contribute to better republican citizenship. An ordered life, a sense of daily accomplishment, an identity that is important to oneself and others, and an ability to interact easily with others all contribute to the kind of character traits needed by republics. They make liberty meaningful and lay the groundwork for confident and intelligent participation in public affairs. **By laying** the **emphasis on work**, then, the living wage wins one **over UBI**.

#### Markets are most pragmatic and key to non-domination. Only middle ground reforms link to my framework.

**Waltman 2**

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Let us turn now to the matter of material equality. As with poverty, a moral case can be made for material equality, but that is irrelevant here. In political terms, furthermore, an arguable case can be made that a republic would function better if there were material equality among its citizens. None would surely then have to bow and scrape. They could all eat at the same restaurants, afford similar clothes, and ride in the same section of the train or plane; and the similarity of their economic condition would bind their interests tightly together. If a society existed, then, with absolute, or even rough, pre-existing material equality, a republic would be an ideal and natural choice for the political system. However, republican political theory is not designed merely to provide a guide to what would be desirable in a social utopia; it is designed to be a program for the real world. Therefore, two factors must be kept in mind. First, a market economy is the natural outgrowth of republican political structure. If people have even qualified property rights, then they must have the right to dispose of their property as they see fit. Transactions among private parties will thereby automatically characterize much of the economic activity in a republic. Because people have different endowments and different luck, inequalities in the possession of property will be an inevitability. Such inequalities are simply a natural by-product of a market economy, and it cannot be otherwise. Since **there is no way to maintain republican freedom without a**n accompanying **market economy**, we must accept that some economic inequality is going to be a fact of life in a republic. Second, **any attempt to legislate** material **equality would vest far too much power in the state** to suit republican tastes. It would lead, that is, to imperium, which would demolish what you were trying to save. This is because the magnitude of the undertaking would create a state the scale of which would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to tether it to republican political institutions. Besides, how could it be done? If some people have a certain skill (say, hitting a little white ball with a stick) which others do not, and if people are willing to pay to watch those with the skill demonstrate it, how would you achieve material equality? You could not physically endow everyone with the skill. So, you would have to lower the skill level of those with it to make abilities equal. At my physical peak, for example, for Barry Bonds and I to be equal at the plate, he would have to have 25 pound weights attached to each wrist and bat blindfolded (at least). While the republic might not collapse if everyone was made equal in sports, if you did this to artists, musicians, dancers, and various other talented individuals, what a drab and oppressive world it would be. Or, you could make the recipients of the largesse fork all of it over to a common pool, to be distributed to everyone. But would not at least some of the incentive go away? And what about the rules, regulations, and bureaucracy that would be required? At the same time, there are entrepreneurs who do serve the greater good while pursuing riches for themselves. New products and better ways of doing things spring from people whose creative abilities lie in these areas. To deprive them of the reasonable fruits of their labors hardly seems fair, and would surely lessen their propensity to tinker in the garage. No, a republican state that tried to utilize governmental power to enforce anything approaching material equality would likely not survive. Nevertheless, too much inequality in material possessions is an equally serious problem. Again, both the moral case and the economic efficiency case against too much inequality, powerful though they may be, must yield to the political case. Severe inequalities in material conditions, to put it straightforwardly, can destroy the very bases on which legal and political equality are built. This is true for three reasons.

### Cap Good (General, :29)

#### The world is the best it’s ever been; markets are the reason

Yevgeniy Feyman 14, Manhattan Institute Fellow, "The Golden Age Is Now", May 23, www.city-journal.org/2014/bc0523yf.html

In How Much Have Global Problems Cost the World?, Lomborg and **a group of economists conclude that**, with a few exceptions, **the world is richer, freer, healthier, and smarter than it’s ever been**. These gains have coincided with the near-universal rejection of statism and the flourishing of capitalist principles. At a time when political figures such as New York City mayor Bill de Blasio and religious leaders such as Pope Francis frequently remind us about the evils of unfettered capitalism, this is a worthwhile message. The doubling of human life expectancy is one of the most remarkable achievements of the past century. Consider, Lomborg writes, that “the twentieth century saw life expectancy rise by about 3 months for every calendar year.” The average child in 1900 could expect to live to just 32 years old; now that same child should make it to 70. This increase came during a century when worldwide economic output, driven by the spread of capitalism and freedom, grew by more than 4,000 percent. These gains occurred in developed and developing countries alike; among men and women; and even in a sense among children, as child mortality plummeted. Why are we living so much longer? Massive improvements in public health certainly played an important role. The World Health Organization’s global vaccination efforts essentially eradicated smallpox. But this would have been impossible without the innovative methods of vaccine preservation developed in the private sector by British scientist Leslie Collier. Oral rehydration therapies and antibiotics have also been instrumental in reducing child mortality. Simply put, technological progress is the key to these gains—and market economies have liberated, and rewarded, technological innovation. People are not just living longer, but better—sometimes with government’s help, and sometimes despite it. Even people in the developing countries of Africa and Latin America are better educated and better fed than ever before. Hundreds of thousands of children who would have died during previous eras due to malnutrition are alive today. Here, **we can thank massive advancements in ag**ricultural **production unleashed by the free market**. In the 1960s, privately funded agricultural researchers bred new, high-yield strains of corn, wheat, and various other crops thanks to advances in molecular genetics. Globalization helped spread these technologies to developing countries, which used them not only to feed their people, but also to become export powerhouses. This so-called “green revolution” reinforced both the educational progress (properly nourished children tend to learn more) and the life-expectancy gains (better nutrition leads to better health) of the twentieth century. These children live in a world with fewer armed conflicts, netting what the authors call a “peace dividend.” Globalization and trade liberalization have surely contributed to this more peaceful world (on aggregate). An interdependent global economy makes war costly. Of course, problems remain. As Lomborg points out, most foreign aid likely does little to boost economic welfare, yet hundreds of billions of dollars in “development assistance” continue to flow every year from developed countries to the developing world. Moreover, climate change is widely projected to intensify in the second half of the twenty-first century, and will carry with it a significant economic cost. But those familiar with the prior work of the “skeptical environmentalist” understand that ameliorating these effects over time could prove wasteful. Lomborg notes that the latest research on climate change estimates a net cost of 0.2 to 2 percent of GDP from 2055 to 2080. The same report points out that in 2030, mitigation costs may be as high as 4 percent of GDP. Perhaps directing mitigation funding to other priorities—curing AIDS for instance—would be a better use of the resources. Lomborg’s main message? Ignore those pining for the “good old days.” Thanks to the immense gains of the past century, **there has never been a better time to be alive**.

#### Markets are the best thing since sliced bread; the neg is ahistorical in the extreme

Ames and Forbes, 2012:

(Freedom Manifesto: Why Free Markets Are Moral And Big Government Isn’t. Steve Forbes, Publishing Executive. Elizabeth Ames, Former Member of The Texas House Of Representatives. 2012 104-107)

Today we have scant appreciation for just how harsh conditions were just two centuries ago. As noted author and theologian Michael Novak has described them: Famines ravaged the civilized world on average once a generation . Plagues seized scores of thousands. In the 1780s, four fifths of French families devoted 90 percent of their incomes simply to buying **bread**—only bread—to stay alive. Life expectancy in 1795 in France was 27.3 years for women and 23.4 for men. In the year 1800, in the whole of Germany fewer than a thousand people had incomes as high as $1,000 [in today’s dollars]. Liberty of religion and speech was rare. In most cultures, absolute rulersreigned simultaneously over political, economy, and moral-cultural matters. In such a world, in most places, traditional Christianity and Judaism lived under severe constraints. The development of the market economy in Britain and the United States, Novak writes, changed everything. “After five millennia of blundering, human beings finally figured out how wealth may be produced in a sustained, systematic way.” Economic freedom gave rise to an era of innovation that dramatically improved living conditions. People were able to look beyond the necessities of survival. They gained a greater “liberty of personal choice” and advantages like “a varied diet, new beverages, new skills, new vocations.” Philosopher Thomas Hobbes’s famed description of life as “nasty, brutish and short” has become less true with each generation. In the bestselling, influential *The Rational Optimist,* British journalist Matthew Ridley describes in powerful detail how free markets have uplifted mankind: [T]he vast majority of people [today] are much better fed, much better sheltered, much better entertained much better protected against disease and much more likely to live to old age than their ancestors have ever been. Even allowing for the hundreds of millions who still live in abject poverty, disease and want, this generation of human beings has access to more calories, watts, lumen-hours, square feet, gigabytes, megahertz, light-years, nano-meters, bushels per acre, miles per gallon, food miles, air miles and of course dollars than any what went before. They have more Velcro, vaccines, vitamins, shoes, singers, soap operas, mango slicers, sexual partners, tennis rackets, guided missiles and anything else they could even imagine needing. By one estimate, the number of different products that you can buy in New York or London tops ten billion. Even in poor countries, Ridley tells us, people are living longer. “**The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton** did **in 1955**. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955.” Food, clothing, fuel, and shelter over decades has grown steadily cheaper:[S]urprising as it may seem, the average family house probably costs slightly less today than it did in 1900 or even 1700, despite including far more modern conveniences like electricity, telephone and plumbing. We also get far more for our labor, he notes, than we ever did: An hour of work today earns you 300 days’ worth of reading light; an hour of work in 1800 earned you ten minutes.” (This achievement may dim considerably if Big Government ends up making consumers buy those expensive bulbs.) Entrepreneurial creativity has been the foremost force for good that society has ever known. Entrepreneur and free enterprise evangelist Michael Strong believes that ‘the creation of new enterprises is the most powerful way to make positive change in the world. If all the energy that is currently invested in zero-sum political conflict was gradually transferred to the committed creation of sustainable enterprises, the cumulative impact on behalf of good would be extraordinary.”

### Cap Good (Poverty, :09)

#### Free Markets Solve Poverty; global trends go aff

MacKenzie, 2014:

(The Data Is Clear: Free Markets Reduce Poverty. June 16, 2014. D.W. MacKenzie, Assistant Professor of Economics At Carroll College)

I have no doubt that Pope Francis has seen many poor people with his own eyes. But, our comprehension of the root causes of poverty requires both data on economic conditions and theoretical knowledge of economic systems. What does rational analysis of evidence tell us about global poverty? It is an obvious fact that severe poverty has disappeared in the most industrialized countries. Nations like the US, UK, Switzerland, and Japan industrialized within what were predominantly laissez-faire free-market conditions. Even the so-called social democracies, like Sweden and Germany, developed in free-market conditions, and adopted extensive state welfare and regulatory programs only after achieving high levels of economic development and industrialization. World Bank data shows that there is inequality, but this inequality is between the free-market nations and the crony-capitalist and socialistic nations.[1] The idea that domestic laissez-faire causes poverty is unfounded. It is a historical fact that India, China, and Kenya never tried capitalism, so this system was never given a chance to work. Furthermore, China and India have realized some progress in abating poverty since they moved in the direction of capitalism. Of course, China and India adopted regulated crony capitalism, but this is still better than their old socialist systems. One could argue that global capitalism allows a few people in some nations to exploit the masses of other nations. Marxists have attempted to make this case since Lenin. Lenin revised Marx because even in his day it had become obvious that Marx’s prediction that capitalists would exploit domestic workers was refuted by evidence. We now know that Lenin’s attempt to blame poverty on global markets is wrong. As previously mentioned, economic conditions in China and India improved after switching from socialism to crony capitalism. China and India have also expanded trade in global markets. There have been significant improvements in living conditions around the world over the past thirty years. The largest improvements in the poorest nations took place during the wave of globalization that took place twenty years ago, after the fall of the USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union opened the door to unprecedented globalization of industry. What does real data tell us about poverty during this period? Per Capita GDP rose dramatically: Thirty years ago half (50 percent) the people in the poorer nations of the world lived [in extreme poverty](http://data.worldbank.org/news/extreme-poverty-rates-continue-to-fall). In 2012, 21 percent of people in the poorer nations of the world live in extreme poverty. Development of global markets has greatly lessened poverty around the world. This is a very important fact. Movement from being in the lowest global income bracket, to lower middle income to middle income means moving from average life expectancy in the low forties to life expectancy of fifty or sixty, respectively. Cardinal Maradiaga is wrong: this economy does not kill; it has extended the lives of the poorest people in the world. A superficial examination of the world today reveals that there is poverty, that this poverty has real consequences for living-standards and life-expectancies, and that we do have global markets and capitalism in most of the world. Careful analysis shows that capitalism has truly lessened the severity of poverty over time, and that the main problem with capitalism in most nations is that it has too many elements of government regulation and cronyism. Pope Francis and Cardinal Maradiaga have good intentions, but their anti-capitalistic beliefs are unfounded. Their campaign against global capitalism endangers the poorest people of the world.

### Cap Good (Enviro, :13)

#### Studies prove markets and income are key to the environment – It’s more likely to create a mindset shift than the alt

**Taylor 3**

Director of Natural Resource Studies 0at Cato Institute, Jerry Taylor, “Happy Earth Day? Thank Capitalism,” New York Sun, April 2 20032, http://www.cato.org/dailys/04-23-03-2.html

Earth Day is traditionally a day for the Left -- a celebration of government's ability to deliver the environmental goods and for threats about the parade of horribles that will descend upon us lest we rededicate ourselves to federal regulators and public land managers. This is unfortunate because it's businessmen -- not bureaucrats or environmental activists -- who deserve most of the credit for the environmental gains over the past century and who represent the best hope for a Greener tomorrow. Indeed, we wouldn't even have environmentalists in our midst were it not for capitalism. Environmental amenities, after all, are luxury goods. America -- like much of the Third World today -- had no environmental movement to speak of until living standards rose sufficiently so that we could turn our attention from simply providing for food, shelter, and a reasonable education to higher "quality of life" issues. The richer you are, the more likely you are to be an environmentalist. And people wouldn't be rich without capitalism. Wealth not only breeds environmentalists, it begets environmental quality. There are dozens of studies showing that, as per capita income initially rises from subsistence levels, air and water pollution increases correspondingly. But once per capita income hits between $3,500 and $15,000 (dependent upon the pollutant), the ambient concentration of pollutants begins to decline just as rapidly as it had previously increased. This relationship is found for virtually every significant pollutant in every single region of the planet. It is an iron law. Given that wealthier societies use more resources than poorer societies, such findings are indeed counterintuitive. But the data don't lie. How do we explain this? The obvious answer -- that wealthier societies are willing to trade-off the economic costs of government regulation for environmental improvements and that poorer societies are not -- is only partially correct. In the [US] United States, pollution declines generally predated the passage of laws mandating pollution controls. In fact, for most pollutants, declines were greater before the federal government passed its panoply of environmental regulations than after the EPA came upon the scene. Much of this had to do with individual demands for environmental quality. People who could afford cleaner-burning furnaces, for instance, bought them. People who wanted recreational services spent their money accordingly, creating profit opportunities for the provision of untrammeled nature. Property values rose in cleaner areas and declined in more polluted areas, shifting capital from Brown to Green investments. Market agents will supply whatever it is that people are willing to spend money on. And when people are willing to spend money on environmental quality, the market will provide it.

### Cap Good (Warming, :13)

#### The market system solves warming

Posadas, 2012:

(Capitalism, Not Collectivism, Will Be Key To Carbon Mitigation. 12/12/2012. Dennis Posadas, Staff Writer For Forbes And The Asia-Based Fellow Of The Washington, D.C.-Based Climate Institute.)

Free market economics, sometimes blamed unfairly as the cause of climate change, can be the key to solving it. It is, after all, really a question of technology and costs: the use of fossil fuels, and not economic activity, is to blame for climate change. If we were all doing business with cheap stable renewable energy and energy efficient loads while earning steady profits, would we even be having this discussion? Capitalism spurs innovation and the development of new tools, and perhaps we have not fully utilized its full potential. One such emerging tool is the voluntary carbon emission market, a place where corporations voluntarily buy emission credits to offset their own carbon emissions without regard for any requirement like a carbon cap. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol Carbon Development Mechanism (CDM for short, commonly referred to as “carbon credits”), the voluntary market does not rely on a treaty that mandates emission cuts for its survival. For its 2012 report, [Bloomberg New Energy Finance](http://bnef.com/WhitePapers/view/112) said that U.S. companies purchased more voluntary carbon offsets than any other country, to support American climate change projects in the absence of a U.S. federal cap and trade scheme. For example, large companies like [Google](http://static.googleusercontent.com/external_content/untrusted_dlcp/www.google.com/en/green/pdfs/google-carbon-offsets.pdf) and [GM](http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2012/06/07/gm-us-companies-lead-way-corporate-carbon-offsets) purchase emissions credits from the carbon markets to allow them to claim that their overall carbon emissions is zero. These credits then help fund other renewable energy and energy efficiency projects to displace or lessen the need for fossil fuels as companies tap these markets in the same way they tap the financial markets to fund their activities. While some have criticized offsets as giving buyers a license to continue polluting, nevertheless it remains an important tool for funding carbon mitigation and adaptation activities. As an analogy, do we argue that people exercise so that they can stuff themselves during the holidays? Probably not. A successful voluntary carbon market will reduce the need for the U.S. government to spend taxpayer money on carbon mitigation and adaptation, as the success of a voluntary carbon market ensures funding for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. This in turn reduces the deficit, but still ensures funding for the clean energy and energy efficiency sector. It drives green employment, such as people who will install solar panels on rooftops, do energy audits, or help install and maintain wind turbines, thus generating its own economic multiplier effect.

### Cap Good (War, :12)

**Cap solves war**

**Bandow 05**

<Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, REASON ONLINE, “A Capitalist Peace?”, October 26, 2005 (http://www.reason.com/news/show/32985.html accessed: June 26, 2009)>

There are a number of reasons why economics appears to trump politics. The shift from statist mercantilism to high-tech capitalism has transformed the economics behind war. Markets generate economic opportunities that make war less desirable. Territorial aggrandizement no longer provides the best path to riches. Free-flowing capital markets and other aspects of globalization simultaneously draw nations together and raise the economic price of military conflict, because the political destabilization resulting from war deters profitable investment and trade. Moreover, sanctions, which interfere with economic prosperity, provides a coercive step short of war to achieve foreign policy ends.

**Empirics confirm**

**Bandow 05**

<Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, REASON ONLINE, “A Capitalist Peace?”, October 26, 2005 (http://www.reason.com/news/show/32985.html accessed: June 26, 2009)>

In particular, poorer democracies perform like non-democracies. By his calculation, the correlation between economic liberty and peace is 50 times as great as that between democracy and peace. He explains: "Democracy does not have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are 14 times more prone to conflict than those with very high levels." Gartzke considers other variables, including alliance memberships, nuclear deterrence, and regional differences. Although the causes of conflict vary, the relationship between economic liberty and peace remains.

## EITC (:57)

### General

Perm, do the aff and EITC; solves exclusivity.

Perm solves best

**Islam and Crego 14** write[[101]](#footnote-101)

**EITC or minimum wage increase: A false choice** then. A false choice now. As we noted earlier, drawing upon a blog by Jared Bernstein, these policies reach two different target groups. The EITC is a "wage subsidy for low wage earners in low income households." In contrast, **a** minimum **wage increase would reach a** much **broader group of working poor and low**er **middle class that would not qualify for the EITC**. There are currently a number of proposals being floated that would deal with the "target group" problem somewhat. President Obama's new budgetpresents an ambitious expansion of the EITC by approximately $60 billion over a decade by taking actions such as dropping the eligibility age to 21 from 25 and doubling the credit for childless workers from $500 to $1,000. It is estimated that this will benefit approximately 13.5 million additional Americans. House Ways and Means Chairman Dave Camp (R-MI) has set out a tax reform proposal that would replace the EITC with a payroll tax exemption up to $4,000 that would cover more people. Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) has recommended replacing the EITC with monthly wage subsidies that would go to more citizens as well. The catch to both of these approaches is that they would either spread the same amount of money over a much larger pool of recipients, thus reducing the benefits to low income working families (Rubio's plan), or significantly reduce the size of the EITC program over the next decade (Camp's plan). In spite of these differing proposals, the common point of agreement is that it makes sense to extend the coverage of the EITC -- or something like it -- beyond its current focus on low income families to low income wage earners in general. This is absolutely necessary given these trying economic times for far too many Americans. It is in no way sufficient, however, to address the circumstances confronting the low wage worker -- especially if there is not a funding increase commensurate with the increased number of program participants. The bottom line is that the bottom line for the low wage worker today is abysmal. As Robert Greenstein, President of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) points out, "At $7.25 an hour in 2013, the minimum wage is 21 percent below its 1968 level, after adjusting for inflation." According to an Economic Policy Institute study,the **minimum wage** when adjusted for inflation **is** worth $2 **less** in 2013 **than** it was **in 1968. An enhanced** or expanded **EITC would do nothing to change that** fact. That is why **we need to raise the** minimum **wage too.** As we wrote earlier, "This should not be either/or. It should be both/and." The CPBB has been advocating for the EITC and an adequate minimum wage as "twin pillars of an effective make-work-pay strategy since the 1990's." Putting both those pillars into place was important at that point in time, it is critically important now. In its Minimum Wage Increase study, the CBO states that the EITC as it exists today would be a better tool to "boost the resources of low-income families" than a minimum wage increase. That's because according to the CBO "an increase in the EITC would go almost entirely" to them. While "a minimum wage increase would add to the resources of most families of low-wage workers, regardless of the families' income..." The CBO's finding on that narrow trade-off question about "low income families" is correct. But, we are at a juncture currently, as the discussion about revising the EITC shows, where the perspective should be broadened to include low income families and low wage workers. More importantly, the low wage policy paradigm needs to be shattered. Joshua Freedman and Michael Lind of the New America Foundation make a powerful and persuasive case for this in their paper, Beyond the Low Wage Social Contract, released in September 2013. In the United States today, 3.6 million people or 4.7 percent of the hourly rate work force earn the federal minimum wage or less. 16.5 million earn less than the $10.10 federal minimum wage proposed by President Obama -- that's almost 22 percent of the work force. And, the composition of the low wage work force is changing. It's older, more diverse and more educated than it was thirty years ago. As the New York Times highlights in a recent editorial, "...since 2000, many college graduates have taken jobs that do not require college degrees and, in the process, have displaced less educated, lower-skilled workers." These are trying and exceedingly difficult times for the entire spectrum of American hourly low wage workers. That's why we don't need a false choice between the EITC and a minimum wage increase. That's why we also don't need a Hobson's choice of only a changed EITC. What is needed is a blended solution that meets the myriad and differing conditions of low income families and low wage workers of all types. That blended solution is a meaningful increase to the minimum wage and a measurably enhanced and expanded EITC.

Only aff solves broadly. Causes spillover, that’s Harris and Kearney 14.

#### The counterplan crushes bargaining power

**NYT 14**

New York Times Editorial Board. “The Case for a Higher Minimum Wage.” February 8th, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/opinion/sunday/the-case-for-a-higher-minimum-wage.html

WHAT’S THE POINT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE? Most people think of the minimum wage as the lowest legal hourly pay. That’s true, but it is really much more than that. As defined in the name of the law that established it — the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 — the minimum wage is a fundamental labor standard designed to protect workers, just as child labor laws and overtime pay rules do. Labor standards, like environmental standards and investor protections, are essential to a functional economy. Properly set and enforced, these standards check exploitation, pollution and speculation. In the process, they promote broad and rising prosperity, as well as public confidence. The minimum wage is specifically intended to take aim at the inherent imbalance in power between employers and low-wage workers that can push wages down to poverty levels. An appropriate wage floor set by Congress effectively substitutes for the bargaining power that low-wage workers lack. When low-end wages rise, poverty and inequality are reduced. But that doesn’t mean the minimum wage is a government program to provide welfare, as critics sometimes imply in an attempt to link it to unpopular policies. An hourly minimum of $10.10, for example, as Democrats have proposed, would reduce the number of people living in poverty by 4.6 million, according to widely accepted research, without requiring the government to tax, borrow or spend. IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE? No. Other programs, including food stamps, Medicaid and the **e**arned-**i**ncome **t**ax **c**redit, also increase the meager resources of low-wage workers, but **they do not provide bargaining power to claim a better wage.** In fact, they can drive wages down, because employers who pay poorly factor the government assistance into their wage scales. This is especially true of the earned-income tax credit, a taxpayer-provided wage subsidy that helps lift the income of working families above the poverty line. Conservatives often call for increases to the E.I.T.C. instead of a higher minimum wage, saying that a higher minimum acts as an unfair and unwise tax on low-wage employers. That’s a stretch, especially in light of rising corporate profits even as pay has dwindled. It also ignores how the tax credit increases the supply of low-wage labor by encouraging more people to work, holding down the cost of labor for employers. By one estimate, increasing the tax credit by 10 percent reduces the wages of high-school educated workers by 2 percent. There are good reasons to expand the tax credit for childless workers, as President Obama recently proposed. It is a successful antipoverty program and a capstone in the conservative agenda to emphasize work over welfare. But an expanded E.I.T.C. is no reason to stint on raising the minimum wage — just the opposite. A higher minimum wage could help offset the wage-depressing effect of a bolstered E.I.T.C., and would ensure that both taxpayers and employers do their part to make work pay.

He’s conceded corporate exploitation comes first; that’s Gupta. Counterplan increases that. Perm solves.

**Bernstein 14** writes[[102]](#footnote-102)

Finally, there’s a highly conspicuous omission amidst all the love Greg heaps on the EITC. Justified love, for sure; the EITC is a highly successful, well-targeted program that encourages work and lowers poverty. But **if the** minimum **wage is a tax on** low-wage **employers, then the tax credit is a** pretty **hefty subsidy.** By increasing the supply of low-wage labor, some of **its benefits accrue to employers in** the form of **lower** pretax **wage offers**. Rothstein finds this subsidy to amount to 27 cents of each EITC dollar, lowering pretax **wages of both EITC recipients and non-recipients** (with the latter, of course, getting no offset from the credit). It’s very hard to imagine Mankiw is unaware of both this dynamic and this research. But **it’s** one of a number of reasons **why we need both a higher minimum wage and** an expanded **EITC**, and is thus perhaps an inconvenient truth for his case.

### EITC (More)

Higher minimum wage is key to the EITC’s effectiveness for women with kids

**Boston Globe 14** writes[[103]](#footnote-103)

That’s a shame. **It’s time to put an end to “either-or” thinking**, and do more research on how these two programs might work together. A 2011 study by economists David **Neumark and** William **Wascher found that raising the minimum wage maximizes** the **effectiveness of the EITC for** certain workers, especially **women with kids**. The **higher wages, which are more likely to cover child-care** costs**, lure more women into the workforce, allowing the EITC to kick in**. But every policy has its trade-offs. It makes good sense to put an end to the false choice of one versus the other, and for both parties to concentrate on finding solutions for hard-working families who are nonetheless stuck in poverty.

Higher minimum wage avoids implementation issues with the EITC

**Konczal 14** writes[[104]](#footnote-104)

Many policy analysts point out that if our sole concern is to reduce poverty, we can just give poor people money. Economists consider the minimum wage a blunt tool for fighting poverty, as its effects spread over broad populations, failing to isolate the poorest. And the government has other successful tools to narrowly target poverty, most notably the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). These are fair points. But the minimum wage is still an excellent and necessary weapon against poverty. Where other policy tools can’t reach, the minimum wage can. As it is currently structured, the EITC does little to boost the income of those without children. Also, since one must be working in order to qualify for the EITC, the credit encourages growth of the labor supply and thus is likely to drag wages down for those who don’t qualify, allowing employers to capture part of the EITC’s benefits. According to government estimates, **at least 20 percent of EITC payments are improperly paid**. Some recipients claim too much **by accident or by fraud;** others don’t get the full value they were entitled to because **the claims process can be confusing.** And **yearly payments are not that effective for poor people barely making it month to month**. A **higher minimum wage doesn’t have any of these problems**. It is practically self-enforcing. People who need it will get it, and it won’t require a massive tax-code bureaucracy to enforce. The income is given to people throughout the year, in each paycheck, rather than in a lump sum. One needn’t have children in order to benefit fully. To the extent that the EITC is captured by employers, a higher minimum wage will balance that out. There is no potential for fraud. And while the EITC costs the government money, which must come from other programs or new taxes, the minimum wage comes at no additional cost to taxpayers, except when it is applied to government employees (which is rare, since government jobs usually pay more than the minimum wage). **Once you consider how the EITC is implemented, the minimum wage makes perfect sense as a complement.**

## Wage Subsidies (1:20)

Perm, do both. Solves employers gaming the system

**Vinik 13** writes[[105]](#footnote-105)

However, **wage subsidies do not replace** the **minimum wage**. On the contrary, **they are a complement** to each other **since the biggest concern with wage subsidies is that businesses will cut employee wages** and let the government pick up the slack. The **minimum wage mitigates this risk**, although it does not eliminate it entirely.

Only a living wage respects workers’ rights. Wage subsidies just encourage hegemony of the market.

**Graf and Lange 97** writes[[106]](#footnote-106)

Haveman would have subsidies flow directly to the employers in the form of tax credits or to the individual worker in the form of **wage subsidies**. Either way the public subsidizes the corporate sector while millions of workers remain marginalized in a calcified low wage labor market. Credit Income Taxes, Negative Income Taxes, and Earned Income Tax Credits are all forms of public subsidy to the private sector. These subsidies **are** public policy **acquiescence to** the private sector's **unwillingness to pay a living wage**. If we accept Haveman's proposals, **we surrender** our belief in a wage economy, **our belief that workers have dignity deserving**, as John L. Lewis demanded, a **"fair day's pay for** a **fair day's work**." **Public subsidies** to the private sector **are a surrender to** the **belief in the hegemony of the market**. They are an unwarranted acknowledgment **that it is** the market and **the market alone that determines wage levels. This** thinking **discounts history, which teaches that power, organized by** and on behalf of **workers, has had a profound effect on wage levels**. This is not to deny market forces. Some labor organizing aims at limiting the supply of labor to bid up its price. Guilds and the modern day craft unions have been successful in this kind of supply side strategy. Other worker organizing has created political clout that has led to higher minimum wages and worker protection. While competition and markets have a decided impact on wages, so does political power. Declining union power can explain low wages as easily as supply and demand.

Wage subsidies enable employers to reduce wages; the aff solves

**Haskell 14** writes[[107]](#footnote-107)

The second issue, and **counter to Phelps’ argument that wage subsidies would bid up wages**, is the concern that **firms would use** the **subsidies to bid down wages**. Phelps’ argument holds true only if the labor market is healthy and unemployment is relatively low; fewer workers in the applicant pool means firms have to bid up the prices. To prevent workers from capturing the subsidy by demanding outrageous wages knowing that the government will subsidize some of portion of the wage, the subsidy will taper off when wages reach a certain level (in effect a price ceiling as far as subsidies are concerned). For instance, if a worker knows that a firm can only pay $20 an hour, but there is a $2 an hour subsidy, then the worker can demand a wage of $22 an hour knowing the firm can meet that price given $2 of it is subsidized. Conversely, **when the labor market is struggling** and unemployment is relatively high**, firms** then **have the ability to bid wages down. If** a firm knows **a worker is willing to work for $8** an hour**, and there is a $1 an hour subsidy** from the government**, the firm can** capture the $1 subsidy by **offer**ing **$7** an hour (which, together with the $1 an hour subsidy, will bring the workers’ subsidized wage to their demand wage of $8 an hour). **To prevent this from happening,** some price floor (minimum wage) will have to remain in place, and the **minimum wage** and subsides **could be indexed to inflation to prevent businesses from capturing** the **subsidies as inflation erodes** the **real value of** the **subsidized wages.**

Success of wage subsidies is too context dependent

**Almeida et al 14** writes[[108]](#footnote-108)

Even though the evidence in developing countries is still thin, it suggests that the **success of wage subsidies depends on context**. For example, **in Slovakia, wage subsidies do not** appear to have **increase employment or earnings** among beneficiaries (Lubyova and Ours 1999). **In Poland** the **results were** even **less encouraging**: male beneficiaries of wage subsidies were less likely to be employed. **This is** likely to be **explained by a stigma effect where beneficiaries are perceived by** the **employers as inferior workers** than otherwise identical workers (Kluve et al. 1999). **However, wage subsidies seem to have worked better** among welfare beneficiaries **in Argentina**. Indeed, in the Proempleo experiment discussed in the next section, receipt of a wage subsidy voucher – with or without training – significantly increased wage employment in the first 18 months after random assignment by 8–9 percentage points and reduced reliance on workfare by a similar amount for women and youth (younger than 30). In spite of this, most employers did not take up the wage subsidy even though they ended up hiring the workers who had a voucher15. Wage subsidies also seem to be effective tools for increasing the employment of skilled youth in contexts of high taxation of formal labor. For example, in Morocco, early evidence shows that the program Idmaj was effective in placing beneficiaries into jobs. Furthermore, the program also had positive effects on the quality of jobs, assessed by having social security coverage and by the level of earnings (see World Bank 2012). However, while wage subsidies seemed to be cost-effective in Morocco and Argentina, the costs are likely to be underestimated. In Turkey, Betcherman et al. (2010) looked at the effects of two employment subsidy schemes and showed that these led to significant net increases in registered jobs in eligible provinces (5–13 percent for the first program and 11–15 percent for the second) but that there were substantial windfalls. An important effect was, however, the increased social security registration of firms and workers rather than boosting total employment and economic activity. In general, studies suggest that a 10 percentage point reduction in the tax-wedge (the difference between the cost of labor and take home pay) could increase employment between 1 and 5 percentage points (see Nickell 2003; Kugler and Kugler 2009; and (Rutowski: “Labor Taxes and Employment in ECA.”, Unpublished). More **recent evaluations for Jordan and South Africa** also **show mixed results**. In Jordan, a pilot program gave beneficiaries a voucher equivalent to the minimum wage with a duration of six months. The evaluation showed that this voucher increased employment by 40 percentage points over the short-term, although most of the jobs were informal. Four months after the voucher expired, however, the effects dissipated – except outside the capital (see Groh et al. 2012). This seems to be explained, in part, by labor regulations that force firms to issue open ended contracts after a certain period of time. Yet, in South Africa, the impact of the wage subsidy persisted even one and two years after the allocation (see Levinsonhn et al. 2013). The impact was relatively large: those in the treatment group where 7.4 percentage points more likely to be in wage employment. This suggests that the subsidy had important dynamics impacts on youth. This overview does not purport to be an exhaustive catalog of wage subsidy evaluations. It nonetheless illustrates several important points. First, such policies are likely to have relatively modest impacts on employment on the order of 5 percentage points or less. **This is** certainly **a positive contribution for groups with high unemployment, but** it seems clear that **wage subsidies will not, by themselves, solve** the problem. Second, both theory and the empirical results suggest that substitution and windfall effect can be important and therefore should receive more attention in evaluations. Third, wage subsidies can, potentially, facilitate learning and improve beneficiaries’ labor market opportunities. And, finally, the wide variation in design and target groups of the subsidies tested, together with the likely idiosyncratic, country-specific economic contexts within which they were implemented, means that one cannot confidently extrapolate these results to a new program in a different country. To be confident of the effects of any new wage subsidy, it should be pilot tested and carefully evaluated in the context within which it is intended to operate.

Perm, do both.

The counterplan can’t solve the aff—

(a) It doesn’t solve bargaining power because it drives down the cost of labor, that’s NYT 14. Bargaining power comes first because corporate exploitation is the root cause of inequality, that’s Gupta 15.

(b) It can’t solve relative poverty because it doesn’t redistribute money from rich employers.

Relative poverty uniquely creates conditions for arbitrary interference

**Scanlon 5**

TM Scanlon (Professor of Swagger at Harvard University). Wei Lun Public Lecture Series; Chinese University of Hong Kong. “When Does Equality Matter?” 14 March 2005. http://www.iso.cuhk.edu.hk/weilun/en/scanlon/scanlon\_fulltext2.html

Status: The leading historical examples of objectionable inequality are caste systems and other social arrangements involving stigmatizing differences in status. In these systems, members of some groups are marked as inferior by, for example, being excluded from roles and occupations that are seen as most desirable, or required to perform tasks that are regarded as demeaning and beneath the dignity of members of other groups. The evil involved in such arrangements is a comparative one. It is not the tasks themselves that are demeaning — they may be necessary tasks that someone has to perform in any society. What is objectionable is being marked as inferior to others in a demeaning way. The remedy is to abolish the social system that defines and upholds these distinctions between superior and inferior. In the historical cases I am referring to, inequalities based on caste, race or gender are a matter of law or of entrenched social attitudes. But purely economic inequalities can be objectionable for the reason I am here discussing. One consequence of extreme inequality in income and wealth can be that it forces the poor to live in a way that is reasonably seen as humiliating. Here again, **the evil is comparative** — it is not merely an objection to having ragged clothes, or poor housing, but of having to live and to present oneself in a way that is so far below the standard generally accepted in society that it marks one as inferior, and as someone that others would not want to associate with. This provides a reason not only to improve the lot of the poor, but also, even if their lot is, in absolute terms, not so bad, to object to the creation of a much higher standard of living for others. This may not, in some cases be a sufficient reason to deny others these benefits, but it is a recognizable cost that these benefits bring, and one that cannot be put down to envy. Domination: Inequalities can also be objectionable because they give some people an unacceptable degree of control over the lives of others. **If, for example, a small number of people control almost all of the wealth in a society, this can give them an unacceptable degree of control over the lives of other citizens**: over where and how they can work, what they can buy, and in general what their lives will be like. More narrowly, ownership of the public media in a country gives someone control over how others in the society view themselves, and their lives, and how they understand their society.

(c) Wage subsidies face implementation problems

**Drum 13** writes[[109]](#footnote-109)

Third, **wage subsidies can be tricky to implement. Are they temporary or permanent? Targeted or universal?** Are they in addition to the EITC or a replacement? **How do you prevent employers from gaming the system and reducing wages** because they know the wage subsidy will make up the difference? There may be answers to these questions, but they aren't trivial. Finally, **wage subsidies haven't been widely adopted** elsewhere**, which means there isn't a lot of compelling research to show how well they'd work**. There are good reasons to be optimistic about wage subsidies, but as far as I know, they're still fairly untested.

## Libertarian Platform CP (Varun)

The counterplan encourages an irrational presumption against government interference—aff empirics prove that living wage doesn’t hinder markets—this justifies perm, do the aff and the CP in other instances

**Pettit 13** writes[[110]](#footnote-110)

The message, to end on a slogan, is that we should take back the economy in the course of our political thinking. As we theorize normatively about the organization of political life, and about the distribution of socio-economic assets, so **we should** also **theorize about what general shape our economy ought to take** and about how our states ought to combine in shaping international economic forces. **We should not shrink from such prescriptions on** the **spurious ground that** the economy is a natural reality, subject to its own autonomous laws, and that **government intervention always represents a** potentially **warping influence**: the source of what are often described as distortions. (See also in this series the related discussion of John Tomasi’s arguments for ‘free market fairness’ by Martin O’Neill and Thad Williamson.) The philosophical re-construal of the market that I am recommending is quite consistent with empirically based arguments to the effect that one or another form of government intervention is counter-productive and that it may make very good sense in some areas of activity to let the market operate under its own logic. The point is that on issues of economic policy **we should keep an open empirical mind. We should not be seduced into a hands-off presumption** of the kind **that libertarians support**. But neither should we presume that we can rely usefully on the hand of government in every area of economic performance. We may know as republicans what we ultimately want to secure in political action and organization within our domestic community. I would say that **we want to establish** people’s **equal enjoyment of** the **basic liberties**, secured by a public order that is itself subject to their equally shared control; if you like, we want to promote equal freedom as non-domination in both private and public spheres. But neo-republican philosophy on its own does not tell us how best to achieve that goal on any front, economic or otherwise. It sponsors a research program on such matters, framing that program as an inquiry into what we can collectively do through government in trying to further the common good. What, then, have I wanted to do here? Merely to insist that that research program should not be inhibited by libertarian presumptions about the market that are implicit in much contemporary thinking. We should not go along with the naturalization of the market, as we might describe it in more or less Marxist terms. We should resist the presumption that the market is a natural domain with its own natural laws and that the depth of government intervention should be limited on the basis of principle, not empirics.

The counterplan does nothing; it’s too broad to be implemented. The Libertarian platform covers virtually all political issues.

Unions DA—The counterplan prevents the state from forcing employers to bargain with unions

**Libertarian Platform 14** writes[[111]](#footnote-111)

2.7 Labor Markets Employment and compensation agreements between private employers and employees are outside the scope of government, and these contracts should not be encumbered by government-mandated benefits or social engineering. **We support the right of private employers** and employees **to choose whether or not to bargain** with each other **through a** labor **union. Bargaining should be free of** government interference, such as **compulsory arbitration** or imposing an obligation to bargain.

Unions protect workers from employer abuses—turns case because employers aren’t respecting the humanity of employees

**Mishel and Walters 3** writes[[112]](#footnote-112)

Unions and workplace protections An extensive array of labor laws and regulations protects workers in the labor market and the workplace. From the National Labor Relations Act and Social Security Act of 1935 to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, labor unions have been instrumental in securing labor legislation and standards. However, beyond their role in initiating and advocating enactment of these laws and regulations, unions have also played an important role in enforcing workplace regulations. **Unions** have provided labor protections for their members in three important ways: 1) they **have been a voice for workers in identifying where** laws and **regulations are needed**, and have been influential in getting these laws enacted; 2) they **have provided information to members about workers’ rights** and available programs; **and** 3) they have **encouraged** their **members to exercise workplace rights** and participate in programs **by reducing fear of employer retribution**, helping members navigate the necessary procedures, and facilitating the handling of workers’ rights disputes (Weil 2003; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Freeman and Rogers 1999). Unions have played a prominent role in the enactment of a broad range of labor laws and regulations covering areas as diverse as overtime pay, minimum wage, the treatment of immigrant workers, health and retirement coverage, civil rights, unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation, and leave for care of newborns and sick family members. Common to all of these rules is a desire to provide protections for workers either by regulating the behavior of employers or by giving workers access to certain benefits in times of need (Weil 2003; Davis 1986; Amberg 1998). Over the years, these rules have become mainstays of the American workplace experience, constituting expressions of cherished public values (Gottesman 1991; Freeman and Medoff 1984). Less well recognized perhaps, is the important role that **unions** play in **ensur**ing **that labor protections are not just “paper promises”** at the workplace. Government agencies charged with the enforcement of regulations cannot monitor every workplace nor automate the issuance of insurance claims resulting from unemployment or injury. In practice, the effectiveness of the implementation of labor protections depends on the worker’s decision to act. This is done either by reporting an abuse or filing a claim. **Unions** have been crucial in this aspect by giving workers the relevant information about their rights and the necessary procedures, but also by facilitating action by **limit**ing **employer reprisals, correcting disinformation,** aggregating multiple claims, **provid**ing **resources to make a claim, and negotiating solutions to disputes on behalf of workers** (Freeman and Rogers 1999; Weil 2003; Hirsch, et al. 1997). Evidence of the vital role of unions in implementing labor protections can be found in the research on various programs and benefits. **Union membership** significantly **increases the likelihood that a worker will file a claim or report an abuse**. **Examples** of this research **can be found in** such areas as **unemployment insurance, worker’s comp**ensation**,** the **Occupational Safety** and Health Act, the Family Medical Leave Act, **pensions, and** the Fair Labor Standards Act’s **overtime** provision.

TURN—The counterplan would end welfare which causes a massive increase in poverty. Even if the aff doesn’t solve poverty well, the counterplan is even worse.

## Bargaining CP (Lexington)

#### IMF Rolls Back The CP; Their Author

SCHULTEN 12

Thorsten Schulten, Doctor of philosophy at Institute of Economic and Social Research, “The significance of extension procedures for collective bargaining systems in Europe”,

The DGA instrument is extraordinarily important for the development of collective bargaining systems in Europe as a whole. For decades now, in many European countries, it has ensured high and stable collective agreement coverage, thus supporting the strong use of collective agreements as a central institution for the regulation of employment conditions – something that is characteristic of Europe in comparison with other regions of the world. Against the backdrop of the current crisis, however, structural changes are being made to national collective bargaining systems in many European countries, under pressure from the so-called troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These changes are fundamentally calling the functioning and the instrument of the DGA into question (Busch et al. 2013; Schulten/Müller 2013). Once again, the conceptual pioneer of such a policy was the OECD which, in the name of the flexibility and adaptability of individual enterprises, is openly calling for the abolition of DGAs. The first country to bow to the IMF pressure was Romania, which in 2011 abolished its previous erga omnes scheme for sectoral collective agreements (Ciutacu 2011). Currently, Portugal has committed itself, in its agreements with the troika, to reforming its DGA arrangements. In October 2012, the Portuguese government adopted a decree, according to which an extension of collective agreements is only possible if the employer covered by the agreement represents at least 50% of the employees of certain sector (Schulten/Müller 2013).In the cases of Greece, Italy and Spain, the existing arrangements for DGAs or their functional equivalents have been maintained, but a politically driven decentralization of collective bargaining and partial abolition of the favourability principle are increasingly undermining the functional logic of DGAs. Overall, this comes down to a comprehensive loss of function for the DGAs, and it is precisely in the Southern European countries, which up to now have had strong DGA-backed area collective agreements, that this will lead to major instability in collective bargaining systems and a clear drop in agreement coverage (Busch et al. 2013; Schulten/Müller 2013). Beyond the situation in Southern Europe, marked as it is by the current crisis, countervailing developments can be observed in a few other countries, leading to a revaluation of DGAs. That goes in particular for Norway and Switzerland, and also for Germany as regards collectively bargained minimum wages. The catalyst for this was the extension of the free movement of labour as part of the EU’s eastward expansion, and the aim was to counter any wage dumping that might occur through the exploitation of migrant labour (Eldring/Schulten 2012). This aspect could also come to the fore in other countries in future, the more so as, according to the latest ruling from the European Court, only legal and generally applicable collective agreements can be accepted as legitimate limitations on basic European freedoms (Kocher 2010).

#### Alt Causes To Low Bargaining Power, And The Plan Solves. Their Card Recut

ILO 08

International Labour Organization, CREDENTIALS, “Minimum wages and collective bargaining: Towards policy coherence”, Published by the International Labour Office, 2008,

This section focuses on the appropriate articulation and design of minimum wages and collective bargaining policies. As we have seen, in many countries collective bargaining is facing diffi cult challenges, which may be linked to globalization, new forms of employment or the growth of subcontracting. In other countries, collective bargaining has been presented as a source of rigidity and the common recommendation has been to replace higher level collective bargaining with bargaining at the enterprise level. In many of these cases, to protect the most vulnerable workers in the labour market, governments seem to have turned towards minimum wages policies as a substitute for collective bargaining. In the absence of strong collective bargaining, governments somehow seem compelled to intervene in wage determination through minimum wages. This has sometimes led to very complicated systems of industry, sectoral and occupational minimum wages. The reliance on overly complex systems of minimum wages rather than collective bargaining is unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, the role of collective bargaining goes much beyond protecting vulnerable workers – it actually benefi ts a broader spectrum of workers than do minimum wages. Collective bargaining also goes beyond wage negotiations to include other aspects of working conditions, such as hours of work and quality of employment. Second, minimum wages that set wage rates for many categories of workers in different industries can end up discouraging collective bargaining instead of stimulating it. While some negotiations between social partners over minimum wages have contributed to stimulating collective bargaining, in the majority of cases complex minimum wages were found to “crowd out” collective bargaining. This negative experience points towards the importance of careful and coherent policy design. In the following paragraphs we therefore review some good practices related to the design of a complementary and coherent set of minimum wages and collective bargaining policies.

#### Doesn’t Solve Collective Bargaining; Their Author

SCHULTEN 12

Thorsten Schulten, Doctor of philosophy at Institute of Economic and Social Research, “The significance of extension procedures for collective bargaining systems in Europe”,

As regards the relationship between DGAs and union organizing power, no clear link can be established. True, there are no DGAs in Denmark and Sweden, two of the three countries with the highest union density. But the same cannot be said of Finland, where in fact union density has clearly risen since the introduction of DGAs in the 1970s (Ahlberg/Bruun 2009). Also, some countries with widespread DGA use have, by European standards, rather middling union density, whereas many countries have both low union density and infrequent DGA use. Finally, there is the unusual situation in France, which does have very high collective agreement coverage underpinned by comprehensive DGA use, but where at the same time union density is extremely low. All in all, however, a European comparison does not provide any clear evidence that DGAs are a root cause of weaker trade union organizing power.

#### His Last Card Proves Correlation Not Causation. Also, Coverage Isn’t Key To Bargaining Power. Here’s The Next Paragraph

ILO 08

International Labour Organization, CREDENTIALS, “Minimum wages and collective bargaining: Towards policy coherence”, Published by the International Labour Office, 2008,

While coverage is an important determinant of wage outcomes, the level at which collective bargaining takes place and the degree of coordination between the different possible levels also affect wage outcomes. Unfortunately, owing to the lack of relevant data we have not been able to capture these effects in our own analysis. Other research studies have confi rmed a strong relationship between centralized and/or coordinated bargaining and lower wage disparity, including a narrower gender pay gap. 70 Conversely, decentralization of collective bargaining has been shown to be leading to higher wage disparity in a number of cases, including in Australia and Chile. 71 But some observers have emphasized that the relationship between bargaining systems and labour market performance is not as straightforward as is often assumed and therefore should not be generalized. 72 A more refi ned analysis is necessary to provide a better understanding of the effects of decentralization on country differences in wage outcomes.

#### Only Applies To Europe

SCHULTEN 12

Thorsten Schulten, Doctor of philosophy at Institute of Economic and Social Research, “The significance of extension procedures for collective bargaining systems in Europe”,

The very varied distribution of DGAs in Europe mostly corresponds to the established classification of European industrial relations systems. For example, taking the approach of Jelle Visser, who distinguishes a total of five different industrial relations systems across Europe (European Commission 2009, p. 51), the following DGA rankings can be made. DGAs and their functional equivalents are most widespread in the Southern European industrial relations system (France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal), which in every case except Italy is marked by strong State influence. On the other hand, no single pattern can be distinguished within the continental European industrial relations systems, where countries with high DGA/functional equivalent use (Austria, Benelux, Slovenia) are juxtaposed with low-use countries (Germany, Switzerland). In the East European industrial relations model, as reconstructed post-1990, the legal possibility of having DGAs does exist everywhere, but except in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and until recently Romania, virtually no use is made of it in practice. Finally, there are the liberal Anglo-Saxon and the corporatist-oriented Nordic industrial relations systems which, despite all the differences between them, are both based on strongly autonomous collective bargaining systems. Here, DGAs either do not exist or are an exceptional arrangement restricted to a few sectors. However, Finland is an interesting exception. Although it is strongly rooted in the Nordic industrial relations tradition, DGA use has also been very widespread there since the 1970s (Ahlberg/Bruun 2009; Hellstein 2011).

## LW Discourse PIC (Greenhill)

### Word PICs Bad

A. If the neg reads a counterplan, it must not compete through a modification of the words of the aff’s advocacy text.

B. They’ve PICed out of the phrase “living wage.”

C. Standards

1. Ground. They moot 100% of the AC which forces an impossible 1AR restart. This also kills clash which comes first under education since it’s the only form of education unique to debate.

2. Topic education. Discourse-focus trades off with discussions about whether the aff’s policy is a good idea.

I’ll pre-empt “discourse-focus key”; they’re wrong

**Brown 1** writes[[113]](#footnote-113)

“Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech.14 Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate **speech regulations, and** the **debates about them, usurp the discursive space** in which one might have offered **[from] a substantive** political **response** to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislated and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationalization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “**Speech codes**, born of social critique, **kill critique**.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique **not only by displacing it** with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, **but also by configuring** political **injustice** and political righteousness **as a problem of** remarks, attitude, and **speech rather than** as a matter of historical, political-economic, and **cultural formations of power.** Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize.

D. Fairness is a voter since it’s a gateway issue to deciding the better debater. Education is a voter since it’s the end-goal of debate; substance doesn’t matter unless there’s an educational benefit to discussing it.

Drop the debater since (a) my 1AR was skewed and I had to commit to theory and (b) a loss will disincentivize future unfair practices.

### AT “It’s a euphemism”

1. No internal link to totalitarianism. Their Kauffman 11 card says that “living wage” is a euphemism for socialism, not Orwellian state control.

2. “Living wage” is a good phrase; it signifies the self-respect and civic participation of workers

**Pollin 7** writes[[114]](#footnote-114)

Lawrence **Glickman**’s 1997 book A Living Wage: American Workers and the Making of Consumer Society **provides a good working definition of** the term **living wage: “It is a wage** level **that offers workers the ability to support families to maintain self respect and** to have both the means and the leisure to **participate in** the **civic life** of the nation” (p. 66). How can we translate Glickman’s definition into dollars and cents, as we obviously must if living wages are to operate as a workable policy tool? When the modern living wage movement began in the mid-1990s, the approach that organizers took was to tie the living wage standard to the federal government’s official poverty line. They set the living wage at least high enough to enable a full-time worker to maintain his or her family above the official poverty line. But we confront an immediate problem with this approach, which is that the poverty line in the United States is seriously deficient. This is because it is calculated using an outdated approach which does not reflect the actual costs of providing for basic necessities other than food, including housing, health care, and child care. The poverty benchmarks also take no account of regional differences in the cost of living. As an average for the country, it is widely recognized among researchers that the official poverty benchmark for the country is probably about 40 to 50 percent too low. In high-cost urban areas such as Boston or Los Angeles, that figure should rise by roughly an additional 25 percent. If we work with a revised poverty threshold at 140 percent of the official level, a national living wage standard in 2009 tied to such a poverty line would be about $11.50 an hour for a single mother with two children, working fulltime, with no vacation and no health care. In high cost areas, the figure would rise to about $14.40 an hour. But poverty thresholds need not be the only benchmark for defining a living wage. Glickman’s definition certainly suggests a more generous approach. **As one outgrowth of the living wage movement, researchers have** recently **developed** estimates of what they term “basic budget” or **“basic needs” standards for communities throughout the country**. These figures provide what researchers at the Economic Policy Institute call a “realistic picture of how much income it takes for a safe and decent standard of living.” Drawing from the Economic Policy Institute’s basic budget estimates, a living wage standard in 2009 for the same single mother with two children, working fulltime, would be about $17.50 an hour in Lincoln, Nebraska, and $31.60 in Boston.

3. Non-unique. They don’t have a replacement for “living wage”, so discussions will continue in the same way.

4. TURN—If “living wage” is a euphemism for redistribution, that’s good; framing minimum wage hikes as redistributive is key to respect workers

**Burbank 14** writes[[115]](#footnote-115)

We too often equate increasing the minimum wage with living standards and poverty levels. This is dangerous for several reasons, including the fact that it sets a precedent for slicing and dicing the minimum wage: Do you have dependents? Do you pay for your own health insurance? How old are you? Are you paying for tuition yourself? All these are important questions, but taken to their logical conclusion, they move the minimum wage into welfare policy, so that an 18-year-old student could get paid less than a 25-year-old who is on her parents' health insurance, and she might get paid less than a single mom with one kid, who could get paid less than a spouse in a household with three kids, etc. These are life situations best handled by social policy, social insurance and the appropriate provisions of public goods and services. But **a focus on** the **minimum wage as welfare policy** debases the fact that we should be raising the minimum wage because we should be insuring that workers are paid the value of their work. That is, such a focus **disrespects workers** as workers. A lot of liberals don't want to call increases in the minimum wage "redistributive." It brings the reality of class conflict too close to the surface, apparently, and portrays workers as workers, not as victims. But in order **for workers to not be victims, they must be compensated for the value of their work. That is not happening** now, not **in the**se **U**nited **S**tates. These state **minimum-wage increases begin to reverse the damage**, precisely **because they are redistributive**, from the owners of capital to the workers they employ. **That is a good thing** -- and an excellent beginning for the new year!

5. Only euphemisms that aim to hide totalitarianism are totalitarian; none of their cards say that all euphemisms are inherently oppressive.

6. Not all euphemisms are bad. For example, it’s better to speak about sex euphemistically around children.

## Youth PIC (Lexington)

### PICs Bad

A. Interpretation – neg must not read plan inclusive counter-plans.

B. Violation – neg counter-plan includes living wage.

C. Standards

1. Time skew – PICs moot the 6 minute AC giving neg a 13 to 7 advantage. Also, PICs force me to read new offense which creates time skew for the 1AR.

2. Ground – I can’t access living wage ground if neg can just PIC out of it in the NC.

3. Predictable Limits – there’s no limit on what they can PIC out of. I have to prep answers to every minor alteration because I don’t know which one they’ll go for.

4. Clash. PICs kill clash because they refocus the debate on minor details of the plan that have nothing to do with AC offense. Clash outweighs other education standards because it’s the only form unique to debate. You can get topic education by staying home to research.

D. Voter – fairness comes first because it’s a gateway issue to finding the better debater. Voting him down is key to stopping unfairness in future rounds; otherwise he has no reason to quit. You can’t just drop the argument because the 1AR has already been skewed, and I had to go for theory.

### Substance

#### Perm do both. Perm do the counterplan.

#### It’s not competitive with on balance affirmation. Youth are a tiny exception, not a general principle.

**Harris and Kearney 14**

Benjamin H. Harris (Policy Director of The Hamilton Project, Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, and Deputy Director of the Retirement Security Project at Brookings) and Melissa S. Kearney (Kearney is the Director of the Hamilton Project; a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; and a Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Maryland, where she has been on the faculty since 2006. She is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a Faculty Affiliate of the Lab for Economic Opportunities. Kearney's research focuses on issues of social policy, poverty, and inequality). “The “Ripple Effect” of a Minimum Wage Increase on American Workers.” Brookings Institution. 10 January 2014. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/01/10-ripple-effect-of-increasing-the-minimum-wage-kearney-harris>

The argument that only a small share of workers is actually paid the minimum wage misses a key point: many of those who would be impacted by a raise in the minimum wage are actually low-wage workers making slightly above the minimum wage. In addition to this broader scope of the workforce, economist Arin Dube of the University of Massachusetts-Amherst points out that **a shrinking share of low-wage workers is comprised of teenagers**. His work shows that among those earning no more than the federal minimum wage of $7.25 in 2011, fewer than a quarter were teenagers. Among those earning less than $10 an hour, **only 12 percent were teenagers**, as compared to 26 percent in 1979.

#### Supercharges inequality because the link is worker solidarity. The counterplan fractures collective bargaining by holding workers to different standards.

#### TURN – living wage is key to non-college jobs.

**Konczal 14** writes[[116]](#footnote-116)

Beyond the efficiency of the minimum wage as an intervention, conservatives who support it tend to do so for three reasons. All three derive from the idea that a **higher minimum wage** would make jobs more desirable. First, it **would help balance the** huge **uptick in the cost of higher education**. Members of both parties worry that the government’s role in trying to increase college attainment has led to dramatic increases in college costs, as well as a predatory for-profit sector that lives off government funds in the form of student loans. Many **marginal students are dropping out** of higher education, leaving them **with** student **loan debts and no degree**. Meanwhile the job market continues to produce jobs that do not need to be filled by highly educated workers. **Raising** the **minimum wage would make these jobs more desirable and give young people** uninterested in higher education **an alternate path** to a decent living.

#### It outweighs his link because non-college youth are less well-off than the college-bound students seeking job training that his ev cites.

#### Living wage has no impact on teen employment; other studies don’t control for regional trends

**Schmitt 13**

John Schmitt (Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C.) “Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect on Employment?” Center for Economic and Policy Research. February 2013. <http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage-2013-02.pdf>

Sylvia Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) applied the insights of Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) to teen employment over the period 1990-2009. Their work made at least two important contributions to the policy debate. First, they analyzed teen employment, rather than industry employment, making their results more directly comparable to the bulk of earlier research on the minimum wage. Second, they included data covering the deep recession that ran from December 2007 through June 2009, allowing them to measure any possible interactions between the minimum wage and strong economic downturns.27

Allegretto, Dube, and Reich analyzed data on teenagers taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1990 through 2009.28 Because the CPS sample is smaller than the QCEW data used in the county-analysis, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich instead tracked teen employment at the state level. When they produced standard statistical analyses of the kind used in much of the research since the mid-1990s on teen employment, the three economists found results similar to those found in that earlier research (a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage reduces teen employment slightly more than 1 percent). But, once they controlled for different regional trends, the estimated employment effects of the minimum wage disappeared, turning slightly positive, but not statistically significantly different from zero.

**[Stop here for time.]**

Living wage solves a generational cycle of child poverty

**Lathrop 15** writes[[117]](#footnote-117)

At a recent unveiling of a new report on child poverty, the **C**hildren’s **D**efense **F**und **made** a set of **recommendations**, including an increase in the minimum wage, **to reduce child poverty** by 60 percent with minimal additional cost to taxpayers. According to the report, **raising** the **minimum wage to $10.10 would immediately** reduce child poverty between 4 and 8 percent, **lift**ing **400,000 children above poverty**, and generating $15.2 million in new revenue to state and federal governments from an increase in income taxes and reduced use of public assistance. **A higher increase** in the minimum wage – such as $12.50 at the federal level, a rate that garners overwhelming public support according to a recent poll – **could have an even larger impact**, bringing much needed relief to more working families whose current earnings keep them in or near poverty despite their hard work. Together with other policy recommendations – including investing more on housing, food and child care assistance, as well as expanding the Earned Income and Child Tax Credits – raising the minimum wage would boost 6.6 million children above the poverty line, and improve the economic prospects of an additional 4 million children. **Over the long term, these investments would not only benefit children living in poverty** right **now, but also brighten their economic prospects as adults and decrease the chances their own children will** also **grow up in poverty**. Congress has a choice to make: Invest in the economic health of the nation’s poorest families now at minimal expense, by implementing commonsense approaches such as raising the minimum wage – or face a much larger price tag in the future, as state and federal governments scramble to provide support for families that continue to fall behind despite their efforts to climb out of poverty.

**The best studies show no impact on teen unemployment**

**Schmitt 13**

John Schmitt (Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C.) “Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect on Employment?” Center for Economic and Policy Research. February 2013. http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/min-wage-2013-02.pdf

The "New Minimum Wage" research also emphasized research methods based on important differences in the "bite" of the federal minimum across the states. Any given increase in the federal minimum, the thinking went, should have more impact in low-wage states, where many workers would be eligible for an increase, than it would in high-wage states, where a smaller share of the workforce would be affected. Card, for example, divided the U.S. states into three groups – low-impact, medium-impact, and high-impact – according to the share of their teenage workforce that would be affected by the 1990 and 1991 increases in the federal minimum wage. His analysis concluded: "Comparisons of grouped and individual state data confirm that the rise in the minimum wage raised average teenage wages... On the other hand, there is no evidence that the rise in the minimum wage significantly lowered teenage employment rates..."8

Card and Krueger's book Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage is the best (though early) summary of these two strands of the "new minimum wage" research. Their detailed review of studies using a variety of methods and datasets to examine restaurant workers, retail employment, and teenagers, concludes: "The weight of this evidence suggests that it is very unlikely that the minimum wage has a large, negative employment effect."9

Alt causes to youth unemployment

**Thompson 14** writes[[118]](#footnote-118)

Rather than pick on Puzder, I'll pick on his shoehorn: **Why can't young people find work, really?** There are three reasons.The **first** reason that young people can't find work is that **they're not looking for work, because they're in school**. Puzder notes that the BLS just recorded the lowest percentage of 16- to 19-year-olds working or looking for work since it started counting such things in 1948. But look what else changed since the 1940s: The share of the population with less than a high school education fell from 76 percent to 12 percent, while the share of Americans with a bachelor's degree septupled to 32 percent. The BLS itself says that "the major factor producing this significant [change in labor participation] has been an increase in school attendance at all levels." The **second** reason that young people can't find work is that they're young. Young workers today are under-employed at high levels, but they've been under-employed at high levels for decades. Because they're young. **Young people have long suffered higher unemployment** than the rest of the country**, unless they have a college degree. Because they're young**. Graduates are moving from unemployment (school) to employment (workforce). Finding a job is always harder than keeping a job. The **third** reason that young people can't find work is that **they're having the same trouble that other job-seekers are having following** the deep recession and **slow recovery**. One way to measure whether the youth job market is particularly sick is to investigate whether the youth unemployment rate is rising faster than the rate for overall workers. Here's the youth unemployment multiple going back to 1985... The first thing you might see is that the overall youth unemployment rate (in light blue) hasn't budged from its historical average. **There is nothing uniquely wrong with the youth** job **market**. Youth unemployment is exactly as high as you might expect. The second thing you'll see is that there is something uniquely wrong with the job market for young grads who never went to college. Their unemployment rate is clearly elevated—a sign that a college degree is a necessary rung on the ladder to the quality career. **Young people**—including college grads—**take time to establish themselves in the economy, and they always have**. The most important concern today shouldn’t be whether they find work, but what kind of work they find. "It has become more common for underemployed college graduates to find themselves in low-wage jobs” since the 2001 recession, according to a recent New York Fed report. The problem isn't that Obama killed entry level jobs, as Puzder argues. It's that he lacks the power to enrich those entry level jobs.

## Microfinance CP (Greenhill)

### Agent CPs Irrelevant

1. Multiple actors can have the same obligation, so proving that microfinance institutions should act doesn’t **dis**prove that governments have the same obligation.

2. Counter-plans just represent opportunity cost disadvantages, but agent counter-plans aren’t opportunity costs because they aren’t alternative choices that could be made by the same actor.

### Perm

Perm, do both. The net benefit is the AC. Their CGAP evidence says governments shouldn’t provide microfinance, not that they can’t provide a living wage while microfinance institutions do their thing.

The perm resolves the unemployment DA; if living wage puts some out of work, they can be self-employed through micro-finance.

### General

The counterplan’s the status quo, so it can’t solve the aff. They say “microfinance institutions should help the poor” but they already do that.

Microcredit hasn’t solved poverty; wage increases are key

**Karnani 7** writes[[119]](#footnote-119)

Microcredit is certainly a noble idea and a genuine innovation that has provided some positive impact to its clients, particularly to women’s noneconomic empowerment. It also helps the poor during cyclical or unexpected crises, and thus reduces their vulnerability.18 But the critical issue is whether microcredit helps eradicate poverty. And on that front, it falls short. **China, Vietnam, and South Korea have significantly reduced poverty** in recent years with little microfinance activity. On the other hand, **Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Indonesia haven’t been as successful** at reducing poverty **despite** the influx of **microcredit**. The fact is, **most** microcredit clients are not **microentrepreneurs** by choice. They **would gladly take a factory job at reasonable wages** if it were available. We should not romanticize the idea of the “poor as entrepreneurs.” The International Labour Organization (ILO) uses a more appropriate term for these people: “own-account workers.” Creating opportunities for steady employment at reasonable wages is the best way to take people out of poverty. “**Nothing is more fundamental to poverty reduction than employment**,” states the ILO. And the United Nations Development Programme agrees: “Employment is a key link between economic growth and poverty reduction. Productive and remunerative employment can help ensure that poor people share in the benefits of economic growth.” Consider the patterns of poverty and employment over time in China, India, and Africa, whose populations make up about three-quarters of the world’s poor (see graphs on p. 39). Each region has pursued a different path to economic development, and the results so far have been markedly different. In China, a large and growing percentage of the population is employed in a job. At the same time, the percentage of people living in poverty has declined significantly in recent decades. In Africa, a small and shrinking fraction of the population is employed, and the incidence of poverty has remained unchanged during the same period. India’s performance lies somewhere between the two: The number of people in jobs has grown some, and the number of people in poverty has shrunk a little. **Many people who have jobs** in these regions **are still stuck below the poverty line** – the working poor. **Whether an employee is “poor” depends on** her **wages**, the size of her household, and the income of other household members. Increased productivity leads to higher wages, which in turn lead to employees earning enough to rise above poverty. That is why it is not enough to create jobs; regions must also increase labor productivity through the use of new technology, management techniques, specialization, and the like.

They can’t solve non-domination; governments are key to ensuring citizens live as equals in a political community, that’s Waltman 2.

The perm’s key. Market-based approaches like microfinance need to be complimented with government action

**Karnani 7** writes[[120]](#footnote-120)

Markets Aren’t Enough India isn’t the only country whose government is failing to meet its responsibilities. Much of the developing world is likewise missing a vibrant public sector. In response to these shortcomings, a growing number of people believe that markets would do a better job of providing these same services. That is one of the reasons why **microcredit** has such widespread appeal: It**’s a market-based approach** to eliminating poverty.23 Even **those who advocate a market-based approach** to providing basic services **don’t argue that the state can totally abdicate its responsibilities**. The late economist Milton Friedman, who advocated a school voucher system, did not want the state to withdraw totally from the field of education. The state must provide basic education for the sake of intergenerational equity. The state must also be responsible for providing services when there is a market failure. **Free markets do not work well when** economies of scale are very large and **there is a natural monopoly**, as in the case of piped water, **and when the commodity is a “common good**,**”** as in the case of public health. In such cases, **the market might be a partial complement to the state, but it cannot be a total substitute**. For example, if a region has a private water supply, the government must still regulate rates and ensure that the poor have enough purchasing power to buy water. The business guru C.K. Prahalad says, “If people have no sewage and drinking water, should we also deny them televisions and cell phones?”24 Writing about the slums of Mumbai, he argues that the poor accept that access to running water is not a “realistic option” and therefore spend their income on things that they can get now and that will improve the quality of their lives.25 This opens up a market, and he urges private companies to make significant profits by selling to the “bottom of the pyramid” (BOP). Yet the BOP proposition glosses over the real issue: Why do poor people accept that they cannot expect running water? Even if they do accept this bleak view, why should we? Instead, **we should emphasize** the **failure of government and attempt to correct it**. Giving a voice to the poor is a central aspect of the development process. The business community, bureaucrats, politicians, and the media are very busy congratulating themselves on the booming private sector in India. Sure, more Indians have cell phones. But what many remember about India is not all the people using cell phones. It’s all the people defecating in public because they do not have toilets. Even in Mumbai, the business capital of India, about 50 percent of the people defecate outside. The current celebration of private sector successes should be met, and perhaps chastened, with anger at the failure of the state to provide basic services. Overall, governments, businesses, and civil society would be well advised to reallocate their resources and energies away from microfinance and into supporting larger enterprises in labor-intensive industries. This is what is alleviating poverty in China, Korea, Taiwan, and other developing countries. At the same time, they should also provide basic services that improve the employability and productivity of the poor. Otherwise, they will miss the mark of lifting people out of poverty.

Microcredit hurts the poor; at best, it only benefits those above the poverty line

**Karnani 7** writes[[121]](#footnote-121)

Despite the hoopla surrounding microcredit, few have studied its impact.10 One of the most comprehensive studies reaches a surprising conclusion: **Microloans are more beneficial to borrowers** living **above the poverty line** than to borrowers living below the poverty line.11 This is because **clients with more income are willing to take** the **risks**, such as investing in new technologies, that will most likely increase income flows. **Poor borrowers**, on the other hand, tend **to take out conservative loans** that protect their subsistence, and rarely invest in new technology, fixed capital, or the hiring of labor. **Microloans sometimes even reduce cash flow to the poorest** of the poor, observes Vijay Mahajan, the chief executive of Basix, an Indian rural finance institution. He concludes that microcredit “seems to do more harm than good to the poorest.”12 **One reason could be** the **high interest rates** charged by microcredit organizations. Acleda, a Cambodian commercial bank specializing in microcredit, charges interest rates of about 2 percent to 4.5 percent each month. Some other microlenders charge more, pushing most annual rates to between 30 percent and 60 percent.13 Microcredit proponents argue that these rates, although high, are still well below those charged by informal moneylenders. But **if poor clients cannot earn a greater return** on their investment **than the interest** they must pay**, they will become poorer** as a result of microcredit, not wealthier.

Microcredit can’t solve; most poor people aren’t entrepreneurs

**Karnani 7** writes[[122]](#footnote-122)

Another problem with microcredit is the businesses it is intended to fund. A microcredit client is an entrepreneur in the literal sense: She raises the capital, manages the business, and takes home the earnings. But the “entrepreneurs” who have become heroes in the developed world are usually visionaries who convert new ideas into successful business models. **Although some** microcredit **clients have created visionary businesses, the vast majority are** caught **in subsistence activities**. They usually have no specialized skills, and so must compete with all the other self-employed poor people in entry-level trades.14 **Most have no paid staff, own few assets, and operate** at **too small** a scale **to achieve efficiencies**, and so make very meager earnings. In other words, **most microenterprises are small and many fail** – contrary to the United Nations’ hype that microentrepreneurs will grow thriving businesses that lead to flourishing economies. This should not be too surprising. **Most people do not have** the **skills**, vision, creativity, and persistence **to be entrepreneurial**. Even in developed countries with high levels of education and access to financial services, about 90 percent of the labor force is employees, not entrepreneurs.15 **The reality of microcredit is less attractive than the promise.**16 Even a stalwart proponent of neoliberal policies like The Economist is beginning to conclude that “the **few studies** that have been done **suggest that small loans are beneficial, but not dramatically so**.”17

The counterplan doesn’t help women economically

**Karnani 7** writes[[123]](#footnote-123)

A major selling point of microfinance is its alleged ability to empower women. Research shows that microcredit increases women’s bargaining power within the home, centrality to the community, awareness of social and political issues, and mobility. It also increases their self-esteem and self-worth.8 Yet **microcredit** alone **cannot overcome ingrained patriarchal systems** of control**. In spite of having access to credit, some female** microcredit **clients do not have control over** the **loans** contracted **or** the **income generated** by the microenterprises.9 Overall, **microcredit does empower women, but only in noneconomic ways**.

Microfinance can’t solve effective small business creation and diverts attention from important reforms like the aff

**Bunting 11** writes[[124]](#footnote-124)

3 **Most loans are not used to create** small **businesses** at all**; they are used for** "consumption smoothing" as the economists describe it, in other words, those **items** of extraordinary expenditure **such as weddings, funerals or education and health** fees**. That** is the kind of scenario which **leads to indebtedness**. 4 Finally, **microfinance is not** very **successful at creating prosperous small businesses** in the long run. Much was made of the "telephone ladies" in the 1990s who took out microloans to buy mobiles and rent them out. Initially they made handsome profits, but as Chang points out their income has dropped dramatically. **If a business idea works and is accessible to poor people, everyone will pile in**; it's why you see rows of women sitting patiently selling a few tomatoes in African marketplaces. **Overcrowding is a result of** very **limited** options in terms of **tech**nology**, skills and financial resources: microfinance doesn't solve** any of **those problems**. Chang and Bateman cite academics arguing that the claims of microfinance are "in many respects a world of make-believe." These points all seem damaging enough but Chang and Bateman go even further, arguing that **microfinance could** actually **inhibit poverty reduction by diverting attention and resources from** the much **more important state** co-ordinated **policy interventions**, financial institutions and investment strategies that have been crucial to the success of fast-growing economies such as Vietnam, China and South Korea.

Previous studies are flawed; more recent studies confirm microcredit can’t solve poverty

**Roodman 12** writes[[125]](#footnote-125)

To be fair, microcredit has had more than selective storytelling on its side. Dozens of academic **studies** in the 1980s and 1990s **seemed to validate the anecdotal evidence**. Researchers typically surveyed hundreds of families and looked for patterns in the data. **Perhaps families that had used microcredit** also **reported higher earnings**, for example. The premier analysis was funded by the World Bank and appeared in the prestigious Journal of Political Economy in 1998; through complex statistical methods, it found that microcredit cut poverty in Bangladesh, especially when women received the loans. One of the researchers later estimated that 5 percent of Grameen Bank borrowers climbed out of poverty each year. **But most** such **studies had a significant problem: If some households with higher borrowing also display higher earnings, can we** really **know which is causing which?** Does credit make households less poor, or does being less poor make them more apt to borrow money in the first place? In recent years, **a new generation of** development **economists has addressed this** problem **by** experimenting with microcredit programs, **randomly offering loans** to some people and not others. Just as in the best drug trials, this has allowed researchers to measure cause and effect more precisely. If, one year later, those who received loans earned more or enrolled more of their girls in school, what factor other than the loans could explain those happy outcomes? **The first randomized studies** of microcredit **appeared in** 20**09**. MIT economists found that **in** the slums of the megalopolis of Hyderabad, **India**, small loans caused more families to start micro- businesses such as sewing saris. Existing businesses saw higher profits. But over the 12 to 18 months the researchers tracked, **the data revealed no change in bottom-line indicators of poverty**, such as household spending and whether children were attending school. Perhaps those who made more from their own businesses earned less in wages outside the home. **A study in Manila by American economists** Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman also **found no effect on poverty for families one to two years after they received a loan**.

Microcredit causes massive debt; multiple countries prove

**Roodman 12** writes[[126]](#footnote-126)

On the heels of such studies came more bad news. **Microcredit bubbles began to** reveal themselves as financial bubbles do — by **pop**ping, **in** places such as **Nicaragua, Bosnia, Morocco and Pakistan. In Bosnia,** for instance, the **microloans outstanding shot** from $275 million in 2005 **to $1 billion in** 20**08**, before slumping to $830 million in 2009 on defaults and write-offs. **In 2010, amid reports of suicide among overindebted borrowers, the government of the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh ambushed** the **microcredit** industry there **with a harsh law that all but shut it down**. Microlenders must now register with the governments of the districts in which they operate and must seek approval for each loan. This puts much power in the hands of local officials, who in some cases are known for their aptitude in converting such leverage into delays and graft.

### Neolib DA (Pettit)

Microfinance is rooted in neoliberal ideology

**Bunting 11** writes[[127]](#footnote-127)

Here are some of Chang and Bateman's top findings: 1 Microfinance is based on an attractive but false premise that poor people can make themselves richer providing they have access to credit. But **wealth creation, outside of fairytales, is very rarely the result of individual effort**. Rather **it is a collective endeavour** – requiring skills and knowledge – **in institutions such as companies, co-operatives. Microfinance has erroneously put the individual centre stage, reflecting a neoliberal world view.**

Women aren’t empowered by microfinance because it subordinates them to a neoliberal view of citizenship

**Levin 12** writes[[128]](#footnote-128)

Another significant area of academic critique is the symbolism of microcredit in a neoliberal economy. Researchers such as Lamia Karim connect the roles of gender and economy in Bangladesh, analyzing repayment rates in the context of neoliberalism. Karim focuses on four major lending institutions in Bangladesh to describe “how **Bangladeshi rural women’s honor and shame are instrumentally appropriated by micro-credit NGOs in** the **furtherance of** their **capitalist interests**” (Karim 2008: 5). Although she acknowledges the success rates of microfinance, Karim probes the techniques used to encourage repayment and suggests that, although it has helped in lifting women out of poverty, **microcredit furthers** the **subjugation of Bangladeshi women by promoting** the **manipulation of traditional cultural values**. Another author agrees that “**microcredit thus constitutes** social **citizenship and women’s needs in a manner consistent with neoliberalism**” (Ranklin 2001).

Neolib kills non-domination; it ignores that freedom can only exist in a community

**Waltman 2** writes[[129]](#footnote-129)

Critics sometimes contend that civic republicanism, by granting the state such extensive powers, can suffocate the individual. Of course, it is theoretically possible that it could, but that is a faint threat in a viable republic. Republican politics endeavors to construct a society in which individuals are free to make the choices that they wish, to be truly free from domination today and the threat of domination tomorrow. If the citizenry, though, becomes selfish and irresponsible, then, yes, republican governments could become arbitrary and destructive of liberty. It is often, though, a **rampant individualism** that **undermines** individual **freedom**. In part, this is because **it turns a blind eye to** the **domination** that can be inherent in individuals' relations with each other. But it is also because that by **asserting that there is no higher good than self-interest** it **destroys the whole**. Tocqueville, it is worth recalling, was strongly in favor of "individuality," attainable only when people are free from domination, but deeply skeptical of "individualism," where people acknowledge no higher good than the pursuit of their own self-interest. In fact, one of the major concerns voiced throughout his writing was whether republican liberty could be maintained as democracy spread, or whether the offspring would swallow the parent. (10) Consequently, "rights,"whether the **economic rights favored by Friedmanites** or the privacy rights cherished by the left, **cannot stand as impenetrable barriers to policies designed to achieve the public good**. (11) **To do so is to champion** an **individualism that is the path to isolation and** ultimately to **anarchy. Rights are** a **means to** the **accomplishing** of **liberty, not zones that by absolutely restricting state action are subversive of it.**

### Relative Poverty O/W (Scanlon)

The counterplan can’t solve relative poverty since it doesn’t take from the rich.

**Relative poverty outweighs absolute poverty. It creates a functional caste system, which comes first under the standard.**

**Scanlon 5**

TM Scanlon (Professor of Swagger at Harvard University). Wei Lun Public Lecture Series; Chinese University of Hong Kong. “When Does Equality Matter?” 14 March 2005. http://www.iso.cuhk.edu.hk/weilun/en/scanlon/scanlon\_fulltext2.html

Status: The leading historical examples of objectionable inequality are caste systems and other social arrangements involving stigmatizing differences in status. In these systems, members of some groups are marked as inferior by, for example, being excluded from roles and occupations that are seen as most desirable, or required to perform tasks that are regarded as demeaning and beneath the dignity of members of other groups. The evil involved in such arrangements is a comparative one. It is not the tasks themselves that are demeaning — they may be necessary tasks that someone has to perform in any society. What is objectionable is being marked as inferior to others in a demeaning way. **The remedy is to abolish the social system that** defines and **upholds these distinctions** between superior and inferior. In the historical cases I am referring to, inequalities based on caste, race or gender are a matter of law or of entrenched social attitudes. But purely economic inequalities can be objectionable for the reason I am here discussing. One consequence of extreme inequality in income and wealth can be that it forces the poor to live in a way that is reasonably seen as humiliating. Here again, **the evil is comparative** — it is not merely an objection to having ragged clothes, or poor housing, but of having to live and to present oneself in a way that is so far below the standard generally accepted in society that it marks one as inferior, and as someone that others would not want to associate with. This provides a reason not only to improve the lot of the poor, but also, even if their lot is, in absolute terms, not so bad, to object to the creation of a much higher standard of living for others. This may not, in some cases be a sufficient reason to deny others these benefits, but it is a recognizable cost that these benefits bring, and one that cannot be put down to envy. Domination: Inequalities can also be objectionable because they give some people an unacceptable degree of control over the lives of others. If, for example, a small number of people control almost all of the wealth in a society, this can give them an unacceptable degree of control over the lives of other citizens: over where and how they can work, what they can buy, and in general what their lives will be like. More narrowly, ownership of the public media in a country gives someone control over how others in the society view themselves, and their lives, and how they understand their society.

## States CP

### Theory

States counter-plans are unfair and uneducational. First, they’re utopian. The states never acted unanimously once in 250 years. Second, it kills clash by mooting all AC offence which forces an impossible 1AR restart. Third, they kill topic education and force stale process debates. Reject the arg because fairness is a gateway issue.

[If drop the debater]

Fairness is a gateway issue. Vote on theory because the ballot is the currency of debate; a loss will disincentivize unfair and uneducational practices.

### Morally Irrelevant

The states counterplan is morally irrelevant.

1. Multiple actors can have the same obligation, so proving that the states should act doesn’t **dis**prove that congress has the same obligation.

2. Counter-plans just represent opportunity cost disadvantages, but agent counter-plans aren’t opportunity costs because they aren’t alternative choices that could be made by the same actor.

### AT PTX Net Benefit

States link to politics. **Kiely 12** writes[[130]](#footnote-130)

Who’s to blame, if that’s the right word, if the project ends up using manufactured steel from China? The National Steel Bridge Alliance blames the state railroad agency. The Alliance for American Manufacturing says the federal Buy American laws have been “weakened with loopholes and various exemptions that make it easier for bureaucrats to purchase foreign-made goods instead of those made in American factories with American workers.” So, **how did Obama get blamed for the decisions by state agencies and** for state **projects that,** in at least one case, **didn’t even use federal funds?** The answer is a textbook lesson in how **information gets distorted** when emails go viral. We looked at the nearly 100 emails we received on this subject and found that Obama wasn’t mentioned at all in the first few emails. Typical of the emails we received shortly after the ABC News report aired was this one from Oct. 11, 2011: “I just got an email regarding Diane Sawyer on ABC TV stating that U. S. Bridges and roads are being built by Chinese firms when the jobs should have gone to Americans. Could this possible be true?” The answer: Yes, it’s true. End of story, right? Wrong. Days later, emails started to appear in our inbox that claimed ABC News reported that Chinese firm were receiving stimulus funds to build U.S. bridges — even though the broadcast news story didn’t mention stimulus funds at all. (The report did include a clip of Obama delivering a speech on the need to rebuild America’s bridges and put Americans to work, but said nothing about the president’s $830 billion stimulus bill.) Still, we received emails such as this one on Nov. 4, 2011, that included this erroneous claim language: “Stimulus money meant to create U.S. jobs went to Chinese firms. Unbelievable….” **It didn’t take long for Obama to be blamed**. That same day — Nov. 4, 2011 — we received an email that made this leap to Obama: “SOME CHINESE COMPANIES WHO ARE BUILDING ‘OUR’ BRIDGES. (3000 JOBS LOST TO THE CHINESE FIRM)…..AND NOW OBAMA WANTS ‘MORE STIMULUS MONEY’…..THIS IS NUTS ! ! ! If this doesn’t make you furious nothing will….” This year, Obama’s name started to surface in the subject line of such critical emails — raising the attack on the president to yet another level and perhaps ensuring the email will be even more widely circulated. Since Jan. 17, we have gotten more than a dozen emails with the subject line, “ABC News on Obama/USA Infrastructure,” often preceded with the word “SHOCKING” in all caps. The emails increasingly contain harsh language about the president. Since Jan. 11, 23 emails carried this added bit of Obama-bashing: “I pray all the unemployed see this and cast their votes accordingly in 2012!” One of those emails — a more recent one from Feb. 8 — contained this additional line: “Tell me again how Obama’s looking out for blue collar guys. **He** cancels pipelines, and **lets Chinese contractors build our bridges…” And so** it goes, **on** and on. **All from a news report that blamed state officials — not Obama — for spending taxpayer money** on Chinese firms to build U.S. bridges.

### AT Solvency

States can’t solve the aff

**Levin-Waldman 14** writes[[131]](#footnote-131)

Those who argue the virtues of returning to traditional federalism, or what some might refer to as the new federalism, where the states assume more responsibility for domestic policy will no doubt hold these measures as sign of progress. They might point out that it is in the states where interesting policy innovations are occurring, and that in lines with Louis Brandeis’s statement that the states were the “laboratories of democracy,” policy initiatives should always be tried at the state level first. That is because if successful at the state level, it is ripe to expand it to the federal level. At the same time, this argument might carry with it a double-edged sword. Currently, at least twenty-two states have minimum wages higher than the federal minimum wage, and data showing that there have been no disemployment effects — the loss of jobs to states with lower minimum wages — would certainly strengthen the argument for raising the federal minimum wage so as to maintain uniformity across the nation. The lack of uniformity, however, especially in the absence of data to the contrary, only strengthens the arguments of minimum wage opponents who argue that minimum wage differentials between the states encourages firms to leave high wage states for lower ones. This only furthers the race to the bottom as states compete with one another to create low-wage jobs. It should be recalled that it was precisely **because of wage differentials between the states** that **proponents of** the initial **minimum wage in** 19**38 made their case for uniform standards**. Southern states where wages were lower than in the North opposed the minimum wage, and Northern states hoped that a uniform minimum would stop industry and jobs from moving down South. Optimally **we** should raise the federal minimum wage and it should either be pegged to the inflation rate or some type of productivity index. **The goal should be to ensure a minimum level of living standards** for all. But **it should also be** a goal **to arrest wage stagnation**. It is important to note that **median household income dropped** from around $54,000 in 2010 to $51,939 in 2013. Although it has started to creep back up in the last few months, it is below where it was. Of course, some will say this is due to the aftereffects of the Great Recession and the persistence of long-term unemployment. But **it may have** more **to do with the absence of a serious national wage** policy. When we consider that following the end of the Great Recession in 2009 there was what was referred to as the “jobless” recovery where there was still growth, this recession excuse does not quite wash. On the contrary, there was growth in productivity, which means that gains should have been shared among workers in the form of higher wages. Obviously, employers needed a legislative push, and a rise in the national minimum wage might well have been that push. There is every reason to believe that had there not been a deterioration in labor market institutions like unions and the minimum wage over the last three decades, that wages too would have kept up. Of course, opponents of the minimum wage that derive economic benefit and corresponding political advantage from maintaining low wages have an interest in opposing any increase in the federal minimum wage for precisely that reason. And **even if states raise their own, it will not have the same effect of a raise in the federal**. None of this is to say that states should not continue to raise their own minimum wage if it helps their citizens. It is certainly understandable that liberals will champion these efforts if it is the best they can get. But they aren’t enough. Conservatives opposed to the minimum wage are served by this minimum wage new federalism, even if by default. Nevertheless, **it would be a great disservice to** the interests of **the national economy if the minimum wage** specifically, and wage policy generally, **were** to be **lost in the language of** new federalism and **states’ rights.**

Plan solves best. States will model.

**Adler 6** writes[[132]](#footnote-132)

**Federal policies** that directly influence state regulatory decisions are only half of the picture. Just as the federal action **may encourage** or discourage **state** regulatory **action** directly, federal action may indirectly, or even incidentally, encourage or discourage state regulatory action. Federal policies will facilitate greater state regulation **where such actions reduce** the **costs** of state implementation, such as by subsidizing necessary research, **or where federal policies increase the demand for given** regulatory **policies at the state level** **so as to** alter or **“set” state policy agendas.**

### AT Federalism

Federalism kills natural disaster preparedness

**Governing Magazine 5** writes[[133]](#footnote-133)

After Hurricane Frances ripped through Florida about a year ago, the Federal Emergency Management Agency wrote checks worth $31 million to residents of Miami-Dade County. There was a big problem with the payouts, though: The storm had actually hit about 200 miles to the north. Frances gave Miami a good soaking but didn't really do much damage there. It's an ironic tale, in light of all the finger-pointing wrought by the catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina. To be sure, state and local officials never relish having to work with FEMA's bureaucracy when disaster strikes. That's been abundantly clear this past month. But there's usually a silver--or green--lining. It's not too hard to shake millions, even billions, out of Washington after a calamity, or even a rainstorm in Miami's case. In fact, it's much easier than winning federal aid for workaday priorities such as education or public housing. This is one of **federalism**'s little quirks--one that some argue **makes natural disasters** even **more disastrous. If the feds always pick up the tab,** then **there's no incentive for states or localities to halt** risky development in areas prone to **flooding, mudslides or wildfires.** It's an example of what economists call a "moral hazard" problem. **"The signal that's gone out** over many years **is that no matter what type of natural disaster** it is**, FEMA** comes in and **bails you out**," says Pietro Nivola, a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution. **"State and local governments become complacent."**

Natural disasters cause extinction. **Sid Ahmed 5** writes[[134]](#footnote-134)

The human species has never been exposed to a natural upheaval of this magnitude within living memory. What happened in South Asia is the ecological equivalent of 9/11. Ecological problems like global warming and climatic disturbances in general threaten to make our natural habitat unfit for human life. The **extinction** of the species **has become a** very **real possibility**, whether by our own hand or **as a result of natural disasters** of a much greater magnitude than the Indian Ocean earthquake and the killer waves it spawned. Human civilisation has developed in the hope that Man will be able to reach welfare and prosperity on earth for everybody. But now things seem to be moving in the opposite direction, exposing planet Earth to the end of its role as a nurturing place for human life. Today, **human conflicts have become less of a threat than** the **confrontation between Man and Nature. At least they are less likely to bring about the end of the human species.** The reactions of Nature as a result of its exposure to the onslaughts of human societies have become more important in determining the fate of the human species than any harm it can inflict on itself. Until recently, the threat Nature represented was perceived as likely to arise only in the long run, related for instance to how global warming would affect life on our planet. Such a threat could take decades, even centuries, to reach a critical level. This perception has changed following the devastating **earthquake and tsunamis** that hit the coastal regions of South Asia and, less violently, of East Africa, on 26 December. This cataclysmic event has **underscore**d **the vulnerability of our world before the wrath of Nature** and shaken the sanguine belief that the end of the world is a long way away. Gone are the days when we could comfort ourselves with the notion that the extinction of the human race will not occur before a long-term future that will only materialise after millions of years and not affect us directly in any way. **We are now forced to live with the possibility of** an **imminent demise of humankind.**

No link and perm solves. Federalism Isn’t Zero-Sum.

**Rabe 6** writes[[135]](#footnote-135)

The **federal/state choice in** environmental **regulation is not** an “**either/or”** proposition as it was sometimes cast in the environmental federalism debate of the mid-1990s.137 **Those studying** environmental law and **policy** today **must contemplate a fluid system** of relationships, **in which influence can pass from the federal to the state** level, **from the state to the federal** level, or from state to state, **via mechanisms** ranging **from the political** **process** to the legal process. The inter-state competition framework developed here should be useful in this study, and also for those seeking to influence U.S. environmental law and policy. For both scholars and practitioners, dynamics such as those observed above may form helpful guideposts.

No impact. Federalism is meaningless.

**Greve 12** writes[[136]](#footnote-136)

In an instructive law review article, the late Bobby Lipkin collected the contemporary Supreme Court’s references to **federalism’s “balance”** and showed that the notion **is empty. It has no constitutional reference** point, **and its** **deployment** as an actual constitutional norm—as opposed to high-toned burble to tart up a result reached on other grounds—**has absurd implications**. **Suppose**, for example, that some otherwise constitutional **federal law shifts the** “constitutionally mandated**” balance to the states’ detriment: could we make it up to the states by giving them a power to**, say, **tax** imports from China? Would that make us feel better about our federalism (because “balance” has been restored)? **I didn’t think so,** either.

# Ks

## Cap K

### Frontline (1:17)

#### Neg burden is to win offense to a policy; that’s Nelson 8. The new K framing forces 1AR restarts which kills critical engagement.

#### Perm do both

#### Contention 2 impact turns the link. Productivity focus is key to purchasing power and turnover reduction which wrests control from corporations; prefer my empirical ev to abstract philosophizing.

#### Valorizing wage labor is key to civic republicanism. UBI fails.

**Waltman 2**

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The first major difference is the work feature of the living wage. Advocates of UBI down play the importance of work, Parijs saying that we need to avoid "work fetishism." To be sure, work can be onerous, unpleasant, degrading and productive of stress. But then anything that is good can have a down side. Most people-intellectuals and survey respondents alike-seem to agree that on the whole, the virtues of work, both for the individual and for society, outweigh the drawbacks. (37) For present purposes, those **attributes** of work **that relate to republican citizenship need to be stressed**. First, work provides structure and routine. The tendency to entropy pervades human activity as much as it does the physical world. Only a precious few of our fellows can keep their lives on course without structure and routine. Stories from the Depression almost always stress this. People were lost without routines, and an aimlessness soon infected every corner of life. Orderly life began to crumble. Or, listen to the advice of retirement counselors. Only retire, they stress, if you have something you want to do. Second, work gives many if not most people a sense of accomplishment, which invariably makes people feel better about themselves. Third, and closely related to the second, work provides a sense of identity. We all know what the question "What do you do?" means. I play softball and putter around in my wood shop is not the type of answer most people expect. Of course, this can be overdone; but the feeling that "I am this" cannot be ignored either. Fourth, work forces us to confront the social world. We learn how to interact with others and how to perform in groups, formal and informal. We learn what society's expectations of us are; we also develop expectations of certain behaviors from others. This leads to greater mental health and better social adjustment. All of these aspects of work contribute to better republican citizenship. An ordered life, a sense of daily accomplishment, an identity that is important to oneself and others, and an ability to interact easily with others all contribute to the kind of character traits needed by republics. They make liberty meaningful and lay the groundwork for confident and intelligent participation in public affairs. **By laying** the **emphasis on work**, then, the **living wage wins** one over UBI.

#### Markets are most pragmatic and key to non-domination, which makes the entire aff framework a DA to the K. Only middle ground reforms link to my standard.

**Waltman 2**

Jerry Waltman (taught political science at the University of Southern Mississippi for 25 years; in 15 of those he participated in the British Studies Program.  He currently holds an endowed professorship in political science at Baylor University, where he teaches British politics and comparative public law.  He received his Ph.D. from Indiana University, and is the author of eight books and numerous articles in academic journals on both British and American politics.  In addition to his years spent on the British Studies Program, he has traveled and taught in the UK on many occasions). “Civic Republicanism, The Basic Income Guarantee, and the Living Wage.” USBIG Discussion Paper. No. 25, March 2002.

Let us turn now to the matter of material equality. As with poverty, a moral case can be made for material equality, but that is irrelevant here. In political terms, furthermore, an arguable case can be made that a republic would function better if there were material equality among its citizens. None would surely then have to bow and scrape. They could all eat at the same restaurants, afford similar clothes, and ride in the same section of the train or plane; and the similarity of their economic condition would bind their interests tightly together. If a society existed, then, with absolute, or even rough, pre-existing material equality, a republic would be an ideal and natural choice for the political system. However, republican political theory is not designed merely to provide a guide to what would be desirable in a social utopia; it is designed to be a program for the real world. Therefore, two factors must be kept in mind. First, a market economy is the natural outgrowth of republican political structure. If people have even qualified property rights, then they must have the right to dispose of their property as they see fit. Transactions among private parties will thereby automatically characterize much of the economic activity in a republic. Because people have different endowments and different luck, inequalities in the possession of property will be an inevitability. Such inequalities are simply a natural by-product of a market economy, and it cannot be otherwise. Since **there is no way to maintain republican freedom without a**n accompanying **market economy**, we must accept that some economic inequality is going to be a fact of life in a republic. Second, **any attempt to legislate** material **equality would vest far too much power in the state** to suit republican tastes. It would lead, that is, to imperium, which would demolish what you were trying to save. This is because the magnitude of the undertaking would create a state the scale of which would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to tether it to republican political institutions. Besides, how could it be done? If some people have a certain skill (say, hitting a little white ball with a stick) which others do not, and if people are willing to pay to watch those with the skill demonstrate it, how would you achieve material equality? You could not physically endow everyone with the skill. So, you would have to lower the skill level of those with it to make abilities equal. At my physical peak, for example, for Barry Bonds and I to be equal at the plate, he would have to have 25 pound weights attached to each wrist and bat blindfolded (at least). While the republic might not collapse if everyone was made equal in sports, if you did this to artists, musicians, dancers, and various other talented individuals, what a drab and oppressive world it would be. Or, you could make the recipients of the largesse fork all of it over to a common pool, to be distributed to everyone. But would not at least some of the incentive go away? And what about the rules, regulations, and bureaucracy that would be required? At the same time, there are entrepreneurs who do serve the greater good while pursuing riches for themselves. New products and better ways of doing things spring from people whose creative abilities lie in these areas. To deprive them of the reasonable fruits of their labors hardly seems fair, and would surely lessen their propensity to tinker in the garage. No, a republican state that tried to utilize governmental power to enforce anything approaching material equality would likely not survive. Nevertheless, too much inequality in material possessions is an equally serious problem. Again, both the moral case and the economic efficiency case against too much inequality, powerful though they may be, must yield to the political case. Severe inequalities in material conditions, to put it straightforwardly, can destroy the very bases on which legal and political equality are built. This is true for three reasons.

#### Neolib movements fail; there’s no real alt

Jones 11—Owen, Masters at Oxford, named one of the Daily Telegraph's 'Top 100 Most Influential People on the Left' for 2011, author of "Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class", The Independent, UK, "Owen Jones: Protest without politics will change nothing", 2011, [www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html)

My first experience of police kettling was aged 16. It was May Day 2001, and the anti-globalisation movement was at its peak. The turn-of-the-century anti-capitalist movement feels largely forgotten today, but it was a big deal at the time. To a left-wing teenager growing up in an age of unchallenged neo-liberal triumphalism, just to have "anti-capitalism" flash up in the headlines was thrilling. Thousands of apparently unstoppable protesters chased the world's rulers from IMF to World Bank summits – from Seattle to Prague to Genoa – and the authorities were rattled. Today, as protesters in nearly a thousand cities across the world follow the example set by the Occupy Wall Street protests, it's worth pondering what happened to the anti-globalisation movement. Its activists did not lack passion or determination. But they did lack a coherent alternative to the neo-liberal project. With no clear political direction, the movement was easily swept away by the jingoism and turmoil that followed 9/11, just two months after Genoa. Don't get me wrong: the Occupy movement is a glimmer of sanity amid today's economic madness. By descending on the West's financial epicentres, it reminds us of how a crisis caused by the banks (a sentence that needs to be repeated until it becomes a cliché) has been cynically transformed into a crisis of public spending. The founding statement of Occupy London puts it succinctly: "We refuse to pay for the banks' crisis." The Occupiers direct their fire at the top 1 per cent, and rightly so – as US billionaire Warren Buffett confessed: "There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning." The Occupy movement has provoked fury from senior US Republicans such as Presidential contender Herman Cain who – predictably – labelled it "anti-American". They're right to be worried: those camping outside banks threaten to refocus attention on the real villains, and to act as a catalyst for wider dissent. But a coherent alternative to the tottering global economic order remains, it seems, as distant as ever. Neo-liberalism crashes around, half-dead, with no-one to administer the killer blow. There's always a presumption that a crisis of capitalism is good news for the left. Yet in the Great Depression, fascism consumed much of Europe. The economic crisis of the 1970s did lead to a resurgence of radicalism on both left and right. But, spearheaded by Thatcherism and Reaganism, the New Right definitively crushed its opposition in the 1980s.This time round, there doesn't even seem to be an alternative for the right to defeat. That's not the fault of the protesters. In truth, the left has never recovered from being virtually smothered out of existence. It was the victim of a perfect storm: the rise of the New Right; neo-liberal globalisation; and the repeated defeats suffered by the trade union movement. But, above all, it was the aftermath of the collapse of Communism that did for the left. As US neo-conservative Midge Decter triumphantly put it: "It's time to say: We've won. Goodbye." From the British Labour Party to the African National Congress, left-wing movements across the world hurtled to the right in an almost synchronised fashion. It was as though the left wing of the global political spectrum had been sliced off. That's why, although we live in an age of revolt, there remains no left to give it direction and purpose.

#### The world is the best it’s ever been; markets are the reason

Yevgeniy Feyman 14, Manhattan Institute Fellow, "The Golden Age Is Now", May 23, www.city-journal.org/2014/bc0523yf.html

In How Much Have Global Problems Cost the World?, Lomborg and **a group of economists conclude that**, with a few exceptions, **the world is richer, freer, healthier, and smarter than it’s ever been**. These gains have coincided with the near-universal rejection of statism and the flourishing of capitalist principles. At a time when political figures such as New York City mayor Bill de Blasio and religious leaders such as Pope Francis frequently remind us about the evils of unfettered capitalism, this is a worthwhile message. The doubling of human life expectancy is one of the most remarkable achievements of the past century. Consider, Lomborg writes, that “the twentieth century saw life expectancy rise by about 3 months for every calendar year.” The average child in 1900 could expect to live to just 32 years old; now that same child should make it to 70. This increase came during a century when worldwide economic output, driven by the spread of capitalism and freedom, grew by more than 4,000 percent. These gains occurred in developed and developing countries alike; among men and women; and even in a sense among children, as child mortality plummeted. Why are we living so much longer? Massive improvements in public health certainly played an important role. The World Health Organization’s global vaccination efforts essentially eradicated smallpox. But this would have been impossible without the innovative methods of vaccine preservation developed in the private sector by British scientist Leslie Collier. Oral rehydration therapies and antibiotics have also been instrumental in reducing child mortality. Simply put, technological progress is the key to these gains—and market economies have liberated, and rewarded, technological innovation. People are not just living longer, but better—sometimes with government’s help, and sometimes despite it. Even people in the developing countries of Africa and Latin America are better educated and better fed than ever before. Hundreds of thousands of children who would have died during previous eras due to malnutrition are alive today. Here, **we can thank massive advancements in ag**ricultural **production unleashed by the free market**. In the 1960s, privately funded agricultural researchers bred new, high-yield strains of corn, wheat, and various other crops thanks to advances in molecular genetics. Globalization helped spread these technologies to developing countries, which used them not only to feed their people, but also to become export powerhouses. This so-called “green revolution” reinforced both the educational progress (properly nourished children tend to learn more) and the life-expectancy gains (better nutrition leads to better health) of the twentieth century. These children live in a world with fewer armed conflicts, netting what the authors call a “peace dividend.” Globalization and trade liberalization have surely contributed to this more peaceful world (on aggregate). An interdependent global economy makes war costly. Of course, problems remain. As Lomborg points out, most foreign aid likely does little to boost economic welfare, yet hundreds of billions of dollars in “development assistance” continue to flow every year from developed countries to the developing world. Moreover, climate change is widely projected to intensify in the second half of the twenty-first century, and will carry with it a significant economic cost. But those familiar with the prior work of the “skeptical environmentalist” understand that ameliorating these effects over time could prove wasteful. Lomborg notes that the latest research on climate change estimates a net cost of 0.2 to 2 percent of GDP from 2055 to 2080. The same report points out that in 2030, mitigation costs may be as high as 4 percent of GDP. Perhaps directing mitigation funding to other priorities—curing AIDS for instance—would be a better use of the resources. Lomborg’s main message? Ignore those pining for the “good old days.” Thanks to the immense gains of the past century, **there has never been a better time to be alive**.

#### Transition impossible – alt gets curbstomped by the bourgeousie

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(Richard, , “Power Down: Options and Actions for a Post-Carbon World”, 2004, p. 167-168)

There is no need to belabor the point: the people of this world whose opinions count the most — the people with the power to command armies, economies, and governments — have already made up their minds. The cards are dealt and the bets are on the table. For them, the coming decades will constitute a fatal game of Last One Standing, a brutal contest for the world's remaining resources. To the interested observer, this may seem patently insane. Even the nation that "wins" the game will be utterly devastated. In the end, oil, natural gas, and even coal will run out, and not even the wealthy will be able to maintain their current way of life. And in the meantime, hundreds of millions — perhaps billions — will have violently perished. Why would anyone choose this path? It is possible to understand the reason for the current course of events only by looking at who is choosing it, and at the incentives and constraints to which they are subject. The elites — corporate owners and managers, government officials, and military commanders — are people who have been selected for certain qualities: loyalty to the system, competitiveness, and hunger for power. Often they are literally bred for their roles. Like George W. Bush, they are people born to wealth and power, and raised to assume that privilege is their birthright. These are people who identify with the system and the status quo; they are constitutionally incapable of questioning its fundamental assumptions. Moreover, the elites are guided day-to-day by a set of incentives that are built into the system itself. Managers who pursue immediate gain get ahead, while those who make short-term sacrifices in order to preserve long-term stability are often at a disadvantage. Likewise, managers are rewarded who keep up appearances, who generate good news, and who exude confidence. Confessing errors accrues no benefit; instead, managers are encouraged to deny short-comings and to blame competitors or subordinates.

### Cap Good (General)

#### Markets are the best thing since sliced bread; the neg is ahistorical in the extreme

Ames and Forbes, 2012:

(Freedom Manifesto: Why Free Markets Are Moral And Big Government Isn’t. Steve Forbes, Publishing Executive. Elizabeth Ames, Former Member of The Texas House Of Representatives. 2012 104-107)

Today we have scant appreciation for just how harsh conditions were just two centuries ago. As noted author and theologian Michael Novak has described them: Famines ravaged the civilized world on average once a generation . Plagues seized scores of thousands. In the 1780s, four fifths of French families devoted 90 percent of their incomes simply to buying **bread**—only bread—to stay alive. Life expectancy in 1795 in France was 27.3 years for women and 23.4 for men. In the year 1800, in the whole of Germany fewer than a thousand people had incomes as high as $1,000 [in today’s dollars]. Liberty of religion and speech was rare. In most cultures, absolute rulersreigned simultaneously over political, economy, and moral-cultural matters. In such a world, in most places, traditional Christianity and Judaism lived under severe constraints. The development of the market economy in Britain and the United States, Novak writes, changed everything. “After five millennia of blundering, human beings finally figured out how wealth may be produced in a sustained, systematic way.” Economic freedom gave rise to an era of innovation that dramatically improved living conditions. People were able to look beyond the necessities of survival. They gained a greater “liberty of personal choice” and advantages like “a varied diet, new beverages, new skills, new vocations.” Philosopher Thomas Hobbes’s famed description of life as “nasty, brutish and short” has become less true with each generation. In the bestselling, influential *The Rational Optimist,* British journalist Matthew Ridley describes in powerful detail how free markets have uplifted mankind: [T]he vast majority of people [today] are much better fed, much better sheltered, much better entertained much better protected against disease and much more likely to live to old age than their ancestors have ever been. Even allowing for the hundreds of millions who still live in abject poverty, disease and want, this generation of human beings has access to more calories, watts, lumen-hours, square feet, gigabytes, megahertz, light-years, nano-meters, bushels per acre, miles per gallon, food miles, air miles and of course dollars than any what went before. They have more Velcro, vaccines, vitamins, shoes, singers, soap operas, mango slicers, sexual partners, tennis rackets, guided missiles and anything else they could even imagine needing. By one estimate, the number of different products that you can buy in New York or London tops ten billion. Even in poor countries, Ridley tells us, people are living longer. “**The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton** did **in 1955**. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955.” Food, clothing, fuel, and shelter over decades has grown steadily cheaper:[S]urprising as it may seem, the average family house probably costs slightly less today than it did in 1900 or even 1700, despite including far more modern conveniences like electricity, telephone and plumbing. We also get far more for our labor, he notes, than we ever did: An hour of work today earns you 300 days’ worth of reading light; an hour of work in 1800 earned you ten minutes.” (This achievement may dim considerably if Big Government ends up making consumers buy those expensive bulbs.) Entrepreneurial creativity has been the foremost force for good that society has ever known. Entrepreneur and free enterprise evangelist Michael Strong believes that ‘the creation of new enterprises is the most powerful way to make positive change in the world. If all the energy that is currently invested in zero-sum political conflict was gradually transferred to the committed creation of sustainable enterprises, the cumulative impact on behalf of good would be extraordinary.”

### Cap Good (Poverty)

#### Free Markets Solve Poverty; global trends go aff

MacKenzie, 2014:

(The Data Is Clear: Free Markets Reduce Poverty. June 16, 2014. D.W. MacKenzie, Assistant Professor of Economics At Carroll College)

I have no doubt that Pope Francis has seen many poor people with his own eyes. But, our comprehension of the root causes of poverty requires both data on economic conditions and theoretical knowledge of economic systems. What does rational analysis of evidence tell us about global poverty? It is an obvious fact that severe poverty has disappeared in the most industrialized countries. Nations like the US, UK, Switzerland, and Japan industrialized within what were predominantly laissez-faire free-market conditions. Even the so-called social democracies, like Sweden and Germany, developed in free-market conditions, and adopted extensive state welfare and regulatory programs only after achieving high levels of economic development and industrialization. World Bank data shows that there is inequality, but this inequality is between the free-market nations and the crony-capitalist and socialistic nations.[1] The idea that domestic laissez-faire causes poverty is unfounded. It is a historical fact that India, China, and Kenya never tried capitalism, so this system was never given a chance to work. Furthermore, China and India have realized some progress in abating poverty since they moved in the direction of capitalism. Of course, China and India adopted regulated crony capitalism, but this is still better than their old socialist systems. One could argue that global capitalism allows a few people in some nations to exploit the masses of other nations. Marxists have attempted to make this case since Lenin. Lenin revised Marx because even in his day it had become obvious that Marx’s prediction that capitalists would exploit domestic workers was refuted by evidence. We now know that Lenin’s attempt to blame poverty on global markets is wrong. As previously mentioned, economic conditions in China and India improved after switching from socialism to crony capitalism. China and India have also expanded trade in global markets. There have been significant improvements in living conditions around the world over the past thirty years. The largest improvements in the poorest nations took place during the wave of globalization that took place twenty years ago, after the fall of the USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union opened the door to unprecedented globalization of industry. What does real data tell us about poverty during this period? Per Capita GDP rose dramatically: Thirty years ago half (50 percent) the people in the poorer nations of the world lived [in extreme poverty](http://data.worldbank.org/news/extreme-poverty-rates-continue-to-fall). In 2012, 21 percent of people in the poorer nations of the world live in extreme poverty. Development of global markets has greatly lessened poverty around the world. This is a very important fact. Movement from being in the lowest global income bracket, to lower middle income to middle income means moving from average life expectancy in the low forties to life expectancy of fifty or sixty, respectively. Cardinal Maradiaga is wrong: this economy does not kill; it has extended the lives of the poorest people in the world. A superficial examination of the world today reveals that there is poverty, that this poverty has real consequences for living-standards and life-expectancies, and that we do have global markets and capitalism in most of the world. Careful analysis shows that capitalism has truly lessened the severity of poverty over time, and that the main problem with capitalism in most nations is that it has too many elements of government regulation and cronyism. Pope Francis and Cardinal Maradiaga have good intentions, but their anti-capitalistic beliefs are unfounded. Their campaign against global capitalism endangers the poorest people of the world.

### Enviro

#### Studies prove markets and income are key to the environment – It’s more likely to create a mindset shift than the alt

**Taylor 3**

Director of Natural Resource Studies 0at Cato Institute, Jerry Taylor, “Happy Earth Day? Thank Capitalism,” New York Sun, April 2 20032, http://www.cato.org/dailys/04-23-03-2.html

Earth Day is traditionally a day for the Left -- a celebration of government's ability to deliver the environmental goods and for threats about the parade of horribles that will descend upon us lest we rededicate ourselves to federal regulators and public land managers. This is unfortunate because it's businessmen -- not bureaucrats or environmental activists -- who deserve most of the credit for the environmental gains over the past century and who represent the best hope for a Greener tomorrow. Indeed, we wouldn't even have environmentalists in our midst were it not for capitalism. Environmental amenities, after all, are luxury goods. America -- like much of the Third World today -- had no environmental movement to speak of until living standards rose sufficiently so that we could turn our attention from simply providing for food, shelter, and a reasonable education to higher "quality of life" issues. The richer you are, the more likely you are to be an environmentalist. And people wouldn't be rich without capitalism. Wealth not only breeds environmentalists, it begets environmental quality. There are dozens of studies showing that, as per capita income initially rises from subsistence levels, air and water pollution increases correspondingly. But once per capita income hits between $3,500 and $15,000 (dependent upon the pollutant), the ambient concentration of pollutants begins to decline just as rapidly as it had previously increased. This relationship is found for virtually every significant pollutant in every single region of the planet. It is an iron law. Given that wealthier societies use more resources than poorer societies, such findings are indeed counterintuitive. But the data don't lie. How do we explain this? The obvious answer -- that wealthier societies are willing to trade-off the economic costs of government regulation for environmental improvements and that poorer societies are not -- is only partially correct. In the [US] United States, pollution declines generally predated the passage of laws mandating pollution controls. In fact, for most pollutants, declines were greater before the federal government passed its panoply of environmental regulations than after the EPA came upon the scene. Much of this had to do with individual demands for environmental quality. People who could afford cleaner-burning furnaces, for instance, bought them. People who wanted recreational services spent their money accordingly, creating profit opportunities for the provision of untrammeled nature. Property values rose in cleaner areas and declined in more polluted areas, shifting capital from Brown to Green investments. Market agents will supply whatever it is that people are willing to spend money on. And when people are willing to spend money on environmental quality, the market will provide it.

### Warming

#### The market system solves warming

Posadas, 2012:

(Capitalism, Not Collectivism, Will Be Key To Carbon Mitigation. 12/12/2012. Dennis Posadas, Staff Writer For Forbes And The Asia-Based Fellow Of The Washington, D.C.-Based Climate Institute.)

Free market economics, sometimes blamed unfairly as the cause of climate change, can be the key to solving it. It is, after all, really a question of technology and costs: the use of fossil fuels, and not economic activity, is to blame for climate change. If we were all doing business with cheap stable renewable energy and energy efficient loads while earning steady profits, would we even be having this discussion? Capitalism spurs innovation and the development of new tools, and perhaps we have not fully utilized its full potential. One such emerging tool is the voluntary carbon emission market, a place where corporations voluntarily buy emission credits to offset their own carbon emissions without regard for any requirement like a carbon cap. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol Carbon Development Mechanism (CDM for short, commonly referred to as “carbon credits”), the voluntary market does not rely on a treaty that mandates emission cuts for its survival. For its 2012 report, [Bloomberg New Energy Finance](http://bnef.com/WhitePapers/view/112) said that U.S. companies purchased more voluntary carbon offsets than any other country, to support American climate change projects in the absence of a U.S. federal cap and trade scheme. For example, large companies like [Google](http://static.googleusercontent.com/external_content/untrusted_dlcp/www.google.com/en/green/pdfs/google-carbon-offsets.pdf) and [GM](http://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2012/06/07/gm-us-companies-lead-way-corporate-carbon-offsets) purchase emissions credits from the carbon markets to allow them to claim that their overall carbon emissions is zero. These credits then help fund other renewable energy and energy efficiency projects to displace or lessen the need for fossil fuels as companies tap these markets in the same way they tap the financial markets to fund their activities. While some have criticized offsets as giving buyers a license to continue polluting, nevertheless it remains an important tool for funding carbon mitigation and adaptation activities. As an analogy, do we argue that people exercise so that they can stuff themselves during the holidays? Probably not. A successful voluntary carbon market will reduce the need for the U.S. government to spend taxpayer money on carbon mitigation and adaptation, as the success of a voluntary carbon market ensures funding for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. This in turn reduces the deficit, but still ensures funding for the clean energy and energy efficiency sector. It drives green employment, such as people who will install solar panels on rooftops, do energy audits, or help install and maintain wind turbines, thus generating its own economic multiplier effect.

### War

**Cap solves war**

**Bandow 05**

<Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, REASON ONLINE, “A Capitalist Peace?”, October 26, 2005 (http://www.reason.com/news/show/32985.html accessed: June 26, 2009)>

There are a number of reasons why economics appears to trump politics. The shift from statist mercantilism to high-tech capitalism has transformed the economics behind war. Markets generate economic opportunities that make war less desirable. Territorial aggrandizement no longer provides the best path to riches. Free-flowing capital markets and other aspects of globalization simultaneously draw nations together and raise the economic price of military conflict, because the political destabilization resulting from war deters profitable investment and trade. Moreover, sanctions, which interfere with economic prosperity, provides a coercive step short of war to achieve foreign policy ends.

**Empirics confirm**

**Bandow 05**

<Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, REASON ONLINE, “A Capitalist Peace?”, October 26, 2005 (http://www.reason.com/news/show/32985.html accessed: June 26, 2009)>

In particular, poorer democracies perform like non-democracies. By his calculation, the correlation between economic liberty and peace is 50 times as great as that between democracy and peace. He explains: "Democracy does not have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are 14 times more prone to conflict than those with very high levels." Gartzke considers other variables, including alliance memberships, nuclear deterrence, and regional differences. Although the causes of conflict vary, the relationship between economic liberty and peace remains.

### Miller

#### Framing issue, his impacts rely on crony capitalism which is not inevitable. The aff is a reform from within.

Miller, 2011:

Miller, Ethan L., "Rethinking Economy for Regional Development: Ontology, Performativity, and Enabling Frameworks for Participatory Vision and Action" (). Masters Theses. Paper 630. <http://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/630>, 2011

The basic premise of this thesis is that the stories we tell **about the world** make a difference. Rather than simply being descriptive accounts of an objective "reality," our concepts and theories play an active role in shaping the worlds that we live in. Ideas do not determine our worlds; nor do they fabricate them from nothing (it is not all a "language game"), but they can and do sometimes play a profound role in helping to bring them into being. What we think the world is made of, and how we think it all works, influences what we imagine, what we desire, and what we decide to make and do. Our concepts of "economy" and "economic development" are no exception. The current dynamics and institutions that constitute our economic lives are not written into the laws of nature; they are, rather, produced by specific historical processes in which our ideas about "the economy" have played a crucial role. This implies that the construction of different--more equitable, cooperative, democratic and ecologically-sound--economic relationships cannot simply be a matter of finding ways to cope differently with the overwhelming and demanding presence that we call "the economy." It must involve an interrogation of the very nature of this thing, our assumptions about what it is and how it works, and about the ways that these assumptions shape our sense of agency and possibility. As Gibson-Graham writes provocatively, "it is the way capitalism has been 'thought' that has made it so difficult for people to imagine its supersession" (2006a, 4). Theories of regional economic development, as I will argue in Chapter 1, have contributed to constructing a widely-shared set of assumptions about economic ontology (what "the economy" is and how it works) 1 that channel energy and imagination into a constricted set of options for communities to pursue. Facing an apparently omnipresent, ever-demanding, weather-like (often "global") economy, people in regions around the world often feel forced to take actions in the name of necessary growth and competition that otherwise undermine their fundamental values: to create jobs, to increase income, to attract capital, to "win" in the "global marketplace," regions clearcut their forests, tear apart their mountains, drain their rivers, sell off public lands and resources, slash social programs and public-interest laws, **lower minimum wages**, or outsource all of these forms of violence to other regions in order to maintain an attractive, competitive "quality of life" for wealthy consumer-citizens. The seeming necessity of these dynamics--the sense of their inevitability--is produced, in significant part, by the way that economy has been "thought," by the ways in which discourses of regional economic development have constructed and successfully promoted a concept of economy and development that make such ethical trade-offs appear as part of the fabric of nature itself. This thesis will challenge such a conception of economy and development and explore other pathways for thinking that might open up space for politics. Indeed, this is a thoroughly political project, grounded in my commitment to the work of imagining and building more equitable, democratic, ecologically-sound, and loving ways of living together. Another regional development is possible, I believe, and I hope to contribute to its creation and institution. My points of intervention in this project are quite specific: recognizing the power of economic ontologies to shape and channel our imagination and action, I seek to interrogate conventional accounts of economy, to understand more fully what it means to "perform" other economies into being, and to explore some alternative ontologies that might be useful in facilitating participatory inquiry into other economic possibilities. While much of this thesis is theoretical, approaching economic discourse on a quite abstract level, its focus remains oriented toward action. For as will be made evident in my work on performativity in Chapter 2, we make our worlds only partially through the strategic use of ideas and discourses. Economies are produced by stories, but not by stories alone. To be made real, stories--ontologies--must ultimately be enacted by people who have put down the books (or theses), rolled up their sleeves and gotten down to the work of building a common world. This is true for the ontologies of the currently dominant paradigm of economic development, and it is true for the other forms of livelihood that are already growing--and might yet grow more--in our midst.

## Fem

Living wage empowers women

**Riordan 13** writes[[137]](#footnote-137)

**Living wage is a feminist issue. Feminists** from the second wave on through present day **have strived for** the **independence of women**, and our right to choose our own lifestyles and careers, and to do so without being dependent on men. If we truly believe each woman should be able to live her life freely and as she chooses we need to raise the minimum wage to a living wage. When **someone** is **not paid a living wage** they **cannot afford to pay for housing** and **food** and **childcare and healthcare**. Instead they must make choices between all of these, prioritizing some over others. **For a woman paid less than a living wage birth control** is not a basic medical expense, it **is a luxury**. And **without birth control it is harder to control the** size and **future of one’s family, something that dramatically impacts one’s economic reality**. Healthcare decisions are harder, and for many people healthcare isn’t a reality at all. Childcare decisions are complicated, and women making minimum wage are more likely to work multiple jobs to make ends meet. Women work 2/3 of minimum wage jobs. If we want women to have the freedom to live their lives as they choose and to do so independently, we need to pay women a living wage.

Perm, do both. Their link cards only prove some people had sexist justifications for the aff, not that the aff itself is sexist.

Women are the primary beneficiaries of a minimum wage increase and low-wage work is an extension of patriarchy

**Konczal 14** writes[[138]](#footnote-138)

The **minimum wage affects women disproportionally**, especially women of color. According to the Center for American Progress, more than 64 percent of those earning the minimum wage or less are women. African American and Latina women are 15.8 and 16.5 percent of female minimum wage earners, respectively, though only about 12.5 percent of employed workers. **Women are increasingly breadwinners or co-breadwinners** in many households, **and a higher minimum wage will allow** for **a family of three to be raised out of povert**y on one full-time salary. Almost 80 percent of minimum wage earners are more than twenty years old. According to researchers at the Economic Policy Institute, the average worker affected by a $10.10 minimum wage hike would be thirty-five years old, with more than half working full-time. Twenty-eight percent of these workers have children. So this is not just a matter for teenagers without dependents. It is important to understand how **the service industry evolved from** of **a traditional vision of women’s role** in the economy. The historian Bethany Moreton has argued that the **emergence of Wal-Mart’s low-wage workforce can be seen as an extension of women’s perceived duty to care and serve. Without institutional mechanisms** to ensure that service jobs and care work are compensated at breadwinner salaries**, women’s wages will remain low**. This obstacle to gender equality will certainly worsen given that these same sectors are projected to generate the most jobs in the future, which will drive down wages for those employed in them. An increase in the minimum wage would buttress pay in these sectors enough to provide for single people and for families.

The kritik is heteronormative which is an independent reason to reject it. Saying that a living wage is inherently tied to the male breadwinner model doesn’t account for gay or lesbian families who’d benefit.

## Eugenics K (Greenhill)

1. Non-unique. They don’t have an alternative, and the status quo doesn’t solve the ideology of eugenics.

2. The ideology of eugenics manifests in embracing that minimum wage hikes cause unemployment, which my aff didn’t do

Their authors **Bernstein and Leonard 9** write[[139]](#footnote-139)

Minimum-wage legislation, passed by several states beginning with Massachusetts in 1912,51 was the sine qua non of progressive labor reform, and progressive economists championed minimum wages. But **eugenically minded progressives** advocated minimum wages precisely because binding minimums would cause job losses.52 They **argued that minimum-wage-induced job loss was a social benefit because it performed the eugenic service of ridding the labor force of the “unemployable**.**” Sidney and Beatrice Webb**, as ever, **put it** plainly**: “**With regard to certain sections of the population [the unemployable], this **unemployment is not a mark of social disease, but** actually of **social health.”**53 “[O]f all ways of dealing with these unfortunate parasites,” Sidney Webb opined, “the most ruinous to the community is to allow them unrestrainedly to compete as wage earners . . . .”54 Columbia’s Henry Rogers Seager, future AEA president and a leading progressive economist, argued that deserving workers needed protection from the “wearing competition of the casual worker and the drifter” and from the other “defectives” who drag down the wages of more deserving workers.55 The minimum wage protects deserving workers from the competition of the unfit by making it illegal to work for less: “The operation of the minimum wage requirement would merely extend the definition of defectives to embrace all individuals, who even after having received special training, remain incapable of adequate self-support,”56 that is, of earning a living wage.

3. Perm, do the aff and reject the ideology of eugenics. Eugenics isn’t inherent to living wage, just the flawed rationale some people had for it.

While we should remember the minimum wage’s eugenic past, we must also realize that that doesn’t affect how the minimum wage is presented today

**Geloso 10** writes[[140]](#footnote-140)

So even if there was a social cost to the minimum wage through less employment and lower output, it was outweighed, as the former president of the Association of American Economists A. B Wolfe said, by the elimination of those "who are a burden on society." A similar logic applied to the capping of work hours, the Immigration Restriction Act (which increased quotas for "race importation") of 1924 under President Coolidge that was advocated by Irving Fisher, and the regulation of working conditions. It always came back to the necessity of excluding certain population groups so they would not lower the genetic makeup of a community and foster its decadence and destruction. **Since World War II**, with the horrors of Nazi Germany, **eugenics has completely disappeared from the mainstream academic community**. Academic papers like the Journal of Eugenics, Eugenics Review, and Applied Eugenics have disappeared, and **the Eugenics Society is less than a shadow of its former self**. However, some of the policies they proposed, like the minimum wage, remain alive today. **The minimum wage is today presented** as a tool **for providing anyone with a decent wage, regardless of racial origin, and** its level **is** always **calculated by government officials** so as **to produce the least** possible **distortion of employment. Still, when analyzing ideas, it is worth remembering who first bandied them about, and their reasons** for doing so.

4. Their second Bernstein and Leonard card’s about immigration, not the minimum wage. Even if eugenic ideology is still present, it’s declining overall; that’s Geloso 10.

5. Crichton’s irrelevant. If I win that my aff doesn’t rely on eugenic ideology, then it doesn’t use vague terminology to conceal an ulterior motive.

## Util K (Greenhill)

1. No link and turn—Baker is miscut—their author says util is the exact opposite of racist neoconservatism

**Baker 8** writes[[141]](#footnote-141)

**If the aim of** the social philosophy called “**util**itarianism” **is “the greatest happiness of the greatest number,”** then **the neoconservative slogan runs directly contrary to util**itarianism**.** For, the **neocons have always desired the greatest happiness for the smallest elite of the fittest members of American society. “Fit”** here**, within a**n American **politics of race, means that those who should be most rewarded by** supply-side, **free market, capitalistic polity are educated**, even intellectual, savvy, **white men with a knack for seizing the** main **chance**. “Fit” implies most of all an explicit form of societal-ethnic cleansing in the endeavors, think tanks, corporatism, and racial politics of American neoconservatism.

Miscutting evidence is an independent reason to drop them. They’ve killed academic integrity; to quote their NC, “the judge is an educator, and this is a teachable moment.”

2. Non-unique. Bennett runs util all the time, so he’s only indicting my performance for strategic benefit. If performances matter, he should be dropped just as much as me.

3. TURN—Non-utilitarian theories make debate unsafe by preventing us from minimizing the suffering of others.

4. TURN—Util avoids abstraction because util calc requires a sound understanding of material facts.

5. The role of the ballot is to decide whether a living wage policy is a good idea.

1. Aff choice. Provides a stasis point which forces the neg to clash.

2. Predictable limits. There’s unlimited roles of the ballot and kritik alts. Topic focus is the only way to create a limited lit base which makes research possible.

3. Time skew. His framework moots the AC and forces a 1AR restart.

These all turn his education claims because they’re pre-requisites to effective dialogue.

## Util K (Varun)

### Framing

If I win any reason the K is false, vote neg; 4 reasons.

1. Accusations that I’m making debate unsafe shouldn’t be taken lightly. Make him commit to this argument.

2. Dropping him deters false accusations of making debate unsafe which trade off with more legitimate efforts in the activity.

3. My arguments prove util should be the preferred framework. He doesn’t have util offense, so at that point you can only negate.

4. It’s key to compensate for the time I spent responding. Otherwise it’s no-risk for the aff.

### AT Intrinsic Value

Util wouldn’t entail rampant racism in practice. Very few things cause more suffering than racism, and a choice between racism and those kinds of suffering doesn’t arise for most decision-makers.

K is false. [Needs retagging]

**Pettit 99** writes[[142]](#footnote-142)

**It is usually said** against **consequentialism** that it would lead an agent to do horrendous deeds, so long as they promised the best consequences. It **would forbid nothing absolutely**: not rape, not torture, not even murder. **This** charge is on target but it **is only relevant** of course **in horrendous circumstances**. Thus if someone of ordinary values condoned torture, that would only be in circumstances where there was a great potential gain – the saving of innocent lives, the prevention of a catastrophe – and where there were not the bad consequences involved, say, in state authorities claiming the right to torture. Once it is clear that the charge is relevant only in horrendous circumstances, it ceases to be clearly damaging. After all **the non-consequentialist will** often **have to defend an equally unattractive response** in such circumstances. **It may be awful to think of torturing** someone **but it must be equally awful to** think of not doing so and **consequently allow**ing, say, **a massive bomb to go off in some public place.**

If the alt prevents us from minimizing the suffering of others, it makes debate unsafe. Non-utilitarian theories often rely on the act-omission distinction which justifies being complicit in structural violence.

Util can account for characteristically deontological rules without deeming them correct for deontological reasons

**Yudkowsky 8** writes[[143]](#footnote-143)

But if you are running on corrupted hardware, then the reflective observation that it seems like a righteous and altruistic act to seize power for yourself—this seeming may not be be much evidence for the proposition that seizing power is in fact the action that will most benefit the tribe. By the power of naive realism, the corrupted hardware that you run on, and the corrupted seemings that it computes, will seem like the fabric of the very world itself—simply the way-things-are. And so we have the bizarre-seeming rule: "For the good of the tribe, do not cheat to seize power even when it would provide a net benefit to the tribe." Indeed it may be wiser to phrase it this way: If you just say, "when it seems like it would provide a net benefit to the tribe", then you get people who say, "But it doesn't just seem that way—it would provide a net benefit to the tribe if I were in charge." The notion of untrusted hardware seems like something wholly outside the realm of classical decision theory. (What it does to reflective decision theory I can't yet say, but that would seem to be the appropriate level to handle it.) But on a human level, the patch seems straightforward. Once you know about the warp, you create rules that describe the warped behavior and outlaw it. A rule that says, "For the good of the tribe, do not cheat to seize power even for the good of the tribe." Or "For the good of the tribe, do not murder even for the good of the tribe." And now **the philosopher comes and presents their "thought experiment**"—setting up a scenario **in which**, by stipulation, **the only possible way to save five** innocentlives **is to murder one** innocent person**, and this** murder **is certain to save the five** lives. "There's a train heading to run over five innocent people, who you can't possibly warn to jump out of the way, but you can push one innocent person into the path of the train, which will stop the train. These are your only options; what do you do?" An altruistic human, who has accepted certain deontological prohibits—which seem well justified by some historical statistics on the results of reasoning in certain ways on untrustworthy hardware—may experience some mental distress, on encountering this thought experiment. So **here's a reply to that** philosopher's **scenario**, which I have yet to hear any philosopher's victim give**: "You stipulate that** the only possible way to save five innocent lives is to murder one innocent person, and **this murder will definitely save the five** lives, **and that these facts are known to me with effective certainty. But since I am running on corrupted hardware, I can't occupy the epistemic state you want me to imagine**. Therefore I reply that, in a society of Artificial Intelligences worthy of personhood and lacking any inbuilt tendency to be corrupted by power, it would be right for the AI to murder the one innocent person to save five, and moreover all its peers would agree. However, I refuse to extend this reply to myself, because the epistemic state you ask me to imagine, can only exist among other kinds of people than human beings." Now, to me this seems like a dodge. I think the universe is sufficiently unkind that we can justly be forced to consider situations of this sort. The sort of person who goes around proposing that sort of thought experiment, might well deserve that sort of answer. But any human legal system does embody some answer to the question "How many innocent people can we put in jail to get the guilty ones?", even if the number isn't written down. **As a human, I try to abide by** the **deontological prohibitions that humans have made to live in peace** with one another. **But I don't think** that our **deontological prohibitions are** literally **inherently nonconsequentially terminally right**. I endorse "the end doesn't justify the means" as a principle to guide humans running on corrupted hardware, but I wouldn't endorse it as a principle for a society of AIs that make well-calibrated estimates. (If you have one AI in a society of humans, that does bring in other considerations, like whether the humans learn from your example.) And so I wouldn't say that a well-designed Friendly AI must necessarily refuse to push that one person off the ledge to stop the train. Obviously, I would expect any decent superintelligence to come up with a superior third alternative. But if those are the only two alternatives, and the FAI judges that it is wiser to push the one person off the ledge—even after taking into account knock-on effects on any humans who see it happen and spread the story, etc.—then I don't call it an alarm light, if an AI says that the right thing to do is sacrifice one to save five. Again, I don't go around pushing people into the paths of trains myself, nor stealing from banks to fund my altruistic projects. I happen to be a human. But for a Friendly AI to be corrupted by power would be like it starting to bleed red blood. The tendency to be corrupted by power is a specific biological adaptation, supported by specific cognitive circuits, built into us by our genes for a clear evolutionary reason. It wouldn't spontaneously appear in the code of a Friendly AI any more than its transistors would start to bleed. I would even go further, and say that if you had minds with an inbuilt warp that made them overestimate the external harm of self-benefiting actions, then they would need a rule "the ends do not prohibit the means"—that you should do what benefits yourself even when it (seems to) harm the tribe. By hypothesis, if their society did not have this rule, the minds in it would refuse to breathe for fear of using someone else's oxygen, and they'd all die. For them, an occasional overshoot in which one person seizes a personal benefit at the net expense of society, would seem just as cautiously virtuous—and indeed be just as cautiously virtuous—as when one of us humans, being cautious, passes up an opportunity to steal a loaf of bread that really would have been more of a benefit to them than a loss to the merchant (including knock-on effects). **"The end does not justify the means" is just consequentialist reasoning** at **one meta-level up**. If a human starts thinking on the object level that the end justifies the means, this has awful consequences given our untrustworthy brains; therefore a human shouldn't think this way. But it is all still ultimately consequentialism. It's just reflective consequentialism, for beings who know that their moment-by-moment decisions are made by untrusted hardware.

Absolutism can justify racism also. For example, a non-consequentialist theory could allow hate speech because the right to free speech is inviolable.

**Absolutism fails. It can’t explain empirical uncertainty. Inviolable rules like the aff’s may sound nice, but they can’t be action-guiding.**

**Jackson and Smith 6**

Frank Jackson (Australian National University) and Michael Smith (Princeton). “Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty.” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 103, No. 6 (June 2006), pp. 267-283. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20619943

A skier is heading in a direction you know for sure will trigger an avalanche that will kill ten people. You know the only way to save the ten people is for you to shoot him. The probability that the skier intends to trigger the avalanche and kill the ten people is 1-p. We can agree that our target absolutist theory says it is right for you to shoot if it is certain that the skier intends to kill the ten, that is, if p = 0, for in that case you would not be killing someone innocent—you would be protecting the ten in the only way possible from an unprovoked attack. We can agree that our target theory says that it would be wrong for you to shoot if you are certain he simply happens to be skiing in that direction, that is, if p = 1, for then you would be intentionally killing someone innocent, and that is never right no matter how many you will be allowing to die by your failure to shoot. The number of lives that would be saved in the example as described is ten, but of course the distinctive position of absolutism is that the number does not matter: it is never right intentionally to kill the innocent no matter how many lives would be saved by doing so. Our question is, What should the theory say for other values of p? III. THE INFINITE DISVALUE APPROACH Perhaps the simplest absolutist answer to our question is to hold that whenever there is any chance that an action violates an absolute prohibition, the action ought not to be performed. This is the answer suggested by the absolutists' case against early stage abortion summarized above. In our example, the answer would prohibit shooting the skier whenever there is any chance that he is innocent, whenever, that is, p < 1. One way of implementing this answer is to assign infinite disvalue to intentionally killing the innocent and some finite disvalue to allowing people to die. For then the expected disvalue of the shooting—that is, the product of the disvalue of intentionally killing the innocent times the chance that the shooting is an intentional killing of the innocent—will exceed the disvalue of allowing others to die, no matter how many others die and how certain it is that they will die, provided there is some chance that the shooting is indeed an intentional killing of the innocent. It will, on this approach, be impossible to make the action that has some chance of being the intentional killing of someone innocent the right thing to do by making the number allowed to die by refraining from shooting large enough—the numbers allowed to die will be irrelevant, just as absolutists typically say.6 The trouble with this response is that there is nearly always some greater than zero chance that someone is innocent. All the evidence may be against them, but induction from the past record of over turned verdicts in cases that looked watertight at the time tells us that there is nearly always some chance that someone who looks clearly to be guilty is in fact innocent. We will get the result that it is never, or hardly ever, right to shoot the skier. Indeed, it will be hard to find any cases where it is right intentionally to kill someone as there is always some chance that the someone is innocent, and a small chance times an infinite disvalue equals an infinite dis value. We will have a quick (too quick) argument from absolutism against intentionally killing the innocent to an extreme kind of personal pacifism.

A racist deontologist could wrongly claim black people aren’t rational in the same way they’d oppose animal rights because animals aren’t rational. If what actual deontologists say is justified means this is irrelevant, then what actual utilitarians say is justified means his kritik is also irrelevant.

No internal link to safe spaces. Policy debate is almost universally util, and it’s not more unsafe than LD is.

Util can account for intrinsic value of an action

**Williams 73** writes[[144]](#footnote-144)

[Brackets for gendered language] To insist that what has intrinsic value is states of affairs and not actions seems to come near an important feature of consequentialism. Yet it may be that we have still not hit exactly what we want, and that the restriction is now too severe. Surely some actions, compatibly with consequentialism, might have intrinsic value? This is a question which has a special interest for utilitarianism, that is to say, the form of consquentialism concerned particularly with happiness. Traditionally utilitarians have tended to regard happiness or, again, pleasure, as experiences or sensations which were related to actions and activity as effect to cause; and, granted that view, utilitarianism will indeed see the value of all action as derivative, intrinsic value being reserved for the experiences of happiness. But that view of the relations between action and either pleasure or happiness is widely recognized to be inadequate. **To say that a [hu]man finds certain actions** or activity **pleasant**, or that they make him happy, or that he finds his happiness in them, **is certainly not always to say that they induce certain sensations** in him, and in the case of happiness, it is doubtful whether that is ever what is meant. Rather it means such things (among others) as that **[s]he enjoys doing these things for their own sake**. It would trivialize the discussion of utilitarianism to tie it by definition to inadequate conceptions of happiness or pleasure, and **we must** be able to **recognize** as **versions of util**itarianism those **which**, as most modern versions do, **take as central** some notion such as **satisfaction**, and connect that criterially with such matters as the activities which a man will freely choose to engage in. But the **activities which a [hu]man engages in for their own sake are activities in which [s]he finds intrinsic value**. So any specification of consequentialism which logically debars action or activity from having intrinsic value will be too restrictive even to admit the central case, utilitarianism, so soon as that takes on a more sophisticated and adequate conception of its basic value of happiness.

### Extinction 1st

If the choice were actually racism versus extinction, extinction is clearly worse. They’d intuitively oppose a policy that might cause some racism but will certainly prevent the death of every single person because our brains can’t understand the scope of the harm of extinction. Util solves scope insensitivity, that’s Yudkowsky 8.

Our intuition that genocide is wrong requires minimizing existential risks

**Bostrom 13** writes[[145]](#footnote-145)

We might also consider the issue from a less theoretical standpoint and try to form an evaluation instead by considering analogous cases about which we have definite moral intuitions. Thus, for example, **if we feel** confident **that committing a small genocide is wrong, and that** committing **a large genocide is no less wrong, we might conjecture that committing omnicide is also wrong**. And if we believe we have some moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a small number of people, and a stronger moral reason to prevent natural catastrophes that would kill a larger number of people, we might conjecture that **we have a**n even **strong**er **moral reason to prevent catastrophes that would kill the entire human population.**

### AT Kant Alt

Kantianism can’t account for racism

**Yankah 12** writes[[146]](#footnote-146)

A republican theory of criminal law which focuses on civic excellence brings into stark relief another feature of modern criminal law which is insufﬁciently emphasized by a Kantian ﬁxation on individual rights. **No fair minded observer can fail to be** deeply **unsettled by** the deep **racial and class divide** reﬂected **in** our **criminal justice** system. From any remove, the modern penal system increasingly looks like an administrative system of social control aimed at the Black, Brown and poor. Whatever one’s individual views on the source of this inequality—a history of deep racism, structural discrimination, maliciousness by those in power or pathos within minority and poor communities—no one should doubt that this disparity is a matter of deep concern and erodes trust both within minority communities and generally. **Because a Kantian view focuses** nearly **exclusively on** the **individual rights** of each individual citizen**, it obscures the complaint of** so many **minority communities infuriated that they are the subject of disproportionate police monitoring and punishment even when engaged in identical behavior** (Yankah 2011:21). The deep racial and class factionalism in the application of criminal law, reﬂected in the ways our laws are drafted, policed and enforced is one of the most disturbing stains in our current criminal law practices. **Ripstein’s Kantian picture** may have the resources to address this but that it does not bring this into relief illustrates an important way in which the Kantian picture **is incomplete.** Indeed, one important beneﬁt to highlighting our civic bonds is that it highlights the way in which the overly broad reliance on criminal law as a (some would say ‘‘the’’) method of social control is dangerous and deﬁcient.

## Phil K (Greenhill)

### General

#### The role of the ballot is to decide whether a living wage policy is a good idea.

#### 1. Aff choice. Provides a stasis point which forces the neg to clash.

#### 2. Predictable limits. There’s unlimited roles of the ballot and kritik alts. Topic focus is the only way to create a limited lit base which makes research possible.

#### 3. Time skew. His framework moots the AC and forces a 1AR restart.

#### These all turn his education claims because they’re pre-requisites to effective dialogue.

#### This role of the ballot isn’t an “artificial requirement” if I have warrants for it. There’s also plenty of topic lit about racism, so I don’t exclude their discussions.

#### No link and perm, do both. Civic republicanism isn’t white political philosophy.

#### 2 warrants.

#### a. Civic republicanism accounts for the realities of oppression

**Marti 13** writes[[147]](#footnote-147)

**Civic republicanism has a** very **simple idea: we must** avoid or **minimize domination** in the world. No matter what kind of domination, no matter what source, no matter who is being dominated and by whom. We must minimize domination, being careful of not producing a greater domination in the process. To do so is to empower the weak, while controlling and restricting the powerful. According to this view, the source of all political evils is the imbalance of power that makes domination possible. Power, of course, comes not only from economic means – although obviously these are very effective. **Power may come**, for instance, **from** unequal access to information, from **cultural inequalities,** from **sexist cultural patterns, and** from **many** other **sources**. **Socialists are** traditionally **concerned about workers’ exploitation** by the owners of the means of production. So are republicans. **Feminists are concerned about gender and domination**. So are republicans. **Multiculturalists are concerned about** the **domination of cultural or religious minorities** by their majoritarian counterparts. **So are republicans**. Democrats want more transparency, accountability, and opportunities for political engagement and popular control by citizens. So do republicans. And republicans, in addition, are concerned about many other issues: the discrimination faced by the LGBT community, consumers at the mercy of retailers or companies, web users at the mercy of providers or regulatory states, children at the mercy of their parents or teachers, the elder at the mercy of younger disrespectful citizens, the kid being bullied by a classmate at school, the prisoner abused by his jail mates or by the prison authorities, etc. The varieties of domination are almost infinite. According to republicans, being subject to alien control constitutes domination even if such an influence is benevolent or well-intentioned. **The mere fact of being at the mercy of others is a case of domination**. And this is the opposite of being free. Freedom is the central republican value. But freedom understood in this particular way, as the absence of domination. This is one of the respects in which republicanism is different from liberalism, which traditionally favours a negative idea of freedom. When I am under the arbitrary power or alien control of others, I am subordinated. They may or may not actually interfere in my life. But I am being dominated, even if I believe that I am free. The idea is, again, quite simple. **To be free is to enjoy** an **equal social and political status** and an equal protection by the law. As Philip Pettit puts it, free persons – according to this republican view – are those who “can speak their minds, walk tall among their fellows, and look others squarely in the eye. They can command respect from those with whom they deal, not being subject to their arbitrary interference” (José Luis Martí and Philip Pettit, A Political Philosophy in Public Life, page 38). The forms of domination can be separated into two main sources: i) private agents, like individual citizens, criminal organizations, religious communities, corporations and companies, unions, other civil associations, etc; and ii) public agents or institutions, like governments – our own or a foreign government – any type of public institution including the agencies of the administration but also the corporations owned by the government, international organizations, and even institutions with no agency, such as cultural patterns or structures, etc. According to Pettit, the first task **to avoid private domination** is “to firm up the infrastructure of nondomination, providing as far as possible for a resilient economy, a reliable rule of law, an inclusive knowledge system, a sound health system, and a sustainable environment”. But **the republican government**, according to him, **must** also do at least three other things: **empower**ing **the weak by giving them** the **resources of basic functioning**, protecting all citizens through the law from both internal and external enemies, and regulating and restricting the powerful. Republicanism, in contrast to liberalism, is not suspicious of governmental intervention. On the contrary, there is a belief that the government and the law is the only way to achieve the goal of reducing significant private domination. But the government itself must be subject to control and regulations in order to avoid the risk of public domination, the arbitrary power of public agents. This is why constitutional arrangements with separation of powers, some kind of federalism, a judicially enforceable bill of rights, the rule of law, and other traditional legal strategies are needed. Isn’t it appealing? But how do we apply it? If civic republicanism is really to be our North Star, it must be able to guide us through the world as it stands. Is it able to do that?

#### b. Civic republicanism provides key philosophical tools for addressing racism

**Feldman 92** writes[[148]](#footnote-148)

To a great extent, **King's beloved community corresponds to the common good of civic republicanism**. 2°9 **Both can be envisioned simultaneously** as a moral attitude and as a normative goal.210 One who believes in the beloved community, as well as one who believes in the common good, will manifest an attitude of caring for others when focused on public issues.211 At the same time, the beloved community and the common good provide a standard for individuals and the community to strive for in political discussion and action. These parallels between the beloved community and the common good suggest that King's efforts to substantively define the beloved community might provide insight into the content of the common good. 212 At the outset, though, one must recognize that neither the beloved community nor the common good has a static or objective content. The beloved community always remains an ideal, never fully realized, and indeed never fully and certainly defined.213 Similarly, the common good should never be understood as having a fixed or objective meaning. As already discussed, the common good is best conceived as an interpretive concept whose meaning constantly emerges anew depending upon the changing historical circumstances. 214 Therefore, King and civic republicans should not be criticized for failing to specify definitively the content of the beloved community or the common good.2 15 Those meanings can only emerge in concrete historical contexts, and even then, the meanings must be open and tentative. 216 Despite this caveat, King's efforts to define the beloved community can inform our understanding of the common good. Although King wrote over twenty years ago, the unfortunate reality is that **the nonwhite poor have not significantly improved their position relative to the rest of** American **society**.217 Thus, many of King's observations and recommendations remain as true today as they were during King's life. King insisted that we must radically restructure "the whole of American society" in order to move towards the beloved community. 218 The two pillars of the reconstructed America must be racial and economic justice.219 King stated that "the largest portion of white America is still poisoned by racism, which is as native to our soil as pine trees, sagebrush and buffalo grass. '220 Thus, in America, the eradication of racism is a moral imperative:221 our goal, ultimately, must be to "respect the dignity and worth of all human personality. ' 222 With regard to economic justice, **King argued for** "**an economic bill of rights**. '22 3 To eliminate poverty, we must "guarantee a job to all people who want to work and are able to work, ' 2 2 4 and "also guarantee an income for all who are not able to work. ' 225 These economic reforms, according to King, would help alleviate the needs for improved housing and education for the nonwhite poor, but society must also directly allocate more resources to satisfy those latter needs. 226 Finally, King insisted that economic reforms should not be diluted or delayed because of any perceived costs to whites: quite simply, the justice of the beloved community is not subject to a costbenefit analysis. 227 King's personal experiences of social injustice and racism prevented him from being naive in his quest for the beloved community. 228 He understood the complexity of human nature, and he realized that the privileged usually resist threats to their power.229 He remained eternally wary of the human propensities for depravity and for greedy pursuit of self-interest, and consequently, as a matter of political tactics, he was not above adverting to convergencies between the interests of whites and African Americans. For example, King argued that the economic growth of the South required the eradication of racial discrimination and that discrimination deflated the nation in world opinion. 230 But King emphasized: "These are practical considerations all dictating one road. Yet above it all, a greater imperative demands fulfillment. Throughout our history, the moral decision has always been the correct decision. ' '231 Thus, the constitutional and political theory that emerges from King strongly resembles the realistic civic republicanism of the framers. The framers always remained committed to a government that pursues the common good, despite their recognition that factions would inevitably arise in a democracy. Likewise, King always remained committed to the beloved community, despite recognizing the human penchant for evil. 232 The framers believed that through political dialogue, the community can arrive at the common good, while King believed that through various forms of political dialogue, the community can push itself towards the ideal of the beloved community. The framers were not above using factionalism to preserve the republic: they structured the government so that the ever-present potential for factionalism would actually encourage governmental officials to pursue the common good. King, meanwhile, was not above occasionally using white self-interest if it would help build the beloved community, but he realized that pure self-interest ultimately is corrupt and therefore must be subordinated to morality and love. 233 **King not only echoed the framers**, however, **but** also **elaborated their civic republican vision**. He understood the divisiveness of racism as well as the need to take special steps to eradicate it. **He recognized the necessity of empowering all** individuals and groups throughout American society **so that they could participate in** the **political dialogue** that is the lifeblood **of the community**. And he realized that social justice and political equality de mand profound economic reforms, not minor or piecemeal remedies. In sum, King's personal experiences of racism and oppression imbued his civic republicanism with a realism far more stark than any known to the framers. CONCLUSION Racism is a debilitating sickness in the heart and blood of American society. It is the institutionalized subjugation of people of color. It is the unconscious yet nauseating images that infect every American mind. It is the concrete obstacle to economic prosperity, inhibiting the rational pursuit of material interests. It mortgages the future by undermining support for public education. Racism is pervasive, oppressive, and tenacious: it will not cure itself and just disappear. We must take racism seriously if we are to remedy this ultimate blight on America. To reduce racism, we must consistently hold it at the forefront of political discussion and constitutional theory. Social psychology research and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s writings suggest that we should support a constitutional and political theory that is **civic republican** in nature. Such a **theory would emphasize** the **elements necessary to reduce racism: belonging to a superordinate political community, dialogue among citizens, and** the **pursuit of the common good, not pure self-interest**. Most important, the dialogue must be open and inclusive: to generate concern for others and solidarity within a broad community, different subgroups must be empowered to participate in political discussions. **A civic republican approach thus neither entails** forced consensus and **conformity nor** the **destruction of minority cultures**. To the contrary, King and the social psychologists emphasize that **participation in a larger political community is consistent with belonging to a vital** subgroup or **subculture**. Moreover, subgroups provide divergent views or voices that potentially enrich and improve the communal dialogue.2 34 The nonwhite poor, consequently, might consider a dual strategy in their efforts to overcome racism and to achieve social justice. The primary approach would be to support **a civic republican** constitutional and political **theory**. In the long run, such a theory **is most likely to reduce racism, a prerequisite to social justice**. Nonetheless, the nonwhite poor might secondarily advert to white self-interest at especially opportune times. The social psychology evidence that suggests people act on an uncertain mixture of motivations, including self-interest,23 and King's tactical use of white selfinterest support the appropriateness of this approach. But, both King and social psychologists underscore that appeals to self-interest should not become the primary means to social justice; such a misconceived strategy would ultimately propagate racism and injustice. 236 Political pluralism (or conservatism), as recommended by Delgado, would eventually defeat the quest of the nonwhite poor for social justice. Thus, on any particular issue, the ideal political program would be one that appeals to the moral conscience of the entire political community by pursuing the common good, but that also coincides with the material interests of the white majority. 237

#### [Could be useful]

#### Civic republicanism doesn’t assimilate minority cultures like Anglo-conformity does

**McGrane 12** writes[[149]](#footnote-149)

In the early 1990s, liberal multiculturalism came under attack from sources such as MPs from the federal Progressive Conservative Party (PCs) and the federal Liberal Party, right-wing academics, the Bloc Québécois, and “fifth force” immigrant writers like Neil Bissoondath (Abu-Laban and Stasiulis 1992; Roy 1995). While the federal government’s response to this attack has been analyzed (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002; Ryan 2010), little attention has been paid to the effect that this attack had on multiculturalism at the provincial level. In Manitoba (and to lesser extent, Saskatchewan), the response to these attacks could be termed civic republicanism. Civic republicanism is a philosophical school of thought stretching back to the writings of Aristotle, Cicero, Machiavelli, and Rousseau. Iseult Honohan argues that **the idea “that citizens need to be concerned with the common good** and to take some personal responsibility for realising it **is one of the** longest-standing **themes of civic republicanism**, which flows from understanding citizens as engaged in a political community” (2002, 145). She argues that current debates of civic republicanism revolve around instilling civic virtue in citizens through encouraging their participation in society and politics. As an approach to managing ethnic diversity, **civic republicanism does not try to abolish** the existence of **diverse homeland cultures through assimilation as does Anglo-conformity**. However, unlike liberal multiculturalism, neither does civic republicanism place an emphasis on cultural preservation and cultural sharing. Rather, civic republicanism recognizes the individual’s right to retain his or her homeland culture but holds that the preservation of homeland culture should not be an important consideration of state policy. Rather, **the primary consideration is for the state to encourage cultural minorities to participate** and integrate **in**to **the polity** in order **to forge** a sense of **shared values**. The individual is encouraged to retain his or her homeland culture—but only to the extent that it does not interfere with his or her participation in the broader polity. At first glance, civic republicanism seems very similar to Quebec’s model of interculturalism. However, there is one crucial difference. Quebec interculturalism puts forth the idea that there is a dominant public culture with which new immigrants must participate because the civic Québécois nation, with its unique language, history, and culture, is the principal defining feature of Quebec society (Karmis 2004; Gagnon and Iacovino 2007). Conversely, Honohan argues that **civic republican polities need not be based on** the recognition of **an overarching nationality** but that **“republican solidarity is better understood as a commitment to** the **people with whom we are interdependent in the polity”** (2002, 281). Unlike Quebec interculturalism, there is no explicit mention of a dominant culture to which newcomers must integrate within the civic republicanism of Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Rather, similar to what Kernerman (2006) and Winter (2007) have found in the case of Canada, the province is held to a multicultural polity that supposedly has no single dominant culture within it. Government documents suggest that newcomers integrate into a pre-existing multicultural polity called “Manitoba” and “Saskatchewan” whose values and identity is the product of a multicultural history dating back to Confederation. Saskatchewan’s culture and Manitoba’s culture are, in their essence, multicultural. At the same time, there are clear suggestions that there are certain values, norms, and levels of participation that newcomers are expected to embrace and follow. As such, a newcomer can retain his or her homeland culture but must conform to the “mainstream” practices of the province that are themselves a product of British cultural heritage. Ultimately, the extent to which the shared values and shared identity of civic republicanism in Saskatchewan and Manitoba are actually the values and identity of the cultural majority is an unresolved tension within civic republicanism and remains unclear within public documents pertaining to this issue.

### AT Vincent 13

#### No warrant for why the judge’s entire decision should come down to performance; their evidence only proves that speech acts are relevant. Simply rejecting the framework but not living wage is sufficient to solve.

#### Focus on “performances of the body” naturalizes racial difference and is incapable of changing debate

**Bankey, 2013:**

(THE “FACT OF BLACKNESS” DOES NOT EXIST: AN EVOCATIVE CRITICISM OF RESISTANCE RHETORIC IN ACADEMIC POLICY DEBATE AND ITS (MIS)USE OF FRANTZ FANON’S BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS. August 2013. Brendon Bankey, M.A. in Communication, Assistant Debate Coach At Wake Forest University.)

Reid-Brinkley’s dissertation concerning strategies of bodily resistance, or resistance in the flesh, in high school and intercollegiate policy debate provides an 115 example of rhetorical scholarship that appropriates Fanon’s “fact of blackness”—that the black body takes anti-human form as “an object among other objects” in social spaces—absent a discussion of disalienation. In this chapter, I apply my reading of Fanon to Reid-Brinkley’s scholarship as a means of illuminating the extent to which her method for resistance in policy debate undermines Fanon’s goal of disalienation. Through this criticism, I argue that Reid-Brinkley’s resistance fails to generate a vision of policy debate “freed from” what Fanon describes as “the springboard of embodying resistance of others” because, by prioritizing the importance of the body in order to distinguish her movement from traditional forms of debate, it requires those who resist to dig “into [their] flesh in order to find self-meaning.” Because of this dependency on the ‘biological difference’ that the skin signifies, the specific inventional strategies Reid-Brinkley offers for marginalized bodies to resist fail to unlock the “suffocating reification” that Fanon attributes his objectification to in L’Expérience Vécue du Noir. The unfortunate result of this reification is the construction of a rhetorical barrier that hinders the ability of traditional debaters to acknowledge the styles and voices of those engaging in resistance.3

#### The idea that bodies necessitate different argument styles erases the lived reality of black individuals while reinforcing biological differences between races

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For the field of rhetoric, one observable consequence of Markmann’s mistranslation is that critics defer to cultural studies and emphasize Fanon’s 6 psychoanalytic claims concerning the objectification of the black body over his proposal for the concept of disalienation. For example, in her dissertation supporting the importance of black aesthetic performance in policy debate competitions at the high school and collegiate level, Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley borrows excerpts of Markmann’s translation of Black Skin, White Masks to argue “the black body signifies a difference from white bodies that makes the colored body significantly more visible in majority white societies. The black body represents dirt or a stain, or … a ‘pollutant,’ on and in the social body, one that must be controlled and contained.” Her scholarship applies this observation alongside other Afro-pessimist thought, specifically that of Hortense Spillers, to theorize the importance of the flesh for “the colored body” within white educational spaces. She observes, “Color is written on the skin, encrusted on the “flesh” of the body … for it is the flesh that signifies … on internal processes of the biological body.” As such, she proposes that communication scholars view resistant performances of colored bodies in predominantly white spaces as acts of resistance in the flesh.18 Reid-Brinkley establishes the importance of competitive policy debate as a site for examining hegemonic educational practices within primarily white spaces. She explains: Policy debate is considered the "granddaddy" of those activities. It is a highly intellectual game that requires an extensive time commitment in order to be successful. It is research intensive and requires specialized training. Thus, the lack of diversity in one of the oldest and most prestigious academic programs available to American students is a critical space from which to interrogate the parameters of the educational gains achieved since the end of legal segregation. There are many academic spaces from which minorities remain excluded and it is from these spaces that we might learn the methods by which such exclusions are maintained.19 Within this perspective, spaces of competitive policy debate express the extent to which racialized and/or female bodies are visibly marked as different in predominantly white educational spaces. She explains “that educational spaces in general tend to eschew the body, to make it absent from intellectual space” because the presence of different bodies threatens the stability of dominant codes that preserve the hegemony of white, straight, economically privileged men in educational spaces. “Despite the fact that significant gains have been made in reducing the social belief in the biological difference between the races,” Reid-Brinkley’s understanding of the flesh leads her to express that “the colored body signifies a biological difference, an inherent difference, from non-colored or white bodies” in white educational spaces. For her, “the combination of cultural values, behavioral practices, and the significance of the flesh” creates “barriers to the inclusion of othered bodies and identities” in spaces of policy debate competition.20 The use of Fanon in this manner is potentially problematic because of what black performance theorist Fred Moten describes as a psychopathological “flirtation with positivism” that allows critics to universalize their understanding of ‘the black problem’ without adhering to the contingencies necessary to constitute black subjectivity as a ‘problem’ in the first place.21 Despite the fact that Fanon explicitly employs psychoanalytic language and observations to pathologize and diagnose colonized Antilleans, readers must also focus on Black Skin, White Masks in light of its examination of the “social and economic realities” faced by colonized people in order to appreciate the magnitude of the text.22 Moreover, although he “endeavor[s] to assume the universalism inherent in the human condition” through psychoanalytic observations aimed at uncovering the pathology of colonized people, Fanon eventually defers to “subjective experience” with the belief that it “can be understood by all.” As he explains, “In this study I have attempted to touch on the misery of the black man—tactually and affectively. I did not want to be objective. Besides, that would have been dishonest: I found it impossible to be objective.”23

**Insistence that white debaters are detached papers over the intersection of Whiteness with non-racial forms of privilege**

**Bankey, 2013:**

(THE “FACT OF BLACKNESS” DOES NOT EXIST: AN EVOCATIVE CRITICISM OF RESISTANCE RHETORIC IN ACADEMIC POLICY DEBATE AND ITS (MIS)USE OF FRANTZ FANON’S BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS. August 2013. Brendon Bankey, M.A. in Communication, Assistant Debate Coach At Wake Forest University.)

Although certain forms of social privilege are inevitably granted on young white male bodies, I am skeptical that this applies to the scope of those high school and college-aged students that avidly participate in forensic extra-curricular activities. Alexander is similarly critical of this form of responsibility imposed on white bodies. He writes: A repeated mantra in White Studies, linked with excavating Whiteness, denying Whiteness, and dismantling Whiteness is the notion that privilege requires 152 responsibility. The assertion is often based in the logic of social responsibility and ultimately reduced to giving something back. Although that is a noble deed … I often reject sentiments of giving to the less fortunate that are embedded in White Studies. Why should White privilege require responsibility? Is it to make up for, to apologize for, to deflect arguments against privilege? Is it an enactment of what Shannon Jackson (1998) calls in “White Noises,” “a conflicted and ubiquitous state of self-righteousness, guilt, entitlement, romaniticization, objectification, and self censorship” (p. 53)? … Maybe my concern is the conflation and assumption that to be White is to be privileged—as opposed to the economic- or class-based issue of privilege.10 The assumption of the universality of privilege contributes to the homogenization of experience. Moreover, it treats skin as a metonymy that allows us to read the truth of people’s experience without a prior act of engagement.

**Criticism Fails**

**Critique of whiteness is overbroad and undermines pragmatic action**

Adolph **Reed 13**, professor of political science @ U Pennsylvania, Marx, Race, and Neoliberalism, New Labor Forum January/February 2013 22: 49-57,

This sort of historical materialist perspective throws into relief a fundamental limitation of the “whiteness” notion that has been fashionable within the academic left for roughly two decades: **it reifies whiteness as a transhistorical social category**. In effect, it treats “whiteness”—and therefore “race”—as existing prior to and above social context.10 Both who qualifies as white and the significance of being white have altered over time. Moreover, **whiteness discourse functions as a kind of moralistic exposé rather than a basis for strategic politics**; this is clear in that the program signally articulated in its name has been simply to raise a demand to “abolish whiteness,” that is, to call on whites to renounce their racial privilege. In fact, its fixation on demonstrating the depth of whites’ embrace of what was known to an earlier generation’s version of this argument as “white skin privilege” and the inclination to slide into teleological accounts in which groups or individuals “approach” or “pursue” whiteness **erases the real historical dynamics and contradictions of American racial history**. The whiteness discourse overlaps other arguments that presume racism to be a sui generis form of injustice. Despite seeming provocative, these arguments do not go beyond the premises of the racial liberalism from which they commonly purport to dissent. **They differ only in rhetorical flourish, not content**. Formulations that invoke metaphors of disease or original sin **reify racism by disconnecting it from the discrete historical circumstances and social structures in which it is embedded, and treating it as an autonomous force.** Disconnection from political economy is also a crucial feature of postwar liberalism’s construction of racial inequality as prejudice or intolerance. Racism becomes an independent variable in a moralistic argument that is idealist intellectually and ultimately defeatist politically. This tendency to see racism as sui generis also generates a **resistance to precision in analysis**. It is fueled by a tendency to inflate the language of racism to the edge of its reasonable conceptual limits, if not beyond. Ideological commitment to shoehorning into the rubric of racism all manner of inequalities that may appear statistically as racial disparities has yielded two related interpretive pathologies. One is a constantly expanding panoply of neologisms—“institutional racism,” “systemic racism,” “structural racism,” “color-blind racism,” “post-racial racism,” etc.—intended to graft more complex social dynamics onto a simplistic and frequently psychologically inflected racism/anti-racism **political ontology**. Indeed, these efforts bring to mind [Thomas S.] Kuhn’s account of attempts to accommodate mounting anomalies to salvage an interpretive paradigm in danger of crumbling under a crisis of authority.11 A second essentialist sleight-of-hand advances claims for the primacy of race/racism as an explanation of inequalities in the present by invoking analogies to regimes of explicitly racial subordination in the past. In these arguments, **analogy stands in for evidence** and explanation of the contemporary centrality of racism. Michelle Alexander’s widely read and cited book, The New Jim Crow, is only the most prominent expression of this tendency; even she has to acknowledge that the analogy fails because the historical circumstances are so radically different.12 Rigorous pursuit of equality of opportunity exclusively within the terms of capitalist class relations has been fully legitimized under the rubric of “diversity.”

**Academic criticism is too insular; it will never spill up to broader social change**

**O'Callaghan ‘2** ( Lecturer in IR, 02 (Terry , lecturer in the school of International Relations at the University of South Australia, International Relations and the third debate, ed: Jarvis, 2002, p. 80-81)

There are also a host of technological and logistical questions that plague George's scheme and make problematic his recommendations. For example, through what medium are those on the fringes of the international system going to speak to the world? Although it may be true that the third world has now been integrated into the global polity via the advent of technological innovations in communications, allowing for remote access to information sources and the Internet, it also remains true that the majority of those on the fringes continue to be disenfranchised from such mediums, whether as a result of a lack of economic resources, the prevalence of illiteracy, or social, cultural and political circumstances that systemically exclude, women (among others) from economic resources and certain political and social freedoms. Need we remind George that social, political, and individual autonomy is at a minimum in these parts of the world, and an intellectual approach as controversial as postmodernism is not likely to achieve the sorts of goals that George optimistically foreshadows. Indeed, on practical questions such as these, matters otherwise central to the success of postmodern visions, George prefers to be vague, suggesting instead that the intricacies of such details will somehow work themselves out in a manner satisfactory to all. Such a position reveals George's latent idealism and underscores how George's schema is an intellectual one: a theory of international politics written for other theorists of international politics. George's audience is thus a very limited and elite audience and begs the question of whether a senior, middle-class scholar in the intellectual heartland of Australia can do anything of real substance to aid the truly marginalized and oppressed. How is it possible to put oneself in the shoes of the "other," to advocate on his or her behalf, when such is done from a position of affluence, unrelated to and far removed from the experiences of those whom George otherwise champions? Ideals are all good and well, but it is hard to imagine that the computer keyboard is mightier than the sword, and hard to see how a small, elite, affluent assortment of intellectuals is going to generate the type of political momentum necessary to allow those on the fringes to speak and be heard! 1 . Moreover, why should we assume that states and individuals want to listen and will listen to what the marginalized and the oppressed have to say? There is precious little evidence to suggest that "listening" is something the advanced capitalist countries do very well at all. Indeed, one of the allegations so forcefully alleged by Muslim fundamentalists as justification for the terrorist attacks of September I I is precisely that the West, and America in particular, are deaf to the disenfranchised and impoverished in the world. Certainly, there are agencies and individuals who are sensitive to the needs of the "marginalized" and who champion institutional forums where indigenous voices can be heard. But on even the most optimistic reckoning, such forums and institutions represent the exception, not the rule, and remain in the minority if not dwarfed by those institutions that represent Western, first world interests. To be sure, this is a realist power-political image of the current configuration of the global polity, but one apparently, and ironically, endorsed by George if only because it speaks to the realities of the marginalized, the imposed silences, and the multitude of oppressions on which George founds his call for a postmodern ethic. Recognizing such realities, however, does not explain George's penchant for ignoring them entirely, especially in terms of the structural rigidities they pose for meaningful reform. Indeed, George's desire to move to a new "space beyond International Relations" smacks of wishful idealism, ignoring the current configuration of global political relations and power distribution; of the incessant ideological power of hyperindividualism, consumerism, advertising, Hollywood images, and fashion icons; and of the innate power bestowed on the (institutional) barons of global finance, trade, and transnational production. George seems to have little appreciation of the structural impediments such institutions pose for radical change of the type he so fiercely advocates. Revolutionary change of the kind desired by George ignores that fact that many individuals are not disposed to concerns beyond their family, friends, and daily work lives. And institutional, structural transformation requires organized effort, mass popular support, and dogged single-mindedness if societal norms are to be challenged, institutional reform enacted, consumer tastes altered, and political sensibilities reformed. Convincing Nike that there is something intrinsically wrong with paying Indonesian workers a few dollars a week to manufacture shoes for the global market requires considerably more effort than postmodern platitudes and/or moral indignation. The cycle of wealth creation and distribution that sees Michael Jordan receive multimillion dollar contracts to inspire demand for Nike products, while the foot soldiers in the factory eke out a meager existence producing these same products is not easily, or realistically, challenged by pronouncements of moving beyond International Relations to a new, nicer, gentler nirvana. More generally, of course, what George fails to consider is the problem of apathy and of how we get people to care about the plight of others. What do we with the CEOs of multinational corporations, stockbrokers, accountants, ctory workers, and the unemployed, who, by and large, fail to consider the omeless and destitute in their own countries, let alone in places they have never isited and are never likely to visit? Moral indignation rarely translates into action, and apathy about the plight of others is a structural impediment as strong any idea, theory, or writing. What George's treatise thus fails to consider is how we overcome this, and how we get others to listen. He needs to explain how the social, political, psychological, and moral structures that define the parameters of existence for the many millions of ordinary citizens in the first world, and that deflects attention from the marginalized and the oppressed can be broken down. Unfortunately, there is little to indicate that George has thought much about this, suggesting that his commitment to postmodern theory is not likely to make much difference. In fact, in the academy the postmodern light is already beginning to dim in certain quarters, having registered scarcely a glimmer in the broader polity, where, if change was to ensue, it needed to burn brightly. Even among those versed in the nomenclature of scholarly debate, theorists of international politics remain skeptical of the value of postmodern discourse, by and large rejecting it. This does not portend well for postmodern visionaries and the future of postmodern discourse. But can George really be surprised by this? After all, his discourse indicts the "backward discipline" for complicity in crimes against humanity, calling for a repudiation of realism and with it a repudiation of the lifelong beliefs and writings of eminent theorists like Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and Stephen Krasner who have otherwise defined the parameters of the discipline, its projects, and research agendas. Can George really expect discipline-wide capitulation to an intellectual diaspora that would see theorists repudiate their beliefs and works in order to take up the creed of postmodernism, as vague, open-ended, and indeterminate as it is? Without a clear and credible plan of how to get from "incarceration and closure" to intellectual freedom, creativity, and openness, George's postmodern musings have understandably attracted few disciples.

**Method focus causes scholarly inaction**

**Jackson**, associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, **‘11**

(Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to worry endlessly about foundational assumptions. At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. Hirschman (1970b, 338) noted this very danger, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” the focus on producing internally consistent packages of assumptions instead of actually examining complex empirical situations would result in scholarly [inaction] paralysis. Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles as uniquely scientific, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a firmer scientific footing by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103). The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but only after the fundamentals have been soundly established. Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.

**Overemphasis on method destroys effectiveness of the discipline**

**Wendt 2**

Alexander Wendt (IR Scholar), Handbook of IR, 2002 p. 68

It should be stressed that in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method-driven social science. Too much research in international relations chooses problems or things to be explained with a view to whether the analysis will provide support for one or another methodological ‘ism’. But the point of IR scholarship should be to answer questions about international politics that are of great normative concern, not to validate methods. Methods are means, not ends in themselves. As a matter of personal scholarly choice it may be reasonable to stick with one method and see how far it takes us. But since we do not know how far that is, if the goal of the discipline is insight into world politics then it makes little sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds. In that case a method indeed becomes a tacit ontology, which may lead to neglect of whatever problems it is poorly suited to address. Being conscious about these choices is why it is important to distinguish between the ontological, empirical and pragmatic levels of the rationalist-constructivist debate. We favor the pragmatic approach on heuristic grounds, but we certainly believe a conversation should continue on all three levels.

### No Prior Q – Cochran

**Action’s key. Prior questions will never be settled.**

Molly **Cochran 99**, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

## Race (Newark)

The role of the ballot is to decide whether a living wage policy is a good idea.

1. Aff choice. Provides a stasis point which forces the neg to clash.

2. Predictable limits. There’s unlimited roles of the ballot and kritik alts. Topic focus is the only way to create a limited lit base which makes research possible.

3. Time skew. His framework moots the AC and forces a 1AR restart.

These all turn their education claims because they’re pre-requisites to effective dialogue.

There’s also plenty of topic lit about racism, so I don’t kill accessibility.

Civic republicanism provides key philosophical tools for addressing racism

**Feldman 92** writes[[150]](#footnote-150)

To a great extent, **King's beloved community corresponds to the common good of civic republicanism**. 2°9 **Both can be envisioned simultaneously** as a moral attitude and as a normative goal.210 One who believes in the beloved community, as well as one who believes in the common good, will manifest an attitude of caring for others when focused on public issues.211 At the same time, the beloved community and the common good provide a standard for individuals and the community to strive for in political discussion and action. These parallels between the beloved community and the common good suggest that King's efforts to substantively define the beloved community might provide insight into the content of the common good. 212 At the outset, though, one must recognize that neither the beloved community nor the common good has a static or objective content. The beloved community always remains an ideal, never fully realized, and indeed never fully and certainly defined.213 Similarly, the common good should never be understood as having a fixed or objective meaning. As already discussed, the common good is best conceived as an interpretive concept whose meaning constantly emerges anew depending upon the changing historical circumstances. 214 Therefore, King and civic republicans should not be criticized for failing to specify definitively the content of the beloved community or the common good.2 15 Those meanings can only emerge in concrete historical contexts, and even then, the meanings must be open and tentative. 216 Despite this caveat, King's efforts to define the beloved community can inform our understanding of the common good. Although King wrote over twenty years ago, the unfortunate reality is that **the nonwhite poor have not significantly improved their position relative to the rest of** American **society**.217 Thus, many of King's observations and recommendations remain as true today as they were during King's life. King insisted that we must radically restructure "the whole of American society" in order to move towards the beloved community. 218 The two pillars of the reconstructed America must be racial and economic justice.219 King stated that "the largest portion of white America is still poisoned by racism, which is as native to our soil as pine trees, sagebrush and buffalo grass. '220 Thus, in America, the eradication of racism is a moral imperative:221 our goal, ultimately, must be to "respect the dignity and worth of all human personality. ' 222 With regard to economic justice, **King argued for** "**an economic bill of rights**. '22 3 To eliminate poverty, we must "guarantee a job to all people who want to work and are able to work, ' 2 2 4 and "also guarantee an income for all who are not able to work. ' 225 These economic reforms, according to King, would help alleviate the needs for improved housing and education for the nonwhite poor, but society must also directly allocate more resources to satisfy those latter needs. 226 Finally, King insisted that economic reforms should not be diluted or delayed because of any perceived costs to whites: quite simply, the justice of the beloved community is not subject to a costbenefit analysis. 227 King's personal experiences of social injustice and racism prevented him from being naive in his quest for the beloved community. 228 He understood the complexity of human nature, and he realized that the privileged usually resist threats to their power.229 He remained eternally wary of the human propensities for depravity and for greedy pursuit of self-interest, and consequently, as a matter of political tactics, he was not above adverting to convergencies between the interests of whites and African Americans. For example, King argued that the economic growth of the South required the eradication of racial discrimination and that discrimination deflated the nation in world opinion. 230 But King emphasized: "These are practical considerations all dictating one road. Yet above it all, a greater imperative demands fulfillment. Throughout our history, the moral decision has always been the correct decision. ' '231 Thus, the constitutional and political theory that emerges from King strongly resembles the realistic civic republicanism of the framers. The framers always remained committed to a government that pursues the common good, despite their recognition that factions would inevitably arise in a democracy. Likewise, King always remained committed to the beloved community, despite recognizing the human penchant for evil. 232 The framers believed that through political dialogue, the community can arrive at the common good, while King believed that through various forms of political dialogue, the community can push itself towards the ideal of the beloved community. The framers were not above using factionalism to preserve the republic: they structured the government so that the ever-present potential for factionalism would actually encourage governmental officials to pursue the common good. King, meanwhile, was not above occasionally using white self-interest if it would help build the beloved community, but he realized that pure self-interest ultimately is corrupt and therefore must be subordinated to morality and love. 233 **King not only echoed the framers**, however, **but** also **elaborated their civic republican vision**. He understood the divisiveness of racism as well as the need to take special steps to eradicate it. **He recognized the necessity of empowering all** individuals and groups throughout American society **so that they could participate in** the **political dialogue** that is the lifeblood **of the community**. And he realized that social justice and political equality de mand profound economic reforms, not minor or piecemeal remedies. In sum, King's personal experiences of racism and oppression imbued his civic republicanism with a realism far more stark than any known to the framers. CONCLUSION Racism is a debilitating sickness in the heart and blood of American society. It is the institutionalized subjugation of people of color. It is the unconscious yet nauseating images that infect every American mind. It is the concrete obstacle to economic prosperity, inhibiting the rational pursuit of material interests. It mortgages the future by undermining support for public education. Racism is pervasive, oppressive, and tenacious: it will not cure itself and just disappear. We must take racism seriously if we are to remedy this ultimate blight on America. To reduce racism, we must consistently hold it at the forefront of political discussion and constitutional theory. Social psychology research and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s writings suggest that we should support a constitutional and political theory that is **civic republican** in nature. Such a **theory would emphasize** the **elements necessary to reduce racism: belonging to a superordinate political community, dialogue among citizens, and** the **pursuit of the common good, not pure self-interest**. Most important, the dialogue must be open and inclusive: to generate concern for others and solidarity within a broad community, different subgroups must be empowered to participate in political discussions. **A civic republican approach thus neither entails** forced consensus and **conformity nor** the **destruction of minority cultures**. To the contrary, King and the social psychologists emphasize that **participation in a larger political community is consistent with belonging to a vital** subgroup or **subculture**. Moreover, subgroups provide divergent views or voices that potentially enrich and improve the communal dialogue.2 34 The nonwhite poor, consequently, might consider a dual strategy in their efforts to overcome racism and to achieve social justice. The primary approach would be to support **a civic republican** constitutional and political **theory**. In the long run, such a theory **is most likely to reduce racism, a prerequisite to social justice**. Nonetheless, the nonwhite poor might secondarily advert to white self-interest at especially opportune times. The social psychology evidence that suggests people act on an uncertain mixture of motivations, including self-interest,23 and King's tactical use of white selfinterest support the appropriateness of this approach. But, both King and social psychologists underscore that appeals to self-interest should not become the primary means to social justice; such a misconceived strategy would ultimately propagate racism and injustice. 236 Political pluralism (or conservatism), as recommended by Delgado, would eventually defeat the quest of the nonwhite poor for social justice. Thus, on any particular issue, the ideal political program would be one that appeals to the moral conscience of the entire political community by pursuing the common good, but that also coincides with the material interests of the white majority. 237

Their Curry evidence says that the aff ascribes morality to a fundamentally racist and thus immoral system; if I win that legal progress for Black people within the system is possible, Curry’s pessimistic diagnosis of the system is wrong.

**Racism still exists, but reform is possible; the best statistical evidence shows a history of racial progress**

-- panel of experts at Harvard

-- statistics on health, wealth, education, income, incarceration, foreclosure rates, and poverty

-- school-to-prison pipeline contrasted with pipeline to higher education

**Feldscher 13**

Karen Feldscher (Senior Writer/Project Manager at Harvard School of Public Health), “Progress, but challenges in reducing racial disparities,” Harvard School of Public Health, 9 September 2013. <http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/features/progress-but-challenges-in-reducing-racial-disparities/>

September 19, 2013 — Disparities between blacks and whites in the U.S. remain pronounced—and health is no exception. A panel of experts at Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH) discussed these disparities—what they are, why they persist, and what to do about them—at a September 12, 2013 event titled “Dialogue on Race, Justice, and Public Health.” The event was held in Kresge G-1 and featured panelists Lisa Coleman, Harvard University’s chief diversity officer; David Williams, Florence Sprague Norman and Laura Smart Norman Professor of Public Health in the HSPH Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences; Chandra Jackson, Yerby Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the HSPH Department of Nutrition; and Zinzi Bailey, a fifth-year doctoral student in the HSPH Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences. Robert Blendon, Richard L. Menschel Professor of Public Health and Professor of Health Policy and Political Analysis at HSPH, moderated the discussion. Gains, but pains Health care disparities are troubling, Coleman said. One study found that doctors recommended coronary revascularization—bypass surgery that replaces blocked blood vessels with new ones—among white patients with heart disease 50% of the time, but just 23% of the time for blacks. Black women are less likely to be given a bone marrow density test than white women, even when it’s known they’ve had prior fractures. And the black infant mortality rate is 2.3 times higher than that of non-Hispanic whites. **Each speaker acknowledged that racial minorities have made significant gains over the past half-century, but** said **there is much more work** still **to do.** They cited statistics providing stark evidence of continuing disparities in health, wealth, education, income, arrest and incarceration rates, foreclosure rates, and poverty. Coleman called the data “disconcerting; in some cases, alarming.” Schools are desegregated, she said, but not integrated; median income is $50,000 per year for whites but $31,000 a year for blacks and $37,000 a year for Hispanics; since the 1960s, the unemployment rate among blacks has been two to two-and-a-half times higher than for whites; and one in three black men can expect to spend time in prison during their lifetimes. Blendon shared results from surveys that accentuate sharp differences of opinion about how well blacks are faring in the U.S. For instance, in a survey that asked participants if they thought that the lives of black Americans had changed dramatically over the past 50 years, 54% of whites said yes but only 29% of blacks did. Another survey asked whether or not people approved of the verdict in the George Zimmerman trial; 51% of whites approved but only 9% of blacks did. Reducing disparities through research, education Jackson talked about growing up in a segregated neighborhood in Atlanta and attending a school with 99% black students and inadequate resources. She became the first in her family to attend college. Now, through her research, she hopes to expose and reduce racial health disparities. In a recent study in the American Journal of Epidemiology, Jackson and colleagues reported that blacks—particularly black professionals—get less sleep than whites, which can have potentially negative impacts on health. Bailey discussed what’s known as the “school-to-prison pipeline”—a trajectory in which black teens do poorly in school, get held back a grade, drop out, commit a crime, then end up in jail. On the flip side, she said, there are “diversity pipelines” to recruit minority students into higher education. “Often these programs target students who have already avoided the school-to-prison pipeline,” Bailey said, noting that she would like to see higher education institutions connect with black students at earlier ages to steer them toward positive choices.

**Racial progress has occurred though legal change --- pessimism ignores specific reforms that achieved lasting reductions in racial inequality**

-- desegregation of the armed forces, the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, repeal of anti-miscegenation laws

-- spills over to legal access for feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements

-- antiblackness is political, not ontological; incarceration is used as a tool to suppress voting rights, women of color are policed via reproductive rights laws

**Omi and Winant 13**

Michael Omi (Sociologist at UC Berkeley, focusing on antiracism scholarship and Asian American studies) and Howard Winant (Professor of Sociology affiliated with the Black Studies and Chicana/o Studies departments of UC Santa Barbara), Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 36, Issue 6, p. 961-973, Special Issue: Symposium - Rethinking Racial Formation Theory. 2013.

In Feagin and Elias's account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the ‘white racial frame’ evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely ‘a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call ‘surface flexibility’ to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase ‘racial democracy’ is an oxymoron – a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA, we disagree. The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a racial democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites – employment, health, education – persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era. Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we ‘overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about ‘racial reaction’ in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us. While we argue that the right wing was able to ‘rearticulate’ race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his ‘interest convergence hypothesis’ effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 – ‘We have lost the South for a generation’ – count as ‘convergence’? The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime – under movement pressure – was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms – which he calls ‘passive revolutions’ – cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule. So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society. Indeed we have argued that in many ways **the most important accomplishment** of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and **validation by both the state and civil society** of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other ‘new social movements’: second-wave **feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements** among others. By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same ‘rearticulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of ‘colourblindness’ and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various ‘backlash’ phenomena of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, reveal the transformative character of the ‘politicization of the social’. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today. What are the political implications of contemporary racial trends? Feagin and Elias's use of racial categories can be imprecise. This is not their problem alone; anyone writing about race and racism needs to frame terms with care and precision, and we undoubtedly get fuzzy too from time to time. The absence of a careful approach leads to ‘racial lumping’ and essentialisms of various kinds. This imprecision is heightened in polemic. In the Feagin and Elias essay the term ‘whites’ at times refers to all whites, white elites, ‘dominant white actors’ and very exceptionally, anti-racist whites, a category in which we presume they would place themselves. Although the terms ‘black’, ‘African American’ and ‘Latino’ appear, the term ‘people of colour’ is emphasized, often in direct substitution for black reference points. In the USA today it is important not to frame race in a bipolar manner. The black/white paradigm made more sense in the past than it does in the twenty-first century. The racial make-up of the nation has now changed dramatically. Since the passage of the Immigration Reform Act of 1965, the USA has become more ‘coloured’. A ‘majority–minority’ national demographic shift is well underway. Predicted to arrive by the mid-twenty-first century, the numerical eclipse of the white population is already in evidence locally and regionally. In California, for example, non-Hispanic whites constitute only 39.7 per cent of the state's population. While the decline in the white population cannot be correlated with any decline of white racial dominance, the dawning and deepening of racial multipolarity calls into question a sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit black/white racial framework that is evident in Feagin and Elias's essay. Shifting racial demographics and identities also raise general questions of race and racism in new ways that the ‘systemic racism’ approach is not prepared to explain.3 Class questions and issues of panethnicizing trends, for example, call into question what we mean by race, racial identity and race consciousness. No racially defined group is even remotely uniform; groups that we so glibly refer to as Asian American or Latino are particularly heterogeneous. Some have achieved or exceeded socio-economic parity with whites, while others are subject to what we might call ‘engineered poverty’ in sweatshops, dirty and dangerous labour settings, or prisons. Tensions within panethnicized racial groups are notably present, and conflicts between racially defined groups (‘black/brown’ conflict, for example) are evident in both urban and rural settings. A substantial current of social scientific analysis now argues that Asians and Latinos are the ‘new white ethnics’, able to ‘work toward whiteness’4 at least in part, and that the black/white bipolarity retains its distinct and foundational qualities as the mainstay of US racism (Alba and Nee 2005; Perlmann 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Waters, Ueda and Marrow 2007). We question that argument in light of the massive demographic shifts taking place in the USA. Globalization, climate change and above all neoliberalism on a global scale, all drive migration. The country's economic capacity to absorb enormous numbers of immigrants, low-wage workers and their families (including a new, globally based and very female, servant class) without generating the sort of established subaltern groups we associate with the terms race and racism, may be more limited than it was when the ‘whitening’ of Europeans took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In other words this argument's key precedent, the absorption of white immigrants ‘of a different color’ (Jacobson 1998), may no longer apply. Indeed, we might think of the assimilationist model itself as a general theory of immigrant incorporation that was based on a historically specific case study – one that might not hold for, or be replicated by, subsequent big waves of immigration. Feagin and Elias's systemic racism model, while offering numerous important insights, does not inform concrete analysis of these issues. It is important going forward to understand how groups are differentially racialized and relatively positioned in the US racial hierarchy: once again racism must be seen as a shifting racial project. This has important consequences, not only with respect to emerging patterns of inequality, but also in regard to the degree of power available to different racial actors to define, shape or contest the existing racial landscape. Attention to such matters is largely absent in Feagin and Elias's account. In their view racially identified groups are located in strict reference to the dominant ‘white racial frame’, hammered into place, so to speak. As a consequence, they fail to examine how racially subordinate groups interact and influence each others’ boundaries, conditions and practices. Because they offer so little specific analysis of Asian American, Latino or Native American racial issues, the reader finds her/himself once again in the land (real or imaginary, depending on your racial politics) of bipolar US racial dynamics, in which whites and blacks play the leading roles, and other racially identified groups – as well as those ambiguously identified, such as Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans (MEASA) – play at best supporting roles, and are sometimes cast as extras or left out of the picture entirely. We still want to acknowledge that blacks have been catching hell and have borne the brunt of the racist reaction of the past several decades. For example, we agree with Feagin and Elias's critique of the reactionary politics of incarceration in the USA. The ‘new Jim Crow’ (Alexander 2012) or even the ‘new slavery’ that the present system practises is something that was just in its beginning stages when we were writing Racial Formation. It is now recognized as a national and indeed global scandal. How is it to be understood? Of course there are substantial debates on this topic, notably about the nature of the ‘prison-industrial complex’ (Davis 2003, p. 3) and the social and cultural effects of mass incarceration along racial lines. But beyond Feagin and Elias's denunciation of the ferocious white racism that is operating here, deeper political implications are worth considering. As Alexander (2012), Mauer (2006), Manza and Uggen (2008) and movement groups like Critical Resistance and the Ella Baker Center argue, the upsurge over recent decades in incarceration rates for black (and brown) men expresses the fear-based, law-and-order appeals that have shaped US racial politics since the rise of Nixonland (Perlstein 2008) and the ‘Southern strategy’. Perhaps even more central, racial repression aims at restricting the increasing impact of voters of colour in a demographically shifting electorate. There is a lot more to say about this, but for the present two key points stand out: first, it is not an area where Feagin and Elias and we have any sharp disagreement, and second, for all the horrors and injustices that the ‘new Jim Crow’ represents, incarceration, profiling and similar practices remain political issues. These practices and policies are not ineluctable and unalterable dimensions of the US racial regime. There have been previous waves of reform in these areas. They can be transformed again by mass mobilization, electoral shifts and so on. In other words, **resistance is not futile**. Speaking of electoral shifts and the formal political arena, how should President Barack Obama be politically situated in this discussion? How do Feagin and Elias explain Obama? Quite amazingly, his name does not appear in their essay. Is he a mere token, an ‘oreo’, a shill for Wall Street? Or does Obama represent a new development in US politics, a black leader of a mass, multiracial party that for sheer demographic reasons alone might eventually triumph over the white people's party, the Republicans? If the President is neither the white man's token nor Neo, the One,5 then once again we are in the world of politics: neither the near-total white despotism depicted by Feagin and Elias, nor a racially inclusive democracy. President Obama continues to enjoy widespread black support, although it is clear that he has not protected blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in history. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights – particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of colour are concentrated. He has not intervened to halt or slow foreclosures, except in ways that were largely symbolic. Workers and lower-middle-class people were the hardest hit by the great recession and the subprime home mortgage crisis, with black families faring worst, and Latinos close behind (Rugh and Massey 2010); Obama has not defended them. Many writers have explained Obama's centrism and unwillingness to raise the issue of race as functions of white racism (Sugrue 2010). The black community – and other communities of colour as well – remains politically divided. While black folk have taken the hardest blows from the reactionary and racist regime that has mostly dominated US politics since Reagan (if not since Nixon), no united black movement has succeeded the deaths of Malcolm and Martin. Although there is always important political activity underway, a relatively large and fairly conservative black middle class, a ‘black bourgeoisie’ in Frazier's (1957) terms, has generally maintained its position since the end of the civil rights era. Largely based in the public sector, and including a generally centrist business class as well, this stratum has continued to play the role that Frazier – and before him, Charles S. Johnson. William Lloyd Warner, Alison Davis and other scholars – identified: vacillation between the white elite and the black masses. Roughly similar patterns operate in Latino communities as well, where the ‘working towards whiteness’ framework coexists with a substantial amount of exclusion and super-exploitation. Alongside class issues in communities of colour, there are significant gender issues. The disappearance of blue-collar work, combined with the assault by the criminal justice system – chiefly profiling by the police (‘stop and frisk’) and imprisonment, have both unduly targeted and victimized black and brown men, especially youth. Women of colour are also targeted, especially by violence, discrimination and assaults on their reproductive rights (Harris-Perry 2011); profiling is everywhere (Glover 2009). Here again we are in the realm of racial politics. Debate proceeds in the black community on Obama's credibilty, with Cornel West and Tavis Smiley leading the critics. But it seems safe to say that in North Philly, Inglewood or Atlanta's Lakewood section, the president remains highly popular. Latino support for Obama remains high as well. Feagin and Elias need to clarify their views on black and brown political judgement. Is it attuned to political realities or has it been captured by the white racial frame? Is Obama's election of no importance? \*\*\* In conclusion, do Feagin and Elias really believe that white power is so complete, so extensive, so ‘sutured’ (as Laclau and Mouffe might say) as they suggest here? Do they mean to suggest, in Borg-fashion, that ‘resistance is futile?’ This seems to be the underlying political logic of the ‘systemic racism’ approach, perhaps unintentionally so. Is white racism so ubiquitous that no meaningful political challenge can be mounted against it? Are black and brown folk (yellow and red people, and also others unclassifiable under the always- absurd colour categories) utterly supine, duped, abject, unable to exert any political pressure? Is such a view of race and racism even recognizable in the USA of 2012? And is that a responsible political position to be advocating? Is this what we want to teach our students of colour? Or our white students for that matter? We suspect that if pressed, Feagin and Elias would concur with our judgement that racial conflict, both within (and against) the state and in everyday life, is a fundamentally political process. We think that they would also accept our claim that the ongoing **political realities of race provide extensive evidence** that **people of colour** in the USA **are not** so **powerless**, and that whites are not so omnipotent, as Feagin and Elias's analysis suggests them to be. Racial formation theory allows us to see that there are contradictions in racial oppression. The racial formation approach reveals that white racism is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national and indeed global level down to the personal and intra-psychic conflicts that we all experience, no matter what our racial identity might be. While racism – largely white – continues to flourish, it is not monolithic. Yes, there have been enormous increases in racial inequality in recent years. But movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and sometimes scores victories. Challenges to white racism continue both within the state and in civil society. Although largely and properly led by people of colour, anti-racist movements also incorporate whites such as Feagin and Elias themselves. Movements may experience setbacks, the reforms for which they fought may be revealed as inadequate, and indeed their leaders may be co-opted or even eliminated, but racial subjectivity and self-awareness, unresolved and conflictual both within the individual psyche and the body politic, abides. Resistance is not futile.

Curry also relies on an ontological claim about blackness, that persuading white people to be ethical fails since white existence is ontologically anti-black.

Anti-blackness isn’t ontological – policy’s the best venue to combat it

**Bouie 13**, staff writer at The American Prospect, Making and Dismantling Racism, http://prospect.org/article/making-and-dismantling-racism

Over at The Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi Coates has been exploring the intersection of race and public policy, with a focus on white supremacy as a driving force in political decisions at all levels of government. This has led him to two conclusions: First, that anti-black racism as we understand it is a creation of explicit policy choices—the decision to exclude, marginalize, and stigmatize Africans and their descendants has as much to do with racial prejudice as does any intrinsic tribalism. And second, that it's possible to dismantle this prejudice using public policy. Here is Coates in his own words: Last night I had the luxury of sitting and talking with the brilliant historian Barbara Fields. One point she makes that very few Americans understand is that racism is a creation. You read Edmund Morgan’s work and actually see racism being inscribed in the law and the country changing as a result. If we accept that racism is a creation, then we must then accept that it can be destroyed. And if we accept that it can be destroyed, we must then accept that it can be destroyed by us and that it likely must be destroyed by methods kin to creation. **Racism was created by policy. It will** likely **only be** ultimately **destroyed by policy.** Over at his blog, Andrew Sullivan offers a reply: I don’t believe the law created racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred. It can encourage or mitigate these profound aspects of human psychology – it can create racist structures as in the Jim Crow South or Greater Israel. But it can no more end these things that it can create them. A complementary strategy is finding ways for the targets of such hatred to become inured to them, to let the slurs sting less until they sting not at all. Not easy. But a more manageable goal than TNC’s utopianism. I can appreciate the point Sullivan is making, but I'm not sure it's relevant to Coates' argument. It is absolutely true that "Group loyalty is deep in our DNA," as Sullivan writes. And if you define racism as an overly aggressive form of group loyalty—basically just prejudice—then Sullivan is right to throw water on the idea that the law can "create racism any more than it can create lust or greed or envy or hatred." But Coates is making a more precise claim: That **there's nothing natural about the black/white divide** that has defined American history. White Europeans had contact with black Africans well before the trans-Atlantic slave trade **without** the emergence of an **anti-black racism**. It took **particular choices** made by particular people—in this case, plantation owners in colonial Virginia—to make black skin a stigma, to make the "one drop rule" a defining feature of American life for more than a hundred years. By enslaving African indentured servants and allowing their white counterparts a chance for upward mobility, colonial landowners began the process that would make white supremacy the ideology of America. The position of slavery generated a stigma that then justified continued enslavement—blacks are lowly, therefore we must keep them as slaves. Slavery (and later, Jim Crow) wasn't built to reflect racism as much as it was built in tandem with it. And later policy, in the late 19th and 20th centuries, further entrenched white supremacist attitudes. Block black people from owning homes, and they're forced to reside in crowded slums. Onlookers then use the reality of slums to deny homeownership to blacks, under the view that they're unfit for suburbs. In other words, create a prohibition preventing a marginalized group from engaging in socially sanctioned behavior—owning a home, getting married—and then blame them for the adverse consequences. Indeed, in arguing for gay marriage and responding to conservative critics, Sullivan has taken note of this exact dynamic. Here he is twelve years ago, in a column for The New Republic that builds on earlier ideas: Gay men--not because they're gay but because they are men in an all-male subculture--are almost certainly more sexually active with more partners than most straight men. (Straight men would be far more promiscuous, I think, if they could get away with it the way gay guys can.) Many gay men value this sexual freedom more than the stresses and strains of monogamous marriage (and I don't blame them). But this is not true of all gay men. Many actually yearn for social stability, for anchors for their relationships, for the family support and financial security that come with marriage. To deny this is surely to engage in the "soft bigotry of low expectations." They may be a minority at the moment. But with legal marriage, their numbers would surely grow. And they would function as emblems in gay culture of a sexual life linked to stability and love. [Emphasis added] What else is this but a variation on Coates' core argument, that society can create stigmas by using law to force particular kinds of behavior? Insofar as gay men were viewed as unusually promiscuous, it almost certainly had something to do with the fact that society refused to recognize their humanity and sanction their relationships. The absence of any institution to mediate love and desire encouraged behavior that led this same culture to say "these people are too degenerate to participate in this institution." If the prohibition against gay marriage helped create an anti-gay stigma, then lifting it—as we've seen over the last decade—has helped destroy it. There's no reason racism can't work the same way.

## Anthro K (PVP)

### Role of the Ballot

The role of the ballot is to endorse the best post-fiat plan.

1. Aff choice. Provides a stasis point which forces the neg to clash.

2. Predictable limits. There’s unlimited roles of the ballot and kritik alts. Topic focus is the only way to create a limited lit base which makes research possible.

3. Time skew. His framework moots the AC and forces a 1AR restart.

These all turn his education claims because they’re pre-requisites to effective dialogue.

He creates a bad form of education where we talk about the best way to frame discourse without having actual discussions.

Engaging the government is the only way to solve global problems.

**Gates 7** writes[[151]](#footnote-151)

But **no foundation alone can solve** the health problems of **the developing world. We need** businesses and **government**s as partners. That means **we need** to get these issues on **the political agenda**, and we need to tap into market forces to get the private sector involved. It means we all need to embrace a broader definition of responsibility. **We must** be willing to **look at the failure of collective action** and see how we can change it. **Because these problems are so complex, government has to be involved in solving them. The Gates Foundation accounts for 1 percent of** the **giving in America. If we spent all of our endowment on education, it would amount to just half of what** the state of **California spends** on education **each year.** If we used it to fill the gap between the amount of money that's available for health in developing countries and the amount that's needed, it would barely last one year. Do the right thing, the right way But as soon as we say not just that we won't accept these diseases in our neighborhood or in our country, but that we won't accept them in our world, then we start the wheels of collective action turning. We start by **giving** our **governments permission** to spend more on these challenges. And that **will unleash** the potential for **sweeping change.**

Discourse focus is counter-productive. It distracts from the question at hand.

**Brown 1** writes[[152]](#footnote-152)

“Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech.14 Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate **speech regulations, and** the **debates about them, usurp the discursive space in which one might** have **offer**ed **a substantive** political **response** to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislated and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationalization and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “**Speech codes**, born of social critique, **kill critique**.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique **not only by displacing it** with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, **but also by configuring** political **injustice** and political righteousness **as a problem of** remarks, attitude, and **speech rather than** as a matter of historical, political-economic, and **cultural formations of power.** Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize.

### Pettit Perm

Perm, do both. The net benefit is the AC’s consistency with non-domination.

Nondomination is consistent with environmental ethics; the perm is more pragmatic than the alt alone.

**Pettit 99** writes[[153]](#footnote-153)

Is it possible to defend republicanism as an approach for environmentalists to take? There may be no particular problem with less radical forms of the environmental approach (Goodin 1992; Passmore 1993). But **is it possible to make** a case for **republicanism**— to make a case for the resort to republican language—that will **appeal to radical environmentalists? I believe that it is.** The first thing that needs to be said is that **radical environmentalism**, according to which the state should be shaped with a view to nonhuman as well as human interests, **does not** itself **offer a language of grievance** and claim **that has any chance of reaching** the **ears** of those **outside the green movement. The language is too specialized**, too intimately associated with a particular perspective on the world, **to have** the sort of **general validity for** which we should look in a medium of **political debate.** It may help believers to articulate their outrage— often their perfectly justified outrage—and to develop a philosophy that may yet gam wider acceptance, even the acceptance of the community at large. But as things stand at the moment, short of such widespread acceptance, it offers them no hope of making an impact on the political scene generally. Articulated in the terms considered, radical environmentalism will present itself as a sectarian movement, on a par with familiar religious groupings, and its concerns will make no particular claim in the public world. Why should I be moved by your arguments if you argue from premisses that I do not accept? Why should people generally be moved by the arguments of radical environmentalists if they do not accept the premisses from which those thinkers insist on starting? The lesson is that **politics**, certainly politics **in a pluralist society**, inevitably **requires pragmatism** (Larmore 1987); or, if not pragmatism, at least the acknowledgement that there are reasonable differences of opinion which political argument must try to reach across (Rawls 1993). It requires those who are committed to various political causes to be able to articulate the concerns they want the state to take up in terms which others can understand and internalize. Unless the devotees of a cause are prepared to do this, they cannot reasonably expect their fellow citizens to listen, let alone to go along. The pragmatism required may not appeal to purists, but, apart from being ineffective, the purist attitude is also exceedingly precious. Why should devotees of a certain cause shrink from presenting that cause in terms that have general appeal, on the grounds that the cause appeals to them in different, more particular ways? **There is no inconsistency in admitting that a cause may appeal to different people on different grounds**; one and the same conclusion may be supported by distinct sets of premisses. And there need be no deception of others, and of course no self-deception, involved in arguing for a cause on grounds other than those on which you find the cause appealing; you need make no secret of the fact that the cause appeals to you in a distinctive way, even as you seek to display its attraction in publicly more accessible terms. If this lesson is accepted, then I can begin to make a case for articulating environmental concerns in republican language. While republicanism, like almost all mainline political philosophies, is decisively anthropocentric, it gives us salient reasons why we should be concerned about other species and about our ecosystem more generally; in particular, it gives us reasons why we should want our state and our laws to try to advance such concerns. These reasons are not hard to find. **The ecosystem, with the other** species of **animals** that it contains, **offers us our place in nature**; it is the space, ultimately, where we belong. We are what we eat. And equally we are what we breathe, we are what we smell, we are what we see and hear and touch. We are all that it is given to us to identify with in that world, worked and unworked by humans, that we see as our own. We are none of us a social island, in Donne's memorable metaphor. And neither is any one of us a natural island. We live in physical, biological, and psychological continuity with other human beings, with other animal species, and ultimately with the larger physical system that comes to consciousness in us. These linkages between us and our environment mean that **when you degrade that environment** you hurt me and mine, you hurt us and ours. **You may affect our collective chances of survival**, our individual prospects of a long and healthy life, or our opportunities for affirming our conaturality with other species, and for identifying with the planet that we share with them. Or if you do not affect us, the current representatives of our species in those ways, you may well affect future generations of human beings, including the future citizens of the society and state that we constitute. **We are each** physically **vulnerable**, then, **not just in our own** individual **bodies but in our shared environment and world. But** if that is the case, **then it is clear why the republican state has to espouse environmental concerns.** That any damage is done to the environment—the environment of subgroups, of the society as a whole, or of all societies on earth—means that there is an assault on at least the range of our undominated choice. The damage is bound to mean that the costs of our exploiting various opportunities are raised or that certain opportunities are closed to us: at the limit, as in nuclear devastation, it may mean that few opportunities remain. Even if the damage comes about inadvertently, then, or as the aggregate outcome of individually innocent actions, it counts as a loss in the ledger-book of republican liberty. And, of course, if the damage does not come about inadvertently, if it represents interference by some agency that manages to cover its tracks or to assert its way, then it represents an even greater loss. It means that the agency which assumes the right to inflict that **environmental damage exercises a form of domination over those who are affected**; they live, at least in some part, at the mercy of that agency: it can harm them or not harm them, interfere in their lives or not interfere, at its pleasure.

Pettit isn’t anthropocentric—the aff’s focus on income inequality is particularly consistent with green movements

**Barry and Smith 8** write[[154]](#footnote-154)

Of course, we would allow for the legitimacy of articulating one’s claims in an ethical or political language with is not immediately or universally accepted. More specifically, we strongly endorse the argument for resisting the pressure to present green claims in a language that systematically corrupts its moral import. For example, greens have criticized economic modes of articulating sustainability dilemmas, especially contingent valuation techniques of cost-benefit analysis (Barry, 1999, O’Neill, 1993). Simply put, green political theory contends that moral claims on behalf of nature and non-economic valuations of the environment should not have to be publicly articulated in a language of economic valuation, despite its broad general appeal. Here, we stand with green ‘purists’ (to use Pettit’s term) who refuse to translate their ethical commitments into an economic language, even though by so doing they engage in forms of political communication which seem out of step with widely-held and familiar idioms for addressing political trade-offs. **A good example** of this and one **which demonstrates** the **compatibility of green politics and republicanism is** the **green insistence on the need to democratically regulate the free market** economy, to see the market as an instrument (like the state) **and** to **‘reembed’ it in**to **community** as necessary to achieve sustainability. Greens, like republicans, are concerned to ensure that the market economy does not produce detrimental ‘spill-over’ effects – mainly to do with the tendency of the unregulated market to orientate itself around an **undifferentiated pursuit of** economic **growth and** the **concomitant** creation of socio-**economic inequality** and dominance of ‘consumer’ identities and practices over those of the ‘citizen’ (Barry and Doherty, 2002) – which **threaten** ecological **sustainability and other green** and republican **values** such as political equality, quality of life, civic solidarity and sustainable, liveable communities. **We think this stand is consistent with Pettit**’s position; after all, an unqualified endorsement of his principle could mean that anti-slavery advocates within a predominantly slave-owning political culture would have to express their claims in a language which is, to put it mildly, not ‘fit for purpose’! Just like the abolitionists had recourse to a different but not entirely novel political language – that of individual rights and the dignity of the person – green advocates have recourse to a new (though also old) language of the intrinsic value of nature and enlightened anthropocentrism. An example here is the political discourse of ‘animal rights’, which draws on familiar concepts of rights and justice in a novel way, thus signalling to the audience that the speaker considers these issues morally and politically serious and therefore demanding of their attention. 13 This case for political purity notwithstanding, we believe Pettit’s argument for political pragmatism is well-founded and consistent with the civic republicanism tradition, which also views citizens as imperfect creatures governed by a range of noble and base motivations and politics as an on-going form of ‘social learning’ and adaptation to changing circumstances. It is for this reason that republicans, like some green theorists, see the necessity of integrating an account of the virtues, dispositions of character which are needed to help ‘cope with’ (rather than somehow ‘solve’) human-nature relations (Barry, 1999). This point about the virtues is relevant to the question of whether green politics demands not only that certain actions be done (more recycling, greater civic participation, reducing energy use, etc) but that these actions be done for the ‘right’ reasons. We agree with Pettit and others (such as Dryzek (1987)) that it is more important that people to do the ‘right’ environmental action than that they must do this for the ‘right’ reason. Thus we part ways with a significant body of green political theory that hold the view that behavioural change without an underlying change in consciousness in a ‘green’ direction is either morally less valuable or practically selfdefeating. Nevertheless, attitudes are critical to a healthy political culture, and **Pettit recognises that the main reason for protecting the environment** and engaging in political action for sustainability **is not simply** our interest in **survival but** also touch upon **deeper issues of identity** and belonging. Pettit argues that, 14 The ecosystem, with the other species of animals that it contains, offers us our place in nature; it is the space, ultimately where we belong…We are all that it is given to us to identify with in that world, worked and unworked by humans, that we see as our own…We live in physical, biological and psychological continuity with other human beings, with other animal species, and ultimately with the larger physical system that comes to consciousness in us (Pettit, 1997: 137; emphasis added) **This stress on identity and** our **continuity with the non-human world**, the view of the nonhuman world as our home (with all that ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ implies) significantly **temper the anthropocentrism of republicanism. Pettit’s republican reading** of green politics **permits non-instrumental valuations** (and associated uses) **of the natural world**. While, as he points out, this take on green politics is hardly likely to convince ecocentrics or deep ecologists, his republicanised green politics is very close to enlightened anthropocentric positions which the present authors see as more normatively justifiable and politically attractive (Barry, 1999). Moreover, the republican support for radical democratic pluralism provides a secure place for ecocentric and deep ecological positions to claim their space in the arena of ideas and debate.

Civic republicanism’s emphasis on the common good empowers individuals to make change; that’s key to green politics

**Dobson 4** writes[[155]](#footnote-155)

If liberal citizenship is amenable yet peculiarly vulnerable to the challenge of political ecology, the civic republican model seems to be a less equivocally robust ally. **Three features of civic republicanism resonate loudly with** the impulses of **political ecology**: the focus on the common good and the related elevation of responsibility over rights, the stress on political virtue, and the idea of the active citizen. **First, then, ‘the environment’ is a public good on which we all depend** for the production and reproduction of daily life. There has been plenty of debate, of course, about whether environmental protection is more effectively brought about through private rather than public ownership, but too close a focus on the detail of this debate can obscure the basic agreement that motivates it: that it is in all our interests as embodied creatures, dependent on our environment for the resources that sustain life, to ensure a healthy and sustainable non-human natural context for our endeavours. Even those who argue for private ownership of (parts of) the natural environment do so on the basis (they say) that this is the best way to ensure sustainability for us all. **This squares with a key idea in civic republican citizenship:** that **the citizen has a duty to promote the common good**. Where the citizen’s own interests clash with the common good, the latter should take precedence. Indeed **it is the duty of the citizen to think in terms of the common good** when making decisions. Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously distinguished between the Will of All and the General Will on the basis that the former is what is produced when people deliberate on the basis of their own interests, and the latter is what emerges when people decide what to do in the light of 6 what is in the common interest. **The civic republican impulse** squares with the latter, and **can thus provide a source of inspiration for** political ecology. Earlier I characterised the debate between liberal and civic republican citizenship as a tussle over the stress to be placed on the rights and responsibilities of citizens. In caricature: the liberal citizen claims rights and the civic republican citizen exercises responsibility. The civic republican’s responsibility is to work towards the common good – and it is not hard to see how this might provide a powerful resource for political ecologists. The stress on **the quotidian**, personal, **nature of green politics** is one of the strongest currents in political ecology. We are constantly enjoined to link the facts of the form of our daily behaviour with the state of the environment we find around us. **Green politics urges us to connect** the way we live **our lives with the impact we make** up**on the natural world**. We are made to feel responsible for the state of the environment, and simultaneously encouraged to see that we can do something about it. Sometimes this feels like zealotry – and in this, again, our instinct to link civic republicanism and political ecology does not betray us, for zealotry is indeed a pathological feature of them both. And both of them often invoke sacrifice – in the case of civic republicanism, the sacrifice of the individual to the cause of the republic, and in the case of political ecology, the sacrifice of individual wants and desires to the requirement of environmental sustainability. There is a common ascetic moment too. Civic republicans have their minds on the high and abstract goal of improving the fortunes of the republic, while political ecologists are urged to forgo the pleasures of materialist satisfaction in the cause of sustainability. This links to the second element of common cause between civic republicans and political ecologists: the importance of the exercise of virtue. In neither case are virtues exercised for their own sake, but as a means to an end. For civic republicans, virtues are connected with improving the condition of the republic, while for political ecologists they are a means to the end of environmental sustainability. These differing objectives colour the virtues themselves. Civic republicanism is replete with tales of courage, sacrifice, manliness, while developing theories of ecological citizenship speak of care, concern and compassion. In both cases there are calls to educate citizens in the exercise of these virtues, and so both forms of citizenship place great stress on young people as proto-citizens – to the extent, in the ecological case, where hopes for sustainability are sometimes almost wholly invested in the younger generation. Liberals will typically criticise civic republicans and political ecologists on these grounds: that education becomes inculcation, and that education about sustainability becomes education for sustainability. So whatever the similarities and differences between civic republicanism and political ecology as far as the content of virtue is concerned, they share common cause in their determination to see virtue as a key component of citizenship. Finally, **tying** all **this together is the vision of the citizen as an active political animal**. The standard view of the liberal citizen is that of the passive recipient of entitlements. This is not an entirely accurate picture, as anyone who has spent time chasing down deficiencies in the provision of entitlements in liberal democratic states will know, but it is a powerful one which civic republicans systematically criticise. **Civic republicanism is connected to** the idea of **politics as participation**, and is heir to the classical Aristotelian view that those who do not participate in the political life of their community are not fulfilling their human potential. To this ‘intrinsic’ reason for participation is added the idea that participation improves the quality of political life. All this is, in turn, taken on board in the ecological conception of how political lives should be led. **Green politics has a strong ‘localist’ impulse – even if we ‘think global’ we are urged to ‘act local’**. The ideological links between the ‘city’ of civic republicanism and the ‘village’ of green folklore are strong: they are the places where politics should be done, and both the source and the destination of the virtues that animate their respective politics. These **localised forms of politics enable ‘genuine’ participation** rather than the stunted forms available in the nation-state context of liberal representative democracies. Finally, there is the idea that the aims of neither civic republicanism nor political ecology will be achievable without citizen participation. Sustainability requires a framework of rules and regulations, of course, say political ecologists, and in the most effective cases those subject to them will regard these rules and regulations as legitimate. But sustainability, it is said, also requires daily vigilance by citizens themselves in regard to their impact on the environment. The form of citizens’ daily lives – their ‘participation’ in the widest sense – is what shapes the contours of sustainability itself

### Link of Omission

This kritik works through a link of omission; none of their evidence is Pettit specific, so their only real argument is “the aff didn’t talk about animals.”

No speech act is perfect and omission is not exclusion

**Rorty 2** writes[[156]](#footnote-156)

**I have no quarrel** with Cornell's and Spivak's claim **that "what is missing** in a literary text or historical narrative **leaves its mark** through the traces of its expulsion." **For** that seems simply to say that **any text will presuppose the existence of** people, **things**, and institutions **that it hardly mentions**. So the readers of a literary text will always be able to ask themselves questions such as: "Who prepared the sumptuous dinner the lovers enjoyed?" "How did they get the money to afford that meal?" The reader of a historical narrative will always be able to wonder about where the money to finance the war came from and about who got to decide whether the war would take place. "**Expulsion," however, seems too pejorative a term for the fact that no text can answer all possible questions about its own background and** its own **presuppositions.** Consider Captain Birch, the agent of the East Indian Company charged with persuading the Rani of Sirmur not to commit suicide. Spivak is not exactly "expelling" Captain Birch from her narrative by zeroing in on the Rani, even though she does not try to find out much about Birch's early days as a subaltern, nor about the feelings of pride or shame or exasperation he may have experienced in the course of his conversations with the Rani. In the case of Birch, Spivak does not try to "gently blow precarious ashes into their ghostly shape," nor does she speculate about the possible sublimity of his career. Nor should she. S.ivak has her own fish to and her own witness to bear just as Kipling had his when he spun tales of the humiliations to which newly arrived subalterns were subjected in the regimental messes of the Raj. So do all authors of literary texts and historical narratives, and such texts and **narratives should not** always **be read as** disingenuous exercises in **repression. They should be read as one version of a story that** could have been told, and **should be told, in many other ways.**

### Alt Fails

The alt is a form of mental determinism which can’t solve the structural root causes of exploitation of nature

**Burdon 12** writes[[157]](#footnote-157)

While certainly instructive, **the belief that social change occurs solely by shifting cultural ideas (such as anthro**pocentrism**) suffers from mental determinism –** the notion **that ideas are the sole determiner of social reality**. Adopting **such a** narrow **perspective is a critical shortcoming** in social theory. Indeed, mental determination is as limited an explanation as technological determinism, class-struggle determinism or changes arising out of (cultural) shifts in everyday life (this is the political position taken by Paul Hawken in his influential text, Blessed Unrest). In practice, **major social transformations** occur through a dialectic of transformations across a range of moments and **develop unevenly** in space and time **to produce** all manner of **local contingencies. This is evidenced in** the **contrast between** the **Occupy** movement **and** the second Arab uprising (or **Arab Spring**)**. A deterministic stance fails to capture this complex interplay** and produces a contingency in human evolution (in much the same way that unpredictable mutations produce contingency in Darwinian theory). Another reason for moving away from **a strict mental explanation for the environmental crisis** is that it **ignores** those **structural forms**, **which perpetuate exploitation without relying on a** particular **worldview**. The most important of these is industrial capitalism. It is a truism, but one that must be constantly stressed, that capitalism’s inherent thirst for short-term growth is fundamentally inconsistent with environmental protection. Further, the structural attributes of capitalism mean that the personality and worldview of individual capitalists is largely irrelevant. **It** simply **does not matter if** the director of **Exxon** Mobile or BHP Billiton is a good person or **holds an ecological worldview. No** amount of **eco-literature**, bush walking or Buddhist retreats **will release a corporate director from** the **structural** economic and legal **pressures that pertain to a capitalist mode of production**. Karl Marx makes this point forcefully in volume one of Das Kapital. The capitalist, according to Marx, has no real freedom. **They are mere cogs in a mechanism**, who have to reinvest a portion of their profits to grow their enterprise because the “coercive laws of competition” force them to. **The alternative is to go out of business** and lose social status. As capital personified, their psychology is focused on the augmentation of exchange-value and the accumulation of social power in limitless money-form. If a capitalist shows any sign of drifting away from their central mission, the pesky laws of competition bring them back into line. Thus “accumulation for the sake of accumulation, production for the sake of production” becomes the central mantra of a capitalist mode of production.

Even if the aff is human-centered, that’s better for environmental progress than their radical alternative

**Mendenhall 9** writes[[158]](#footnote-158)

The **weak**ly **anthro**pocentric view avoids the difficulties of justifying an environmental ethic from either end of the spectrum. On one hand, it **avoids controversy** over the existence of intrinsic value in non-human organisms, objects, and ecological systems. This is one important characteristic of a nonanthropocentric ethic like Deep Ecology– finding intrinsic value in all living things.3 By intrinsic value, I mean value that exists independent of any observer to give it value. For example, a nonanthropocentric ethicist would see value in an animal that no human could ever benefit from or even know about, simply because of what it is. While possibly justifiable, **an ethic that treats all living things** and possibly even ecological systems **as intrinsically valuable may seem very radical to** a large portion of **the public**. It seems that **even the philosophical community remains divided** on the issue. On the other hand, our ethic avoids making felt human desire the loci of all value by showing how considered human values can explain the value in our environment. In other words, what humans value, either directly or indirectly, generates value in the environment. In this way, we avoid unchecked felt preferences that would not be able to explain why excessive human consumption is wrong. Avoiding these controversial stances will contribute substantially to the first advantage of a weakly anthropocentric environmental ethic: public appeal. **The importance of public appeal** to an environmental ethic **cannot be overstated. We are running out of time to slow or reverse** the **effects of** past **environmental degradation, and we will need** the **support of society** to combat them effectively. Hence, the most important advantage of a weakly anthropocentric ethic over a nonanthropocentric one is public appeal because many people feel that nonanthropocentrism is just too radical and contrary to common sense. For many, all value does come from humans, since they believe we are the only species capable of rational thought. Opinions about the environment are certainly changing, but anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that **most reasons given for increasing environmental protection** all **reduce to anthro**pocentrism. For example, the 2004 book The Meat You Eat, by Ken **Midkiff**, **explains why factory farming should be rejected, with a focus on** its **detrimental effects to human health**. The vegan and vegetarian movements have increasingly focused on this angle of the factory farming debate, perhaps because of the broader appeal of human-focused motivations. As Midkiff says, “It is simply impossible to raise animals in concentrated operations and to slaughter these animals by the thousands… without severe health consequences among humans. By treating these animals as units of production, the industrial methods, ultimately and inevitably, produce meats that are unfit to eat.”4 **Even if this justification** for ending factory farming **is not** one **defended by deep ecologists, isn’t actual change more important?** Common justifications for species protection include parents wanting their children to know what an elephant, or a leopard, or a panda look like, how the beauty of animals increases human satisfaction in much the same way that an art gallery would, or the genetic information they can provide which might cure human diseases. In fact, almost every justification printed or aired in major news media reflects a anthropocentric bias. For example, an April 2008 article from the BBC, entitled “Species Loss Bad for Our Health”, surveys “a wide range of threatened species whose biology could hold secrets to possible treatments for a growing variety of ailments.”5 President-elect Barack Obama has consistently spoken about global warming in terms of its impact on future human generations. In a 2007 speech at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, he stressed the urgency of the issue by saying that “the polar ice caps are now melting faster than science had ever predicted… this is not the future I want for my daughters.”6 As for the last premise, most people agree that human consciousness is intrinsically valuable. That is the reason why this value needs little explanation. Even if this justification isn’t perfect, I believe that **the ecological ends justify the philosophical means**.

A human-centered view is the only viable environmental ethic

**Mendenhall 9** writes[[159]](#footnote-159)

Another advantage of weak anthropocentricism is its ease as a decision-making calculus. **Weighing** the **intrinsic value of non-human organisms**, objects, or systems **is significantly more difficult than** weighing **human values**, possibly **because of** our **proximity to and experience with them**. If a gorilla has the same intrinsic value as an earthworm, would that justify our killing the gorilla to save two earthworms? If the gorilla does have more intrinsic value, how much more? Why is one ecosystem more valuable than another? If it is not, then why are human-created ecosystems less valuable? All these questions must be answered to act on a nonanthropocentric ethic. Critics may claim that even weak anthropocentrism falls prey to the same problem, but at least the problem is easier to resolve. **A gorilla is** probably **more valuable to human interests than an earthworm**, especially **since there are fewer gorillas** than earthworms. A natural ecosystem is more beneficial to our harmony with nature than a human-made ecosystem. **If human consensus** about benefit **is unclear, we have** the **guidance of our own conscious**. Whether or not I think a gorilla or an earthworm is more valuable is always a relevant question when following a weakly anthropocentric ethic. Admittedly, our ethic may fall prey to the same issue in determinations of the value of one human vs. another, but at least the problem is not as widespread, and we have more experience with human value so that controversy will be easier to answer. Because this is a problem for all ethical systems, and is not unique to an anthropocentric environmental ethic, we will not address it here. **This observation** about practicality **helps explain why** more than just being a benefit, **a human-centered view is the only** type of **environmental ethic we can practically utilize**. As humans, **it is probably impossible to escape a human-centered ethic** to guide our decision-making. **Our subjectivity means we can only experience the world from one perspective, and this** perspective **colors everything we do**. Our self-preservation instincts lead us to value ourselves above the rest of the world. What person would reasonably kill themselves, or their children, friends, and neighbors, to save an ecosystem? Or two ecosystems? Though some radical environmentalists have chained themselves to trees and bulldozers, this is generally a statement to express the direness of the environmental situation, instead of an actual bodily sacrifice. Would the same environmentalist give their life to save two gorillas, or two earthworms? We are all responsible for the world, but we are first and foremost responsible for ourselves. More than that, our subjectivity means that one deep ecologist will observe value in the world differently than the next. Even those who subscribe to the idea that objective deliberations are possible, admit that we can rarely access them. Believing we can have knowledge of intrinsic value that we cannot access in any meaningful way would require the adoption of moral realism, the idea that we can have knowledge of objective moral facts. The problem with this view is the lack of a perceptual capacity that would enable us to know moral facts the way we can see colors and hear music.

The alt leads to authoritarianism.

**Scott 3** writes[[160]](#footnote-160)

In a pertinent criticism, Michael Northcott suggests that this notion of cosmological identification requires 'incorporating the other into self. **Rather than privileging** the importance of **limits in human interaction with nature, this notion of an expansive self** effectively abolishes such limits - and encourages such abolition. Such a position **erases key aspects of difference between humanity and non-human nature** (here Northcott draws on the work of Val Plumwood) and thereby has the appearance of challenging the Western obsession with the concept of the self. Yet, in fact, **such** a view **perpetuates** the **Eurocentric affirmation of self by incorporating all that** which **is not self into the expansive self**. We can go further: **the logic is totalitarian**, the politics that of identity, the totality that of the 'whole' of the expansive self. The deep ecology position, as presented by Fox, is now seen to be a form of 'act-based' idealism whose roots lie in the work of Rousseau and Fichte (rather than Spinoza and Gandhi). The expansive 'natural self’ forms the core of the theory. Yet, of course, **such a self never meets resistance for it operates with no genuine account of** otherness or **difference**. Such a self is precisely self-enclosed. It is never broken and remade through its encounters for its mode of relation is assimilation. Thus this self never negotiates but rather incorporates. In this precise sense, its logic is totalitarian. If an established and well-founded democracy, as Adam Pezeworski suggests, may be defined as 'a system in which the politically relevant forces subject their values and interests to the uncertain play of democratic institutions,' the deep ecology position has no conceptual place for the democratic play of negotiation. In short, we begin to approach the theoretical roots of a point made earlier: deep ecology lacks a political theory and lapses unwittingly into authoritarianism.

## Ableism K

Actual disabled people demand a living wage

**Gruenberg 13**

Mark Gruenberg. “Goodwill's disabled workers join the fight for a living wage.” august 6 20

Can you imagine earning 22 cents an hour - and trying to live on it? That's what Goodwill Industries could pay disabled workers, the workers say in an on-line petition (by the Autistic Self Advocacy Network) demanding decent wages from the charity. The petitioners state: "According to Labor Department records, Goodwill pays some of its disabled workers as low as 22, 38 and 41 cents per hour." Everyone's pay isn't that low, but the rub is that federal law could let Goodwill get away with it, the petition adds. Harold and Sheila Leighland, two blind Goodwill employees, launched the petition via the Autistic Self Advocacy Network. "Sheila Leighland worked at a Goodwill in Montana for four years making about $3.50 an hour but was forced to quit when Goodwill lowered her hourly wage to $2.75. Her husband added Goodwill pays him less because the charity knows the couple has no other options," the petition says. "I want to be paid a living wage for meaningful work," Sheila Leighland said on the petition. "And not just me-all Goodwill employees deserve the same. They call themselves leaders in providing opportunity for the disabled, but since when did opportunity look like a quarter an hour?" The petition about Goodwill's low pay is one of an ever-widening range of actions low-income workers took nationwide in late July, demanding a fair living wage, decent jobs, and the right to organize without the boss' interference, among other things.

Low wages perpetuate ableism

**Smith 14**

Blogging Against Disableism Day 20: Sheltered Workshops Posted on 1 May, 2014 by s.e. http://meloukhia.net/2014/05/blogging\_against\_disableism\_day\_2014\_sheltered\_workshops/

Historically, the attitude towards employment for people with moderate to severe impairments has been highly patronising. Disabled people were placed in ‘sheltered workshop’ environments, where they completed extremely simple, basic, repetitive, and often dull tasks for very low wages, and in some cases no wages at all. The argument in defense of sheltered workshops was that they provided a form of occupational therapy, gave disabled people something to do, and gave them a sense of value in their lives. The disability rights movement has fought back long and hard against this model of employment. We resist the notion that some people should be paid less than others on the basis of disability status (a highly discriminatory pay scale like this is offensive and illegal).

Living wage is key to break the cycle of poverty; it’s a pre-req to independence

**NDRN 14**

National Disability Rights Network, Segregated and Exploited The Failure of the Disability Service System to Provide Quality Work: Protection, Advocacy & Assistance, 2014

The lack of a true minimum wage for many workers with disabilities keeps them in a life of perpetual poverty. It leaves them dependent on family or government programs just to meet their basic needs of food, shelter, and medical care. It denies them the opportunity to take advantage of the pleasures—continuing education, vacations, restaurants, and hobbies—that many people take for granted. It prevents them from achieving true independence. Worse, once in this system, it’s almost impossible for workers with disabilities to get out. They become trapped in a vicious cycle. Due to an exception in labor laws discussed earlier, workshops can pay less than minimum wage to people with disabilities.67 This forces them to continue to rely on federal benefits such as SSI and Medicaid which themselves require recipients to be poor. This circular system is responsible for creating a class of citizens permanently dependent on public benefits and subsidies because their employers pay less than the minimum wage and provide no benefits. Earning at least the minimum wage, if not a living wage, would allow workers with disabilities to support themselves and reduce the amount of aid they receive from government sources. The majority of workers in sheltered workshops that are paid less than the minimum wage receive incredibly low 67 29 U.S.C. § 214(c).P a g e | 29 pay.

Legal change is key.

**NFB ‘14**

NFB. “The Issue of Fair Wages for Workers with Disabilities,” 2014, https://nfb.org/fair-wages

Section 14(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) allows entities holding what are called “special wage certificates” to pay their disabled workers less than the federal minimum wage. These entities are almost always segregated workplaces, sometimes called “sheltered workshops,” that employ workers with various disabilities, including sensory, physical, and cognitive or developmental disabilities. Federal law requires that certain goods and services procured by the federal government be purchased from these sheltered workshops in order to provide workers with disabilities with employment, but these workers do not have the same protections that other American workers have. Most importantly, over 300,000 workers with disabilities do not receive the federal minimum wage. People with disabilities have the right and ability to work in the same jobs earning the same wages as nondisabled workers. There are many examples of individuals with significant disabilities who, when provided the proper training and support, have acquired a competitive job skill to earn at least minimum wage. Very few, if any, disabled or nondisabled individuals acquire a competitive job skill through performing menial tasks in sheltered, segregated, subminimum-wage work environments. We must set higher expectations and provide real training and support for all people to become fully participating members of society.

Deconstruction can’t solve the material disadvantages that disabled bodies face

**Vehmas and Watson 14** write[[161]](#footnote-161)

If the principles of CDS are evaluated critically in the light of disadvantage, its analytical and political value becomes questionable. Its relativism and its suggestions that impairments are ethically and politically merely neutral differences are false. Impairments often have very tangible effects on people’s well-being, many of which cannot be explained away by deconstruction (for example, Shakespeare 2006; Thomas 1999). Recognizing impairment effects is necessary in order to secure proper treatment and social arrangements that enhance disabled people’s well-being and social participation. CDS runs the risk of dismissing not only the personal experiences of living with impairment, but also the significance of the differences between socially created disadvantages. These disadvantages that often result from oppressive social arrangements, are very much real and take place in different ways for different disadvantaged groups. **Disabled people typically experience disadvantage in relation to** the market and **capitalism**, and they have to a large extent been excluded from employment and from equal social participation, respect and wealth (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 26). **On top of** these **materialist disadvantages, disabled people are stigmatized as** deviant and **undesirable**, and also subordinated to various oppressive hierarchical relations. **For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition**; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). Disability is rooted in the economic structures of society and demands redistribution of goods and wealth. In contrast to some other oppressed groups, disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice. This extra help might be small – for example, allowing a student with dyslexia extra time in an examination – through to complex interventions such as facilitated communication, a job support worker or 24-hour personal assistance. Whatever the size, it is an extra cost both to employers and to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences. Without an acceptance of these differences it is hard to see how we could move forward. Whilst these ‘real differences’ can be presented as the result of dominant ableist discourses where disabled people’s needs are regarded as extra cost, this does not solve the problem. The problems disabled people face require more than ideological change, and **ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change.** CDS fails to account for the economic basis of disability and offers only the tools of deconstruction and the abolishment of cultural hierarchies to eradicate economic injustice. This, as Fraser (2000) has argued, would be possible in a society where there were no relatively autonomous markets and the distribution of goods were regulated through cultural values. In such a society, oppression based on identity would translate perfectly into economic injustice and maldistribution. This is far from the current reality where ‘marketization has pervaded all societies to some degree, at least partially decoupling economic mechanisms of distribution from cultural patterns of value and prestige’ (Fraser 2000, 111). **Markets are not controlled by** nor are they subsidiary to **culture; ‘as a result they generate** economic **inequalities that are not mere expressions of identity hierarchies’** (Fraser 2000, 111–112). The disadvantage related to disability is to a great extent a matter of economic injustice, and before this injustice can be corrected we have to be able to identify those individuals and social groups that have been disadvantaged by social arrangements. Whilst this does create and foster categories and binaries between groups of people, it also requires some sort of categories to start with; namely, the various categories of disadvantage. Both the **social and physical mechanisms that produce** human **diversity are real, and** they **produce tangible differences that cannot be challenged**, let alone abolished, **merely by** pointing out the wanton nature of difference, and **deconstructing** the **meanings attached to disability**. Changing the social conditions that disadvantage and disable some people demands that the diverse, sometimes dualistic, reality of social advantage and disadvantage between different groups of people is recognized. This is exactly why group identities based on, for example, impairment, gender, or sexuality have been invaluable tools in the resistance against discrimination and oppression – in the fight against socially produced disadvantage. Confident, positive disability identity has enabled many disabled people to actively challenge the status quo that disadvantages them and to claim rights and power and participation in dominant institutions. Being different from the so-called normal majority is no longer considered to conflict with a good life, equality and respect. Quite the opposite, positive realization of one’s difference has been liberating and empowering to many disabled people (Shakespeare 2006; Morris 1991). For a radical and active disability movement to emerge and for disabled people to take action on their own account, they have to see themselves as an unfairly marginalized or disadvantaged constituency and a minority group (Shakespeare and Watson 2001). The category disabled/ non-disabled is a good abstraction that can enable the development of communities of resistance, and without it is hard to see how these could develop.

## Ableism K (PVP Shell)

### ROB

The role of the ballot is to endorse the best post-fiat plan.

1. Aff choice. Provides a stasis point which forces the neg to clash.

2. Predictable limits. There’s unlimited roles of the ballot and kritik alts. Topic focus is the only way to create a limited lit base which makes research possible.

3. Time skew. His framework moots the AC and forces a 1AR restart.

These all turn his education claims because they’re pre-requisites to effective dialogue.

**Legal change is key.**

**NFB ‘14**

NFB. “The Issue of Fair Wages for Workers with Disabilities,” 2014, https://nfb.org/fair-wages

Section 14(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) allows entities holding what are called “special wage certificates” to pay their disabled workers less than the federal minimum wage. These entities are almost always segregated workplaces, sometimes called “sheltered workshops,” that employ workers with various disabilities, including sensory, physical, and cognitive or developmental disabilities. Federal law requires that certain goods and services procured by the federal government be purchased from these sheltered workshops in order to provide workers with disabilities with employment, but these workers do not have the same protections that other American workers have. Most importantly, over 300,000 workers with disabilities do not receive the federal minimum wage. People with disabilities have the right and ability to work in the same jobs earning the same wages as nondisabled workers. There are many examples of individuals with significant disabilities who, when provided the proper training and support, have acquired a competitive job skill to earn at least minimum wage. Very few, if any, disabled or nondisabled individuals acquire a competitive job skill through performing menial tasks in sheltered, segregated, subminimum-wage work environments. We must set higher expectations and provide real training and support for all people to become fully participating members of society.

### Perm

Perm, do both. None of their cards say a living wage is inherently bad, just that we have to rethink the history of the Progressive Era.

The perm’s key.

While we should remember the minimum wage’s eugenic past, we must also realize that that doesn’t affect how the minimum wage is presented today

**Geloso 10** writes[[162]](#footnote-162)

So even if there was a social cost to the minimum wage through less employment and lower output, it was outweighed, as the former president of the Association of American Economists A. B Wolfe said, by the elimination of those "who are a burden on society." A similar logic applied to the capping of work hours, the Immigration Restriction Act (which increased quotas for "race importation") of 1924 under President Coolidge that was advocated by Irving Fisher, and the regulation of working conditions. It always came back to the necessity of excluding certain population groups so they would not lower the genetic makeup of a community and foster its decadence and destruction. **Since World War II**, with the horrors of Nazi Germany, **eugenics has completely disappeared from the mainstream academic community**. Academic papers like the Journal of Eugenics, Eugenics Review, and Applied Eugenics have disappeared, and **the Eugenics Society is less than a shadow of its former self**. However, some of the policies they proposed, like the minimum wage, remain alive today. **The minimum wage is today presented** as a tool **for providing anyone with a decent wage, regardless of racial origin, and** its level **is** always **calculated by government officials** so as **to produce the least** possible **distortion of employment. Still, when analyzing ideas, it is worth remembering who first bandied them about, and their reasons** for doing so.

### General

1. No link. The ideology of eugenics manifests in embracing that minimum wage hikes cause unemployment, which my aff didn’t do

Their author **Leonard 9** writes[[163]](#footnote-163)

Minimum-wage legislation, passed by several states beginning with Massachusetts in 1912,51 was the sine qua non of progressive labor reform, and progressive economists championed minimum wages. But **eugenically minded progressives** advocated minimum wages precisely because binding minimums would cause job losses.52 They **argued that minimum-wage-induced job loss was a social benefit because it performed the eugenic service of ridding the labor force of the “unemployable**.**” Sidney and Beatrice Webb**, as ever, **put it** plainly**: “**With regard to certain sections of the population [the unemployable], this **unemployment is not a mark of social disease, but** actually of **social health.”**53 “[O]f all ways of dealing with these unfortunate parasites,” Sidney Webb opined, “the most ruinous to the community is to allow them unrestrainedly to compete as wage earners . . . .”54 Columbia’s Henry Rogers Seager, future AEA president and a leading progressive economist, argued that deserving workers needed protection from the “wearing competition of the casual worker and the drifter” and from the other “defectives” who drag down the wages of more deserving workers.55 The minimum wage protects deserving workers from the competition of the unfit by making it illegal to work for less: “The operation of the minimum wage requirement would merely extend the definition of defectives to embrace all individuals, who even after having received special training, remain incapable of adequate self-support,”56 that is, of earning a living wage.

2. The alt’s a lie. PVP didn’t do an “embodied self-narration” of disability, or anything at all.

3. TURN—**Actual disabled people demand a living wage**

**Gruenberg 13**

Mark Gruenberg. “Goodwill's disabled workers join the fight for a living wage.” august 6 20

Can you imagine earning 22 cents an hour - and trying to live on it? That's what Goodwill Industries could pay disabled workers, the workers say in an on-line petition (by the Autistic Self Advocacy Network) demanding decent wages from the charity. The petitioners state: "According to Labor Department records, Goodwill pays some of its disabled workers as low as 22, 38 and 41 cents per hour." Everyone's pay isn't that low, but the rub is that federal law could let Goodwill get away with it, the petition adds. Harold and Sheila Leighland, two blind Goodwill employees, launched the petition via the Autistic Self Advocacy Network. "Sheila Leighland worked at a Goodwill in Montana for four years making about $3.50 an hour but was forced to quit when Goodwill lowered her hourly wage to $2.75. Her husband added Goodwill pays him less because the charity knows the couple has no other options," the petition says. "I want to be paid a living wage for meaningful work," Sheila Leighland said on the petition. "And not just me-all Goodwill employees deserve the same. They call themselves leaders in providing opportunity for the disabled, but since when did opportunity look like a quarter an hour?" The petition about Goodwill's low pay is one of an ever-widening range of actions low-income workers took nationwide in late July, demanding a fair living wage, decent jobs, and the right to organize without the boss' interference, among other things.

4. TURN—**Low wages perpetuate ableism**

**Smith 14**

Blogging Against Disableism Day 20: Sheltered Workshops Posted on 1 May, 2014 by s.e. http://meloukhia.net/2014/05/blogging\_against\_disableism\_day\_2014\_sheltered\_workshops/

Historically, the attitude towards employment for people with moderate to severe impairments has been highly patronising. Disabled people were placed in ‘sheltered workshop’ environments, where they completed extremely simple, basic, repetitive, and often dull tasks for very low wages, and in some cases no wages at all. The argument in defense of sheltered workshops was that they provided a form of occupational therapy, gave disabled people something to do, and gave them a sense of value in their lives. The disability rights movement has fought back long and hard against this model of employment. We resist the notion that some people should be paid less than others on the basis of disability status (a highly discriminatory pay scale like this is offensive and illegal).

5. Living wage is key to break the cycle of poverty; it’s a pre-req to independence for the disabled

**NDRN 14**

National Disability Rights Network, Segregated and Exploited The Failure of the Disability Service System to Provide Quality Work: Protection, Advocacy & Assistance, 2014

The lack of a true minimum wage for many workers with disabilities keeps them in a life of perpetual poverty. It leaves them dependent on family or government programs just to meet their basic needs of food, shelter, and medical care. It denies them the opportunity to take advantage of the pleasures—continuing education, vacations, restaurants, and hobbies—that many people take for granted. It prevents them from achieving true independence. Worse, once in this system, it’s almost impossible for workers with disabilities to get out. They become trapped in a vicious cycle. Due to an exception in labor laws discussed earlier, workshops can pay less than minimum wage to people with disabilities.67 This forces them to continue to rely on federal benefits such as SSI and Medicaid which themselves require recipients to be poor. This circular system is responsible for creating a class of citizens permanently dependent on public benefits and subsidies because their employers pay less than the minimum wage and provide no benefits. Earning at least the minimum wage, if not a living wage, would allow workers with disabilities to support themselves and reduce the amount of aid they receive from government sources. The majority of workers in sheltered workshops that are paid less than the minimum wage receive incredibly low 67 29 U.S.C. § 214(c).P a g e | 29 pay.

# Theory

## Spec

### AT Country Spec (General, :33)

#### I meet. I spec just governments on balance.

#### Counter-interp: the aff may defend just governments on balance.

#### 1. It’s infinitely regressive. I could always spec more, which causes theory prolif. Neg can always nitpick further details. The substance crowd-out impact is conceded from the AC. I specified the US round 1 and 5 and still hit ASpec both times.

#### 2. No resolutional basis. I defend exactly what the topic asks. That’s most predictable. He unlimits the topic to 200 affs which crushes fairness and research. Even I don’t have a case neg for every country.

#### 3. No abuse. It’s a general principle aff with a poverty advantage. If he doesn’t have prep against the most stock aff on the topic, he deserves to lose.

#### 4. TURN – More ground is bad. He already has links to every stock neg arg. Spec allows PICs or hyper-specific DAs that steal the aff and force 1AR restart, which he’s conceded is the largest impact on presumption.

#### 5. Normal means solves. You could resolve ambiguity by cutting a definition card because I’m bound to defending whatever the topic means.

### General Spec (Short, :25)

#### I meet. I spec the topic.

#### Counter-interp: the aff does not have to specify beyond the resolution.

#### 1. It’s infinitely regressive. I could always spec more, which causes theory prolif. Neg can always nitpick further details. The substance crowd-out impact is conceded from the AC.

#### 2. No resolutional basis. I defend exactly what the topic asks. That’s most predictable.

#### 3. No abuse. It’s a general principle aff with a poverty advantage. If he doesn’t have prep against the most stock aff on the topic, he deserves to lose.

#### 4. TURN – More ground is bad. He already has links to every stock neg arg. Spec allows PICs or hyper-specific DAs that steal the aff and force 1AR restart, which he’s conceded is the largest impact on presumption.

#### 5. Normal means solves. You could resolve ambiguity by cutting a definition card because I’m bound to defending whatever the topic means.

### General Spec (Bugatti Version)

#### Counter-interp: the aff does not have to specify beyond defending the resolution.

#### 1. It’s infinitely regressive. There’s always more I could spec. I read a US aff against Lex and Greenhill in prelims and still hit spec.

#### (a) proves he set an arbitrary bright line, which is a double-turn with the reasonability bad claims.

#### (b) causes theory prolif. Neg can always nitpick further details. The substance crowd-out impact is conceded from the AC. The zero educational value outweighs on magnitude even if fairness comes first general.

#### (c) Impact magnifier; he’s from Scarsdale. 0% chance me specifying would have stopped him from running theory, which is terminal defense on his standards.

#### (d) the topic’s the only universally agreed upon standard, which means it’s the least arbitrary brightline for spec.

#### 2. No resolutional basis. I defend exactly what the topic asks. That’s most predictable.

#### Solves your plans good offense with a diversity net benefit.

**Nebel 15** writes[[164]](#footnote-164)

Second, my view is not that plans are bad. On the contrary, **I think that plans are good, but only when they affirm** the resolution. Whether some plan affirms their resolution (i.e., whether it is topical) is a function of the resolution’s semantics. To repeat, I have nothing against plans in general, and I believe that **spec**ification of some resolutional parameter **may be** permissible, if not **obligatory, on many topics.** One of the great things about **LD** is that our **resolutions are diverse** not only in their subject matter but also in their structure. **This requires debaters to analyze each resolution with a fresh eye and not simply** to **import concepts** and assumptions that may have applied to old resolutions into theoretical norms for each new one. But when the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. It is easier to continue with the same assumptions, as long as they are sufficiently shared by one’s peers on the national circuit, rather than reinventing the theoretical wheel every two months. It is important to resist this temptation and not to ignore the meaning of the resolution, even and especially if you may be more comfortable debating a different resolution.

#### 3. No abuse. It’s a general principle aff with a poverty advantage. If he doesn’t have prep against the most stock aff on the topic, he deserves to lose.

#### 4. TURN – More ground is bad. He already has links to every stock neg arg. Spec allows PICs or hyper-specific DAs that steal the aff and force 1AR restart, which he’s conceded is the largest impact on presumption.

#### 5. Normal means solves. You could resolve ambiguity by cutting a definition card because I’m bound to defending whatever the topic means.

### AT: Real World/Lit (Bugatti Version)

#### 1. This is bullshit. I have read an aff with topic-specific framework authors and 3 minutes of studies. It’s more real world than any aff he’s read this year.

#### 2. Spec doesn’t solve. Empirical proof: Bugatti read a very specific plan in run-offs and then went all in on theory and a 2 sentence a priori in the 1AR.

#### 3. I’ve got 100 pages of frontlines for the on balance contention debate. If you can pull out one tenth as many cards for your plan, I’ll concede this debate.

#### 4. His interp allows stale generic process counterplans like the States CP. I force debates on living wage because shady counter-plans aren’t competitive.

### AT: Shifting

#### 1. No link. I’m not shifty.

#### 2. Ex post facto theory solves.

#### 3. TURN – the resolution itself is the single most stable plan because it’s the only one that’s universally accepted as topical.

#### 4. Spec doesn’t solve. I could be shifty about the function of a plan, too.

#### 5. Definitions check. You could define words in the rez to hold me to one interp.

### AT: Neg Ground

#### 1. Uniqueness goes aff. Neg has a massive ground skew already. There’s tons of counterplans and great solvency lit.

#### 2. TURN – spec explodes neg ground. He gets tiny process counterplans and hyper-specific DAs.

#### 3. Empirics go aff. Most debates on this topic have been UBI and unemployment turns, not States counterplan and politics.

#### 4. Side bias impact turns this. Any ground skew moves us closer to equity.

## “I Meets Trigger RVIs” Good

Counter-interp: The aff can claim I meets trigger an RVI.

1. Their shell is an arbitrary limit on the RVI. An I meet proves I’m consistent with the best norm for debate, and by definition I win on an RVI if I prove that.

This comes first; it proves their “abuse story” justifies warping debate concepts to not mean what they really mean.

2. 1AR time skew. Being able to win the debate on an I meet deters frivolous theory where the violation’s ambiguous. Frivolous theory makes it harder for me to cover both theory and substance.

1AR time skew is the root cause of massive neg side bias—side bias means there’s only a risk of the counter-interp since the round was already skewed in their favor.

3. I meet quality. People only read lots of semantic I meets because they know they aren’t round-winners. If I can win that I meets trigger RVIs, that incentivizes me to make better I meets.

That solves their abuse about getting too many outs on theory; there are only so many quality I meets.

4. Reject the argument solves. This was a single spike in the aff, and doesn’t deserve to be a voting issue any more than “RVIs bad” would.

## Counter-Solvency Advocate Bad

Counter-interp: The neg doesn’t need a counter-solvency advocate for a counterplan or a disad.

1. Do research. Solves their abuse with a net benefit of topic education. Their interp can’t solve topic education because it discourages them from verifying themselves whether there are answers to my stuff.

Education’s a voter since it’s the end-goal of debate. Substance doesn’t matter unless there’s an educational benefit to discussing it.

Education outweighs fairness.

(a) It’s an out-of-round impact; fairness is only an in-round impact.

(b) It’s unique to debate. Few competitive activities care about more than wins and losses, but debate is one of them.

(c) It’s more easily quantifiable whereas questions of ground and strategy are more subjective.

2. Reciprocity. Their interp doesn’t require them to show me a case neg, so their entire abuse story is non-unique because they cause it for me.

3. Interp flaw—a disad isn’t an advocacy, so it can’t have a counter-solvency advocate. Don’t vote for an interp that arbitrarily defines debate terms to mean different things.

4. No abuse. They could have asked for my blocks in prep time. I shouldn’t have to read cards against my stuff during my speech.

5. They can’t solve their abuse since their shell is after the fact. Even if I verify in-round that there are answers to my positions, that doesn’t make them any more prepared or knowledgable about them to win.

6. Gutcheck against dumb theory. Competing interps creates a race to the bottom where every round comes down to theory, killing substantive education. Intervention’s inevitable in blippy theory debates.

## AT “Must weigh between voters”

Counter-interp: Debaters don’t have to weigh between theory voters in the speech where they initiated a theory shell.

1. Strat skew. They force me to moot half of my theory offense by doing weighing for the 1AR that they can collapse on.

That also deters me from reading more than one voter which kills in-depth theory debate. Shallow theory debates kill norm setting which comes first because it’s the purpose of theory.

2. No abuse. They can weigh voters in the 1AR, so they don’t have to split their time on everything. 2NR collapse is also inevitable no matter what I read so the abuse is non-unique.

3. CX solves. They can press me on the warrants for the voters to get me to commit to one over the other.

[If debating Shivane]

Reject their judge intervention claim. There’s no reason why a judge will intervene on an issue debated across three speeches but not across four speeches. Intervention’s inevitable in blippy theory debates.

They say CX solves is just defense, but this defense is terminal. Weighing voters in the speech and CX isn’t “net preferable” because weighing in the speech skews my strat—that’s above.

They say judges will misconstrue CX, but that won’t happen if they ask good questions.

They say CX is for strategy, but setting up which voters outweigh in CX is part of strategy.

## AT “Must have advocacy text in the NC”

Counter-interp: the neg doesn’t need an advocacy text in the NC unless they read a counterplan or a kritik alternative.

1. Solves the abuse. If I didn’t state an advocacy text, I’m implicitly defending the status quo. That’s obvious, and I can’t shift out of that.

If they don’t know what turns to read when someone’s read an NC with a disad, that’s just poor strategic thinking, not abusive 2NR vagueness.

2. CX solves. They could have asked me what I defended, and I would have said the status quo.

[If debating Shivane]

They say CX isn’t offense, but it’s still a great reason to not vote on theory.

They say having a text and checking in CX is “net preferable”, but doing both is nonsensical. If I can clarify in CX, a text isn’t necessary because I can answer a 3-second question.

They say judges can misconstrue CX, but any judge that can’t understand “I defend the status quo” isn’t at the TOC.

They say CX kills prep time, but this had no warrant. They also don’t need to ask me because it’s implicitly obvious that I’ve defended the status quo.

They say CX justifies “Counterplan—ask me about it in CX”, but the counter-interp entails that the neg needs an actual advocacy text if they read a counterplan.

They say “spec coming earlier is key to in-round prep,” but cross-apply that it’s obvious how to prep for an NC with a disad even without an advocacy text.

## AT “Must spec type of util”

Counter-interp: The aff can read a standard of “maximizing happiness” without explicitly specifying a type of util if they read extinction scenarios.

1. Solves the abuse.

(a) Proves the aff is implicitly act-util because it justifies the plan based on individual scenarios rather than a general rule. They should know that and strategize accordingly.

(b) They should know how to straight-up answer an extinction scenario even if the standard was vague.

(c) If I don’t spec the type of util, they can check in CX.

2. Reciprocity. Their interp doesn’t require people to clarify the nuances of other frameworks, so they’ve placed an unequal burden on util debaters.

3. Extinction education. Debating about act vs. rule-util trades off with debating about existential risks. Outweighs fairness because we can’t have fairness if we’re all dead.

4. Strat skew. Their interp encourages debaters to read extremely narrow standards based on a particular type of util. Broader standards are better—

(a) narrow standards allow arbitrary exclusions of offense and,

(b) broader standards allow for a nuanced debate about what counts as offense under that standard.

## Link Chain Advocates Bad

Counter-interp: The aff doesn’t need to read a single author that defends each component of their extinction scenario.

1. The logic of their abuse story equally applies to NCs where the framework authors don’t agree with the contention. If that’s ridiculous, so is requiring a single author for the entire extinction scenario.

2. Strat skew. Most authors assume their impacts are good, so I’d need a separate author to quantify them. Their interp even prevents me from accessing plausible systemic scenarios—I needed two authors to say “the aff reduces work hours, and that improves quality of life.”

3. Topic education. Extinction scenarios are key to in-depth understanding of the topic. My aff proves—my internal link card came from a NASA-funded study about income inequality causing famine.

4. Reject the argument solves. If they win theory, evaluate the rest of the debate on whether the aff helps the poor. “Systemic impacts first” weighing belongs on substance.

5. Extinction education.

They make extinction scenarios impossible because solvency authors assume their impacts—that’s above.

Existential risks are discounted by arbitrary cognitive biases. **Marcus 13** writes[[165]](#footnote-165)

There are known knowns and known unknowns, but what we should be worried about most is the unknown unknowns. Not because they are the most serious risks we face, but because psychology tells us that **unclear risks** that are **in the distant future are** the **risks we are less likely to take seriously** enough. At least four distinct psychological mechanisms are at work. First, we are moved more by vivid information, than by abstract information (even when the abstract information should in principle dominate). Second, we discount the future, rushing for the dollar now as opposed to the two dollars we could have a year later if we waited. Third, **the focusing illusion** (itself perhaps driven by the more general phenomenon of priming) **tends to make us dwell on** our most **immediate problems**, even if more serious problems loom in the background. Fourth, we have a tendency to believe in a just world, in which nature naturally rights itself. These four mechanisms likely derive from different sources, some stemming from systems that govern motivation (future discounting), others from systems that mediate pleasure (belief in a just world), others from **the structure of our memory** (the focusing illusion, and the bias from vividness). Whatever their source, the four together **create a** potent **psychological drive** for us **to underweight distant future risks that we cannot fully envision.** Climate change is a case in point. In 1975, the Columbia University geochemist Wallace S. **Broecker wrote** an important and prescient article called **"**Climatic Change: **Are We on the Brink of** a **Pronounced** Global **Warming?",** **but his worries were ignored for decades,** in part **because many** people **presumed, fallaciously, that nature would** somehow **automatically set itself right.** (And, in keeping with people's tendency to draw their inference primarily from vivid information, a well-crafted feature film on climate change played a significant role in gathering public attention, arguably far more so than the original article in *Science*.) Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom has pointed out that the three greatest unknowns we should be worry about are biotechnology, nanotechnology, and the rise of machines that are more intelligent than human beings. Each sounds like science fiction, and has in fact been portrayed in science fiction, but each poses genuine threats. Bostrom's posits "existential risks": possible, if unlikely, calamities, that would wipe out our entire species, much as asteroids appear to have extinguished dinosaurs. Importantly, many of these risks, in his judgment, exceed the existential risk of other concerns that occupy a considerably greater share of public attention. Climate change, may be more likely, and certainly is more vivid, but is less likely to lead to the complete extinction of the human species (even though it could conceivably kill a significant fraction of us). The truth is that we simply don't know enough about the potential biotechnology, nanotechonology, or future iterations of artificial intelligence to calculate what their risks are, compelling arguments have been made that in principle any of the three could lead to human extinction. These risks may prove manageable, but I don't think we can manage them if we don't take them seriously. In the long run, biotech, nanotech and AI are probably significantly more likely to help the species, by increasing productivity and limiting disease, than they are to destroy it. But we need to invest more in figuring out exactly what the risks are, and to better prepare for then. Right now, the US spends more than $2.5 billion dollars a year studying climate change, but (by my informal reckoning) less than 1% of that total studying the risk of biotech, nanotech, and AI. What **we** really **should be worried** about is **that we are not** quite **doing enough to prepare for the unknown.**

Extinction education also outweighs fairness and other forms of education because we can’t have those if we’re dead.

[AT Experts=brains shut down]

1. This evidence is about people taking expert opinion as advice for their own lives, not debates where people have to defend the strength of their evidence. My brain can’t possibly shut down if they force me to think of 1AR responses.

2. Non-unique. Debaters’ brains could shut down when they get inundated with lots of philosophy cards and bad theory spikes.

[AT Tetlock]

Experts are right about their subject areas. Tetlock assumes subjects that experts are unfamiliar with. **Caplan 5** writes[[166]](#footnote-166)

Is my confidence in experts completely misplaced? I think not. **Tetlock**'s sample **suffers from** severe **selection bias**. **He deliberately asked** relatively **difficult and controversial questions**. As his methodological appendix explains, **questions had to "Pass the 'don't bother me** too often **with dumb questions' test." Dumb according to who?** The implicit answer is "Dumb according to **the typical expert** in the field." **What Tetlock really shows** is **that experts are overconfident if you exclude the questions where they have reached** a **solid consensus.** This is still an important finding. Experts really do make overconfident predictions about controversial questions. We have to stop doing that! However, this does not show that experts are overconfident about their core findings. It's particularly important to make this distinction because **Tetlock's work is so good that a lot of crackpots will want to highjack it:** "Experts are scarcely better than chimps, so why not give intelligent design and protectionism equal time?" But what **Tetlock** really **shows** is **that experts can raise** their **credibility if they stop overreaching**.

[AT Quantify impacts analytically]

Specifying impacts analytically is ridiculous because I’m not an expert. Assuming those impacts are good without quantifying them prevents in-depth weighing debates which are key to education.

Rejecting expert predictions in favor of personal assessment kills sound a analysis

**Fitzsimmons 7** writes[[167]](#footnote-167)

But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challeng-  ing. If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors  can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decision-  makers.15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive  limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and  complexity grows. It should follow, then, that in planning under conditions of  risk, variability in strategiccalculation should be carefully tailored to available  analytic and decision processes.  Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity  and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, **where analysis is**silent or **inadequate**, the **personal beliefs**of decision-makers  **fill the void**. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic sur-  prise, in ‘an environment **that lacks clarity**, abounds with conflicting data, **and  allows no time for**rigorous **assessment** of sources and validity, ambiguity allows  intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... **The greater the ambiguity, the  greater the impact of preconceptions**.’16The decision-making environment that  Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environ-  ment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making.  He **invites ambiguity**, takes conflicting data for granted **and substitutes a priori  scepticism about the validity of prediction** for time pressure as a rationale for  discounting the importance of analytic rigour.  It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous  assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and  scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of  decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate  those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be  both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite  extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what  is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? **A decision-maker with no** faith in **prediction is left with** little more than a set of  worst-case scenarios and his **existing beliefs**about the world to confront the  choices before him.Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but **if they  are not**made explicit and **subject to**analysis and **debate** regarding their application to particular strategic contexts**, they remain only beliefs**and premises**, rather than rational judgements**. Even at their best, such **decisions are**likely to  be **poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation.** At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers  themselves.

## AT Meta-Theory 1st

1. No shell automatically comes first if it links to the same voters. My abuse story can still outweigh any harms from how I presented the shell.

2. Infinitely regressive—they encourage meta-meta-theory and so on which leads to messy debates.

## Brackets in Original Good (PVP)

I meet. I didn’t bracket the card; my authors did.

Counter-interp: Debaters may read cards that include brackets inserted by the author themselves.

1. Solves the abuse. I’m not misappropriating my author’s words because the brackets are their own.

Even if the author could use brackets to mislead, (a) academics are less likely to do that, and (b) non-unique—authors could use ellipses to do the same thing.

2. This shell is wrong

**Damerdji 15** writes[[168]](#footnote-168)

Is that small gain worth the cost? I think **the shell creates an unworkably high bar for academic honesty**. On such a view, **even lining down evidence** would be suspect because it **alters the** author’s **original text**. Tags would also be suspect since most judges frame their interpretation of a card based on the tag that they were given. These practices aren’t inherently academically honest, and neither are brackets. Yes, all of them could be used to misconstrue evidence, but generally, they’re not, so it’s hard to claim that someone’s “cheating.” **Additionally, the abuse story is circular – it** already **presumes that judges assume every word in a card is the author’s word. If we rejected this norm, judges would know brackets are legitimate**, so they wouldn’t assume every word was the author’s. Brackets aren’t deceitful because reasonable judges should have an expectation they’re being used. Moreover, the shell merely pushes the issue back a step. The problem with brackets is that they might misconstrue evidence, but even with a warning, evidence still might be misconstrued with brackets. If nearly every card has brackets, prefacing each card becomes so commonplace that it fails to signify anything special to look out for to ward against misconstrued evidence. Ask yourself this: when has a round ever been determined by whether a judge knows that one word, though they don’t know which one, is bracketed in? If you’ve never seen this, and I certainly haven’t, you should probably agree that **this is perhaps the most frivolous shell ever** to receive the absurdly disproportionate legitimacy it’s been given.

3. Theory proliferation. Their shell is purely based on potential abuse. Anything could be potentially abusive, so they justify endless frivolous theory—that kills substantive education.

Education is a voter since it’s the end-goal of debate. Substance doesn’t matter unless there’s an educational benefit to discussing it.

Education outweighs fairness.

(a) It’s an out-of-round impact; fairness is only an in-round impact.

(b) It’s unique to debate. Few competitive activities care about more than wins and losses, but debate is one of them.

(c) It’s more easily quantifiable whereas questions of ground and strategy are more subjective.

## LW Spillover Effect Good

Counter-interp: The aff can claim spillover effects of a living wage.

1. Topic education. (a) Ripple effect is widely recognized in minimum wage lit, that’s Harris and Kearney 14. (b) Spillover args encourage in-depth research on how living wage affects diverse sectors of the economy.

Education is a voter since it’s the end-goal of debate; substance doesn’t matter unless there’s an educational benefit to discussing it.

Education outweighs fairness.

(a) It’s an out-of-round impact; fairness is only an in-round impact.

(b) It’s unique to debate. Few competitive activities care about more than wins and losses, but debate is one of them.

(c) It’s more easily quantifiable whereas questions of ground and strategy are more subjective.

2. Strat skew. Spillover effect is the best response to cards saying the aff is poorly targeted. I need that strategic out because the poverty debate is core aff ground.

3. Theory proliferation. Voting for their interp encourages more frivolous theory about any card that someone doesn’t like, killing substantive education.

4. Reject the arg solves. If they win theory, I can’t go for ripple effect.

(a) The abuse only happens when the judge signs the ballot on the abusive argument.

(b) It’s the TOC; drop the debater won’t set a precedent about living wage cards on the last tournament for the topic.

(c) It’s a single card in the aff; their claims about irreparable skews are overblown.

## Bostrom Good

I meet. I didn’t claim extinction precedes my framework. The Parlimentary model assumes a weak risk of util, that’s Bostrom 9.

Counter-interp: aff can read a moral framework and say extinction comes first.

1. Reciprocity. Neg can make preclusive arguments, and we can compare warrants.

2. Phil education. A huge part of the lit is about both moral uncertainty and existential risks. Even deontologists debate about thresholds.

3. 1AR time skew. If I can’t make framework weighing, the NC can always spread me out with a 10-point util dump. Empirical neg bias proves 1AR time skew is the largest link to fairness.

4. Not a fairness question. My job is to make strong arguments.

5. Theory proliferation. Their interp justifies people running theory anytime they hit a framework card they don’t like. This massively crowds out substantive education.

6. Extinction education. Any risk I increase discussion of extinction outweighs your offense – that’s Bostrom.

7. Competing interps leads to a race to the bottom where every round becomes theory. Use reasonability – intervention’s inevitable in blippy theory debates.

Education outweighs fairness.

(a) It’s an out-of-round impact; fairness is only an in-round impact.

(b) It’s unique to debate. Few competitive activities care about more than wins and losses, but debate is one of them.

(c) It’s more easily quantifiable whereas questions of ground and strategy are more subjective.

**AT Bostrom Bad Standards**

**AT Resolvability**

1. No link. We can compare warrants between Bostrom and other solutions to moral uncertainty.

2. TURN—Parli model’s key to resolvability. It says compromise resolves disagreement between competing ethical views.

3. No link to fairness. If the round is irresolvable, we’re both screwed.

4. Empirically denied. No judge has ever refused to resolve a round because of Bostrom.

5. Time skew turns resolvability. You can’t tell who did the better debating if the neg only wins because of longer speech times.

6. Neg has the option to concede extinction first.

**AT Reciprocity**

1. Bostrom’s not a NIB. You can turn it.

2. Aff NIBs are good. I have to collapse to avoid time skew. I literally can’t go for everything in a 3 minute 2AR.

3. Turn – neg can make moral uncertainty claims also.

4. Turn – Bostrom’s key to reciprocity. Compensates for neg framework preclusion like skep triggers and permissibility.

5. Reciprocity bad. I need more ground to solve time skew.

6. Conceding Bostrom solves.

**AT Clash**

1. TURN – Bostrom’s key to clash. It forces you to engage me in a topical debate instead of just reading util answers and ignoring the contention.

2. TURN – Bostrom’s key to clash. You have to directly answer it unlike simply dumping general answers to a framework without answering the particular warrants.

3. Theory proliferation turns clash. Debaters go for theory all the time to hide from clash.

4. Education outweighs. Clash isn’t meaningful unless it teaches us something.

5. No link to education – the education happened before the round whether we clash or not.

6. Lack of clash is inevitable – most rounds get decided on dropped arguments, not substantive clash.

7. TURN – Bostrom’s key to clash. It ensures AC offense directly interacts with the NC. Bostrom is functionally “extinction turns the NC”, that’s the weighing ground standard.

## Education Voter—Extinction

Education solves extinction

**Lucas 10** writes[[169]](#footnote-169)

Storytellers are teachers and communicators who speak a universal language. That was Homer's primary role, and both Plato and Aristotle used narratives and dialogues as a means of educating. Good storytelling is based on truths and insights, and a good storyteller is ultimately a teacher - using the arts as a means of making education emotionally meaningt'ul. These are all tools at our educational system's disposal, but too often we aren't making use of them. **When I was in high school, I felt like I was in a vacuum, biding time. I was curious, but bored**. It was not an atmosphere conducive to learning. I was fortunate that I found my path and my language. It's scary to think of our education system as little better than an assembly line with producing diplomas as its only goal. Once I had the means to effect change in this arena, **it became my passion** to do so - **to promote** active, **life-long learning**. I believe in the artisan school of learning, through apprenticeships and Aristotelian questions and discussion. This level of engagement dates back to the beginning of human life, but it's still the best way of doing things. There have to be universal standards particularly in education - and while it seems unwieldy, there is a willingness among educators to share their best practices. Ultimately, that is why I created Edutopia and the George Lucas Educational Foundation, The focus of GLEF has been to share educational innovations - cooperative and project learning, mentorship, parental involvement, and technological advances. This all comes straight from those on the front lines, from teachers who are putting these methods into practice. We are the facilitators. Our goal has been to showcase bold successes and inspire others to further increase the appetite for education. Our hope is that administrators, teachers, and parents will see the power of these collective efforts and join the fight for wider reforms. But reform is just the beginning. **We need to** build new foundations, **foster**ing **independent thought and a desire to keep learning**. Our students need to come away with more than just survival skills, and more than just what is required to complete the program. **We need to promote critical thinking and emotional intelligence. We need to focus on building an education** system that promotes different types of learning, different types of development, and different types of assessment. We have an opportunity and an obligation to prepare our children for the real world, for dealing with others in practical, project-based environments. It's about working together and building character - being compassionate, empathetic, and civil as a means to a greater end. As technology changes, so do students. So should classrooms, and so should our methods of teaching. In a few short years, connectivity has gone from a technological novelty to a daily necessity. It's how our culture communicates, and our children are at the forefront of its use. Understanding those tools and how to integrate them into learning -- is an integral step in defining our future. My pledge is to the process; as long as I have the resources at my disposal, I will seek to raise the bar for future generations of students of all ages. I am dedicating the majority of my wealth to **improving education**. It **is** the **key to the survival of the human race.** We have to plan for **our collective future** -- and the first step **begins with the** social, emotional, and **intellectual tools we provide to our children**. As humans, **our greatest tool for survival is our ability to think and** to **adapt** - as educators, storytellers, and communicators our responsibility is to continue to do so.

## Reject the Argument (Short Version)

Reject the arg, not the debater.

1. It’s more fair because it’s reciprocal. Otherwise neg gets no risk theory.

2. The abuse happens if the judge signs the ballot based on the abusive argument, so rejecting it now solves the abuse.

3. Even if NC time was skewed, my 1AR was skewed by responding to theory, so there’s no net time skew.

4. Voting on theory just encourages more blippy theory in the future, killing substantive debate.

5. Fairness is just a gateway issue to evaluating the round, so if you can determine the better debater on the flow, there’s no jurisdiction to vote on fairness.

6. It’s the TOC. They can’t set a precedent for topic norms on the last tournament for the topic.

[AT Deterrence]

Deterrent effect is empirically denied. Even if I read a different aff, he’d just find a different theory violation.

Deterrent effect is empirically denied. Juveniles are immature. **Bishop 2k** writes[[170]](#footnote-170)

A fundamental tenet is that **adolescents are immature** (Bernard 1992; Scott and Grisso 1997; Feld 1999). Their **lesser capacities for reasoning** and moral judgment **diminish** their **culpability** and render them undeserving of the full burden of retributive punishments (Zimring 1981, 1991, 1998; Forst and Blomquist 1991; Scott and Grisso 1997). Moreover, from a purely utilitarian perspective, their **limited ability to anticipate and weigh long-term consequences makes it unlikely that** threats of criminal **sanctions will deter them** (Teitelbaum 1991). Finally, cultural conceptions of children and adolescents have traditionally emphasized youths' dependency and vulnerability, characteristics that tend to evoke compassionate responses rather than punitive ones.

## Reject the Argument (Long Version)

It’s the TOC. They can’t set a precedent on topic norms on the last tournament of the topic.

Reject the arg is key to proportionality

**Nebel 14** writes[[171]](#footnote-171)

Proportionality. The **punishment of losing** the round **is** much **worse than the “crime**,**” even according to the biggest theory impacts** (**which claim that winning becomes easier** or more likely, **but not certain**). **Fairness requires proportionality because fairness is** the **satisfaction of claims in proportion to their strength**. (That requires a bit more development. For the basic idea, see John Broome, “Fairness.”) **The only residual cost if you drop the arg**ument **is** the **time investment for running theory. But that is balanced by the investment in** the initial practice and in **defending “drop the arg**ument**”**; there’s no evidence that they needed to spend so much time on theory; dropping the debater is the main incentive for the excessive time investment; even if dropping the argument would not fully rectify the “abuse,” it’s closer to being proportional than dropping the debater;

Drop the debater incentivizes bad theory arguments

**Nebel 14** writes[[172]](#footnote-172)

Perverse incentives. **Making theory a voting issue makes bad theory arguments strategic**, because **even bad arguments have** enough of **a chance to make them worth running**. Sure, **dropping the arg**ument **makes unfair practices strategic too, but those practices do not necessarily decide the round even if won**. And the threat of dropping the debater in extreme circumstances will always exist. The main disincentive for bad theory arguments is an RVI, but [if they said RVIs bad] that’s excluded by that interpretation [if they haven’t taken a stance on RVIs] RVIs are bad because [. . .].

Drop the debater is ex post facto which makes it independently unfair

**Nebel 14** writes[[173]](#footnote-173)

Ex post facto. **Punishment is justified only given rules** that are **fixed and announced beforehand, but theoretical rules are constructed** and changed **in** the **round**. **This** doesn’t mean theory is bad but it **does make it** prima facie **unfair to vote against someone on** such **an unpredictable basis**.

The abuse only happens when the judge signs the ballot—means reject the arg is sufficient

**Nebel 14** writes[[174]](#footnote-174)

Reductio ad absurdum. **Their arguments** would **justify voting neg if the aff made a single new arg**ument **in the 2AR**. This example shows that the **unfairness is in the judge voting on some illegitimate arg**ument or practice**, not** in **its mere existence, so dropping the arg**ument **is sufficient.**

Those warrants outweigh his drop the debater warrants

**Nebel 14** writes[[175]](#footnote-175)

**Type-I errors outweigh**. Ceteris paribus, **punishing someone who doesn’t deserve it is worse than not punishing someone who does deserve it**. This is because punishing the innocent is intrinsically bad, but punishing the guilty is not intrinsically good: the punished person doesn’t benefit. It’s only instrumentally good in this case because the non-guilty debater wins, but that reward is also undeserved: that I did something unfair doesn’t mean that they did the better debating overall. **Theory is worse than substance. Substantive debate is centered on a resolution** agreed upon in advance, **so we can** prepare for better **clash, which is key to all benefits of debate. Higher standard of evidence.** If you do drop the debater, you should **require demonstration beyond reasonable doubt to avoid unfair punishment**. Use a higher threshold for theory because (a) claims of unfairness are absolute whereas the probability of the resolution comes in degrees; (b) dropping the debater is an action, in contrast to forming beliefs or degrees of belief in the resolution, and **there’s a slippery slope to allowing debaters to argue about how you should act,** even in this round—**e.g., about speaker points or your wallet**.

## RAND Frontlines

### AT Deterrence

1. Deterrent effect is empirically denied. Even if I met their interp, they’d read a different one and still say I’m unfair.

2. Reject the arg solves deterrence. Dropping me isn’t key to making my args irrelevant which dissuades me from reading them in the future.

3. Reject the arg deters frivolous theory. That’s a better form of deterrence because frivolous theory kills substantive education.

### AT Time Commitment

1. Non-unique. I spent time reading reject the arg and the counter-interp.

2. Efficiency solves. They didn’t need to spend so much time on theory.

3.

# AC Spike Extensions (TOC Qtrs)

## 1. Side Bias

### Ext

#### He’s conceded side bias empirics go aff, which impact turns unfairness because it rectifies the bias. The weighing makes his turns moot. (a) empirics show net effect which sums up all factors, and (b) analytics are suspect because he’s hyping how hard the neg is to win the round.

### AT: Calculation Indict

#### He’s conceded util calc indicts don’t apply to the real world; that’s Hardin. My framework also solves; that’s Pettit.

### AT: Speaks first and last

#### Speaking first and last is net bad because it lets the neg react and gives me the last chance to drop things.

### AT: Efficiency solves

#### Efficiency doesn’t solve because the neg can be efficient, too.

## 2. Offense Defense

### General

#### Offense-defense is key to check infinite abuse, which outweighs petty offense; that’s Nelson.

### AT: Negate is Deny the truth of

#### “Negate” isn’t a word in the topic, but “Resolved” is, which proves it’s a policy.

### AT: Skep Still negates

#### Skep doesn’t negate under O/D because it functions as non-unique defense, and he’s conceded that fallibility means he’ll never win 100% credence in it.

## 3. Reasonability

### General

#### He’s dropped a straight turn to arbitrariness. It’s inevitable in blippy theory debates, but I solve by deterring theory long term.

#### No arbitrariness impact; the destruction of the activity should outweigh. If you love this activity, you should intervene to save it from this bullshit.

### AT: Race to the Bottom

#### Race to the bottom doesn’t apply in this round. He’s conceded that I’m reading the most stock aff on this topic. There’s a reason it’s the frivolous theory debaters who read competing interps.

## 4. Theory Prolif DA

### General

#### Voting neg does not just mean endorsing his interp. It actively legitimizes frivolous theory. Look at the state of the activity. You will encourage more of this shit in the future, which is a DA you have to weigh in addition to the specific offense.

## WEIGHING – Frivolous Theory Bad

### General

#### Frivolous theory destroys the activity. It is devoid of educational value. I should not have to justify this to you. A risk you perpetuate it should outweigh all of his marginal offense.

### AT: Crit Thinking

#### Theory kills critical thinking because it encourages evasion over clash. We repeat stupid buzzwords which will not apply when this tournament ends.

### AT: Models Courtrooms

#### This is nothing like a court room, but if it is, he’s the one filing the frivolous lawsuits that are destroying our legal system. This analogy flows aff.

# T - Contractors

Total: 2:53

## Generic

### I Meet

#### I meet. I defend the topic. T is a question of advocacy, not evidence.

### Counter-interp

#### Counter-interp: The topic is a general principle that applies to workers on balance, not only contractors.

### Standards (:42)

#### 1. Season-long consensus. Almost every single round for the past 5 months has been about national wage laws. No brief on this topic focused on contractors. I didn’t even have a case neg for his topical version going into the tournament.

#### Consensus is the largest link to all other standards because it determines what ground is predictable of legitimate. The reason I have a huge Hong Kong case neg and zero cards on Bolivia is because that’s what people have been running.

#### 2. Phil education

#### He guts it. The core phil ground on this topic is universal workers’ rights versus business ethics.

Stevens 15

Rachel Stevens (Top 8 National NFA LD Debater 2011; supervisor of Debate Central). “LD January/February 2015 Analysis.” Debate Central. 2015. http://debate-central.ncpa.org/januaryfebruary-2015-ld-topic-analysis-is-published/

The key term in the resolution is “living wage.” Living wage refers to a rate of pay at which a person could be expected to have enough income to meet his or her basic needs. Basic needs include food, shelter, transportation, utilities, medical care, and perhaps some modest degree of recreation. Some would further include saving for the future (such as illness, emergency, or retirement) under the category of basic needs. Many people also argue that a true living wage should be high enough for a fulltime worker to support a family, not just the individual worker him or herself. As the affirmative, you should have a clear idea of which interpretation(s) of living wage you are willing to defend. The general idea advanced by supporters of living wages is that **no person who works a fulltime job** (40 hours per week) should have to live below the poverty line. Opponents argue that businesses should only have to pay employees for the economic value of their labor (essentially, how much money their job is worth to the company), and that asking them to pay more is unfair and may have unintended economic consequences. Whether or not businesses have an obligation to provide a certain standard of living to their employees is controversial, and will be **a major part of this debate.**

#### Phil outweighs other education because:

#### (a) it's the only education that applies to everyone all the time, whereas most of us won’t be policy-makers,

#### (b) it's the only education unique to LD

#### (c) key to fairness because LD topics are written so phil is the core ground

#### (d) Stevens is about topic-specific NCs, which turns any staleness indicts to phil debate.

### AT: Field Context/Textuality (:56)

#### 1. His interp assumes city-level ordinances. That violates “government.” It’s “a branch or service of the supreme authority of a state or nation, taken as representing the whole” according to dictionary.com.

Dictionary.com. “Government.” No date. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/government

#### 2. He violates “employers.” It’s a bare plural in the topic, which means a general principle.

**UltraLingua 11**

UltraLingua (Language Software Company). “Definite Articles.” 2011. http://www.ultralingua.com/onlinedictionary/references/english/38.htm

The definite article does not always precede nouns: sometimes indefinite articles or partitive articles will be used. Often, though, no article at all is necessary, as in the following cases: As a general rule, the definite article is omitted before abstract nouns or nouns representing general categories. It is often omitted after verbs expressing opinions or preferences:

#### Contractors are legally distinct.

NOLO 14

(Independent Contractor Or Employee: How Government Agencies Make The Call. NOLO: Law For All, Legal Encyclopedia. Last Updated July 6, 2014.)

The U.S. Department of Labor also cares about how your company classifies workers: If a worker is an independent contractor, then the worker is not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), **the major** federal **law regarding wages** and hours. This means, among other things, that the worker is not entitled to minimum wage or overtime. Like the IRS, the Department of Labor has no single rule or test for determining whether someone is an independent contractor under the FLSA. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the following factors are significant when determining whether a worker is an independent contractor under the FLSA: whether the worker’s services are an integral part of your company’s business (this points to employee status) the permanency of the relationship (the more permanent the relationship, the more likely it is that the worker is an **employee**) whether the worker has invested in facilities and equipment (if so, this points to independent contractor status) how much control your company has over the worker (the more control, the more likely it is that the worker is an employee) whether the worker has opportunities to make a profit or suffer a loss (as opposed to always earning a set amount of money no matter what happens, like an employee) whether the worker competes in the open market (if so, this points to independent contractor status), and the extent to which the worker operates a truly independent business (the more independence, the more likely the worker is an **independent contractor**).

#### “Employers” outweighs “living wages” because “employers” modifies it to clarify which “living wage” definition the topic uses.

#### 3. “Living wage” refers to a national minimum wage increase on this debate topic specifically. His “wage floor” distinction goes aff; it proves they’re the same.

Stevens 15

Rachel Stevens (Top 8 National NFA LD Debater 2011; supervisor of Debate Central). “LD January/February 2015 Analysis.” Debate Central. 2015. http://debate-central.ncpa.org/januaryfebruary-2015-ld-topic-analysis-is-published/

“Living wage” is related, but not identical, to “minimum wage.” The United Sates has a federal minimum wage, which is $7.25/hour. However, it may be higher in certain states or cities which have chosen to pass legislation to raise their own minimum wage. “Living wage,” on the other hand, does not legally refer to any specific dollar amount. Some areas may have living wage ordinances, which require its businesses to pay a wage indexed to the current cost of living in that area. However, because cost of living differs depending on where one is, the living wage could be dramatically different in one area to the next. So, **if we are discussing things on a national scale (which most debates on this topic** probably **will),** it is important to recognize that the living wage would not be a consistent number of dollars per hour throughout an entire country, but rather would be set at different amounts depending on the cost of living in various areas. (Another area of ambiguity in the topic: how much discrepancy is appropriate? Should the wage be set by county? City? Neighborhood? Block?) To determine what a living wage might be in a particular location, check out this living wage calculator. Technically, **a living wage *IS* a minimum wage**, in the sense that both establish the smallest amount of money a business can legally pay an employee. They are both what can be called a “wage floor” in **economic literature**. So, while the federal minimum wage is not necessarily a living wage (data shows that, in many cities, the cost of living dramatically outpaces the federal minimum wage), a legally-required **living wage *would become the new minimum wage*** *in its corresponding area*. In other words, theoretical arguments about how wage floors affect economies would apply to debates about both the federal minimum wage and any given living wage. But, arguments specific to the federal minimum wage generally will not be directly 4 applicable to discussions of a living wage, and vice versa. This is because living wages are tied to the cost of living in a specific area, while the same is not always true of the legal minimum wage.

#### The CRA prodict just says it cites Neumark, which is non-unique because he writes tons of cards about my aff, too.

#### CRA cites field context; that doesn’t apply to normative, switch side debate rounds.

Eric **Kupferberg 87**, University of Kentucky, Senior Assistant Dean, Academic & Faculty Affairs at Northeastern University, College of Professional Studies Associate Director, Trust Initiative at Harvard School of Public Health 1987 “Limits - The Essence of Topicality” http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Kupferberg1987LatAmer.htm

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#### IRS is more qualled on topicality, and they conclude contract and employment are mutually exclusive

NOLO, 2014:

(Independent Contractor Or Employee: How Government Agencies Make The Call. NOLO: Law For All, Legal Encyclopedia. Last Updated July 6, 2014.)

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is probably **the most important agency** to satisfy **when it comes to classifying a worker** as an independent contractor. Under the IRS’s test, workers are considered employees if the company they work for has the right to direct and control the way they work, including the details of when, where, and how the job is accomplished. In contrast, the IRS will consider workers independent contractors if the company they work for does not manage how they work, except to accept or reject their final results. The IRS looks at a number of factors when determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.

#### Martin is over a decade too old. It doesn’t assume Seattle, or the Fight-for-15, which prove the most recent labor movements shifted in favor of the aff.

#### 4. Topic-long consensus goes aff. Almost every single round on this topic for the past 5 months has been about national wage laws. I didn’t even have a case neg for his topical version until an hour before our prelim round.

#### That straight turns Merrell’s terminal impact of predictability because TOC prep is governed by past round, not legalistic topic readings.

### AT: Resolvability (:36)

#### On Resolvability

#### Next line of his card concludes there’s no lit base

Neumark and Adams 3

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Living wage ordinances mandate wage floors that are typically much higher than the wage floors set by state and federal minimum wage legislation. These ordinances are frequently tied to the federal government’s definition of poverty. While traditional minimum wage legislation is nearly universal in coverage, living wages apply to a subset of firms. Only businesses under contract to provide services to the city and, in some cases, firms receiving assistance from the city for the purpose of economic development or job creation, or city employees, are subject to the requirements of these ordinances. Thus, theoretical predictions of the effects of traditional minimum wage laws and the extensive empirical literature that tests these predictions can only serve as a rough guide to studying the effects of living wages. Their unique features require separate empirical examination.

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To date, there has been **no attempt** to estimate the actual impact that living wage ordinances have had on their expected beneficiaries–low-wage workers and low-income families in the cities where these ordinances have been enacted. In this paper, we present evidence on the effects of these city ordinances on wages, employment, hours, and poverty. This is done by comparing the changes in these outcomes for workers in cities that have adopted living wages to changes for workers in cities that have not adopted them.

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#### No impact to resolvability.

#### 1. Risk of offense and presumption solve.

#### 2. Empirically denied. No debate round in history has ended in the judge refusing to vote because they couldn’t resolve the round.

#### 3. Resolvability’s inevitable.

**Huemer 2k**

Michael Huemer (Professor at UC Boulder). Why I Am Not an Objectivist. April 2000. http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/rand.htm

Again, however, I would caution the reader against concluding too hastily as to the unresolvability of a particular ethical (or other) dispute. Both philosophical thought experiments and derivation from other principles can have a surprisingly long reach. You cannot conclude that since you have not yet found a way to convince someone of a moral conclusion, you will never find one. Most people are not so stubborn as my imagined skeptic who denies everything, and it is highly unlikely that two people will disagree about every moral issue (Cf. section 5.4.1, part (I)).

#### 4. phil debates prove

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## Brentwood – Short Version (1:33)

### I Meet

#### I meet. I defend the topic. T is a question of advocacy, not evidence: I need to kick cards to solve time skew, which he concedes comes first.

### Counter-interp

#### Counter-interp: The topic is a general principle that applies to employers on balance, not only contractors.

### AT: Field Context

#### On field context

#### 1. His interp assumes city-level ordinances. That violates “government.” It’s “a branch or service of the supreme authority of a state or nation, taken as representing the whole” according to dictionary.com.

Dictionary.com. “Government.” No date. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/government

#### 2. He violates “employers.” Contractors are legally distinct.

NOLO 14

(Independent Contractor Or Employee: How Government Agencies Make The Call. NOLO: Law For All, Legal Encyclopedia. Last Updated July 6, 2014.)

The U.S. Department of Labor also cares about how your company classifies workers: If a worker is an independent contractor, then the worker is not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), **the major** federal **law regarding wages** and hours. This means, among other things, that the worker is not entitled to minimum wage or overtime. Like the IRS, the Department of Labor has no single rule or test for determining whether someone is an independent contractor under the FLSA. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the following factors are significant when determining whether a worker is an independent contractor under the FLSA: whether the worker’s services are an integral part of your company’s business (this points to employee status) the permanency of the relationship (the more permanent the relationship, the more likely it is that the worker is an **employee**) whether the worker has invested in facilities and equipment (if so, this points to independent contractor status) how much control your company has over the worker (the more control, the more likely it is that the worker is an employee) whether the worker has opportunities to make a profit or suffer a loss (as opposed to always earning a set amount of money no matter what happens, like an employee) whether the worker competes in the open market (if so, this points to independent contractor status), and the extent to which the worker operates a truly independent business (the more independence, the more likely the worker is an **independent contractor**).

#### “Employers” outweighs “living wages” because “employers” modifies it to clarify which “living wage” definition the topic uses.

#### 3. “Living wage” refers to a national minimum wage increase on this debate topic specifically. His “wage floor” distinction goes aff; it proves they’re the same.

Stevens 15

Rachel Stevens (Top 8 National NFA LD Debater 2011; supervisor of Debate Central). “LD January/February 2015 Analysis.” Debate Central. 2015. http://debate-central.ncpa.org/januaryfebruary-2015-ld-topic-analysis-is-published/

“Living wage” is related, but not identical, to “minimum wage.” The United Sates has a federal minimum wage, which is $7.25/hour. However, it may be higher in certain states or cities which have chosen to pass legislation to raise their own minimum wage. “Living wage,” on the other hand, does not legally refer to any specific dollar amount. Some areas may have living wage ordinances, which require its businesses to pay a wage indexed to the current cost of living in that area. However, because cost of living differs depending on where one is, the living wage could be dramatically different in one area to the next. So, **if we are discussing things on a national scale (which most debates on this topic** probably **will),** it is important to recognize that the living wage would not be a consistent number of dollars per hour throughout an entire country, but rather would be set at different amounts depending on the cost of living in various areas. (Another area of ambiguity in the topic: how much discrepancy is appropriate? Should the wage be set by county? City? Neighborhood? Block?) To determine what a living wage might be in a particular location, check out this living wage calculator. Technically, **a living wage *IS* a minimum wage**, in the sense that both establish the smallest amount of money a business can legally pay an employee. They are both what can be called a “wage floor” in **economic literature**. So, while the federal minimum wage is not necessarily a living wage (data shows that, in many cities, the cost of living dramatically outpaces the federal minimum wage), a legally-required **living wage *would become the new minimum wage*** *in its corresponding area*. In other words, theoretical arguments about how wage floors affect economies would apply to debates about both the federal minimum wage and any given living wage. But, arguments specific to the federal minimum wage generally will not be directly 4 applicable to discussions of a living wage, and vice versa. This is because living wages are tied to the cost of living in a specific area, while the same is not always true of the legal minimum wage.

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#### That also proves you drop the arg because my aff still affirms under his interp. Deterrence makes no sense in TOC elims, but it does set a norm for frivolous theory which will apply to future topics. 1AR responses make time skew reciprocal.

#### No impact to resolvability.

#### a. Risk of offense and presumption solve.

#### b. Empirically denied. No debate round in history has ended in the judge refusing to vote.

#### c. Resolvability’s inevitable.

Huemer 2k

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## Brentwood – Long Version (2:39)

### I Meet

#### I meet. I defend the topic. T is a question of advocacy, not evidence.

### Counter-interp

#### Counter-interp: The topic is a general principle that applies to workers on balance, not only contractors.

### AT: Field Context (:56)

#### On field context

#### 1. His interp assumes city-level ordinances. That violates “government.” It’s “a branch or service of the supreme authority of a state or nation, taken as representing the whole” according to dictionary.com.

Dictionary.com. “Government.” No date. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/government

#### 2. He violates “employers.” It’s a bare plural in the topic, which means a general principle.

**UltraLingua 11**

UltraLingua (Language Software Company). “Definite Articles.” 2011. http://www.ultralingua.com/onlinedictionary/references/english/38.htm

The definite article does not always precede nouns: sometimes indefinite articles or partitive articles will be used. Often, though, no article at all is necessary, as in the following cases: As a general rule, the definite article is omitted before abstract nouns or nouns representing general categories. It is often omitted after verbs expressing opinions or preferences:

#### Contractors are legally distinct.

NOLO 14

(Independent Contractor Or Employee: How Government Agencies Make The Call. NOLO: Law For All, Legal Encyclopedia. Last Updated July 6, 2014.)

The U.S. Department of Labor also cares about how your company classifies workers: If a worker is an independent contractor, then the worker is not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), **the major** federal **law regarding wages** and hours. This means, among other things, that the worker is not entitled to minimum wage or overtime. Like the IRS, the Department of Labor has no single rule or test for determining whether someone is an independent contractor under the FLSA. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the following factors are significant when determining whether a worker is an independent contractor under the FLSA: whether the worker’s services are an integral part of your company’s business (this points to employee status) the permanency of the relationship (the more permanent the relationship, the more likely it is that the worker is an **employee**) whether the worker has invested in facilities and equipment (if so, this points to independent contractor status) how much control your company has over the worker (the more control, the more likely it is that the worker is an employee) whether the worker has opportunities to make a profit or suffer a loss (as opposed to always earning a set amount of money no matter what happens, like an employee) whether the worker competes in the open market (if so, this points to independent contractor status), and the extent to which the worker operates a truly independent business (the more independence, the more likely the worker is an **independent contractor**).

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### Counter-Standard (:43 or 1:03)

#### 2. Phil education

#### He guts it. The core phil ground on this topic is universal workers’ rights versus business ethics.

Stevens 15

Rachel Stevens (Top 8 National NFA LD Debater 2011; supervisor of Debate Central). “LD January/February 2015 Analysis.” Debate Central. 2015. http://debate-central.ncpa.org/januaryfebruary-2015-ld-topic-analysis-is-published/

The key term in the resolution is “living wage.” Living wage refers to a rate of pay at which a person could be expected to have enough income to meet his or her basic needs. Basic needs include food, shelter, transportation, utilities, medical care, and perhaps some modest degree of recreation. Some would further include saving for the future (such as illness, emergency, or retirement) under the category of basic needs. Many people also argue that a true living wage should be high enough for a fulltime worker to support a family, not just the individual worker him or herself. As the affirmative, you should have a clear idea of which interpretation(s) of living wage you are willing to defend. The general idea advanced by supporters of living wages is that **no person who works a fulltime job** (40 hours per week) should have to live below the poverty line. Opponents argue that businesses should only have to pay employees for the economic value of their labor (essentially, how much money their job is worth to the company), and that asking them to pay more is unfair and may have unintended economic consequences. Whether or not businesses have an obligation to provide a certain standard of living to their employees is controversial, and will be **a major part of this debate.**

#### Phil outweighs other education because:

#### (a) it's the only education that applies to everyone all the time, whereas most of us won’t be policy-makers,

#### (b) it's the only education unique to LD; you can get policy education in policy or PF, and

#### (c) phil education is a prereq to policy education; learning the util benefits of living wage wouldn’t matter unless util is the correct moral theory.

#### (d) Stevens is about topic-specific NCs, which turns any staleness indicts to phil debate.

### AT: Ev Proves a Violation (:18)

#### My cards don’t prove a violation.

#### 1. I advocate the resolution, not the cards.

#### 2. Overburdens the aff. I would lose for having one non-topical card.

#### 3. Advocacy statement and text of the topic solve stability. CX isn’t key.

#### 4. TURN – overstabilization causes 1AR time skew. I need to collapse out of some parts of the aff to prevent a 7-4 spread-out.

#### 5. Cards don’t frame implementation. No AC text ever models a congressional bill.

#### 6. I don’t overstate my cards, and if I do, that’s good for the neg because it should be easy to beat a bad aff where the cards don’t support the plan.

1. Vbriefly database. “LD Side Bias.” 2015. 3177 aff wins versus 3737 neg wins over all octos and quarters bids this season. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
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